REGION-BUILDING IN AFRICA

Political and Economic Challenges

Edited by

DANIEL H. LEVINE & DAWN NAGAR

REGION-BUILDING IN AFRICA

This page intentionally left blank

Region-Building in Africa

Political and Economic Challenges

Edited by
Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar

palgrave
macmillan

CENTRE FOR
CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
CAPE TOWN • SOUTH AFRICA

REGION-BUILDING IN AFRICA

First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of Nature America, Inc., One New York Plaza, Suite 4500, New York, NY 10004-1562.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

ISBN 978–1–137–60157–5
E-PDF ISBN: 978–1–137–58611–7
DOI: 10.1057/9781137586117

Distribution in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world is by Palgrave Macmillan®, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Levine, Daniel H., editor. | Nagar, Dawn, editor.
Title: Region-building in Africa : Political and Economic Challenges / edited by Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar.
Description: New York City : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015036164| ISBN 9781137586100 | ISBN 1137586109 | ISBN 9781137601575 | ISBN 1137601574
Subjects: LCSH: Regionalism—Africa. | International economic integration. | Africa—Economic integration.
Classification: LCC JQ1873.5.R43 .R44 2016 | DDC 320.54096—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015036164

A catalogue record for the book is available from the British Library.

This book is dedicated to Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) from 1975 to 1991, and the "Father of Regional Integration in Africa."

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

This page intentionally left blank

Figures

This page intentionally left blank

Tables

Acknowledgments

This volume is one of the products of a four-year project on "Peacebuilding and Region-building in Africa" undertaken by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), in Cape Town, South Africa. The project explored the various processes involved in region-building and regional integration in all five subregions of Africa, from organizations and institutions, to issues of inequality, agency, and human security. We would like to thank all those who participated in the project; their comments were tremendously helpful in shaping this publication.

Regional integration in Africa has recently been gaining increased scholarly attention, from both the continent and beyond. This book aims to make a distinctive contribution to that conversation by taking a synoptic look at all five subregions of Africa and the African Union (AU), and at all aspects of integration: economic, political, and security. It brings a diverse set of voices to that conversation, both African and global, with authors from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, the United States, Argentina, Indonesia, Britain, Canada, and France. We thank them all for their dedication and for responding to our many queries so promptly, kindly, and efficiently.

We would like to convey particular thanks to Adekeye Adebajo, executive director of CCR, for his guidance, enthusiasm, and perseverance throughout the time it took to prepare this publication. We would particularly like to thank CCR staff, research assistant Jill Kronenberg and administrative assistant Liliane Limenyande for their invaluable support on this project. We would also like to thank Jason Cook for his help in copyediting the book, and our colleagues at CCR for their support and administrative assistance.

We are grateful to all the contributors for their commitment to this project, and we thank Palgrave Macmillan, and particularly Sara Doskow, International Relations, Regional Politics, and Development Studies editor, and her colleagues for their close collaboration throughout the publishing process. We hope the book will take forward the lively debates on how effective region-building can be achieved in Africa and beyond.

Daniel H. Levine
and
Dawn Nagar,
July 2015

This page intentionally left blank

Abbreviations

3Ts	Tin, Tantalum (Coltan), and Tungsten
AAF-SAP	Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation
ACB	African Central Bank
ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
ACM	African Common Market
ACN	Andean Community of Nations
ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific (Group of States)
ACUSE	Action Committee for the United States of Europe
ACWC	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children
ADF-NALU	Allied Democratic Forces—National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AEC	African Economic Community (African Union)
AEC	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Community (ASEAN)
AERC	African Economic Research Consortium
AFCAC	African Civil Aviation Commission
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AFRAA	African Airlines Association
AFTA	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area
AGF	African Governance Forum
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AGR	Africa Governance Report
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AIB	African Investment Bank
AICHR	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AIDI	African Infrastructure Development Index
AIMS	American Institute of Maghribi Studies
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation

ALADI	Asociación Latino Americana de Integración (Latin American Integration Association)
ALBA	Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)
ALTID	Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development
AMF	African Monetary Fund
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AMV	Africa Mining Vision
ANC	African National Congress
ANU	Australian National University
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
APSC	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Political and Security Community
APT	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ARF	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum
ASC	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Security Community
ASCC	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India, China
BITs	Bilateral Investment Treaties
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China (bloc)
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CACO	Central Asian Cooperation Organization
CAM	Competitive Adaptation Mechanism
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CAPP	Central Africa Power Pool
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CCT	Technical Coordination Committee
CCU	Continental Customs Union
CDC	Congress for Democratic Change
CEEAC	Communauté Économique des États de l' Afrique Centrale (Economic Community of Central African States)

CEI	Centro de Economía Internacional (Center for International Economics)
CEMAC	Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEPGL	Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)
CEPT	Common External Preferential Tariff
CET	Common External Tariff
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community)
CFTA	Continental Free Trade Area
CGD	Center for Global Development
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CIC	Center on International Cooperation
CISSM	Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People)
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CNRS	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Centre for Scientific Research)
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COP	Conference of Parties
COPAX	Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale (Peace and Security Council of Central Africa)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Liberia)
CPA	Coutonou Partnership Agreement
CPCM	Conseil Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (Permanent Consultative Council of the Maghreb)
CRIA	Centre for Regional Integration in Africa
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CZI	Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DFQF	Duty-Free and Quota-Free
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSC	Defence and Security Commission
DSM	Dispute Settlement Mechanism
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa)
EAC	East African Community
EACJ	East African Court of Justice

EALA	East African Legislative Assembly
EAOGS	East Africa Oil and Gas Summit
EAPS	East African Payment System
EAS	East Asia Summit
EASF	East African Standby Force
EBA	Everything But Arms
EBID	Economic Community of West African States Bank for Investment and Development
EC	European Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America (United Nations)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (United Nations)
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWARN	Economic Community of West African States Early Warning System
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EIGA	Economic Community of West African States Investment Guarantee Agency
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPZ	Export-Processing Zone
ERP	Economic Recovery (Adjustment) Programme
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (United Nations)
ETF	Exchange-Traded Fund
ETLS	Economic Community of West African States Trade Liberalisation Scheme
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FCS	Forestry Certification Scheme
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Social Sciences Institute)
FLS	Frontline States

FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FOMAC	Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (Central African Multinational Force)
Fonplata	Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata (Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plate Basin)
FRIDGE	Fund for Research into Industrial Development, Growth, and Equity
FSC	Fisheries Stewardship Council
FTA	Free Trade Area
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
G20	Group of 20
G-77	Group of 77
G8	Group of Eight
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GAVI	Vaccine Alliance
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GNI	Gross National Income
GTE	Executive Technical Group
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IAI	Initiative for Association of Southeast Asian Nations Integration
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
IATA	International Air Transport Association
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBSA	India, Brazil, and South Africa
ICA	Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICGL	International Contact Group on Liberia
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEPA	Interim Economic Partnership Agreement
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IIAG	Ibrahim Index for African Governance
IIRSA	Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INEA	Innovation and Networks Executive Agency
ISEAL	International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (Alliance)
ISEAS	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
IT	Information Technology
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
JCIE	Japan Centre for International Exchange
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
LAS	League of Arab States
LDCs	Least-developed Countries
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (persons)
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action (for the Development of Africa)
LSE	London School of Economics
LWR	Lutheran World Relief
M23	March 23 Movement
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MARAC	Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide de l'Afrique Centrale (Central African Early Warning System)
MCS	Marine Certification Scheme
MDC	Maputo Development Corridor
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)
MFN	Most-Favored Nation
MICOPAX	Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique (Central African Peace Consolidation Mission)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUSCA	Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Centrafricaine (United Nations Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic)
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
MIST	Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey
MLTSF	Medium- to Long-Term Strategic Framework
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
MSC	Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS)
MSC	Marine Stewardship Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-aligned Movement

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRE	National Centre for Research on Europe
NDB	New Development Bank (of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa bloc)
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGF	Nigeria Governors' Forum
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NLD	National League for Democracy
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC	Natural Resource Charter
NSW	National Single Window
NTBs	Non-tariff Barriers
NTS	Non-traditional Security
NTUC	National Trades Union Congress
OAPEC	Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCP	Office Chérifien des Phosphates (Sharifian Phosphate Office)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSBP	One-Stop Border Post
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PAPED	Programme Accords de Partenariat Économique pour le Développement (Economic Partnership for Development Agreement Programme)
PICE	Programa de Intercambio y Cooperación Económica (Exchange Programme and Economic Cooperation)
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PIIGS	Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain
Polisario	Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro)
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RATS	Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation)
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
REC	Regional Economic Community

RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
ROOs	Rules of Origin
RTA	Regional Trade Agreement
SAAC	Southern African Aid Coordination Conference
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACN	South American Community of Nations
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SACU+	Southern African Customs Union Plus
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SAFPI	South African Foreign Policy Initiative
SAIIA	South African Institute for International Affairs
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SAPP	Southern Africa Power Pool
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDIs	Spatial Development Initiatives
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SID	Society for International Development
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMEs	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SNCs	Southern African Development Community National Committees
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SPRM	State Peer Review Mechanism (Nigeria)
STAP	Short-Term Action Plan
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TAH	Trans-African Highway
TEN-E	Trans-European Energy Network
TEN-T	Trans-European Transport Network
T-FTA	Tripartite Free Trade Agreement
TMEA	TradeMark East Africa
TMSA	TradeMark Southern Africa
TOA	Treaty of Asunción
TPD	Tous pour le Développement (All for Development)
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRALAC	Trade Law Centre (South Africa)
TTF	Tripartite Task Force
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TWh	Terawatt-Hour
UCT	University of Cape Town
UDEAC	Union Douanière des États d'Afrique Centrale (Customs Union of Central African States)

UGTT	Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (Tunisian General Labour Union)
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNU-CRIS	United Nations University Centre for Regional Integration Studies
US	United States
USAID	United States Institute for International Development
USTR	United States Trade Representative
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAMA	West African Monetary Agency
WAMI	West African Monetary Institute
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WANEP	West African Network for Peace
WEF	World Economic Forum
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZNCC	Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

Introduction

Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar

What have African region-building and regional integration efforts achieved in nearly six decades of independence? This book is a comprehensive effort to answer that question as it relates to all five African subregions. Recent global changes have created an urgent need, and an audience, for more scholarly attention to regional integration, especially in the global South. Region-building has often been central to Africa's development plans, and as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN) are implemented, new assessments are needed of the successes and failures of development in Africa. In addition, the 2008–9 global financial crisis has raised both theoretical and practical concerns about the value of economic integration. If integration is not a panacea for weaker economies and can expose those economies to greater economic risk (an issue seen both in Africa and in Europe), new attention must be focused on the questions of when, whether, and how to pursue regional integration.

Regional economic integration holds the promise of dramatic growth for African economies, as well as increased clout for the continent in global markets. However, historical divisions have worked against achieving regional integration, leaving the majority of African economies weak, and institutional capacity lacking for the promotion of region-building in national, subregional, and continental bodies. Africa lags behind other regions in integration: intraregional exports in Africa in 2013 constituted only 14 percent of total exports, compared to about 16 percent in Latin America's Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), 26 percent in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) area, and 61 percent within the European Union (EU).[1] The high transaction costs caused by overlapping regional memberships and the failure to improve the continent's inadequate infrastructure, as well as other trade and nontrade barriers, have had deleterious consequences for region-building and regional integration in Africa. Other emerging factors have also impacted negatively on Africa's region-building efforts: food, energy, and water insecurity; arms and drug trafficking; HIV/AIDS and other health threats; migration and xenophobia; terrorism; and climate change. At the same time, the African Union (AU) and major regional economic communities (RECs)—including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)—have been finding ways to adapt to the continent's challenges. Substate actors, such as rising African multinational corporations (MNCs) and informal or clandestine economic networks, have also been creating new and sometimes unexpected forms of regional integration.

About the Book

This book is a project by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), based in Cape Town, South Africa, to address Africa's progress in region-building and regional integration.[2] Contributors were invited to explore issues of enhancing understanding of region-building and regional integration processes in Africa; advancing African efforts to promote peace, security, and socioeconomic development; and strengthening the capacities of institutional frameworks for intracontinental trade, including through improved coordination between the AU and the continent's subregional bodies. The centre has published five previous books on related topics: *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (2012); *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* (2012); *The African Union and Its Institutions* (2008); *Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (2008); and *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (2007).[3] This experience allowed CCR to bring together a diverse group of scholars, from both Africa and around the world—including authors from both the global South and the industrialized North—to examine African regional integration.

The literature on regional integration in Africa has grown substantially in recent years. But as British scholar Timothy Shaw notes in his contribution to this volume (chapter 6), regional integration in Africa has not garnered the same attention that regional integration in Southeast Asia or the EU has.

Much recent literature has tended to focus on individual subregions of Africa, in contrast to this book's continental scope. CCR's own 2012 book on region-building in Southern Africa is a significant contribution of this type, covering theories of region-building and assessing how far the region still has to go in order to achieve sustainable economic growth, political stability, and democratic governance. That volume explores the inherited divisions that have thwarted united action in Southern Africa and kept the institutions necessary to support a regional political, socioeconomic, and security framework weak. Other African scholars have produced work on Southern Africa as well, including Moses Tekere in his 2012 edited volume on poverty reduction and economic integration.[4]

Economic growth is a major concern of the literature on West Africa (as in Elias Ayuk and Samuel Kaboré's 2013 book on regional integration and poverty reduction), but given the region's history, security integration looms large as well (as in a 2011 Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa [CODESRIA] volume on ECOWAS and peacebuilding).[5] The politics of East African integration is the subject of a 2012 book by Juma Mwapachu, a former secretary-general of the EAC, while another 2012 volume by Redie Bereketeab and Kidane Mengisteab examines the politics of regionalism in the

Horn of Africa.[6] Central African integration has received relatively little attention, but its prospects for political and economic region-building are the subject of a 2005 CODESRIA volume, and of 2008 reports by both the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).[7] North Africa has often not been treated as part of Africa as a whole in the literature on regional integration. Assessments of regional integration in North Africa have tended to emphasize its connection to the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, rather than to the rest of Africa—Algerian scholar Azzedine Layachi's contribution to this volume is an exception to the trend. For example, a 2012 anthology edited by Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaïdis examines the ways in which regional identities and politics cut across state borders in the Mediterranean, and the World Bank has published reports examining economic integration in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.[8] These subregion-specific works are joined by a few pieces of more continental scope, but limited to a particular sector, such as Iwa Salami's 2012 book on financial integration.[9]

The most substantial and sustained series of studies on Africa's overall region-building and regional integration efforts are those in the UNECA series *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*. To date, UNECA has published six volumes in this series, starting in 2004.[10] The most recent volume, published in 2013, focuses on the need to harmonize trade policies, rules, and procedures across countries to facilitate trade—recognizing, as many contributors to this volume do, that traditional concerns about tariffs are only one of the pressing issues for economic integration in Africa. In addition to these UNECA reports, there have been a few volumes in recent years that address general issues of regional integration in Africa, including a collection edited by Ulrike Lorenz-Carl and Martin Rempe in 2013 on the variety of regionalisms on the continent, and an edited volume in 2013 by Emmanuel Fanta, Timothy Shaw, and Vanessa Tang that addresses regionalism in the global South generally, but with significant focus on Africa.[11] However, the UNECA volumes are primarily aimed at an audience of economists and policymakers, tending to be technically and economically focused rather than providing a broad discussion, as this volume does, of the economics, politics, and theoretical basis of region-building efforts.[12] Academic volumes rarely include strong African voices, like those in this volume, who can also speak from experiences on the ground.

With this book, CCR aims to add to the growing conversation about both Africa in its own right, and the lessons that African integration might be able to take from, and bring to, the world at large. This volume makes a unique contribution by providing a contemporary, comprehensive, scholarly assessment of regional integration processes in Africa. The book brings together scholars and practitioners, both African and non-African, from a diversity of backgrounds: Ghanaian, Kenyan, Nigerian, South African, Ugandan, African-American, Argentine, Indonesian, American, British, Canadian, French, and French American. Their individual chapters not only draw on this diversity of experience, but also represent the outcome of discussions and cross-pollination of ideas that took place among these authors at the 2014 CCR seminar where most of the chapters were commissioned.[13]

The Rationale of Region-Building in Africa

The economic rationale for regional integration in Africa, as reflected explicitly in the chapters by Ghanaian scholar Samuel K. B. Asante, Nigerian economists Afeikhena Jerome and David Nabena, Kenyan scholar Gilbert Khadiagala, South African political scientist Dawn Nagar, and Canadian scholar John Ravenhill (and implicit in most other chapters), is straightforward. With a few exceptions, such as Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, African countries and their economies are small. In larger economies, there are more natural resources to be utilized, more workers to employ, and more consumers to purchase the end products of industry. Removing political barriers to the movement of goods, services, and factors of production would allow these to be allocated more efficiently and would also permit African firms to take advantage of economies of scale. In addition, the creation of larger unified markets would make foreign trade and investment in those markets more attractive.[14] This core economic argument for regional integration is characteristic, as Asante argues in his chapter, of the current "wave" of regionalism that began in the 1990s.

As Nigerian scholar Adekeye Adebajo, Ugandan academic Kasaija Apuuli, and Asante and Khadiagala all discuss in their chapters, however, the regional and continental aspirations for unity that emerged at independence were rooted as much (if not more so) in political Pan-Africanism as they were in a desire for economic efficiency. Solidarity across the continent and with the diaspora was encouraged by the political and security practicalities of the liberation movements. Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, noted that many anticolonial leaders garnered support and exchanged ideas at the five international Pan-African Congresses that were held between 1919 and 1945.[15] The congresses initially brought together members of the diaspora primarily, though leaders from the continent took charge at the fifth congress in Manchester, England, in October 1945.[16] In addition, liberation movements that used armed guerrilla tactics required rear bases where they could escape pressure from colonial forces; many were found in neighboring colonies or in newly independent states.[17] One example of liberation necessity ultimately leading to broader regional integration is the case of the Front Line States (FLS), originally comprising Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. The FLS supported liberation movements and opposed white minority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, and South-West Africa (now Namibia). In 1980, after Zimbabwe achieved majority rule and joined the grouping, the FLS created the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), along with Lesotho and Swaziland. SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992, adding Namibia, and South Africa joined after its first democratic elections in 1994.[18]

For Pan-Africanists, the economic was also political. Reducing the need for African countries to export primary commodities to the West and import manufactured goods was seen by Nkrumah as a key element in the full liberation of Africa,[19] and Nigeria's Adebajo Adedeji, executive secretary of UNECA from 1975 to 1991, argued that sluggish economic growth in Africa after independence was the "result of the continued operation of the African economies within the framework of the inherited colonial economic legacy."[20] Regional or continental integration would provide the size and diversity that African economies needed to be self-sustaining.[21] Some even more radical thinkers expected political and economic borders between African states to be destroyed as a by-product of the destruction of capitalist economic organization. For example, Amilcar Cabral, one of the founders of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), argued that national liberation should be seen as a necessary precursor to a process of class struggle that would culminate in the destruction of capitalism and statist forms of organization.[22] Afro-Trinidadian communist C. L. R. James dismissed statist approaches to political and economic liberation as "bureaucratic balderdash" and advocated continued revolt against states that simply put Africans in charge of colonial state structures.[23] The conviction that some form of socialist transformation of the economy was a political necessity, and was connected to a Pan-African identity, was widely held.[24]

While solidarity was widespread during and after the struggle against colonialism, differences over the details of the Pan-African project caused divisions as newly independent states tried to implement concrete integration projects. Nkrumah's views were typical of the "Casablanca group" of more radical Pan-Africanists, which also included the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco.[25] He argued for a single "United States of Africa" with a unified political, military, and economic structure, to be implemented as soon as practicable, building on initial federations of a few states each. In particular, economic integration would be facilitated as a consequence of political integration into a single continental state. By contrast, members of the "Monrovia group," to which most African states belonged, pressed for slower integration, based first on building economic links between countries while maintaining national sovereignty. Members of the Monrovia group also tended to favor capitalist economies that maintained links with former European colonial powers.[26]

The tensions between ideals of radical solidarity and practical pressures toward a more conservative approach were eloquently described by Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, in a 1966 speech. He called the national (rather than continental) struggle against colonialism "merely a tactical necessity."[27] However, whereas some Pan-Africanists regarded the artificiality of colonial borders as a reason to dissolve them,[28] Nyerere argued that unless strong state structures were built within the colonial borders, and national identities inculcated, Africa would become further subdivided into even smaller, more easily manipulated political entities based on ethnic identities.[29] He granted that building strong nation-states would inevitably force African states into competition with each other, and create political and economic inequities between them. He further noted, however, that he could see no other practical option—his recommendation was that African leaders remain "loyal to each other" while recognizing that Pan-African unity must be put off for several decades in favor of national and regional development.

Asante, in his contribution to this volume, argues that the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 represented a compromise between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups. While the OAU maintained an aspiration for continental unity, it put a strong emphasis on state sovereignty, the maintenance of colonial borders, and mutual noninterference. As time wore on, the compromise seemed increasingly to favor the Monrovia approach.[30] Nkrumah continued to campaign unsuccessfully for a continental state at the OAU until his ouster in a 1966 coup.[31] In his later writings from political exile, Nkrumah argued that the OAU provided a cover for "pro-imperialist" African states, and called instead for the creation of a Pan-African, grassroots, paramilitary movement to overthrow such states.[32] Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya, once a supporter of Pan-Arabism, later became the best-known standard-bearer for complete continental political integration. The Sirte Declaration, which laid some of the groundwork for the creation of the AU, was adopted under his leadership of the OAU in 1999.[33] However, if other African leaders had been suspicious of Nkrumah's personal ambitions within his proposed super-state, they were doubly so of Gaddafi's plans, and the association of Pan-African ideals with the Libyan leader tainted them in many eyes.[34] As Asante further notes, the economic crisis of the 1980s caused African states to turn to individual structural adjustment programs (SAPs) under World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidance, and away from regional integration.

When an integration agenda was given new impetus in the 1990s, it took a broadly functionalist and subregionalist form.[35] This represented changing intellectual trends in reaction to the events of the first four decades of African independence. As Ali Mazrui had predicted, apartheid in South Africa was ultimately not defeated by a socialist revolution (though trade unions played a significant role).[36] South Africa emerged as an economic powerhouse, but one that sought to build black economic empowerment by integrating the majority population and the region with global capitalism.[37] Regional economic integration projects, similarly, have focused on the creation of freer trade and increased per-capita incomes as a way of promoting the welfare of citizens. Movements toward political integration are also less comprehensive, and tend to take the form of promulgation of cosmopolitan norms—such as those regarding democracy and human rights that Adejumobi discusses in the case of West Africa, and Khadiagala in the case of East Africa, in this volume—rather than efforts toward the creation of full-fledged super-states. States give up some sovereignty to the extent that they are bound by regional or continental political norms, but this is a very different, more liberal, variety of political integration than the forms some of the earlier Pan-Africanists envisaged. As Khadiagala notes in his chapter, the EAC still aims to create a political federation, but radical political-economic restructuring at either the regional or the continental level is, for the most part, currently relegated to thought experiments by Pan-African intellectuals.[38]

The Political Economy of Region-Building

While the grand political designs of some of the Pan-Africanists may no longer be at the center of debates on region-building in Africa, the more liberal concerns of contemporary region-builders should not be taken to imply that the underlying political issues for regional integration have faded or been solved. If there is one thread that runs through all the chapters in this volume, it is the idea that region-building must be understood not as a technical project just waiting for the political will and competence to implement it, but as deeply tied up with both Africa's economic relations and the political struggles behind them.

Regionalization, Sovereignty, and Hegemony

The tension between a cosmopolitan, Pan-African vision for the continent and the fact that state sovereignty represented the hard-won prize of independence from European colonialism has not completely subsided. While many contributors to this volume (including Adebajo, French American scholar René Lemarchand, Nagar, and African-American academic Scott Taylor) lament the weakness of regional and continental institutions, the concern that yielding sovereignty to supranational institutions will expose states to dominance by stronger actors, particularly regional hegemons that could wield disproportionate power within such institutions, cannot simply be dismissed. For example, South Africa accounts for about three-quarters of Southern Africa's economic activity. While contemporary South Africa has not been the openly malicious actor that it once was under apartheid (1948–90), Taylor calls our attention to the phenomenon of "corporate colonialism" by South African firms, which often enter other African markets, displace local competitors, and then link their supply chains back to the South African metropole. Argentine scholar Laura Gómez-Mera describes how Brazil—also responsible for about 75 percent of its region's economy—has both led regional integration there and caused its neighbors to seek economic links outside the region to balance its power. Adejumobi regards Nigeria's influence in West Africa as largely positive, but security and governance issues in the country could pose problems for the region. Nigeria has faced two major insurgencies—one in the Niger Delta over how oil revenues should be distributed in the country, and the increasingly regionalized Boko Haram movement in the north that has rejected the legitimacy of Nigeria's secular democracy and sought to impose Islamic law throughout the country.[39] Nigeria has also long struggled with illicit markets and the scourge of corruption.[40]

Europe's experience also offers some democratic reasons for concern about moving decision-making to a supranational level. Some of the dissatisfaction of European citizens with the EU stems from the perception that the organization is run by unaccountable technocratic elites.[41]

States may also, of course, resist subordinating themselves to regional institutions for more venal reasons—French scholar Daniel Bach discusses the case of West African states (such as Benin, Gambia, and Togo) that resisted integration so that gray-market actors could continue to take advantage of arbitrage, while Taylor describes how the rhetoric of sovereignty and solidarity was used to shield Zimbabwe from legal sanction.

State sovereignty can also face pressure "from below." Ravenhill, in his chapter, argues that global firms in the twenty-first century are often less interested in negotiating with states for market access than they are in being allowed to create value-chains that ignore state and geographic boundaries in favor of regions that make sense to the firm—such as mobile calling plan regions, or networks of knowledge workers based in far-flung cities.[42] Bach, Shaw, and Taylor each discuss the ways that illicit economic actors can build their own forms of clandestine "regional integration."

Geopolitical Context

Global forces can undermine regionalism. Asante and Bach argue, for example, that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that African governments have been under pressure to conclude with Europe will isolate African countries from each other, carving them up into regional groupings that favor European interests over African ones. The United States pursues a similar unilateral economic agenda through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) agreements, and now China has become the largest individual trade partner of Africa.[43]

The EU, in particular, has exerted a strong influence on region-building in Africa, as Asante and Ravenhill discuss—and about which British scholar Piers Ludlow raises some concerns. For example, SADCC began in 1978 as the Southern African Aid Coordination Conference (SAAC), operating from an office in London, with funding from the European Economic Community (EEC) and Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.[44] We need not necessarily imagine any malice on the part of European backers to realize that their conception of what was "good" for Africa was going to be tied up with a desire to maintain an environment conducive to the continued operation of their extensive economic interests on the continent.

On the other hand, these same pressures can also bring about a realization that regional integration can provide necessary global political clout. As Adebajo notes in his chapter, one of Adedeji's primary concerns in pressing for regional integration in Africa was to resist economic dominance by Europe. Gómez-Mera, in her chapter, argues that the need to balance against the political and economic power of the United States was a significant factor in region-building efforts in Latin America. Effective region-building in Africa would similarly allow smaller African states and economies to negotiate their interests as a bloc.

Regionalization and Inequality

As Adejumobi notes, while Nigeria's per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) is respectable ($3,006 in 2013), inequality in the country is extreme. In 2010, 46 percent of Nigeria's population lived below the national poverty line, and the country had a Gini coefficient of 43.0 (by contrast, the highest Gini coefficient of any Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] nation was Italy's, 35.5 in 2010).[45] The picture in Africa's other large economies is similarly disturbing. For example, South Africa is one of the most unequal nations in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 65.0 and 46 percent of its population living in poverty in 2011.[46] Inequality is not just a problem in Africa, of course—as Indonesian scholar Mely Caballero-Anthony points out in her contribution, it is also of concern for the ASEAN region. Aside from the moral scandal it represents in its own right, high levels of inequality seem to undercut one of the core goals of regional integration—economic growth.[47]

One manifestation of the social instability that inequality can bring is the xenophobic violence that peaked in South Africa in May 2008, and resurged in April 2015.[48] Cross-border flows of people are nothing new in Africa (many migration patterns predate state borders), and some state policies have encouraged migration (e.g., South Africa's migrant-worker policies, based on those established during the nineteenth century to provide cheap labor for the mines).[49] But inequality and globalization can turn these flows into "centrifugal" regional forces, as Taylor notes in his contribution. According to this view, xenophobia in South Africa is rooted in the economic conditions facing the poorest individuals in South African society: severe competition for jobs and in the retail sector (especially for small sellers in poor areas), tight housing, and high levels of crime and corruption.[50] Under such pressures, many poor South Africans see poor migrants as threats to their already precarious well-being, and this fear can lead to violence. We should also not forget that economic distress, along with democratic shortfalls, can contribute to violence directed against women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons.[51] A high-inequality growth strategy that relies on exploiting the poor throughout the region as a source of cheap labor will tend to reinforce the demonization of outsiders, in a sense integrating regional (exploitative) economies at the cost of fragmenting regional social and political solidarity.[52]

Security, Conflict, and Regionalization

We cannot ignore the fact that African regions are trying to build economic cooperation in a context of ongoing conflicts and their resulting human insecurity. Many analysts (including Adejumobi and British scholar Louise Fawcett in this volume) have noted that security and economic development are inextricably linked—it is difficult to build the economy when people are being displaced and killed, infrastructure is being destroyed, and outside investors are nervous.

For example, Layachi describes the ways in which regional cooperation in North Africa has long been stalled by deep political and ideological divides. Algeria and Libya (the latter at least under Gaddafi between 1969 and 2011), whose governments saw themselves as popular socialist regimes, were ideologically opposed to Morocco's monarchy, and Algeria has had disputes over territory with Morocco as well. Gaddafi's ambitions for a wider and deeper African and Arab union were at odds with the more modest and sovereignty-protecting attitudes of many of his neighbors. After the Arab Spring uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East beginning in 2011, the political situation has become even more unsettled.

Successful integration may even provide new vectors for insecurity. Freer trade can open up weaker economies to deindustrialization, destroying economic and social networks. In addition, while trade is often touted as a solution to violent conflicts, some economic actors are also in the business of violence. For example, South Africa has a significant arms industry. In 2013, the South African government authorized exports of 3.2 billion rand in conventional weapons and military equipment (a figure that excludes small arms).[53] While these figures are for legal sales, in 2011 the South African nongovernmental organization (NGO) Ceasefire Campaign reported that 15.5 billion rand in South African military equipment had been sold from 2000 to 2010 to countries with human rights records or active conflicts that, it was argued, should have prohibited sales, including Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.[54] South Africa has been actively working to increase its currently small share of the continental arms market.[55] Economic integration could therefore expand the reach of weapons suppliers as well as more innocuous firms.

Structure of the Book

The book is divided into four sections, each focusing on a different aspect of regional integration in Africa.

Part I: Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa

Region-building in Africa needs to be understood in the context of global changes in regionalism, the theoretical frameworks that have been mobilized to understand integration processes, and the visions for the future that major regional projects represent. Louise Fawcett (chapter 1) provides an overview of how region-building in Africa fits into the global context. She situates the current set of African region-building projects in the wide variety of region-building processes attempted globally, from highly formal and legalized unions like the EU to informal conferences and contact groups, and from small subregions to continental unions. She also discusses the heterogeneous aims of regional organizations, from single-sector economic arrangements, to mutual defense pacts, to complex organizations with both economic and security roles. Next, John Ravenhill (chapter 2) elaborates a theoretical framework for understanding regional integration in Africa and elsewhere, and for understanding why progress has in many ways been limited. Ravenhill identifies three major challenges to effective regionalism in Africa: the pursuit of forms of integration (inspired by European models) that impose stronger constraints on state sovereignty than states are actually willing to accept; the lack of domestic policies or material infrastructure to take full advantage of trade liberalization; and the inheritance of an outdated, twentieth-century form of regionalism that is not well-adapted to the challenges of the twenty-first. Finally, Adekeye Adebajo (chapter 3) provides a different sort of context, illuminating how region-building in Africa, Europe, and Latin America has been driven by political vision, not just economic rationale. He considers the case of three "Cassandras" of region-building: Nigeria's Adebayo Adedeji, Argentina's Raúl Prebisch, and France's Jean Monnet. Each of these men was a driving force behind regional integration on his continent, and each saw reality fall short of his vision.

Part II: The Political Economy of Africa's Region-Building and Regional Integration Initiatives

The book's discussion of the material and political underpinnings of regional integration in Africa opens with Daniel Bach's discussion of the ways in which informal regional processes have developed alongside and beneath formal region-building efforts in Africa (chapter 4). He argues that "borderlands" in which the state is only partially able to enforce its rules, and where individuals share trans-border identities and networks, are potential "resources" for regional integration in the sense that they link political, social, and economic activity across state boundaries but often threaten formal state-based attempts at region-building.

The section then turns to Afeikhena Jerome and David Nabena's overview of the state of infrastructure on the continent and the challenges that infrastructure gaps pose for regional integration in Africa (chapter 5).

Next, Timothy Shaw (chapter 6) calls our attention to the varied and complex forms of African agency at play in regional processes on the continent. And finally, Samuel K. B. Asante (chapter 7) provides a historical examination of the political factors that have shaped region-building efforts in Africa, beginning with Pan-African goals at independence in the 1960s, and continuing through the African financial collapse in the 1980s that ended these initial aspirations. He then discusses how, from the 1990s on, the second wave of African regionalism has followed more traditional economic principles of efficiency and openness.

Part III: The African Union and Subregional Organizations and Initiatives

Kasaija Phillip Apuuli (chapter 8) opens the book's discussion of the state of affairs in current continental and regional institutions with an analysis of the contribution of the AU to regional integration in Africa, particularly its support to Africa's regional economic communities.

The book then turns to a discussion of progress and challenges in Africa's five regions. Scott Taylor (chapter 9) describes a number of social, political, and economic forces that simultaneously serve to bind Southern Africa together and to fragment it, such as South Africa's dominant position, regional migration, and the region's revolutionary history. SADC could be an institution for enhancing the region-building aspects of Southern Africa and suppressing tendencies toward fragmentation. However, it is hampered by severe lack of resources and its members' weak commitments to regional and international norms. Gilbert Khadiagala (chapter 10) discusses the evolution and successes of regional integration in the EAC, as well as how a resurgent faith in the functionalist mantra that economic cooperation will trump political divisions may be masking serious differences over governance and security challenges that could undermine the region's goal of creating a political federation. Dawn Nagar (chapter 11) then discusses the 2008 tripartite agreement of COMESA, EAC, and SADC, taking a neoclassical economic approach. Nagar argues that trade liberalization in regional blocs with a hegemonic partner—such as the Southern African Customs

Union (SACU), which includes South Africa along with the smaller economies of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland—can cause economies to converge over the long run, considering that there is a compensating mechanism attached, such as the disbursement mechanism for customs revenue generated in the SACU bloc. Nagar identifies SACU as becoming the new regional integration frontier and expanding its regional trade partners in Africa.

Said Adejumobi (chapter 12) then discusses the successes and challenges of region-building in West Africa, particularly regarding human security and the rule of law. Adejumobi argues that ECOWAS has been quite successful in helping to turn West Africa from a conflict-affected neighborhood into a region in which human security and democratic governance are being firmly established, though economic integration has lagged. René Lemarchand (chapter 13) next draws on his firsthand experiences as an EU consultant assessing governance programs in ECCAS to analyze region-building in Central Africa. He argues that the chief obstacle to integration in Central Africa is the fragile situation in the DRC, which has been perpetuated by its neighbors, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, and which has prevented Congo from establishing itself as a responsible power. In addition, he describes ECCAS as weakened by ongoing conflicts in the region, and more focused on creating the appearance of progress on region-building, so as to keep donor money flowing to corrupt state bureaucracies, than on actually addressing the region's problems. Finally, Azzedine Layachi (chapter 14) explores the tensions over ideology, economics, and territory that have undermined region-building efforts in North Africa.

Part IV: Comparative Regional Schemes: Lessons for Africa

Though actors pursuing regional integration in Africa can learn much from successes and failures in other regions, one important lesson is that region-building in Africa should not necessarily try to replicate the forms of integration pursued elsewhere. Piers Ludlow (chapter 15) explores the historical contingencies that led to relatively successful region-building efforts in Europe. He warns that the European template is not a foolproof recipe for success elsewhere, and that even its success in Europe is far from automatic. Mely Caballero-Anthony (chapter 16) then draws our attention to how ASEAN's priority has shifted from "region-building" to "community-building," an approach that focuses on deepening democratic inclusion and broadening the notion of security from state stability to human security—even though ASEAN faces challenges in the form of high inequality, marginalization of minority groups, and the need to respond to natural disasters. Finally, Laura Gómez-Mera (chapter 17) examines how, after a promising start, MERCOSUR in Latin America faltered in many of its aims after the early 1990s, as well as the history of attempts to relaunch and "re-relaunch" integration in the region. The presence of the external economic threat posed by the United States was an impetus for early region-building efforts, but once "defensive" measures had succeeded in part, powerful economies such as Brazil began looking outside the continent for alliances, while weaker Latin American economies, such as Paraguay and Uruguay, formed subregional alliances to balance the power of the stronger ones. If Africa continues down the road that Latin America has followed, with multiple overlapping and sometimes incompatible regimes, regional integration will be all the more difficult.

None of the contributors to this volume view regional integration in Africa as having entirely succeeded to date, and none of them think that the barriers to an ideal form of integration are easily removed, or susceptible to merely technical policy fixes. All, however, continue to see regional integration as a goal that could greatly benefit Africa, and several identify its successes amid great challenges. Together, the contributors to this volume provide a wealth of material for careful reflection about how Africa has arrived at the place in which it finds itself, and how the continent, its one billion people, and its regional organizations can ultimately build effective regions.

Notes

1. Data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) international trade indicators database, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx (accessed June 1, 2015).
2. Portions of this discussion are drawn from Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), "Concept Note for a Policy Research Seminar on Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa," http://ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/concept_note_region-building_apr2014.pdf (accessed October 14, 2014).
3. Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: Zed, 2012); Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* (London: Hurst, 2012); John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, and Tim Murithi (eds.), *The African Union and Its Institutions* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008); Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (eds.), *Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008); Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg (eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007).
4. Moses Tekere (ed.), *Regional Trade Integration, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction in Southern Africa* (Oxford: African Books Collective, 2012).
5. Elias T. Ayuk and Samuel T. Kaboré, *Wealth through Integration: Regional Integration and Poverty-Reduction Strategies in West Africa* (New York: Springer, 2013); Thomas Jaye, Dauda Garuba, and Stella Amadi (eds.), *ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-Building* (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa [CODESRIA], 2011).
6. Redie Bereketeab and Kidane Mengisteab (eds.), *Regional Integration, Identity, and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa* (London: James Currey, 2012); Juma V. Mwapachu, *Challenging the Frontiers of African Integration: The Dynamics of Policies, Politics, and Transformation in the East African Community* (Dar es Salaam: E&D Vision, 2012).
7. E. S. D. Fomin and John W. Forje (eds.), *Central Africa: Crises, Reform, and Reconstruction* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005); United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), *Prospectus sur l'État de l'Intégration en Afrique Centrale*, 2008, http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/14994/bib.%2057956.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed January 9, 2015); Chrysantus Ayangafac

(ed.), *Political Economy of Regionalisation in Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Monograph no. 155, 2008, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/M155FULL.PDF (accessed January 9, 2015).

8. Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (eds.), *Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflict, and Memory in a Transnational World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Mustapha Rouis and Steven R. Tabor, *Regional Economic Integration in the Middle East and North Africa: Beyond Trade Reform*, World Bank, 2013, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12220/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed January 9, 2015).
9. Iwa Salami, *Financial Regulation in Africa: An Assessment of Financial Integration Arrangements in African Emerging and Frontier Markets* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012).
10. UNECA, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*, 2004, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria1english_full.pdf (accessed January 5, 2015); UNECA and African Union (AU), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, 2006, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria2_eng.pdf (accessed January 29, 015); UNECA and AU, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa III: Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa*, 2008, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria3_eng.pdf (accessed September 5, 2014); UNECA, AU, and African Development Bank (AfDB), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade*, 2010, http://vi.unctad.org/digital-library/?task=dl_doc&doc_name=546-assessing-re (accessed September 1, 2014); UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V: Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area*, 2012, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria5_print_uneca_fin_20_july_1.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014); UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI: Harmonizing Policies to Transform the Trading Environment*, 2013, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria_vi_english_full.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014).
11. Ulrike Lorenz-Carl and Martin Rempe (eds.), *Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013); Emmanuel Fanta, Timothy M. Shaw, and Vanessa T. Tang (eds.), *Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the 21st Century: Insights from the Global South* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013).
12. Similarly, the *Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa* yearbook, on which the South African Trade Law Centre (TRALAC) and the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung have collaborated for more than a decade, is a highly regarded technical resource, but serves a different role than broader academic discussions on Southern Africa. The most recent TRALAC yearbook at the time of writing is André du Pisani, Gerhard Erasmus, Trudi Hartzenberg, and Colin McCarthy (eds.), *Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Yearbook 2013/2014*, March 12, 2015, http://www.tralac.org/publications/article/7132-monitoring-regional-integration-in-southern-africa-yearbook-2013-2014.html (accessed April 20, 2015).
13. A report from the seminar is available online: CCR, *Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa*, Cape Town, South Africa, October 2014, http://ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/vol49_region_building_29sep2014.pdf (accessed October 14, 2014).
14. For one argument for integration along these lines, aside from those in this volume, see Percy S. Mistry, "Africa's Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration," *African Affairs* 99, no. 397 (2000), 554–6.

15. Conventions for numbering the Pan-African Congresses differ, with some writers counting the 1900 Pan-African Conference as the first congress (see, e.g., chapter 8 in this volume).
16. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 132–5.
17. See, for example, John Fobanjong, "Articulating Cabral's Regionalist and Pan-African Visions," *African Identities* 4, no. 1 (2006), 118–19.
18. See, for example, Gilbert M. Khadiagla, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994); Abillah H. Omari and Paulino Macaringue, "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective," in Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani, and Abillah H. Omari (eds.), *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), pp. 45–60.
19. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, pp. 111–12.
20. Adebayo Adedeji, "Comparative Strategies of Economic Decolonization in Africa," in Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji (eds.), *General History of Africa VIII: Africa Since 1935* (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 1993), p. 393.
21. Ibid., pp. 407–408.
22. Amilcar Cabral, "Presuppositions and Objectives of National Liberation in Relation to Social Structure," in Amilcar Cabral, *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar*, trans. Michael Wolfers (New York: Monthly Review, 1979), pp. 130–3. See also Fobanjong, "Articulating Cabral's Regionalist and Pan-African Visions."
23. C. L. R. James, *A History of Pan-African Revolt* (Oakland: PM, 2012), pp. 117–18, 132.
24. See, for example, Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Léopold Sédar Senghor, *On African Socialism*, trans. Mercer Cook (New York: Praeger, 1964).
25. On the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, see Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, pp. 143–7; Edem Kodjo and David Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Liberation," in Mazrui and Wondji, *General History of Africa VIII*, pp. 748–9; S. K. B. Asante in collaboration with David Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration," in Mazrui and Wondji, *General History of Africa VIII*, pp. 727–8. See also chapters 7 and 8 in this volume.
26. Tirfe Mammo, *The Paradox of Africa's Poverty: The Role of Indigenous Knowledge, Traditional Practices, and Local Institutions—The Case of Ethiopia* (Lawrenceville: Red Sea, 1999), p. 36. On capitalism in Africa in general, see Chinweizu, "Africa and the Capitalist Countries," in Mazrui and Wondji, *General History of Africa VIII*, pp. 769–7.
27. All quotations and references to Nyerere's thought in this paragraph are from Julius Nyerere, "The Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist," transcript of a speech given July 13, 1966, http://www.blackpast.org/1966-julius-kambarage-nyerere-dilemma-pan-africanist (accessed May 1, 2015).
28. See, for example, Kwame Nkrumah, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution*, US ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1969), pp. 24–6.
29. In addition to Nyerere's comments, see Asante and Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration," pp. 730–1.
30. See, for example, Guy Martin, "Dream of Unity: From the United States of Africa to the Federation of African States," *African and Asian Studies* 12, no. 3 (2013), 176–7.

31. Asante and Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration," p. 728.
32. Nkrumah, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*, pp. 32–8, 56–78. See also Paulin J. Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, trans. Henri Evans in collaboration with Jonathan Rée, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 138–9.
33. Organisation of African Unity (OAU), "Sirte Declaration," EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1, adopted at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of Heads of State and Government, September 9, 1999, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/sirte.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).
34. See, for example, Adekeye Adebajo, "Gaddafi: The Man Who Would Be King of Africa," *Guardian* (London), August 26, 2011; Martin, "Dream of Unity," pp. 170–1, 175; Maano Ramutsindela, "Gaddafi, Continentalism, and Sovereignty in Africa," *South African Geographical Journal* 91, no. 1 (2009), 1–3.
35. See, for example, Asante and Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration," pp. 728–30. See also chapters 7 and 10 in this volume.
36. Ali A. Mazrui, "Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom," in Mazrui and Wondji, *General History of Africa VIII*, pp. 122–5; Sam Mbah and I. E. Igariwey, *African Anarchism: The History of a Movement* (Tucson: See Sharp, 1997), pp. 73–5.
37. See Khelha Shubane, "Black Economic Empowerment: Myths and Realities," in Adebajo, Adedeji, and Landsberg, *South Africa in Africa*, pp. 63–77; Hein Marias, *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change* (London: Zed, 2011), esp. Chapter 4.
38. Pan-African scholar Guy Martin provides a survey of some recent proposals in Martin, "Dream of Unity," pp. 177–85. See also Mueni wa Muiu and Guy Martin, *A New Paradigm of the African State: Fundi wa Afrika* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
39. On Boko Haram, see, for example, International Crisis Group (ICG), *Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency*, April 3, 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.aspx (accessed April 20, 2015). The violence in the Niger Delta region has been reduced from its peak levels, especially since a 2009 amnesty, but it has not been eliminated. See, for example, the reports on individual states available at Fund for Peace, "Nigeria Conflict Bulletins," http://library.fundforpeace.org/conflictbulletin (accessed April 20, 2015). On the Niger Delta conflict in general, see, for example, Ike Okonta, "The Disease of Elephants: Oil-Rich 'Minority' Areas, Shell, and International NGOs," in Adebajo and Mustapha, *Gulliver's Troubles*, pp. 116–37.
40. See, for example, Daniel Jordan Smith, *A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
41. CCR, *Region-Building*, p. 31.
42. For a brief discussion of the latter, see Richard Florida, "The World Is Spiky," *The Atlantic*, October 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/images/issues/200510/world-is-spiky.pdf (accessed January 9, 2015), pp. 50–1.
43. See, for example, Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.), *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).
44. See Ibbo Mandaza and Arne Tostensen, *Southern Africa in Search of a Common Future: From the Conference to a Community* (Gaborone: Southern African Development Community [SADC] Secretariat, 1994), pp. 3–4; Ibbo Mandaza,

"SADCC: Problems of Regional, Political, and Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: An Overview," in Peter Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.), *Regional Integration in Africa: Unfinished Agenda* (Nairobi: Academy Science, 1990), p. 149.

45. World Bank, "Gini Index (World Bank Estimate)," http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI (accessed April 20, 2015); World Bank, "Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Lines (% of Population)," http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries (accessed April 20, 2015). All poverty figures in this paragraph are based on national poverty lines, and the numbers may be different if poverty is defined at international standards of $1.25 per day or $2 per day. Figures are the most recent available from the World Bank at the time of writing.
46. World Bank, "Gini Index"; World Bank, "Poverty Headcount Ratio."
47. See, for example, Jonathan D. Ostry, Andrew Berg, and Charlambos G. Tsangarides, "Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth," International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Discussion Note SDN/14/02, April 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf (accessed April 20, 2015). For a more popularized summary of recent literature, see "Inequality v Growth," *The Economist*, March 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21597931-up-point-redistributing-income-fight-inequality-can-lift-growth-inequality (accessed October 13, 2014).
48. On the 2008 violence and xenophobia, see Francis Nyamnjoh and Patience Mususa, "Migration and Xenophobia," in Saunders, Dzinesa, and Nagar, *Region-Building in Southern Africa*, pp. 215–29.
49. Nicos Trimikliniotis, Steven Gordon, and Brian Zondo, "Globalisation and Migrant Labour in a 'Rainbow Nation': A Fortress South Africa?," *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 7 (2008), 1324–6.
50. Baruti Amisi, Patrick Bond, Nokuthula Cele, and Trevor Ngwane, "Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban's Structured Social Divisions," *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* 38, no. 1 (2011), 63–4.
51. See, for example, Shireen Hassim, "After Apartheid: Consensus, Contention, and Gender in South Africa's Public Sphere," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 22, no. 4 (2009), 453–64.
52. Trimikliniotis, Gordon, and Zondo, "Globalisation and Migrant Labour," esp. pp. 1329–31.
53. South Africa National Arms Control Committee, *2013 Annual Report*, AC 5/1/9A, April 3, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/south_africa/SA_2013.pdf (accessed June 1, 2015), Annex A.
54. Ceasefire Campaign, *Ceasefire Campaign Dossier: South African Arms Exports, 2000–2010*, October 31, 2011, http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/doc/2012/Dossier-SA-Arms-Exports2000–10%20%282011%29.pdf (accessed June 1, 2015).
55. Pieter D. Wezeman, "South African Arms Supplies to Sub-Saharan Africa," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Background Paper, January 2011, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1101.pdf (accessed October 13, 2014), pp. 5–6.

Part I

Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa

Chapter 1

Region-Building Debates in a Global Context

Louise Fawcett

Introduction

A starting point of this introductory chapter is that region-building debates necessarily take place within a global context and are informed by wider patterns and trends, so it is important to examine this wider context and how it develops over time. At the same time, region-building is also intimately connected with the specifics of a particular region; hence a parallel study of regional particularities and variants is also needed.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the African continent, as different chapters in this volume show. However, if we also consider the parallel cases of Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America since World War II, we will see that we cannot understand region-building without juxtaposing the global and the local. All these regions developed alongside and in response to major changes in the international system: the Cold War and its ending, or the processes of decolonization and globalization. Yet each region also developed in a unique way, responding to local circumstances informed by geography and history. In this respect, any informed study of region-building from the perspective of international relations also demands a view from the perspective of area studies—something that is often lacking in attempts to construct a general theory of regionalism.

General Features and Theories of Region-Building

Some Definitions

While this chapter focuses primarily on region-building as a policy linked to formal organizations comprised of states, it is also important to note that the activities clustered under the term "region-building" occupy a wide spectrum of activity, from integration and cooperation within regional institutions, to more informal or ad hoc processes and practices. Regional integration, at one end of the spectrum, denotes a process whereby previously disparate units become united, implying the surrender of state authority to some supranational body. "Region-building," like the associated term "regionalism," is a looser term that is understood here as the promotion of regionally based policies and practices. It could be as much about fostering shared ideas, a dialogue, or regional awareness as it is about building formal institutions. "Regionalization" is another widely used term that needs to be distinguished from "regionalism" and "region-building," because it can refer to spontaneous or undirected regional activity. Regionalization, the *process*, may drive and flow from regionalism, the *policy*, but it is not a conscious project.[1]

The Formal-Informal Divide

Within regionalism and region-building processes there are sharp divides over levels of legalization and institutionalization. As regards this formal-informal divide, some states evidently prefer the greater flexibility and opt-out that informal arrangements allow, and this is reflected in looser institutional arrangements.[2] The Central American peace process was initiated in the informal Contadora grouping of the 1980s, rather than in the more formal setting of the Organization of American States (OAS). At the United Nations (UN) level, the preference for informality is evident in the Security Council's frequent use of ad hoc coalitions or groups of friends as means of conflict mediation.[3] Others like the tie-in of formality, which offers harder contractual obligations or guarantees. Here the hard-soft law analogy regarding state preferences is helpful in showing under which conditions states might prefer hard over soft regionalism.[4] Contrast the development of the European Union (EU), a highly legalized institution, with that of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), both of which commenced as a conference rather than as a formal organization. So did the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) of 1980, which aimed to finally dismantle apartheid South Africa in the early 1990s and only became a community in 1992 with the formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The early activities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were largely informal, based around the principles of dialogue and consensus building, reflecting the limits of cooperation in a conflict-prone region.[5] ASEAN did not formally adopt a charter—an important constitutional development—until 2008.[6] Though this chapter focuses principally on region-building as a policy linked to formal organizations, it recognizes the important roles that informal processes can play in the start-up and evolution of cooperation.

Geography and Territory

Apart from these definitional questions, there are also various types and sizes of regions that can be built depending on the designs and intentions of the builders. Efforts at region-building usually conform to a combination of geographical, political, or cultural logics, though not in equal measure, and scholars disagree on the hierarchy of factors that drive regionalism.[7] The League of Arab States (LAS) is an example of an organization applying linguistic-cultural rather than purely geographical conditions for inclusion: only the 22 Arab-speaking states are eligible, so Iran, Israel, and Turkey are excluded (Turkey has recently been granted observer status).[8] The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is another example of religious identity, rather than geography, defining membership. History and politics explain the start-up and consolidation of an organization like the Commonwealth, though for some the idea of the Commonwealth as a regional organization is stretching the definition too far, because from a simple geographical perspective Commonwealth countries are widely dispersed across five major regions.

From a geographical and territorial perspective, international (as opposed to subnational) region-building also occupies a wide spectrum. It includes large, continental-scale projects, covering contiguous territorial areas, or smaller regional units, sometimes called subregions, with the latter denoting fewer member states and occupying a smaller territorial space. The names of such organizations usually indicate their size and reach: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), SADC, or the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) all occupy subregions within their wider regions—the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, respectively. It should be noted that size, in itself, is not necessarily a facilitator of region-building; often the reverse is true. The potential collective weight of a larger number of states is balanced by their diversity and the difficulty of reaching common agreement.[9] Indeed, large-scale region-building is notoriously hard to achieve beyond advancing dialogue and confidence-building measures. In this respect it experiences similar obstacles to those faced by universal organizations like the UN, while lacking the equivalent authority and legitimacy.[10] Smaller, more compact institutions with one or more powerful players, despite their more limited resources, may be more effective in taking the lead in and promoting region-building. The start-up of the European Community (EC) as well as the activities of the GCC, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or MERCOSUR all depended on strong regional players. In Africa, a recent innovation to maximize efficiency is the aspiration to bring regional organizations under a single umbrella in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) initiative.[11] The wider ASEAN network is another example, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Plus Three constituting the ASEAN "family" of institutions.[12]

Functions and Purposes

Region-building also serves different functions and purposes. Some regions are constructed for the purpose of fulfilling a specific function, whether security, development, or economic. Many early organizations followed the EU's lead in proposing to create free trade areas and common markets.[13] Some organizations today remain principally focused on economic integration, like APEC or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some are self-consciously security-oriented, like the long-established North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) or the more recently established Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which has prioritized cooperation against terrorist threats. Others are multipurpose, as was the case with a number of the early continental or "pan" associations like the OAS, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), or the LAS. An interesting feature of region-building is how the emphasis and functions can shift depending on changing external and internal factors. Some organizations that started life promising economic integration have moved toward promoting security tasks: ECOWAS is one such case. Others have experienced sustained institutional deepening and accordingly expanded their repertoires to take on both economic and security roles: the EU is the most obvious example, but there are others, like MERCOSUR.

Drivers

Finally, and reflecting its global and local origins, region-building is a process that can be driven both externally and internally, though the two are often found in combination. First, it can be driven by other international organizations: the UN in particular, but other multilateral institutions, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the World Trade Organization (WTO), may act as engines of regional cooperation. The role of the UN as a facilitator of regional security cooperation will be considered later in the chapter. The EU has also become an important facilitator of global regionalism, both by providing a model and by promoting interregional cooperation, for example, in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, and in attempting to create a greater Mediterranean region to incorporate Middle Eastern states.[14]

Second, regionalism may be driven by powerful external states. The United States, Great Britain, and France were interested in and supportive of the construction of the EC, the LAS, and African institutions, respectively, as vehicles for enhancing their regional and global positions. The United States supported the creation of ASEAN as a stabilizing force in Cold War Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, as well as Russia inside and outside the former Soviet space, have been active in promoting region-building, particularly in conflict areas where they wish to sustain their involvement.

Just as important, of course, are the internal drivers of regionalism. First, region-building reflects the specific concerns of states—domestic elites and interest groups—whether security, economic, or political.[15] Second, one or more core regional states—hegemons—may be particularly important in driving and sustaining regional organization.[16] Individuals may play important roles in promoting region-building ideas and policies, as shown in chapter 3 in this volume in writing of regional entrepreneurs in Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

At a macro level, regional blocs of states have been influenced by wider trends, particularly among developing countries, which have viewed region-building as a defense against the pretensions of global powers, or as a way of harnessing their collective strength and identity in pursuit of common regional goals like economic development or security. Such efforts were evident in UN forums like the Group of 77 (G-77), with its demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s; and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which had its origins in the 1950s. There is a synergy between such developing-country or "Southern" coalitions and region-building, as illustrated, for example, in the work of the "dependency" school, which highlighted the unequal relationship between the advanced industrialized and less developed countries. Though this school originated largely in Latin America, it influenced economic policy throughout the developing world. Current forums, like the Group of 20 (G-20), also reflect similar intentions to realign the international economic and political system, challenging the persistence of Western predominance.

These combinations of external and internal drivers may change over time: external factors may become more or less important—at times of international crisis, for example. It is widely recognized that crises provide critical turning points in stories of region-building.[17] In this respect, theories of historical institutionalism, which track institutional pathways and processes of change, are helpful in identifying such junctures in regionalism.[18] Where regions suffer from chronic internal conflicts and instability and are of particular interest to external actors (like the Middle East), there may be repeated, externally driven efforts to region-build. Or region-building may become a more internally driven process, as in Africa since the Cold War, where outside powers sought disengagement; or in Asia or Latin America, where the effects of global financial crisis sparked a desire for greater regional autonomy.[19] All these factors need consideration in thinking of region-building and in locating the African region, or any other region, within the wider global experience.

The remainder of this chapter builds on these preliminary observations and considers comparatively different attempts at region-building by looking first at some global push factors over time and then considering how these have played out in different regions. The concern throughout is both to historicize region-building and to explore the multiple connections between global and regional processes, but with an emphasis on the region itself, and regional particularity as a locus of explaining different outcomes. We cannot explain the early successes of European integration, or its relatively slow development in Asia or the Middle East, without reference to such particularities: Western Europe found itself in a unique situation after World War II, making regionalism both desirable and possible; conflict and contestation about regional order in Asia and the Middle East made progress harder to achieve. From this observation it is evident that any single explanation or understanding of region-building should be rejected. If, for example, we use a simple integration measure—whether the customs union or free trade area, or security community measure—we will likely be disappointed. There is rarely linear or continuous progression toward a collective goal: the "successful" cases of both Europe and Latin America show this clearly. Some organizations have shifted the emphasis of their activity from economics to security to respond to more immediately pressing security demands. This does not mean that regional integration is necessarily transient or elusive, but rather that its progress is punctuated and uneven and defies simple attempts at measurement. For these reasons, regionalism cannot be reduced to neat theoretical formulas such as intergovernmentalism, functionalism, or constructivism.[20] Elements of all three play into different region-building efforts at different times, but none provide sufficient explanations. Current evaluations of regionalism that adopt such singular perspectives lead to a partial understanding and do not capture its breadth or its historical trajectory. Indeed, recent analyses of regionalism, particularly of non-European regions, argue for the possibilities of alternative perspectives and for cross-fertilization between regions.[21]

If we detach ourselves from any single perspective and consider regionalism on a wide spectrum and over the long run, we find a steady growth in the numbers and the activities of regional organizations. Formal integration as described earlier—the uniting of formally disparate parts to create a new sovereign body—has not been achieved in most cases, but some progress toward greater integration has. The growth of regionalism in numerical terms is demonstrable and measured in databases like those of the UN University Centre for Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) or the WTO.[22] Though growth is not synonymous with success according to any fixed criteria, the existence and persistence of regional organizations—the product of region-building—cannot be ignored. Regionalism has become a well-established fact of international relations, making it hard to imagine a world without it. As such it is an integral part of the contemporary multilateral architecture. This emphasis could shift. Regionalism has gone through a number of phases, often referred to as "waves," wherein its importance, like its content, has waxed and waned. Recent research in the economic arena suggests that regional trading blocs may diminish in importance, giving rise to mega-blocs without regional relevance (see chapter 2 in this volume). There have been previous shifts in the relationship between regionalism and multilateral processes. Both Europe and Latin America have been referred to as sites of regional disintegration following financial crisis (in the eurozone) and political change, with Latin America in particular displaying multiple and often competing types of organization (e.g., bandwagoning with or balancing against the United States), of which the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) or Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) are two examples.[23] However, it is important to keep a wide perspective on the region-building debate: even if regionalism is faltering in some areas, or giving way to alternative cross-regional, transnational, or subnational forces, there are other sectors, like security, for example, where region-building remains highly relevant.

The Global Context

In advancing two parallel and interlocking stories of region-building, the following discussion focuses principally on the security side of regionalism, balancing the emphasis of other chapters, while recognizing the interdependence of security and economic domains. Indeed, as the notion of what constitutes security has continuously expanded to include economic development and human security, as defined in various UN documents, it is increasingly hard to separate these spheres.[24]

History

Processes of international region-building have a long history, predating any formal recognition of regional agencies by international organizations like the League of Nations and the UN. Powerful states and empires have long sought to build and develop regions as an extension or demonstration of their power or as a means of balancing the power of others. These were not experiments in integration as such: region-building was often done in a coercive and expansionist fashion. In this sense, imperial powers like the Cold War superpowers were forceful region-builders. However, contemporary regional organization as recognized in international law is understood as noncoercive, consensual, and conformist with UN principles. Regional organizations have not always operated fully within the constraints of the UN Charter: NATO's interventions in the former Yugoslavia, or the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, are two examples. Yet they feel obliged to justify their actions in Charter terms. It is not only strong states that seek to advance their power and influence in this way: weaker states in the international system have found in regionalism an effective way to augment their own capabilities or to balance an opposing power—as in the case of the GCC (against Iran) or SADCC (against South Africa). Early region-building in independent South America responded to the desire of the new Spanish American states to strengthen their position in the prevailing global order, balancing first against European power and later the United States.[25] Regionalism was seen as a steppingstone to greater global influence and acceptance, as well as promoting regional identity and self-sufficiency. This process has been reflected elsewhere. Newly created Arab states after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, albeit not fully independent, also saw region-building, informed by pan-Arab sentiment, as a way of contesting the colonial settlement—an effort that continued beyond formal independence, as shown in the actions of Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser, for example. Pan-Africanists had similar aspirations.[26] Most contemporary regionalisms combine a mixture of competition and complementarity in relationship to the prevailing global order.

Though the wider historical context is important and illuminating, the foundational assumption for those who study regional integration is that regionalism is principally a product of the post–World War II era, wherein region-building can be more clearly distinguished from other forms of universal or multilateral organization and was accorded a formal status in international law. The global context of regionalism after World War II was one in which the prevailing international system encouraged the development of regional groups under certain conditions and afforded them legal status. This is clearly laid out in the UN Charter, mostly in Chapter VIII (the League of Nations Covenant contained just one reference to "regional understandings").[27] Article 53, for example, states that "the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority."[28] The internal structure of the UN itself is regionally organized, as reflected in its voting procedures and the regional economic commissions, such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

Though this opportunity to collaborate with the UN structure existed, there was little evidence outside Western Europe of sustained region-building in the early years of the Cold War. Indeed, the success of the EC, though itself a regional organization, must be included in regionalism's global context, since the EC model informed region-building worldwide. Why did regionalism not take off elsewhere? First, the conditions in many newly independent states, considering the newness of their institutions, relative inexperience of their leaders, and underdeveloped state of their economies, were simply not conducive to regional integration. Second, the actions of the superpowers, while actively promoting some forms of regionalism, like NATO, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), or the Warsaw Pact, placed restraints on regional autonomy, while often not recognizing the constraints of the UN Charter. Even the EC, the early flagship of regionalism, was partly shaped by the global system, and dependent on US security guarantees. Third, there was some hostility toward regionalism among international liberals who feared that its separatist and partial quality might threaten aspirations for a global peace. Memories of the region-building experiences of Nazi Germany in Europe, and Japan in Asia, were still fresh.

Against this rather negative picture may be set an alternative interpretation of region-building in the Cold War era. While scarcely able to pursue deep integration in security and economic affairs—the record of early attempts at economic integration was particularly poor—regionalism offered some obvious advantages to newly independent countries. Given their relative weakness and desire for autonomy, they found in regionalism a useful defense against external domination and a means of finding collective voice. In this task, they were assisted by the UN environment, with its language of equality and self-determination, but also by the wider climate of ideas provided by the NAM and episodes like the oil price hikes inspired by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in the early 1970s, which helped to inspire the G-77. The fact that states were not otherwise particularly successful in coordinating responses to security or developmental challenges in the short term does not detract from the claim that there was an important global and ideological context to region-building provided by the Cold War, albeit one generating considerable variety across regions. Rather than regarding the Cold War as a desert for region-building, or classing early regional organizations as failures, it is more useful to see the Cold War as providing an arena for the selective development of these organizations and as a foundation for later region-building.

The later Cold War period validates this claim, since it opened up further spaces for regionalism to develop in response to new global circumstances and opportunities. This was an era of subregionalism, with the emergence first of ASEAN (1967), then ECOWAS (1975), SADCC (1980), the GCC (1981), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (1985), to name just a few examples. All these institutions fulfilled new security and developmental roles in a changing international environment. The development of the CSCE also anticipated new levels of pan-European cooperation beyond the Cold War. The value of such experiences became more apparent after the Cold

War ended, when the increased capability and autonomy of weaker states meant that they were better placed to region-build on their own terms.

Contemporary Perspectives

While the end of the Cold War is rightly viewed as providing a critical juncture in stimulating "new" regionalisms, this prehistory of region-building is also important in that many existing organizations were able to build upon existing structures, upgrade their activities, and spawn new institutions. There are numerous examples, whether from Latin America (MERCOSUR), the Asia-Pacific (APEC), or Central Asia (the Central Asian Cooperation Organization [CACO]). As before, the wider global context was critical, with UN documents like Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* laying out an agenda to improve upon but also expand the existing remit of regional organizations.[29] Indeed, as the UN Security Council was overburdened with new security demands, the "logic behind Chapter VIII" was brought sharply into focus.[30] Boutros-Ghali and his successor, Kofi Annan, also set a precedent of convening regular meetings with heads of regional organizations, further emphasizing their importance and showing how a determined UN secretary-general could make a difference to the region-building process. Under Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the emphasis shifted to promoting partnerships with the African continent, reflecting the continuing gravity of the regional security situation.[31]

Though the tension and competition that had characterized relations between the UN and regional bodies was not entirely removed, the post–Cold War environment helped to set regions free, enabling them to pursue their own goals.[32] In some regions, like Africa and South America, superpower overlay was less oppressive than previously, encouraging regional autonomy; in others, like the Middle East, the new Chinese space, or the former Soviet space, it remained significant. But overall, the UN and the post–Cold War environment of economic and political liberalization together provided greater incentives for regional empowerment and action. Regionalism also provided a site to challenge US unipolarity and fill global governance gaps in security and development provision. This was reflected in the new arenas of regional activity in the security and economic domains, with the latter borrowing from the European experience once again. In the former, peace operations can be seen as a major new departure, with African institutions in particular making a contribution to an expanded array of peacekeeping and related activities. This growth in regional peace operations is recorded annually by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC). In 2012–13 around half of a total of 130 peacekeeping missions involved regional organizations.[33] Regional organizations around the world have also responded to the threats to international security posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The SCO has established a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure based in Tashkent,[34] while the Pelindaba Treaty, establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone among African states, came into effect in 2009.[35]

This picture of regional empowerment, whether in the security or the economic sphere, may be countered in the light of contemporary evidence that reveals both diversity of practice and significant shortfalls in the progress of economic integration and security cooperation around the world: consider the persistent levels of insecurity in parts of Africa or the Middle East. New experiments in economic integration, inspired by Europe's post–Maastricht Treaty agenda, have yielded patchy results, as the still-disappointing regional trade patterns in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia reveal. Despite some encouraging signs from the Middle East in respect of support for multilateral action in Libya, for example, there has been little evidence of any major upgrading of regional security organizations. The early failure of Arab and African organizations to agree on a common response to the uprisings of the Arab Spring is noteworthy.

Despite the opportunities for regional organizations to operate more effectively within the UN framework, there remain significant limits to region-building, with lack of capacity, overlapping mandates, and sometimes-contradictory incentives provided by both internal and external actors. Regionalism has not provided a particularly effective mechanism for strengthening state capacity, nor for contesting external influence. Core states like the United States, Russia, or China are able to set and constrain security agendas, showing how the concept of great power overlay remains salient.

In some ways, both the picture of regionalism's failure (outside Europe) in the Cold War context and its relative success after are oversimplifications. The Cold War provided a base for regionalism on the one hand, and the post–Cold War era did not offer a simple springboard for regions to assume more important roles. The definition of regional activity under the heading of "new regionalism" has ballooned to include new issue areas and actors, making it harder to identify and evaluate. The limits on region-building in the current global context remain apparent, as evident in the case of the Middle East, where fragmentation rather than integration has been the norm. ASEAN's success story is contested by some, while Africa's attempts at institutional borrowing and the creation of an integrated architecture are patchy and incomplete, with competing transnational networks cutting across and arguably diminishing the capacity of formal state-based organizations.[36] A similar alphabet soup of crisscrossing regionalisms is also a constraint on further integration in South America.[37]

This global context of region-building viewed historically is crucial to understanding its trajectory, as it reveals the constraints and opportunities it has encountered. No less important is the local context.

Regional Experience

Surveying the diverse landscape of regionalism today, it is evident that whatever the global context, regional outcomes do not map onto prescribed patterns, but invariably reflect the agency of local actors and circumstances. The conditions that facilitated region-building in Europe cannot be replicated. ASEAN is sometimes dubbed as one of the most effective organizations, but although Asian institutions may borrow and adapt, they will never mirror those of Europe. Similarly, Latin American countries have consistently exhibited different forms of regionalism in response first to European and then to US hegemony, placing a high premium on sovereignty and noninterference. In the Arab case, region-building was overlain by ideas of community and solidarity in response to the divisions brought about by colonial rule. The same was true of Africa, though today the transnational features of regionalism and proliferation of cross-border flows suggest how the profile of region-building is constantly changing (see chapter 4 in this volume).

First- and Second-Wave Regionalisms

Let us briefly explore some regional differences across space and time. In first-wave regionalisms, divergence was the result of state type, colonial or superpower overlay, the nature of the regional economy, and the extent of regional rivalries. In regions with well-established external trade patterns and weak infrastructure (as in parts of Africa), the incentives to regional integration were few. Similarly, where regional rivalries, or superpower overlay, persisted (as in Asia), the prospects of building security cooperation were slight. However, US-driven efforts to create NATO-type security structures in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (CENTO and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO]) were divisive and unpopular and ultimately failed. Later Cold War regionalisms, while reflective of changing international conditions, were also place- and function-specific: the creation of the GCC to counter the threat of the Islamic Revolution in Iran; SADCC to balance apartheid South Africa; the OIC to give expression to the voice of Islamic countries. While certain common features and language were present, the conditions that gave rise to these institutions were unique to these regions, revealing the importance of the "history of place" in different region-building stories.[38]

Second-wave regionalisms showed similar diversity, despite the common themes provided by the end of the Cold War. Some regions, such as Latin America and Africa, embraced new models of integration; others, such as the Middle East, lagged behind. The regeneration and diversification of Europe was important and continued to provide a model and inspiration to others. Indeed, one feature of "new" regionalism was the adoption of EU-style institutions, evident in Africa's remodeled institutions, like the Court of Justice, but also evident in Latin America—in MERCOSUR, for example.[39] Security regionalisms took on new forms incorporating principles like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P); the remodeled African Union (AU) is an example of an organization that embraced R2P before the UN itself did.[40] But the take-up by regional organizations of new security challenges has varied widely. Multiple peace operations have been conducted in Europe and Africa, a much more limited number in East Asia and South America, but virtually none in the Middle East. The latter, in contrast to other regions, also lacks any unified antiterrorist or nuclear nonproliferation regime.

New Regionalism

New regionalism, despite its promise of offering a fresh agenda for region-building in a transformed global era, was neither a coherent nor a distinctive project.

Some of the "new" actors and practices identified did not constitute sustained evidence of region-building, but rather looser processes of regionalization that operated at different levels, creating contradictory trends. Despite the claims of scholars to have advanced theories of regionalism that move beyond state-centric formulations, the practical reality is that it is still the state that remains the main gatekeeper of region-building, and it is against state-centered projects that regionalism is mostly judged.[41] This point is placed squarely in perspective by considering the region-building activities of new or rising powers, like Brazil, China, or Russia, for which the authority of the state remains at the center of any such project. Indeed, strong states or hegemons continue to be critical elements in any story of region-building. What is interesting about contemporary regionalisms is that as new strong states, or rising powers, are emerging, the panorama of regionalism has changed to reflect this. Region-building is not, as once predicted, about the decline of the nation-state, nor can it any longer be seen as a largely Western project.[42]

One aspect of region-building that captures its diversity is the vexed question of regional identity. Most regions, even loosely connected communities, share some common identity and purpose that distinguishes them from others. As a starting point, one could point to the notion of Europe as a "normative power," of a common "Arab dialogue," or of an "Asian Way" of regionalism.[43] The much-repeated "African solutions to African problems" slogan captures parts of the Africanist agenda and its links to the heirs of Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah. The manner in which regions are constructed and the way regional actors respond to the challenges of region-building depend on a variety of conditions—existing institutional frameworks, leaders and crises, as well as the external domain described earlier—but ideas about regionalism—its scale, its ambitions, and its language—also have a local character. This was evident in the era of so-called pan-regionalism, but it is also true of smaller groups, which seek to nurture particular values or styles of cooperation.

In this way, an understanding of region-building needs to incorporate not only global trends and measures, but also a variety of local factors, including hard-to-define identity constructions that help to make sense of regions and their relationships with the wider world.

Conclusion: Global Imperatives, Regional Outcomes

Region-building is neither natural nor inevitable. There is no linear progress or automatic relationship between regionalism and multilateralism. Regionalism has waxed and waned according to local and global conditions. Yet despite the contrary pressures of globalization, regionalism has become an inescapable feature of international relations and is likely to remain so.

One need only consider events of the past few years—whether in the eurozone, the Arab uprisings, events in Mali, or the Ebola crisis—to see how regional actors are often placed in the front line of problem solving, regardless of whether or not the UN and other multilateral institutions become involved. Yet while the broad parameters of regionalism are often set by global trends, the local picture remains extraordinarily varied, depending on the features of any given region, with regime type, resources, and external links all critical variables.

If we return to the starting point of the postwar world, it is apparent that, outside Europe at least, the local context of early regionalisms, given their lack of resources and the global environment, was often unfavorable both to economic regionalism and to security regionalism. This is hardly surprising: states and regions were in the process of (re)construction after decolonization. If we consider Africa, for example, or the Middle East or South Asia, there were evidently few prospects for short-term economic integration or security cooperation, given levels of underdevelopment and regional divides. Indeed, in retrospect, it seems extraordinary that the European integration yardstick could be applied to measuring non-European efforts at economic integration. The same could be said for security regionalism and early ideas of building security communities.[44] Both were highly Western-centered concepts developed around a particular notion of integration and community among like-minded states. They also rested on a particular notion of the state—a strong and prosperous liberal one: the kind of state most likely to engage in and benefit from regional organization. Weak states often suffer from legitimacy deficits and from a chronic lack of resources, meaning the appropriate conditions do not exist. Regionalism can help weak states grow stronger and more legitimate, and hegemons and new rising powers can act as region-builders, but these processes take time. Hence it is only in the late post–Cold War period that we have seen region-building beginning to take off outside the European core, with regions becoming more assertive and capable—even possible sites of reconstruction of global order.

Global conditions provide critical opportunities for and constraints on region-building. Overload on global institutions can be empowering for regions, allowing them to close global governance gaps; conversely, efficient global institutions may offer disincentives to regionalism. After World War II and again after the end of the Cold War, there were attempts to strengthen the multilateral system through universal rather than regional institutions. Other modalities may emerge to surpass regionalism—and a number of chapters in this volume express skepticism of its long-term viability and potential—but here the African case may be atypical in terms of the high levels of contestation regarding the appropriateness of any regional level of analysis. However, a long view of regionalism in the local and global context has been one of opportunity and enablement; institutions have demonstrated the ability to adapt and survive, even to shift functions, to address new conditions and demands. Another conclusion is that there is also some inertia or path-dependence in terms of dominant patterns of regional and global governance; current patterns are likely to prevail.[45] Finally, the local context of region-building, while critically informed by global conditions, has its own logics and dynamics. Regions and regional actors are constantly making and remaking choices about whether, when, and how far to respond to global and local challenges.

In international relations, the dominance of rational-realist scholarship has been unable to account for the resilience of regionalism and the stickiness of regional institutions and norms. Regions are not transient creations, incidental and time-limited repositories of power and resources. Such scholars fail to account for regionalism's survival, its durability amid multiple challenges, and its receptiveness to local ideas. They also fail to account for the scope and variety of sub- and transnational forces that impact on regionalism: in arenas of trade, environment, and human rights, for example. While the focus of this introductory chapter has been on more formal institutions and processes, it is important to recognize the world of regionalism outside formal structures like the AU, EU, or UN. Indeed region-building, while most evident at the state level, is the result of multiple and repeated iterations among states and domestic, international, and civil society actors.

Notes

1. See Louise Fawcett, "Regionalism from a Theoretical Perspective," in Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne, and Luk Van Langenhove (eds.), *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), pp. 23–5.
2. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55, no. 4 (2001), 761–99.
3. Jochen Prantl, "Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council," *International Organization* 59, no. 3 (2005), 559–92.
4. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (2000), 421–2.
5. Rosemary Foot, "Pacific Asia: The Development of Regional Dialogue," in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 229.
6. Simon S. C. Tay, "The ASEAN Charter: Between National Sovereignty and the Region's Constitutional Moment," *Singapore Yearbook of International Law* 12 (2008), 152, 154–5.
7. Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel (eds.), *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
8. William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774* (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 243.
9. Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers," *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (1992), 681–708.
10. Christoph Scheuer, "Regionalism v Universalism," *European Journal of International Law* 6, no. 1 (1995), 477–99.
11. Alex Vines, "A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture," *International Affairs* 89, no. 1 (2013), 89–109.
12. Joerg Friedrichs, "East Asian Regional Security: What the ASEAN Family Can (Not) Do," *Asian Survey* 52, no. 4 (2012), 754–76.
13. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).
14. Heiner Hanggi, Ralf Roloff, and Jurgen Ruland (eds.), *Interregionalism and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2008); Louise Fawcett, "Alliance and Regionalism," in Louise Fawcett (ed.), *International Relations of the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 199.
15. Andrew Moravscik, *The Choice for Europe* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

16. Dirk Nabers, "Power, Leadership, and Hegemony in International Politics," in Daniel Flemes (ed.), *Regional Leadership in the Global System* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 51.
17. Lorenzo Fioramonti, *Regions and Crises: New Challenges for Contemporary Regionalism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
18. Peter Pierson, *Politics in Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
19. Richard Higgott and Nicola Philipps, "Challenging Triumphalism and Convergence: The Limits of Global Liberalization in Asia and Latin America," *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 3 (2000), 359–79.
20. Ben Rosamund, *Theories of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
21. Emilian Kavalaski, *China and the Politics of Regionalization* (London: Routledge, 2009); Alex Warleigh-Lack and Luk Van Langenhove (eds.), *Journal of European Integration* 32, no. 6 (2010), special issue: "Rethinking EU Studies: The Contribution of Comparative Regionalism."
22. See the website of the UN University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, http://www.cris.unu.edu (accessed December 4, 2014) and World Trade Organization (WTO), "Regional Trade Agreements," http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (accessed December 4, 2014).
23. Andrés Malamud, "Overlapping Regionalism, No Integration: Conceptual Issues and the Latin American Experiences," European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Programme, working paper RSCAS 2013/20, March 2013, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/26336/RSCAS_2013_20.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed December 4, 2014).
24. UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,* A/59/565, December 2, 2004; see also Edward Mansfield and Etel Solingen, "Regionalism," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010), 145–63.
25. Louise Fawcett, "The Origins and Development of Regional Ideas in the Americas," in Louise Fawcett and Monica Serrano (eds.), *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas: Continental Drift* (London: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 27–51.
26. Timothy Murithi, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005).
27. *The Covenant of the League of Nations*, signed June 28, 1919, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp (accessed December 18, 2014), art. 21.
28. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, signed June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf (accessed December 18, 2014), art. 53.
29. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, A/47/277, S/24111, June 17, 1992.
30. Thomas G. Weiss, "Preface," in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Beyond UN Sub-Contracting: Task Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements* (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. xii.
31. Luk Van Langenhove, Tânia Felício, and Ademola Abass, "The UN and Regional Organisations for Peace: Tracking a Slippery Partnership," in Philippe De Lombaerde, Francis Baert, and Tânia Felício (eds.), *The United Nations and the Regions: Third World Report on Regional Integration* (New York: Springer, 2012), pp. 91–106.

32. Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 4–5.
33. Center on International Cooperation (CIC), *Annual Review of Peace Operations 2013* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2014).
34. See the website of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS SCO) at http://ecrats.org/en/ (accessed December 18, 2014).
35. United Nations General Assembly, "Final Text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone," A/50/426, September 13, 1995. The treaty was adopted on April 11, 1996, and came into force on July 15, 2009; see African Union (AU), "List of Countries which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba)," January 28, 2014, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/pelindaba%20Treaty.pdf?OpenView (accessed December 18, 2014).
36. John Ravenhill, "East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado about Nothing?" *Review of International Studies* 35, supplement S1 (2009), 215–35. See also chapter 2 in this volume.
37. Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini, "Has Regionalism Peaked? The Latin American Quagmire and Its Lessons," *International Spectator* 47, no. 1 (2012), 116–33.
38. Marc Beeson, *Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC, and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 5.
39. See Olufemi Babarinde, "The EU as a Model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation," Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, vol. 7, no. 2, Miami European Union Center, April 2007, http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/BabarindeEUasModellong07edi.pdf (accessed December 2, 2014), pp. 8–9.
40. See AU, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, adopted July 11, 2000, entered into force December 26, 2001, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf (accessed December 4, 2014), article 4(h).
41. Frederik Söderbaum and Timothy Shaw (eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
42. Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
43. Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002), 235–58; Michael Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (1993), 75–85.
44. See Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
45. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, "How International Institutions Affect Outcomes," in Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner (eds.), *History and Neorealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 49–77.

Chapter 2

Regional Integration in Africa: Theory and Practice

John Ravenhill

Introduction

Regional institutions have not fared well in the first decades of the twenty-first century. The European Union (EU), the regional project with by far the deepest and most extensive collaboration, has been one of the principal victims of the global financial crisis. It may yet emerge from the crisis reconstituted, with its members committed to even deeper integration, but this outcome remains uncertain at the time of writing. The Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR, Southern Common Market) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are both in disarray. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) did declare in November 2015 that it had reached its goal of creating an economic community—but this fell far short of the deep economic integration originally envisaged. Meanwhile, the advent of "mega-regional" agreements—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—threatens to undermine more traditional regional schemes.

The infrequency with which regionalism has been successfully pursued, especially among less developed economies, is the backdrop against which Africa's own struggles to fulfill its aspirations for regional collaboration should be set. But first we need to be clear about the focus of this chapter. I understand regionalism as a form of intergovernmental collaboration on a geographically restricted scale. Regionalism reflects purposive action by states. It is a subset of multilateralism, defined by John Ruggie as an "institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct."[1] Regionalism is a social institution: as with other institutions, regional interstate collaboration can take place within formal organizations or on an entirely informal basis.

Regionalism should therefore be distinguished from regionalization, a process of increased integration within a given geographical area.[2] Arguments that suggest we have seen the emergence of a "new regionalism" in the past two decades frequently unhelpfully conflate the two concepts by placing emphasis on nonstate actors and their role in enhancing cross-boundary transactions.

Processes of regionalization, often led by nonstate actors, may indeed increase the incentives for governments to collaborate, but one process does not automatically follow from the other. In East Asia, for instance, the extension of value chains across the region over the past quarter of a century has generated a substantial increase in intraregional trade without, as yet, leading governments to commit to a region-wide preferential trade agreement.[3]

Regionalism can similarly be distinguished from the broader concept of regional order—whether of a security character or a more general political character.[4] Regional "orders," essentially a label for interstate interactions within a given geographical space, may or may not include instances of institutionalized intergovernmental collaboration, that is, of regionalism as defined in this chapter.

Regionalism takes many forms, addresses multiple objectives, and has attracted a wealth of theorizing from various academic disciplines.[5] Ultimately, all forms of regional collaboration arguably have a political underpinning—resting on a desire to ensure that armed conflict is inconceivable among their member states, the construction of "peace in parts" (to borrow the title of Joseph Nye's classic work).[6] This objective has been pursued directly, as in the European Coal and Steel Community's (ECSC) attempts to dismantle national war-making capabilities, or, more frequently, indirectly through the use of economic cooperation as a means for confidence-building among regional partners—a strategy employed particularly successfully by ASEAN.

In the absence of a counterfactual, it is impossible to demonstrate the validity of this variant of a liberal internationalist approach—but the record coincides with what I perceive as generally persuasive evidence that high levels of economic interdependence are associated with the absence of interstate armed conflict.[7] It may, then, be inappropriate to judge a regional institution simply by reference to the objectives that it has proclaimed: there may be latent functions that the institution is fulfilling despite its inability to meet its own stated goals. Institutions that seem "designed to fail" in terms of their ostensible goals may nonetheless be functional for the performance of other tasks. Supporters of ASEAN frequently argue, for instance, that the regional grouping is primarily about the *process* of institutionalizing collaboration rather than specific outcomes; it therefore should not be evaluated just by reference to its frequent failures to meet its targets for economic cooperation, but by its success in confidence-building among its diverse member states.[8]

All forms of regionalism inevitably impose some constraints on state autonomy. African Union (AU) members, for instance, would not normally speak out against the fundamental norms of the institution. The extent to which regionalism intrudes on state sovereignty varies substantially, however, according to the form that it takes. We can envisage this relationship as a "regionalism and state autonomy 'smile' curve," as shown in figure 2.1.

Political regionalism refers to institutions whose primary role is to promote a sense of collective identity or enhance the voice of a group of states in multilateral organizations, or in global affairs more generally.[9] Whatever its failings to date in promoting deep economic cooperation, the AU has excelled in these political roles. It facilitates and institutionalizes a collective voice for African states



Figure 2.1 Regionalism and state autonomy "smile curve"

that far exceeds that which an individual state might achieve. Political regionalism, rather than imposing constraints on national autonomy, may actually serve to enhance the international role of individual states and thereby contribute to the enhancement of sovereignty.[10] Where regional collaboration rests on a strong underlying political motivation, it may be sustained despite lack of effective economic collaboration, as was arguably the case in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in the apartheid era.[11]

At the other end of the state autonomy curve is functional regionalism, which means interstate collaboration on specific issues—areas such as river basins, transportation links, or meteorology. Most observers believe that poor infrastructure is a major impediment to regional integration in Africa, a continent characterized by a large number of relatively small economies, a substantial proportion of which are landlocked; and by transport networks inherited from the colonial era that were designed to facilitate trade with the colonizing power and that remain directed primarily toward extracontinental linkages.[12] Generating improved infrastructure through regional collaboration has the potential to bring substantial economic gains: the World Bank estimates, for example, that regional power pools could save African states $2 billion in energy costs each year; access to submarine cables would halve countries' international communication costs.[13]

Various forms of functional regionalism have been successful on the continent. Regional power pools began with the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) in 1995, and the model has spread elsewhere in Africa.[14] The Senegal River Basin Multi-Purpose Water Resources Development Project[15] provides an example of cooperation in the development of water resources, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established a Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in 2010.[16]

Functional regionalism has several advantages. Although functional cooperation inevitably imposes some constraints on the autonomy of national decision-making, these are generally fairly narrow and can be predicted and largely controlled in advance (the likelihood of "spillover" to other potential areas of collaboration is limited).[17] The benefits from such collaboration are often immediate and highly visible. And while the costs of investment in various functional projects, particularly the provision of infrastructure, can be huge, these are the types of projects that often attract support from external donors (although there is always the risk that donor preferences may distort funding priorities).

In contrast to these two forms of regionalism that impose few constraints on state autonomy are various forms of economic regionalism—collaborative action by states to remove barriers to the flow of goods and services, migration, and capital. The well-known typology of forms of regional economic collaboration—from free trade area (FTA), to customs union, to common market, to economic union—reflects a hierarchy of constraints that the schemes impose on state autonomy. No surprise, therefore, that the vast majority of regional economic institutions take the form of FTAs, where the "only" requirement is that states reduce or remove barriers to flows of goods and services from their partners. Customs unions are more intrusive on state autonomy, in requiring regional agreement on harmonizing external tariffs; common markets are even more intrusive, in providing for the free movement of capital and labor; while economic unions are the most demanding, in providing for a common currency that in turn necessitates extensive harmonization of domestic economic policies, as seen in the Maastricht criteria adopted by the EU for countries seeking to be part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).[18] The regionalism and state autonomy smile curve should really be elaborated to reflect the different degrees of constraint that these various forms of regionalism impose—with FTAs further from the bottom of the curve than other forms of economic regionalism.

The assumption of much of the literature on regionalism is that adoption of the different forms of economic collaboration, to the extent that movement occurs up the hierarchy, will be sequential. Partners in an FTA will find that they incur transaction costs that could be removed by forming a customs union. In turn, a customs union exposes further frictions that could be reduced if flows of capital and people were freed within the regional space. The operation of a customs union can demonstrate to governments that greater benefits could be achieved from regional collaboration if transaction costs were reduced through the adoption of a common currency. But at each level, the constraints that regionalism imposes on the autonomy of government policymaking escalate substantially. Consequently, there is no automaticity in progression up the hierarchy of regional collaboration; each step requires purposive action by governments to cede further autonomy in policymaking. And, historically, few governments have been persuaded that the potential benefits from deeper regional collaboration exceed the costs of the constraints that they would impose on national autonomy. Even within the EU, some governments decided that the costs of adopting a common currency outweighed conceivable benefits to their economies.

Elsewhere, few regional schemes go beyond the relatively shallow cooperation required in an FTA. The World Trade Organization (WTO) notes that, of the 377 regional trade agreements that were in force in January 2014, more than 90 percent were FTAs (or "partial scope agreements"), with almost all the balance accounted for by customs unions.[19] ASEAN, one of the longest-standing regional schemes among developing economies, and one often judged to be the most successful, took 25 years after its foundation in 1967 to agree to the establishment of an FTA. Two decades further on, the grouping declared (in November 2015) that it had succeeded in its aspirations to establish an ASEAN Economic Community. Considerable progress had been made in eliminating tariffs, but there has been little success in addressing nontariff barriers or in liberalizing trade in services. The Community, in the words of a major Asian Development Bank study, remained a "work in progress."[20]

In contrast to the gradualism of Southeast Asian states in slowly ascending the hierarchy of regional economic collaboration, African leaders have made things especially challenging for themselves by choosing forms of regionalism that impose high levels of constraint on policy autonomy and yet, in the absence of favorable background conditions, that are unlikely to generate commensurate gains from regional cooperation.[21] As the crisis in the eurozone has demonstrated, the adoption of a common currency is particularly constraining, in removing key economic policy instruments from the control of national governments. Without governments giving up autonomy to ensure a substantial degree of convergence in domestic economic policies, currency unions are unlikely to be sustainable in the medium to long term.[22]

Meanwhile, the free movement of people, an essential component of common markets, has proved to be—whether in Europe, in ASEAN, or in Africa—a source of popular resentment against regionalism, despite the benefits that migrant labor brings to host and home economies alike. In several instances, social tensions over migration have spilled over to sour interstate relations.[23] A vivid example was Nigeria's mass expulsion in 1985 of migrant workers from Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, and Niger (Ghana and Niger, the sources of most of the migrants, are fellow members of ECOWAS).[24]

Why, then, have African states opted for forms of regionalism that, if fully implemented, would impose maximum constraints on their autonomy? One explanation is that several of the regional schemes had their origins in colonial arrangements when adjacent territories were governed as a federation—the case, for instance, of the franc zone, with its origins in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa.[25] Elsewhere, the influence of the EU looms large. The EU has acted as a hegemon in both senses of the word: as a dominant external power and as the source of "legitimate" ideas. For instance, it has pressed African countries to form customs unions to facilitate negotiations for the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) that replaced the Lomé Conventions. Moreover, European aid (from national and EU sources) has financed many of the studies and advisers who have helped design African regional schemes. Consequently, it is not surprising, as Tobias Lenz noted in the case of the postapartheid Southern African Development Community (SADC), that African leaders gave no serious consideration to alternative models of economic integration when the Treaty of Windhoek was drawn up in 1992.[26] The European ideal was hegemonic—even though the context appeared entirely unfavorable to European-style integration.

Africa and Theories of Regionalism

Much of the literature on regionalism has rightly been criticized for its preoccupation with the EU, an outlier in global experiences of regionalism. Yet, in accepting that regionalism may—and indeed should—take institutional forms other than those associated with the EU, there is a danger of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. Although the European experience may be sui generis, and the institutional forms that regionalism has taken in the EU do not exhaust the possibilities available to economies in other parts of the world, the literature on European regionalism is relevant to the extent that other groupings are attempting to pursue similar activities to those undertaken within the EU.

While institutional configurations in other regional schemes may differ, functional equivalents will need to be devised if regional collaboration is to be successfully institutionalized. For instance, all forms of regional collaboration require dispute settlement mechanisms in some form. Various institutional alternatives are available—from a highly legalized procedure, as in the EU, with disputes over treaty provisions ultimately subject to the European Court of Justice; to the highly informal—and politicized—procedures of ASEAN, where disputes ultimately are the responsibility of heads of state. Different forms of dispute settlement mechanisms may generate outcomes that diverge considerably and that may be more or less functional for the tasks at hand. The key point here is that the choice of institutional design matters.[27] In some circumstances, soft law institutions may be preferable and indeed the only viable approach—but they may dictate that collaboration remains shallow, subject to the whims of political figures.[28]

Economic regionalism in Africa has often combined a commitment to a very ambitious integration agenda (notably, customs unions and common currencies), with a very shallow institutional framework, in which few responsibilities are delegated to regional institutions. This lack of correspondence between institutional design and the purported mission of regional collaboration has been a major factor in the credibility gap that African regionalism has faced. To observers, it often appears that African regional institutions have been "designed to fail." Does this preclude the possibility that they may have "latent" functions? Not necessarily. As with SADCC (largely ineffective) economic cooperation may have been pursued primarily because it helped attain political objectives. But such examples seem rare. If the intention was to improve political relations with neighbors, then regional institutions were designed very poorly, seemingly in a manner that guaranteed that they would enhance the likelihood of interstate conflict. A more cynical explanation that might be advanced is that the latent function that some regional institutions served was to enable governments to stake a claim to aid funding through creating institutions to which they had little commitment (see also chapter 13 in this volume).

Again, the argument is not that regional collaboration is impossible with shallow institutionalization. Various FTAs, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area, are able to conduct their business successfully without a common secretariat, relying solely on national government agencies for coordination and implementation.[29] But deeper integration typically requires the delegation of tasks to one or more joint institutions. Few governments in the developing world (Africa is not unique in this respect) have been willing to relinquish sovereignty to permit the requisite transfer of authority to regional institutions. And, in Africa, national institutions are frequently so overextended that they cannot substitute for lack of capacity at the regional level.

The theoretical literature in political science on regionalism places a great deal of emphasis on the significance of domestic political coalitions in determining governmental preferences for collaboration. It was no accident that pluralism was at the heart of neo-functionalist analysis of domestic political systems, given the dominance of the concept in US political science at the time that neo-functionalist ideas were formulated.[30] Interest groups were perceived to be the principal drivers of regionalism, their promotion of collaboration a function of an increasing realization that the challenges they faced could no longer be resolved at the national level. And even in the liberal intergovernmental approach that rejected some of the key premises of neo-functionalism (such as any automatic "spillover" from one area of cooperation to another), the preference formation that determines foreign economic policy goals is perceived to be a "response to shifting domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions."[31] Domestic interests—the emergence of internationalizing coalitions that are the beneficiaries of economic openness—are also the overriding explanatory factor in Etel Solingen's arguments as to why we see the development of cooperative regional orders in some parts of the world, for example, Southeast Asia,[32] and conflict-prone orders elsewhere, as in the Middle East.[33] The presence of democratic forms of government is also viewed as an important facilitator of international collaboration, because it reduces uncertainty about the behavior of partners.[34] Pluralism and democratic political institutions are the key political background conditions in whose absence the prospects for institutionalized regional governmental collaboration are remote.[35] Inward-looking, rent-seeking coalitions that frequently dominate the political scene in Africa are likely to derail the regionalism project.

The economic background conditions for African regionalism are equally unsupportive. The economic case for regionalism is well established.[36] Regional economic integration, by creating a larger "domestic" market, will intensify competition among producers and enable a more efficient allocation of resources through the realization of economies of scale. Returns to investors should increase, which in turn should make the region more attractive to foreign investors. Regional schemes are often attractive to international development aid agencies (the EU has been particularly supportive of regionalism in other parts of the world). And a commitment to legally binding treaties that underpin regionalism can be an important signaling device, helping to lock in trade and other economic policy reforms in the face of domestic opposition. It has long been recognized, however, that the case for what is essentially the promotion of import-substituting industrialization on a regional scale rests on conditions that are absent in most parts of Africa. In particular, the expectation is that regional partners must have the potential to mobilize resources within a reasonably short timeframe, so as to be able to supply a significant part of the import demand of the regional economy.

In Africa, this has proved not to be the case. Potential African exporters are frequently less competitive suppliers, even with the protection of an external tariff, than extraregional sources.[37] Opportunities certainly exist for a substantial increase in the share of intraregional trade in total trade from its currently very low base, but even if this were to be achieved, its share in the overall trade of the vast majority of African states would still be relatively small. Moreover, the principal barriers to enhanced supply within the region are usually not tariffs but poor infrastructure, which is often compounded by a plethora of nontariff barriers. Neither of these issues is addressed by conventional preferential trade agreements. The consequence is that despite decades of attempts to promote import substitution through regional trade schemes, dating back to the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, intra-African trade remains very low in terms of the share of total African trade. The most recent data from the AU suggest that intraregional exports constitute on average only 10.4 percent of total African exports.[38] Even if a comprehensive FTA were to be introduced for the continent, estimates are that intra-African trade by 2022 would increase to only 15.5 percent of the continent's total trade.[39] In Africa, the experience has frequently been one of regionalism without regionalization.

African regional trade areas are not substantially different from other regional economic schemes among developing economies in this regard. To be sure, intraregional trade in ASEAN as a share of the region's total trade is double that of Africa.[40] But this share is largely unchanged from when ASEAN was first created, nearly half a century ago, and the figure is dominated by two countries (Malaysia and Singapore) that together account for half of intraregional trade. Regional schemes in other parts of the developing world have similarly low levels of intraregional trade to those prevailing in Africa, simply a reflection of the noncompetitiveness of economies in supplying the import needs of their partners. The question arises, therefore, as to whether in an increasingly globalized economy the traditional type of regional economic collaboration that continues to be given priority in Africa is really the best means of realizing aspirations for enhanced economic growth through regional collaboration.

African Regionalism in a World of Global Value Chains

Seemingly paradoxically, the developing-economy region where intraregional trade as a share of total trade has increased most rapidly in the past quarter of a century, East Asia, is the one where there has been no region-wide preferential trade agreement. The East Asian experience is frequently characterized as "market-led" integration, a phrase that only partially captures reality. Purposive state action, most notably in the form of unilateral tariff reductions, the establishment of export-processing zones and duty-drawback arrangements, and entry into sectoral trade agreements—especially the Information Technology Agreement—laid the foundations for the cross-border trade in components that accounts for much of East Asia's intraregional exports.[41] East Asia has benefited from a process that economists have termed "fragmentation"—the breaking up of the process of manufacturing (and increasingly of the provision of services) into discrete activities performed in different parts of the world.[42] The value chains that eventuate may have driven regional economic integration, but the foundations that made this regionalization of production possible were created by the foreign economic policies pursued by states individually and, less commonly, collectively.

Richard Baldwin notes that the increasing prominence of global value chains has completely transformed the essence of contemporary regionalism: it is no longer about preferential market access to foster import substitution on a regional scale, as was the case in the twentieth century, but now about establishing the disciplines that underpin the nexus between investment, services, and trade to generate export-led growth. In his words, "the basic bargain is 'foreign factories for domestic reforms'—not 'exchange of market access.'"[43] The principal focus of negotiations is not tariffs but regulatory reform directed toward behind-the-border barriers and toward improvements in the investment climate. The factories that are established produce components that may end up in products exported to anywhere in the world. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the interests of key players in entering and managing global value chains have driven a new agenda—the negotiation of "mega-regional" arrangements such as the TPP and the TTIP. Developing economies that focus on "twentieth-century" regionalism—that is, preferential trade agreements designed to promote import-substituting growth—will miss the boat.

Some observers, and indeed the EU itself, have suggested that the EPAs that the EU has insisted upon through the Cotonou Agreement—to replace the nonreciprocal preferential access to the European market that the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group enjoyed under the Lomé Conventions—are a means of enabling African economies to embrace the world of global value chains while encouraging deeper regionalism in Africa itself (through the frequently expressed European preference to conduct negotiations for EPAs not with individual countries but with African customs unions). Whether negotiations with the EU will lead to deeper African regionalism remains to be seen. The risk in giving preferences to a major economic partner, while still maintaining relatively high levels of tariffs against third parties, is that the bulk of the rents could be captured by European companies that enjoy a privileged position in African markets. These companies may not only displace more efficient extra-European partners but also suppress intraregional trade: one estimate of the possible reduction in intraregional trade as a consequence of the EPAs is as high as 16 percent.[44] Moreover, in that the EU remains the single most important source of imports for most African economies, the removal of tariffs on European imports will lead to a substantial drop in government revenue.[45] Even without assuming that an EPA would lead to trade diversion in favor of European suppliers, African governments on average would lose tariff revenue equivalent to 7–10 percent of total government revenues from removing tariffs on current levels of European imports.[46]

The striking feature about East Asia's move to preferential trade agreements is that it was preceded by unilateral tariff reductions by all countries in the region.[47] Taken together with the measures implemented to facilitate processing trade, these moves minimized the risk that the turn to preferential trade would lead to any significant trade diversion. In the twenty-first century, there seems little reason why African states would want to privilege European partners if the desire is to use interregional trade agreements to access global production networks. For sub-Saharan Africa in particular, partners in these networks could just as easily come from Brazil, China, or India. Unilateral trade liberalization would reduce the discriminatory effects of the EPAs and broaden the opportunities available.[48]

Conclusion

A half century of regional economic collaboration has failed to realize the legitimate aspirations of African leaders for closer economic integration and accelerated economic growth. Various econometric studies have been unable to provide any evidence to suggest that African regional economic collaboration has made a significant contribution to the continent's welfare.[49] On the one hand, the global economic context in which African regionalism has been pursued has frequently been unfavorable. On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that institutional design has played a major part in the failures of African regional economic cooperation. Despite economic and political background conditions far removed from those that facilitated European integration, African states have chosen to attempt to emulate the very ambitious forms of economic collaboration found in the EU. African governments have given primacy to those forms of economic collaboration that, if properly implemented, would be the most intrusive on state sovereignty. The disjunction between, on the one hand, the absence in Africa of the conditions that theories of regionalism drawn from economics and political science identify as conducive to successful collaboration and, on the other hand, the complexities of the forms of regionalism chosen by African states has had predictable consequences. In a context where governments are preoccupied with domestic security, where state capacity is weak, where outward-oriented domestic coalitions are largely absent, and where African political elites are unwilling to cede sovereignty, African regional economic institutions often appear to be designed to fail.

Moreover, by focusing predominantly on tariff barriers, Africa's FTAs, customs unions, and common markets arguably ignored more important impediments to enhanced regional economic collaboration. The most important of these are poor infrastructure and various forms of nontariff barriers. Supply response is held back by various deficiencies in infrastructure ranging from transport to power supplies. Transport problems are exacerbated by road blocks and local "tolls." Descriptions of the various checkpoints and other obstacles on some of the major interstate highways in West Africa, as presented, for instance, in the most recent reports of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on Africa's regional integration, are reminiscent of the tollbooths of medieval Europe.[50] Trading across African borders is at best costly and time-consuming—far more so than in most other parts of the world—and is at worst, in the words of a World Bank report on defragmenting Africa, "risky business."[51]

Deep regionalism in the form of economic union is neither necessary nor sufficient in itself to address the most significant impediments to African economic integration. In pursuing the modes of collaboration that are the most politically contentious, African governments have endangered other forms of cooperation that have greater potential for addressing the principal impediments to increased regionalization by being more likely to provide immediate gains while imposing fewer economic and political constraints. Priority should be given to functional cooperation and to trade facilitation processes that concentrate on the removal of the plethora of nontariff barriers that currently impede trade across Africa's borders.[52]

Even in the best of economic and political circumstances, the creation of preferential trade agreements in Africa will do little to integrate the continent with the global economy. African leaders too frequently appear to be preoccupied with twentieth-century forms of regional cooperation while most of the rest of the world has moved on to acknowledge that these are increasingly irrelevant in a world of global value chains.[53] The EPAs with the EU that Africa is negotiating or implementing may be a first step in encouraging integration into the new global economy. But in opening this opportunity to only one partner, African governments are at risk of creating new distortions that will come at the expense both of economic efficiency and their own revenues. Unilateral trade liberalization would reduce the distortions that EPAs introduce and be a better choice—although integration into global value chains has its own challenges, not least in facilitating the upgrading of local production to capture a larger share of value added. But meeting that challenge raises a different set of issues whose exploration would require another book.[54]

Notes

1. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (1992), 571. The World Trade Organization (WTO) adds further confusion to the issue by categorizing all nonuniversal trade agreements as "regional." The vast majority of the "regional" preferential trade agreements concluded in recent years are in fact bilateral; a much more complex mix of interregional and transregional agreements has also emerged. On the definition of "regional," see WTO, "Regional Trade Agreements," http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (accessed November 11, 2014). According to the WTO's list of regional trade agreements (RTAs), 77 RTAs have come into force since 2009, of which 50 are bilateral; see WTO, "List of All RTAs," http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (accessed November 11, 2014).
2. As Andrew Hurrell notes, "Regionalization is not based on the conscious policy of states or groups of states, nor does it presuppose any particular impact on the relations between the states of the region . . . patterns of regionalization do not necessarily coincide with the borders of states." Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism

in Theoretical Perspective," in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 40.

3. And in North America, the response of communities to regionalization has been perceived to have undermined the prospects for regionalism. Ann Capling and Kim Richard Nossal, "The Contradictions of Regionalism in North America," *Review of International Studies* 35, supplement S1 (2009), 147–67.
4. See Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
5. Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," provides a useful survey from the perspective of the literature of international relations.
6. Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
7. See Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "A Liberal Peace in Asia," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 1 (2007), 5–27; John R. Oneal, "Empirical Support for the Liberal Peace," in Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins (eds.), *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 189–206. But disputes within regional institutional frameworks in the absence of such levels of interdependence and the associated domestic political coalitions have on occasion contributed to interstate conflict, notably the so-called football war between two members of the Central American Common Market, El Salvador and Honduras, in July 1969, and Tanzania's war with Uganda in 1978–9. See Vincent Cable, "The 'Football War' and the Central American Common Market," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 4 (October 1969), 658–71; John Ravenhill, "Regional Integration and Development in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 27, no. 3 (1979), 227–46. See also Etel Solingen, "Internationalization, Coalitions, and Regional Conflict and Cooperation," in Mansfield and Pollins, *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict*, pp. 60–85.
8. See, for example, Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the 'ASEAN Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'?," *Pacific Review* 10, no. 3 (1997), 319–46.
9. Regional institutions have been more successful in enhancing the voice of their members in international affairs than in improving their bargaining position with partners on specific economic issues. Although the latter is frequently referenced as one of the potential advantages of regional collaboration, the results over the years have been meager (one example that is cited is that ASEAN at one point bargained collectively and successfully with Australia over the allocation of air routes). One reason for the lack of success is that distributional questions that divide members of a developing country region frequently come to the fore—and their potential partners can utilize these to split the coalition.
10. Jeffrey Herbst, "Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa," in Amitav Acharya and Alistair Iain Johnston (eds.), *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 129–44.
11. Michael Clough and John Ravenhill, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference," in Michael

Clough (ed.), *Changing Realities in Southern Africa: Implications for American Policy* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1982), pp. 161–86.

12. There are 16 landlocked countries in Africa: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
13. World Bank, *Partnering for Africa's Regional Integration: Progress Report on the Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, CAS Progress Report no. 60387, March 21, 2011, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/03/24/000333037_20110324060711/Rendered/PDF/603870CASP0P101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY191.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), p. 1.
14. On the Southern African Power Pool, see Dawn Nagar, "Regional Economic Integration," in Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: Zed Books, 2012), pp. 131–47.
15. See documentation available at the World Bank, "Senegal River Basin Multi-Purpose Water Resources Development Project," last updated September 25, 2013, http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P093826/senegal-river-basin-multi-purpose-water-resources-development-project?lang=en (accessed November 10, 2014).
16. See the website of the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 2013, http://www.ecreee.org (accessed November 10, 2014).
17. Functional cooperation is not immune, however, to disruption either because of domestic political turmoil in partner states or because of deterioration in interstate relations—witness the demise of what was at the time the most elaborate of Africa's systems of functional collaboration, the East African Community (EAC), in the 1970s, as conflict escalated among the member states. See Ravenhill, "Regional Integration and Development in Africa."
18. See Commission of the European Union, "The Rules of the EMU," http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/economic_and_monetary_union/the_rules_of_emu/index_en.htm (accessed November 14, 2014).
19. Besides the EU, the other non-FTA regional institutions were the Andean Community, CARICOM, the Central American Common Market, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (known by its French acronym, CEMAC), ECOWAS, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Russian Federation-Belarus-Kazakhstan, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), MERCOSUR, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Data from WTO, "Regional Trade Agreements"; WTO, "RTA Database," http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByCrResult.aspx (accessed April 15, 2014).
20. Sanchita Basu Das, Jayant Menon, Rodolfo Severino, and Omkar Lal Shrestha (eds.), *The ASEAN Economic Community: A Work in Progress* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013).
21. As Yongzheng Yang and Sanjeev Gupta note: "By aiming for deep integration, African countries are seeking to maximize the benefits of regional integration, but they are also imposing on themselves a substantial demand for administrative capacity and a high degree of economic convergence among themselves." Yongzheng Yang and Sanjeev Gupta, "Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa: Past Performance and the Way Forward," International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Working Paper no. WP/05/36, February 2005, http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/2010/06079.pdf (accessed October 17, 2014), p. 15.

22. Members of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc zone, for instance, agreed on "four quantitative convergence criteria of the 'first order': Basic budget balance relative to GDP [gross domestic product] of close to zero or positive as the 'key criterion'; Annual average inflation rate below 3%; Ratio of public debt (domestic and external) to GDP below 70%; Non-accumulation of domestic and external arrears in the current budget." Martin Hallet, "The Role of the Euro in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the CFA Franc Zone," European Commission Economic Paper no. 347, November 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication13478_en.pdf (accessed November 11, 2014), p. 18.
23. On the ASEAN experience, see Helen E. S. Nesadurai, "Malaysia's Conflict with the Philippines and Indonesia over Labour Migration: Economic Security, Interdependence, and Conflict Trajectories," *Pacific Review* 26, no. 1 (2013), 89–113.
24. See, for example, A. A. Afolyan, "Immigration of ECOWAS Aliens in Nigeria," *International Migration Review* 22, no. 1 (1988), 21–3.
25. On the colonial history of the franc zone, see, for example, Allechi M'Bet and Amlan Madeline Niamkey, "European Economic Integration and the Franc Zone: The Future of the CFA Franc After 1996: Part I: Historical Background and a New Evaluation of Monetary Co-operation in the CFA Countries," African Economic Research Consortium Research Paper no. 19, July 1993, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2046/No%2019.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed November 11, 2014), pp. 3–12.
26. Tobias Lenz, "Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and SADC," *West European Politics* 35, no. 1 (2012), 164.
27. As discussed extensively in studies such as Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), *Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (eds.), *The Rational Design of International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
28. Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (2000), 421–56.
29. See, for example, the discussions collected in Brian Bow and Greg Anderson (eds.), *Regional Governance in Post-NAFTA North America: Building without Architecture* (New York: Routledge, 2014).
30. See Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
31. Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993), 481.
32. Etel Solingen, "ASEAN, Quo Vadis? Domestic Coalitions and Regional Co-operation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21, no. 1 (1999), 30–53.
33. Etel Solingen, "Democracy, Economic Reform, and Regional Cooperation," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 8, no. 1 (1996), 79–114.
34. See Peter F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (1993), 299–326.

35. Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization* 15, no. 3 (1961), 366–92.
36. International Development Association (IDA) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), *Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Subsaharan Africa*, World Bank Regional Integration Department, Africa Region Report no. 43022-AFR, March 18, 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGINICOO/Resources/1587517-1271810608103/RIAS-Paper-Final-Approved-Oct2010.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014).
37. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Union (AU), and African Development Bank (AfDB), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade*, 2010, http://vi.unctad.org/digital-library/?task=dl_doc&doc_name=546-assessing-re (accessed September 1, 2014).
38. AU, *Status of Intra-African Trade*, 2012, http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Trade%20yearbook%2C%20Status%20of%20Intra-Africa%20Trade.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), p. 8. The figure is only half of that reached at its peak in 1997; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Economic Development in Africa Report 2013: Intra-African Trade—Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism*, United Nations Publication UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2013, 2013, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014). The AU estimates that the share of intraregional trade in total trade may be doubled if informal trade is incorporated into the figure; AU, *Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade*, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Action%20Plan%20for%20boosting%20intra-African%20trade%20F-English.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014).
39. UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V: Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area*, 2012, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria5_print_uneca_fin_20_july_1.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), p. 43.
40. In 2012, intra-ASEAN trade was 24.56 percent of total trade in the region; while intra-African exports were 11.7 percent of total exports, and imports 12.38 percent of the total. Data on ASEAN are from Asia Regional Integration Center, "Integration Indicators," http://aric.adb.org/integrationindicators (accessed November 11, 2014); data on Africa are from UNCTAD, "UNCTADStat Data Center," http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed November 11, 2014).
41. The real value of which is substantially overstated because of the double-counting involved when components cross national boundaries on multiple occasions. See Hubert Escaith and Satoshi Inomata (eds.), *Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia: From Trade in Goods to Trade in Tasks*, World Bank and Institute of Developing Economies—Japan External Trade Organisation, 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/stat_tradepat_globvalchains_e.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014).
42. Sven W. Arndt and Henryk Kierzkowski (eds.), *Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
43. Richard E. Baldwin, *21st Century Regionalism: Filling the Gap between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rules*, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight no. 56, 2011, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/policyinsights/PolicyInsight56.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), p. 3.

44. Cited in UNECA African Trade Policy Centre, "Is There a Potential for Intra-African Trade?," Briefing no. 13, September 2010, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/atpcpolicybriefs13.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), p. 405.
45. Government revenue in Africa remains dependent on revenue from tariffs to an exceptional degree. Lawrence Hinkle and Richard Newfarmer estimate that the median African country depends on tariffs for 2 percent of GDP and 15 percent of government revenue; for those most dependent on this source of revenue, tariffs constitute 3–6 percent of GDP and over one-quarter of government revenues. Lawrence E. Hinkle and Richard S. Newfarmer, "Risks and Rewards of Regional Trading Arrangements in Africa: Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa," in François Bourguignon and Boris Pleskovic (eds.), *Growth and Integration: Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2006* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 181.
46. Hinkle and Newfarmer, "Risks and Rewards," p. 181.
47. Richard E. Baldwin, "Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism," *Singapore Economic Review* 53, no. 3 (2008), 449–78.
48. Unilateral trade liberalization would further exacerbate the problem of loss of tariff revenue, however, and would need to be accompanied by measures that secured other revenue sources.
49. See, for example, Yang and Gupta, "Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa."
50. UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI: Harmonizing Policies to Transform the Trading Environment*, 2013, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria_vi_english_full.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), p. 34.
51. Paul Brenton and Gözde Isik (eds.), *De-fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional Trade Integration in Goods and Services*, World Bank Development Policy Review no. 68490, 2012, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/05/03/000333038_20120503000714/Rendered/PDF/684900ESW0Whit00Box367921B00PUBLIC0.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), Chapter 2.
52. In this regard, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, adopted by African heads of state in July 2010, was a welcome step forward. See New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), "Africa Launches an Ambitious Program for Infrastructure Development," http://www.nepad.org/regionalintegrationandinfrastructure/news/1628/africa-launches-ambitious-programme-infrastructure-de (accessed November 14, 2014). The risk remains, however, that this dimension of integration will receive insufficient attention if political leaders are distracted by the more glamorous overarching schemes for unifying the continental market. As one of the government participants in the workshop at which this chapter was first presented commented, SADC leaders seldom give any attention to functional cooperation, because they are preoccupied with problems relating to the establishment of the customs union.
53. Ernst Haas put forward the argument that regional integration theory was obsolete in a context of increased global interdependence. At the time, this judgment may have been premature, but it now seems to be largely vindicated. Ernst Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).
54. I explore some of the issues in John Ravenhill, "Global Value Chains and Development," *Review of International Political Economy* 21, no. 1 (2014), 264–74.

Chapter 3

A Tale of Three Cassandras: Jean Monnet, Raúl Prebisch, and Adebayo Adedeji

Adekeye Adebajo

Introduction

In Greek mythology, Apollo—the god of prophesy, poetry, and music—gave the beautiful Cassandra the gift of foresight in a bid to seduce her.[1] When Cassandra refused his advances, Apollo invoked a curse that her truthful prophesies would not be believed, and that she would be considered mad. The more contemporary tale that we recite here is not one of unrequited love or insanity, but the heroic efforts of three technocratic Cassandras to promote regional integration in Europe, Latin America, and Africa.

This chapter assesses the role, vision, and impact of three "prophets" of regional integration and economic development—France's Jean Monnet, Argentina's Raúl Prebisch, and Nigeria's Adebayo Adedeji—all regarded as important institution-builders and charismatic, dynamic, and eloquent contemporary fathers of regional integration.

All three tragically proved to be Cassandras, whose truthful prophesies often went unheeded at the time they were voiced. All three transcended parochial nationalities to become model pan-European, pan–Latin American, and pan-African citizens, and cosmopolitan citizens of the world. It is important to note, however, that Africa and Latin America face a different level of economic development, and hence different challenges, than does Europe. Though this essay focuses on regional integration in all three cases, economic development will be a particular concern of the sections on Africa and Latin America.

The chapter will seek to place Monnet, Prebisch, and Adedeji in historical context, highlighting the role that individuals with vision and forceful and persuasive personalities can play in driving institutions to adopt ideas, but showing the institutional, regional, and external constraints on the implementation of these ideas. Even the best plans for regional interaction rely on the decisions and vested interests of powerful national governments and important external actors. The essay will further assess the personal, intellectual, and professional background and influences that shaped the development of all three men into forceful, pragmatic, crusading prophets.

The Three Prophets

Monnet never attended university, while Prebisch and Adedeji were trained as economists, taught at universities in their countries, and occupied important economic positions in national government. All three were prodigies who were propelled into prominence and achieved professional success at an early age. All three helped restructure national economies after cataclysmic events (World War II of 1939–45, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Nigerian civil war of 1967–70, respectively). Monnet was head of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while Prebisch and Adedeji were headhunted to lead, respectively, the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which became the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Both Prebisch and Adedeji surrounded themselves with bright young economists from their regions to promote their ideas. Monnet led debates on promoting greater cooperation in Europe, while Prebisch and Adedeji contributed to important policy debates on unequal terms of trade between the industrialized North and global South.

Both Prebisch and Adedeji opposed the neoclassical policies propounded by the Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—for their respective regions. Both faced incredible political odds in their policy battles, in which they opposed powerful Western governments. The Bretton Woods institutions would eventually change course on some of their economic orthodoxies in Latin America and Africa and heed the warnings of Prebisch and Adedeji, but often only after much socioeconomic damage had already been done. Both were often erroneously depicted by critics as "dangerous radicals," but were in fact pragmatists who opposed Marxist economic policies and accepted the role of the market economy and an activist state in promoting economic development and integration.[2] Monnet also faced opposition: his own president, Charles de Gaulle, insisted on a government-led European project, though Monnet was a civil society advocate of regional integration and no longer heading a European institution by the time de Gaulle assumed the French presidency in 1959.

All three prophets were men of vision and grand ideas who enjoyed the trust of powerful actors on their respective continents. All three believed that politics could not be separated from economics, and used the force of superior arguments and dynamic political maneuvering within international institutions to promote their goals. But all three were ultimately frustrated in their efforts to unite Europe, Latin America, and Africa. National, regional, and external constraints largely obstructed the implementation of their ideas.

Jean Monnet: Europe's Prophet

Jean Monnet is generally regarded as the father of European integration. He grew up in the French brandy town of Cognac, working in his family's cognac business—the Society of Cognac Vine-Growers. Monnet's travels to Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America provided him with an education in other cultures, which he would later put at the service of international cooperation. His father had learned to speak German in order to expand the family business to the other side of the Rhine and beyond, traveling to Germany, Russia, and Sweden. As Monnet noted, "We knew that our existence depended on the prosperity and the tastes of people all over the world."[3] A sense of noblesse oblige and a desire to contribute to the public good were inculcated in Monnet by his father early in life.

Monnet did not much like school and what he described as "bookish knowledge," preferring the "school of life" that would enable him to "see the world." Sent by his father at the age of 16 to live with a wine merchant in London (after Monnet abandoned his university entrance examinations), he learned English in order to communicate with his clientele. At the age of 18, Monnet traveled to the United States, Sweden, Russia, Greece, and Egypt. As he later observed, "On my travels I had learned that economic forces were not blind and abstract, but could be measured and steered. Above all, I had come to realize that where there was organization there was real strength."[4] The cognac business thus forced Monnet to expand his horizons beyond the provincialism of his small French town and become a cosmopolitan citizen of the world.

During World War I of 1914–18, through the Inter-Allied Maritime Commission, Monnet coordinated merchant fleets, pushing them to charge the same freight rates to ensure more efficient delivery of priority supplies. During World War II of 1939–45, he also led Anglo-French supply programs. Though Monnet was keen to use international cooperation as a means of avoiding war, he also contributed to war efforts to achieve peace. He was always a pragmatic realist, rather than an idealistic pacifist.

In 1919, at the age of 30, Monnet became deputy secretary-general of the League of Nations—the precursor to the UN. He remained in the post until 1923, by which time he had become profoundly disillusioned with the bureaucratic squabbles and languid pace of decision-making. Monnet then managed the struggling family business after his father's death in 1923, before going into private banking in Eastern Europe, New York, San Francisco, and Shanghai, and then helping to reorganize the Chinese railway system between 1934 and 1936.

Throughout his career, he astutely cultivated strong political contacts for the future. Monnet was involved in efforts at creating an Anglo-French Union in 1940, and maintained contacts with US president Franklin D. Roosevelt in Washington, DC, as a member of the British Supply Council between 1940 and 1943. During the 1919 Paris Peace Treaty negotiations he had begun a close friendship with John Foster Dulles, which continued through Dulles's tenure as US president Dwight Eisenhower's secretary of state between 1953 and 1959. These contacts would help enhance continued American support for European integration. Based on his experiences of playing a key role in fostering inter-Allied cooperation during Europe's two civil wars, one of Monnet's credos became the recognition that international cooperation could be used to overcome pernicious national rivalries.

Between 1947 and 1955, Monnet headed the Commissariat du Plan, the commission for France's postwar reconstruction. While holding this post, he devised the Monnet Plan (named after him), which modernized French agriculture and industry, using American aid from the Marshall Plan of 1947. Monnet then became the chief architect of European integration, authoring the Schuman Plan of May 1950 (named after French foreign minister Robert Schuman). He later served, between 1952 and 1955, as president of the plan's main body: the High Authority of the Luxembourg-based European Coal and Steel Community. The High Authority involved Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, which would be the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (see also chapter 15 in this volume). The ECSC governments also created institutions such as the Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers, and the Court of Justice—all forerunners of current European Union (EU) institutions.

Monnet pursued a gradualist approach to European integration and had an intuitive sense of what the political traffic could bear. He knew how hard to push his ideas, and understood the importance of giving other delegations from smaller countries—Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—time to digest concepts and contribute meaningfully to the process. As Monnet famously noted: "Nothing is possible without men; nothing is lasting without institutions."[5] He regarded the Schuman plan as chiefly a political means of dealing with economic problems, realizing that continued French efforts to control the German industrial areas of the Ruhr and Saar would only breed further antagonism between Paris and Bonn.[6] Thus, even though coal and steel were not the best industries to integrate economically (coal would soon decline as a source of energy in much of Europe), French coal and German steel had a potent symbolism, with steel widely viewed in France as a symbol of arms merchants and German military power. Cooperation in this area would thus send a powerful signal of Franco-German pacific intent. The ECSC eventually helped to avoid price discrimination and to promote healthy competition in these important sectors of Europe's economy, cooperation that spilled over into other areas.[7]

Monnet's approach to negotiation of the Schuman Plan was instructive: he always saw the value in preparing a draft text as a target for others to aim at, but was flexible enough to allow amendment while seeking to preserve its core. He pushed simple ideas consistently and patiently until they were accepted. He respected his opponents, and always sought to win them over through the consistent application of superior arguments rather than through condescension or confrontation. Monnet's patience and cosmopolitanism had been inculcated by his provincial upbringing in Cognac. As he noted: "I learned to listen and weigh my words. And I also was given a window on the world."[8]

The weakness of the League of Nations, an organization that Monnet had served as deputy secretary-general for four years, convinced him of the need for a strong European executive. But he had the political wisdom to accept the need for a council of ministers, as well as parliamentary and judicial bodies to satisfy the demands of democratic states and European citizens.[9] During the

ECSC negotiation process, Monnet coined the term "European Community" to describe the construction of his integration scheme.[10]

After stepping down from the presidency of the ECSC High Authority in 1955, Monnet formed the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE) as a pressure group to promote European integration that drew on political parties and trade unions across the six ECSC countries.[11] At the 1955 European summit in Messina, he pushed hard for a common economic market as well as a market for nuclear power (what was to become the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom), both of which were included in the Treaty of Rome, which created the EEC in 1957. Monnet worked closely with Walter Hallstein, a former German professor at Frankfurt University and strong advocate of European federalism, who went on to serve as the first president of the European Commission between 1958 and 1967.

In recognition of Monnet's enormous contributions to European integration, Roy Jenkins, the British president of the European Commission between 1977 and 1981, paid the Gallic visionary a glowing tribute in August 1977:

> After eighty-nine years of his life, Monnet remains, as he has been throughout, impregnably optimistic but not Utopian. He does not believe in miracles, and although he believes that crucial moments of opportunity must never be lost, he gives more importance to patience and direction than to speed and the construction of false timetables. His modesty and manner is underpinned by an unshakeable intellectual self-confidence.[12]

Monnet died in March 1979 at the age of 90, barely 19 months after this tribute, having devoted his life to promoting peace and regional integration in Europe.

Raúl Prebisch: Latin America's Prophet

Our second prophet, Raúl Prebisch, was born in the Argentinian province of Tucumán in 1901 to a German immigrant father and a local Argentine mother. He studied economics at the University of Buenos Aires and taught political economy at the university before serving as undersecretary of finance and agriculture. He advised the country's ministers of finance and agriculture, thus gaining influence among powerful political actors. At the age of 34, Prebisch became the first director of Argentina's central bank, having been one of the architects of its creation. Following a military coup in 1943, he was eventually dismissed (apparently for his pro-Allied views during World War II, and his stout defense of the central bank's autonomy) and ostracized by the regime.

Prebisch soon found succor in the Chilean capital of Santiago, where he served as the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America from 1950 to 1963, having joined the organization in 1949 as its research director. By 1951, after only three years of the ECLA's existence, the United States had become determined to shut it down, regarding it as an unwelcome rival to the Economic and Social Council of the Washington-based Organisation of

American States. Prebisch mobilized political support across Latin America for its governments to take ownership of the body and stare down the US juggernaut. His ECLA produced country studies of such high quality and usefulness that he successfully convinced regional governments (especially Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, and Uruguay) to keep the organization alive, even at the cost of embarrassing Washington. The United States eventually conceded that Prebisch represented for many Latin American governments an "unusually able champion of their economic views."[13]

Before joining the ECLA, Prebisch had achieved regional and UN prominence through an influential document titled *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*, which was presented at the newly established ECLA's Havana session in 1949 with great verve, charisma, and persuasiveness. Due to opposition by the United States and other Western states (though France would become a key supporter of the ECLA), this document carried the name of its author—a rare exception within the workings of the UN. The problem was that Prebisch rejected neoclassical international trade theories. Neoclassical economists argued that international trade benefited all countries due to the comparative advantage that each enjoyed, and that such trade would eventually reduce the income gap between rich and poor countries. But as Prebisch noted: "The forced march of the first countries in the Industrial Revolution has created an economic firmament with a sun composed of the developed countries of the centre around which the peripheral countries rotate in their disorganised orbits."[14] He urged Latin American countries to overturn the international division of labor in which the Northern "center" exported manufactured goods to developing countries, the price of which continued to increase, while the Southern "periphery" exported agricultural goods and minerals to the North, the price of which continued to decline.

These ideas represented Prebisch's main theoretical contribution and came to be known as the "Prebisch-Singer thesis" on the terms of trade between developing and industrialized countries.[15] According to this view, in the long run the differential workings of the global economic cycle cause prices of primary products to deteriorate relative to manufactured goods, forcing countries in the periphery to export even more raw materials to import the equivalent industrial products. During economic upswings, the terms of trade generally move in favor of primary products; but during downturns, terms of trade swing against raw materials to a greater degree than during the upswing, resulting in a long-run deterioration of the periphery's terms of trade.[16]

The ECLA sought to refine the model of core versus periphery. This model continued to present the global economy as divided into an industrial center and agrarian periphery, with the core possessing a homogeneous structure of similar levels of productivity in diverse sectors, and the periphery having a heterogeneity based on different levels of technology. Led by "Don Raúl"—as Prebisch was fondly known by his admirers—ECLA "structuralists" proposed a strategy based on import-substitution industrialization, employing protectionist measures of high tariffs on manufacturing imports and a tax on primary exports to encourage the creation of a larger industrial sector, based first on the domestic market and then on exports. Prebisch also advocated stronger trade unions in the primary export sector, to increase wages, defend prices, and push against protectionist measures in the industrialized countries.[17] His thoroughly researched biennial *Economic Surveys* sought to push Latin American governments to break the vicious cycle of low productivity, low income, and low savings by increasing industrialization through restructuring domestic imports and production.[18]

Prebisch's credibility was boosted by the fact that his ideas were based on actual practice, given his experience as head of Argentina's central bank, and not just on theories devised in an ivory tower. The ruinous effect of the Great Depression of the 1930s on Argentina and other Latin American economies was a particularly formative experience, as Prebisch had until then been an orthodox neoclassical economist. His approach was to find "historical moments" in order to use new ideas to transform institutions into movements for structural change.[19] He strongly believed in the role of the state and national planning in promoting development and industrialization.

At the ECLA, Prebisch—working 18-hour days—assembled a young team of dynamic, ideologically diverse Latin American economists (several recruited from the World Bank and IMF) to help build their own continent. By 1953, the ECLA had 130 full-time staff. In his second term as ECLA executive secretary, between 1956 and 1963, Prebisch focused on trying to create a Latin American common market, an idea given impetus by the creation of Monnet's ECSC in 1951, and the EEC six years later. Prebisch had often complained that Latin America's 20 states operated in "water-tight compartments,"[20] and in 1956 he began preparing studies on inter-American trade with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay—the most enthusiastic supporters of this integrationist agenda. The ECLA cosponsored a meeting of experts on iron and steel in Brazil in 1956, with large private sector interest. Regional trade in Latin America was a derisory 7 percent in 1956, and consisted of $350 million worth of largely agricultural products. Prebisch thus preached specialization based on regional planning as a way of industrializing, benefiting from the economies of scale of a larger market, eliminating protectionism in regional trade, and ending perennial trade deficits. He also sought to use regional integration to provide a better livelihood for Latin America's rural masses in an era of economic stagnation.[21]

The ECLA sought to promote its regional integration agenda through four key strategies: establishing a system of multilateral payments, developing an inventory of existing industries, creating a regional market in manufactures, and stabilizing traditional markets in intraregional trade. Prebisch's efforts ultimately ran into opposition from Washington as well as from two American-dominated institutions: the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The US administration was particularly concerned that a common market not reduce foreign trade or create domestic monopolies. Prebisch had consistently insisted that the Latin American common market would be open to trade, and noted that the EEC had been granted exceptions by GATT for its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and continuing privileged access in trade relations with former European colonies. However, no such special treatment was to be granted to Latin America by patronizing American officials, some of whom argued that the region's citizens should not entertain ideas above their stations by trying to manufacture cars or aeroplanes as Prebisch was urging. At the ECLA summit in Panama City in 1959, Washington ensured the rejection of the Latin American common market, following which a watered-down free trade area was eventually agreed on by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay in February 1960. As a final act of humiliation, the United States peevishly excluded Prebisch from the creation of a new Inter-American Development Bank, which the Argentinian technocrat had earlier championed, and which Washington had rejected at the time.[22]

Prebisch's intellectual impact is evidenced by the fact that the ECLA—and later the ECLAC—has pursued five constant credos throughout its seven decades of existence: acting as a think-tank to policymakers based on rigorous empirical research; adopting a "holistic, integrated, and multidisciplinary" approach to development; analyzing development issues from a specifically Latin American (and later also Caribbean) perspective based on the region's lived experiences; recognizing that the international context often determines domestic structures, providing structural and institutional impediments to development; and maintaining a concern for social justice issues such as poverty alleviation and an equitable distribution of income.[23]

Though Prebisch has often been criticized for promoting impractical socialist ideas, he was consistently anticommunist and promoted the role of the private sector throughout his career. Nevertheless, he was under surveillance by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[24] Prebisch also never rejected the idea of international trade, nor did he ever advocate the delinking of the global South from the international system, an idea championed by proponents of dependency theory such as German-American Andre Gunder Frank and Egypt's Samir Amin. Prebisch thus preached reform rather than revolution. For him, international trade and foreign capital were essential to Latin America's industrialization efforts.[25] Prebisch was frank about the failures of his import-substitution strategies, though be blamed this on ineffective implementation by incompetent governments in Latin America, which he contrasted with more able governments in parts of Asia—such as South Korea, where internationally competitive export firms had been built using similar strategies.

Prebisch helped to transform ideas on international trade and the international division of labor, and influenced theories of both dependency and world systems. Though he was heavily criticized for his views on unequal terms of trade, the idea of international trade distributing its rewards unevenly between primary products and manufacturers remains alive even today.[26] But the increasing success of countries such as Brazil, China, India, Singapore, and South Korea in joining the ranks of the international nouveaux riches, even as Western powers stagnated following the global financial crisis of 2008–9, rendered Prebisch's binary North-South divide somewhat anachronistic. By 2012, China had become the world's second largest economy (after the United States) and the new "workshop of the world," while Brazil's economy was about the same size as Britain's.

Prebisch died in April 1986, at the age of 85, in Santiago. Cristóbal Kay described him as "the most influential Latin American development economist and probably its most eminent"[27]; *The Economist* dubbed him "Latin America's Keynes"[28]; and his biographer, Edgar Dosman, described him as a "leader of rare accomplishment and enduring legacy…the embattled champion of economic justice."[29]

Adebayo Adedeji: Africa's Prophet

Our third Cassandra, Nigerian scholar-diplomat Adebayo Adedeji, is Africa's most renowned visionary of regional integration. Like Jean Monnet, who grew up in the provincial French town of Cognac, Adedeji grew up in the southwestern Nigerian town of Ijebu-Ode under British colonial rule. This experience would leave a fierce anticolonial mark on Adedeji in his later professional exploits. His middle-class parents, farmers who worked on a cocoa and kola nut plantation, left him in the care of his disciplinarian grandmother "Mama Eleja," an enterprising, shrewd, and determined fish-seller and indomitable matriarch. Adedeji was a child prodigy and outstanding student who responded well to his grandmother's constant prodding. His father was also an important influence on the young boy, encouraging his son to study hard and making him work on the family farm during school holidays, stressing to Adedeji the importance of the "dignity of labor." Like Monnet's father, Adedeji's father encouraged him to travel and see the "outside world."[30]

After completing his primary and secondary school education in Nigeria, Adedeji studied economics and public administration at the universities of Leicester, Harvard, and London, eventually obtaining a doctorate in economics. He returned to Nigeria in 1958—two years before the country's independence from British rule—to take up a senior post in the Western region's Ministry of Economic Planning. Here he put in long hours and was widely recognized as a rising star. In 1963, Adedeji—who had always described himself as a "reluctant civil servant"—left government service to take up an academic post at Nigeria's University of Ile-Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University). Four years later, at the age of 36, he had become a full professor of economics and public administration. He transformed the university's Institute of Administration into an effective training ground for both Nigerian and African public servants.[31]

In 1971, at the age of 40, Adedeji was appointed Nigeria's minister of economic reconstruction and development by the military regime of General Yakubu Gowon. He would oversee the country's difficult postwar rebuilding efforts. Nigeria's civil war of 1967–70 had resulted in about a million deaths and the destruction of much of the country's infrastructure, particularly in its secessionist Eastern region (the would-be Republic of Biafra). Fortunately for the reconstruction, the discovery of large oil fields propelled Nigeria into the ranks of the world's largest oil exporters. Along with other cabinet colleagues and powerful mandarins, Adedeji crafted and implemented five-year national development plans that called for rapid industrialization and resulted in the building of dual carriageways, flyovers, and electricity pylons across the country.

Adedeji is widely regarded as the father of ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States). He had outlined a vision for regional integration in West Africa in an academic article published in 1970.[32] Then, between 1972 and 1975, while serving as Nigeria's minister of economic development, Adedeji convinced 16 West African leaders to establish ECOWAS, through tireless "shuttle diplomacy" across the subregion.[33] He has since consistently argued that regional integration must be seen as an instrument for national survival and socioeconomic transformation.[34]

In 1975, Adedeji was headhunted by the UN to lead its Addis Ababa–based Economic Commission for Africa. His 16-year tenure became the organization's longest and most dynamic: he skillfully converted UNECA into a pan-African platform to continue his efforts to promote economic integration, leading to the creation of the Preferential Trade Area in 1981 (which became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA] in 1993), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1983.[35] The tireless Adedeji, who frequently worked 18-hour days, collaborated closely with successive Organisation of African Unity (OAU) secretaries-general in Addis Ababa, and became a confidant and economic adviser to many African leaders whom he addressed at annual continental summits.

Adedeji established a reputation as a pragmatic economist more interested in solving problems than being constrained by ideological straitjackets. He used UNECA—assisted by a dynamic team of largely African economists—to launch a sustained assault on the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed on Africa since the 1980s by the World Bank and IMF. Adedeji coined the widely used term "the lost decade" to describe Africa's rapid decline in the 1980s, and argued against what he regarded as the Bretton Woods approach of "growth without development" and export-led integration of African states into the world economy on massively unequal terms. He stressed instead the need for Africa to use its own resources to promote greater intra-African growth, prioritizing agriculture, and criticizing the World Bank's desperate efforts to produce SAP success stories despite all evidence to the contrary.

Adedeji led the development of Africa's Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) of 1989, and the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation of 1990.[36] Like Prebisch, he often challenged what he regarded as Africa's "mindless imitation" of Western development models, and pushed instead for a human-centered view of development and integration that involved the full participation of Africa's billion citizens. In addition to regional cooperation and integration, Adedeji championed the collective self-reliance and self-sustainability principles of his 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, which was adopted by the OAU but left to gather dust on the shelves of African development ministries, since the continent lacked the resources to pay for its implementation.

S. K. B. Asante, the renowned Ghanaian political economist who wrote a book on Adedeji's development strategies in 1991, described him as an "African Cassandra": a visionary prophet who saw the future clearly, but whose prophesies often went unheeded until it was too late.[37] In the end, the World Bank and IMF reversed the large cuts in education and health spending that the SAPs had demanded, and that had decimated Africa's socioeconomic sector in the 1980s and 1990s. Debt relief also became fashionable more than a decade after Adedeji had warned about the unsustainability of Africa's $250 billion external debt in the 1980s. But by then, much of the doom and gloom for Africa's economy and citizens that Adedeji had predicted had already come to pass.

Critics have noted that Adedeji's Lagos Plan of Action lacked a practical mechanism for achieving its objectives, as well as a timetable and a detailed assessment of the costs for implementing its ideas. The action plan also failed to provide quantitative linkages between sectors and subsectors.[38] Adedeji's calls for self-reliance were criticized as vague and impractical, and some regarded efforts to delink Africa from the global economy as foolhardy. *The Financial Times* dismissed Adedeji's ideas as "statist."[39]

It was not just the international media and financial elites who criticized Adedeji and his ideas. During a Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) conference with UNECA in 1982, several authors castigated the Lagos Plan of Action for being quiet or ambiguous on such issues as communal versus private ownership of land, the need to define how to prioritize agricultural and industrial exports, and the role of foreign investment in development. These African scholars further criticized the action plan as being naive about state agricultural policies in Africa, for ignoring the class dimensions of governing regimes on the continent, and for assuming that African leaders were interested in promoting the welfare of their own citizens.[40] These criticisms partly reflected the fact that the action plan was a document of political consensus adopted by all of Africa's leaders.

Describing Adedeji's tenure at UNECA, Kenyan scholar Gilbert Khadiagala argued that his leadership "did not entirely transform the institution into an autonomous source on African ideas on development." Khadiagala further noted that divergent national practices and Africa's declining international leverage ultimately led instead to the widespread adoption of the World Bank's structural adjustment programs.[41] Even in terms of regional integration—the idea with which Adedeji is most closely associated—bodies like ECOWAS, COMESA, and ECCAS have failed to achieve their integration goals, and in 2016 only about 12 percent of Africa's trade was conducted among its own countries.[42] Adedeji himself conceded in 2004 that "no effective integration has taken place in ECOWAS," and argued that politics and not economics would ultimately determine the success of regional integration efforts in Africa.[43] Like Prebisch in Europe, a frustrated Adedeji later lamented the inability of African governments to match their rhetoric with reality.[44] African leaders provided political support to Adedeji's development ideas, but often lacked the domestic discipline to implement them; more important, the external technical and financial resources advocated by the plans were not provided by foreign donors.

After retiring from UNECA in 1991, Adedeji continued his regional integration efforts in Africa. In 1992 he served on a committee to review the ECOWAS treaty; in 2002 he served on another body to transform the OAU into the African Union (AU); and in 2007 he chaired the committee that audited the five-year integration efforts of the AU. The December 2007 audit of the AU called for an acceleration of regional integration on the continent, and made concrete recommendations for strengthening the AU and Africa's subregional bodies (see also chapter 8 in this volume).[45] The report further advocated strengthening national mechanisms to accelerate economic integration; incorporating decisions of regional bodies into national institutions; adhering to the AU decision to recognize only eight regional economic communities (RECs); focusing the RECs on activities to create an African common market and African economic community by 2028; and strengthening the AU's internal mechanisms for more effective coordination and harmonization of the RECs.[46] Adedeji retired from public service as chair of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2010, after five decades of committed service to his continent.

Conclusion

While Adedeji was widely seen as the father of African integration, and Prebisch the father of Latin American integration, Monnet was widely regarded as the father of European integration. Monnet was more successful than Prebisch and Adedeji in promoting regional integration because he belonged to an industrialized and wealthy region of the world in which a global catastrophe—World War II—had destroyed the continent and, along with American Marshall aid due to strategic Cold War considerations, created the political will to force countries to work more closely together.

Whereas European integration was a peacemaking strategy to keep France and Germany from returning to war, regional integration in Latin America and Africa was concerned with promoting development in countries with large illiterate populations, weak infrastructure, and poor governance. Thus it was far easier to convince powerful actors to support efforts to rebuild a Europe with an educated population, led by a wealthy American patron, than to support attempts to develop Latin America and Africa, given the lack of requisite technical skills on these two continents, their intraregional trade of a mere 10 percent, and their lack of powerful external political and financial backing.

The Cold War's proxy wars also negatively affected both Latin America and Africa, creating difficult political environments in which to promote economic integration. While the perennial shadow of US neo-imperialism hung over Latin America, European neocolonialism cast a pall over Africa. The Soviet Union also interfered with local clients in Latin America and Africa. Both Prebisch and Adedeji, however, had keen political antennae tuned to what regional governments would support, and courageously championed the ideas of home-grown development and self-reliance built on the specific experiences of Latin America and Africa, as well as on regional ownership of development ideas. Both Prebisch and Adedeji acted as public intellectuals, often writing their own speeches and going over the heads of governments to appeal directly to audiences in universities, research institutes, the private sector, and other fora, where they employed their impressive communication skills to explain complicated economic ideas. Both turned the ECLA and UNECA into intellectual think-tanks, acting as secular monks in monasteries in which disciples were encouraged to dream up heretic plans to transform the global economic system in ways that were more in favor of their respective continents. If these two prophets ultimately failed to achieve their goals, it was a heroic failure born not of lack of ambition and application, but of power.

Monnet, Prebisch, and Adedeji headed powerful international organizations—the ECSC, the ECLA, and UNECA—through which they sought to promote their goals. All three had traveled the length and breadth of their respective continents to try to understand the problems of regional integration through lived experiences. All insisted on excellence and hard work from their bureaucrats, and enjoyed generating new ideas. But all three realized that they had to relate such concepts to practical action, and muster political support to implement their visions. All three acted as technocrats operating skillfully behind the scenes in powerful bureaucracies.

All three shared an aversion to the operation of blind market forces, and regarded politics as inseparable from economics. All three regarded regional integration as a means to promote peace and socioeconomic development. All three were far-sighted visionaries who often saw the future more clearly than did the leaders they sought to advise. In the end, though, all three prophets failed to fulfill their visions. Monnet's goal of a European political union—the "United States of Europe"—has yet to be realized. Prebisch's dream of a Latin American common market remains unfulfilled. And Adedeji never saw his aspiration of an African common market achieved. All three turned out to be visionary Cassandras: their prophesies—on the need for an effectively integrated Europe, improved terms of trade between North and South, and for health and education cuts by the Bretton Woods institutions to be reversed—often turned out to be correct, but went unheeded until it was too late.

Notes

1. This chapter builds on Adekeye Adebajo, "Two Prophets of Regional Integration: Prebisch and Adedeji," in Bruce Currie-Alder, Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Madhora (eds.), *International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 323–38; and "A Tale of Two Prophets: Jean Monnet and Adebayo Adedeji," in Amos Sawyer, Afeikhena Jerome, and Ejeviome Eloho Otobo (eds.), *African Development in the 21st Century: Adebayo Adedeji's Theories and Contributions* (Asmara and Trenton: Africa World Press, 2014), pp. 77–90.
2. On the charge of "radicalism," see, for example, "Raúl Prebisch: Latin America's Keynes," *The Economist*, March 5, 2009.
3. Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, translated by Richard Mayne (London: William Collins, Sons, 1978), p. 40.
4. Ibid., p. 40.
5. Cited in Michael Maclay, *The European Union* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998), p. 28.
6. Clive Archer, *The European Union* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 22.

7. Stephen Martin, "Building on Coal and Steel: European Integration in the 1950s and the 1960s," in Desmond Dinan (ed.), *Origins and Evolution of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 126–40.
8. Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 42.
9. John Pinder and Simon Usherwood, *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 11.
10. Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 323.
11. Martin, "Building on Coal and Steel," p. 140.
12. Roy Jenkins, "Foreword," in Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 12.
13. Edgar J. Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch, 1901–1986* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), p. 262.
14. Ibid., p. 276.
15. Hans Singer was a German-born British economist working with the United Nations who had provided the historical price data used by Prebisch to reach his conclusions in a 1948 study.
16. Cristóbal Kay, "Raúl Prebisch," in David Simon (ed.), *Fifty Key Thinkers on Development* (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 200–2.
17. Ibid., pp. 202–3.
18. Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch*, p. 263.
19. Ibid., p. 5.
20. On "water-tight compartments," see Raúl Prebisch, *Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task: Report Submitted to the Inter-American Development Bank* (New York: Inter-American Development Bank, 1970), p. 39.
21. Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch*, pp. 321–45.
22. Ibid.
23. Gert Rosenthal, "ECLAC: A Commitment to a Latin American Way Toward Development," in Yves Berthelot (ed.), *Unity and Diversity in Development Ideas: Perspectives from the UN Regional Commissions* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 180.
24. Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch*, p. 5.
25. Kay, "Raúl Prebisch," p. 202.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 199.
28. "Raúl Prebisch: Latin America's Keynes."
29. Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch*, p. 4.
30. Temilolu Sanmi-Ajiki, *Adebayo Adedeji: A Rainbow in the Sky of Time* (Lagos: Newswatch, 2000).
31. Ibid., pp. 110–22.
32. Adebayo Adedeji, "Prospects for Regional Economic Cooperation in West Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8, no. 2 (1970), 213–31.
33. Adebayo Adedeji, "ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey," in Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 21–49.
34. See Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), *Africa within the World: Beyond Dispossession and Dependence* (London: Zed, 1993); S. K. B. Asante, *African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies* (Ibadan: Spectrum, 1991); Reginald Cline-Cole, "Adebayo Adedeji," in Simon, *Fifty Key Thinkers*, pp. 3–8; Bade Onimode and Richard Synge (eds.), *Issues in African Development: Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at 65* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1995); Bade Onimode et al., *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century: Looking Back to Move Forward—Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy* (London: Zed, 2004).

35. Adebayo Adedeji, "The Economic Commission for Africa," in Adekeye Adebajo (ed.), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), pp. 373–98.
36. Ibid.
37. Asante, *African Development*, p. 138.
38. Robert S. Browne and Robert J. Cummings, *The Lagos Plan of Action vs. the Berg Report: Contemporary Issues in African Economic Development* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1984), p. 23.
39. *Financial Times*, "Flawed Plan for Africa," July 13, 1989, p. 24.
40. Browne and Cummings, *The Lagos Plan of Action*, pp. 213–15.
41. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Two Moments in African Thought: Ideas in Africa's International Relations," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2010), 379.
42. Masimba Tafirenyika, "Intra-Africa Trade: Going beyond Political Commitments," *Africa Renewal*, August 2014, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2014/intra-africa-trade-going-beyond-political-commitments (accessed January 5, 2015), p. 5.
43. Adedeji, "ECOWAS," pp. 36, 46–7.
44. Ibid., p. 47.
45. African Union (AU), *Audit of the African Union: Towards a People-Centred Political and Socio-Economic Integration and Transformation of Africa* (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, 2007).
46. Ibid.

Part II

The Political Economy of Africa's Region-Building and Regional Integration Initiatives

Chapter 4

Cross-Border Interactions and Regionalism

Daniel C. Bach

Introduction

"Africa is not a country," warn the authors of a recent report meant to entice Polish companies to engage with the "rising" African continent.[1] The reminder would seem totally unwarranted but for the enticing blueprints that presume that an integrated single African market is within reach. The establishment by 2017 of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), we are also told, will be followed by a Continental Customs Union (CCU) two years later.[2] Meanwhile, Africa keeps being described as a continent deeply segmented, yet integrated through "a significant amount of cross-border trade [that] does take place . . . [through] informal channels and is [therefore] not measured in official statistics."[3]

This chapter revisits the issue of African economic integration and the broader implications associated with the dynamism of transborder trade. Cross-border interdependencies, as I and others have argued elsewhere, provide the perfect matrix for the study of contrasted, yet closely intertwined, patterns of regionalization that revolve around perceptions of the border as a lucrative source of opportunities, or alternatively as a hindrance to the mobility of goods and people.[4] Borderlands offer critical insight to the analyst, since it is in the borderlands that the nature and intensity of cross-border interactions acquire a paradigmatic value.[5] Border posts and borderlands, because they cast into the limelight how state regulatory power is exercised, help to make sense of broader interactions between region-building and regionalization, as much as they illuminate the capacity of states to implement "public" policies.

After a brief presentation of the chapter's conceptual framework, which builds upon the broadening of the notion of regionalism since the 1980s, this chapter will discuss the dynamics of cross-border interactions and their paradoxical contribution to transborder integration without region-building. It then analyzes the implications of the policies and processes of "defragmentation" that are meant simultaneously to enhance the regional and global integration of African economies. The recently concluded negotiations toward the conclusion of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU), the chapter concludes, should be viewed as the equivalent of a "stress test" in this respect.

The Regionalism/Regionalization Dyad

Regionalism and regionalization are intrinsically and organically tied. Regionalism conventionally refers to programs, policies, and goals that seek to transform an identified social space into a regional project.[6] It also refers to regions that are defined and shaped by institutions and formal arrangements. With the revival of regionalism in the mid-1980s, greater diversity in the processes and representations associated with it has also prompted conceptual adjustments in order to account for the multidimensional and socially constructed nature of regions.[7]

Multidimensionality represents a belated acknowledgment of the diversity of trajectories of institutions and projects that were sidetracked by theories of regional economic integration inspired by the highs and lows of European construction. The result, as Andrew Axline already observed in the 1970s, was that even though regionalism kept expanding in the so-called Third World, research in the field was dominated by theory based on the European experience.[8] The revival of regionalism has compelled students of regionalism to insert into their portfolio groupings and projects that straddle the internal/international divide, as they encompass forms of interaction that do not necessarily aim at "integration"—a trend highlighted, for instance, by the sovereignty "pooling" versus sovereignty "enhancement" dichotomy suggested by Richard Higgott to differentiate the EU from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[9] Within Europe too, conventional understandings of regionalism have had to adjust to its rise within states, in conjunction with aspirations to autonomy or even independence expressed by the Catalans, the Corsicans, or the Scots.[10]

The revival of regionalism has also redirected attention toward the concept of region as a socially constructed space, associated with the production of mental maps and frontiers (see also chapter 9 in this volume). The influence of social constructivist agendas has increased sensitivity to norms, beliefs, identities, and cognitive maps—a dimension captured by Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum's notion of "regionness."[11] The idea of the region as a socially constructed space has also reduced the significance previously attached to territoriality and geographical proximity, two pillars of Joseph Nye's definition of the region as "a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence."[12]

The need to make sense of new trajectories and processes has in turn contributed to the dissemination of the regionalism/regionalization dyad.[13] Regionalization supplements the analysis of regionalism as a project, by focusing on ex post assessment of the performance of societal and corporate players. Regionalization enables us to account for landscapes where "regionness" grows independently from stated regionalist strategies or aspirations. For example, diasporas, religious networks, and multinational corporations contribute to the build-up of regional interdependence through migration, trade, investment, and other interactions.

Depending on time, location, and circumstances, regionalization can be associated with transactions that are licit or illicit, formal or informal, locally banned but internationally acceptable, or, conversely, officially accepted domestically but highly criminalized abroad. As is increasingly the case in Africa, regionalization can also be underscored by networks with a global reach. When these combine characteristics traditionally associated with transnational and international relations, they can be referred to as "trans-state interactions." Trans-state interactions thrive on the instrumentalization of social, ethnic, or religious ties that circumvent or undermine, through complicities, state regulatory power. The lure of frontier transgression paradoxically contributes to entrenching the territorial status quo while undermining the ability of states to craft public policies.[14]

The analytical distinction between regionalism as a state-led or cognitive project, and regionalization as process challenges the assimilation of regionalism to regional integration—that is, the transfer of sovereign competencies to a supranational or hegemonic core. The distinction between regionalism—that may simply refer to a project—and regionalization also helps to steer away from the confusion generated by the ambivalent usage of the concept of regional "integration" to describe both effective and yet-to-be-implemented processes. This is of particular value to the study of the dynamics at play in Africa, where regionalization draws much of its flavor and stamina from the permeation of state and policies by socioethnic or religious networks that straddle norms, institutions, and boundary lines.

Regionalization without Region-Building: The Frontier as a "Resource"

Regionalization, unlike the old fix on integration, enables us to bring into perspective situations where, as observed across African borders, integration is not necessarily conducive to region-building. The dynamics at play across borders and in the borderland regions offer a stark contrast to the disappointing achievements of the regional economic communities' (RECs) region-building blueprints. The opportunities associated with the exploitation of cross-border differentials date back to the early days of colonial rule, when control at the border could be only loosely enforced.[15] In the wake of partition, the population living on each side of the border actively participated in the definition of its practical implications, not least with respect to such important issues as land ownership.[16] More generally, the borderlanders quickly seized the distinct advantages that they could draw from living near the border. The proximity of different spheres of jurisdiction and distinctive fiscal, tariff, labor, and monetary regulations was more a resource than a constraint. Interimperial boundary lines also performed, as a result, much-appreciated regulatory functions, by offering a refuge to populations, and at times whole villages, as they sought to avoid conscription, forced labor, or higher taxation.[17] For the colonial powers, physically enforcing the boundary lines was materially impossible, a problem compounded by mutual suspicion and, at times, competition among colonial rulers.

Independence inaugurated a new phase in the expansion of cross-border flows, as they were no longer confined to the exploitation of the opportunities drawn from tax, fiscal, monetary, or normative differentials between colonial blocs. Cross-border flows thrived on the growing fragmentation of African markets that resulted from diverging macroeconomic policy choices. Cross-border integration gathered stamina, but as a result of a subversion of state regulatory capacity, stimulated by the nonimplementation of the agendas of the RECs. From the mid-1970s onward, this went along with an asymmetric coexistence between institutions of cooperation and integration that kept postponing the implementation of their stated goals and extremely successful (in their own terms) cross-border networks. The so-called informal or unrecorded economy captured increasing attention, while cross-border transactions were depicted as the "second" economy (Tanzania) or even, in extreme cases, as the "real" economy (Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]).[18] In West Africa, smuggling, officially described as "re-exportation" or "transit" trade, was at the backbone of the economy of *entrepôt* states (Benin, Gambia, and Togo), which undertook to fine-tune their policies so as to maximize revenues drawn from the exploitation of cross-border differentials.[19] In practice, these policy orientations were little more than a succession of short-term measures, designed to capture the opportunities generated by the tariff and fiscal discrepancies between the eight West African member states of the (freely convertible until 1972) Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc zone, on the one hand, and Ghana and Nigeria, on the other.[20] The regional reach of "trans-state regionalization" stemmed from the penetration of states' territory and institutions by trans-national players, who benefited from complicities within the state bureaucracies on each side of the frontier.

The opportunities generated by policy differentials carried their own rationale, which worked at the expense of regional economic integration agendas. The experience of the short-lived Senegambia confederation (1981–9) offers the best illustration of this paradox.[21] The launch of the confederation, the most ambitious integration scheme undertaken in Africa during the 1980s, had less to do with economics than with security concerns. On July 30, 1981, a coup organized by a small group of civilians and military officers announced the removal of Gambian President Dawda Jawara, who was then in London. At his request, Senegalese troops then crossed the border and restored him to power without much difficulty.[22]

The subsequent establishment of the confederation was unexpected. It endorsed a quid pro quo whereby Senegal would remain committed to ensure the security of the Gambian regime in exchange for progressive evolution toward an economic union. The establishment of a customs union, from Dakar's point of view, would help to curb the contraband trade with Gambia that had developed largely at the expense of Senegal, due to a policy of lower import tariffs. As the deadline for implementing common policies came closer, the economic and financial costs that the customs union would involve began to appear overwhelming to Banjul: resources were scarce and substantial income and employment opportunities were drawn from "re-export" trade generated by the tariff, regulatory, and monetary disparities with its immediate neighbor Senegal. Gambia therefore announced that it was not prepared to go beyond the creation of a free trade area (FTA). The issue was finally settled in 1989, as the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania became the source of diverging policy orientations between Dakar and Banjul. Amid an atmosphere of increasing distrust, Dakar decided to withdraw its troops from Gambia. President Abdou Diouf then announced that the institutions of the confederation were frozen. By the end of the year its dissolution was formally pronounced.

Cross-border trade between Nigeria and its francophone neighbors similarly provides an ongoing illustration of the adverse impact of cross-border flows on the implementation of regional integration agendas. After the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, Benin and Togo vocally presented themselves as supporters of its intraregional trade promotion agenda, while having no interest in the reduction of tariff differentials. Re-exportation, a seasoned observer candidly noted, "forbids that these small countries play the game of a large market within which it would no longer be possible to preserve pre-existing fiscal incentives."[23] Symmetrically, thanks to their personal connections at the highest level within the Nigerian federal government (and the 36 states), policymaking has ensured—through the combination of taxation peaks, subsidies, and bans—the preservation of the lucrative opportunities across West Africa and the Sahara. These have also contributed to the spectacular expansion of criminal networks lured by global opportunities for profit drawn from petroleum, cigarettes, second-hand cars, fake pharmaceuticals, and, of course, narcotics, arms, and human trafficking.[24]

In Africa, as elsewhere, cross-border trafficking requires a knack for prompt and global tuning to the interplay of changing tariff and fiscal measures, shifts in currency demand and supply, and international prices on export crops or on goods treated as illegal in other areas on (or outside) the continent. The resulting effect was (and remains) a nexus of constant fluctuations in the composition and direction of the trans-state flows and consequently in the articulation and impact of the networks at the grassroots level. Indeed, trans-state networks often benefit most from an environment that appears uncertain and shifting at the formal level, providing constantly renewed opportunities for arbitrage. The preeminence of networks over policies can also take on exacerbated proportions whenever, as in the eastern DRC or Somalia, the exploitation of the "dividends" of the frontier combines with those advantages that "entrepreneurs of insecurity" derive from the erosion of state regulatory power and territorial control.[25]

Pressure for Change: The "Defragmentation" Quagmire

Usage of the term "defragmentation" as a synonym for regional integration is suggested in a World Bank report published in 2013.[26] The term is best understood as a metaphor drawn from the familiar "defrag" function that restores and speeds up computer efficiency through the consolidation of files that have become fragmented in a computer's memory. Indeed, regarding regional integration, the goal assigned to defragmentation is the promotion of "deeper" integration through the removal of "a range of nontariff and regulatory barriers [that] still raise transaction costs and limit the movement of goods, services, peoples and capital across borders."[27]

Integration through deregulation represents a variant of Jan Tinbergen's famous distinction between positive and negative integration. Like defragmentation, negative integration is driven by the dismantlement of constraints to the free circulation of goods, services, people, and capital, while positive economic integration builds upon common policies.[28] The defragmentation agenda covers a particularly broad range of issues and can be expected to have a sweeping impact on the RECs: "on-the-ground constraints that paralize [*sic*] the daily operations of ordinary producers and traders" are to be lifted, "regulatory reforms" ought to be implemented within states and the RECs, the economies should diversify away from goods toward services, and the convergence of standards should be promoted. Convergence may be achieved through harmonization or through "mutual recognition" of qualifications. The report also invites international donors to refocus their engagement toward "helping countries understand the political economy behind resistance to integrative reforms."[29]

The defragmentation agenda is attuned to what Richard Baldwin describes as "twenty-first-century regionalism"—the qualitative transformation of regionalism beyond the focus on preferential market access that characterized the 1990s ("open" regionalism).[30] Twenty-first-century regionalism constitutes a response to the reorganization of global trade through global value chains, that is, the rise of intrafirm trade and trade between multinationals and their affiliates (see also chapter 2 in this volume). With the emergence of multinational production networks that cut across boundaries, issues of compatibility and harmonization of domestic policies have gained preeminence, as has the protection of the investments of multinational corporations through the conclusion of bilateral treaties.

The momentum toward "deep" or deeper integration has been sustained through unilateral policy reforms designed to improve the business climates in developing economies.[31] Deep integration is also associated with a new generation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The RTAs' extensive packages are meant to go well beyond World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, as they cover services, competition policy, investment, technical barriers, regulatory compatibility, and intellectual property protection. The assumption is that regulatory convergence will iron out differences in investment and business climates.[32]

Regulations, not tariffs, are at the core of twenty-first-century regionalism. Ongoing negotiations toward mega-regional agreements also aspire to establish quasi-multilateral agreements. For this reason, twenty-first-century regionalism represents a threat to the WTO's centrality in global trade governance, notes Baldwin. The building/stumbling-block thinking of the 1990s is over. What is at stake today is "the WTO's role as a rule writer, not as a tariff cutter."[33]

Defragmentation, like twenty-first-century regionalism, refers to a convergence between the deepening of Africa's global integration and regionalization. This postulate is also a source of uncertainty on a continent that, as the World Bank observes, has so far "integrated with the rest of the world faster than with itself."[34] Regionalization through defragmentation and lean integration also constitute an alternative and a threat to the RECs and their thick institutional agendas.[35]

Unilateralism as an Alternative to the RECs' Stalled Agendas

In Africa as in other world regions, it is essentially through unilateral reforms that the momentum toward the elimination of import quotas, nontariff barriers, and customs duties has gained consistency since the 1990s.[36] The formation of FTAs within some of the RECs owes more to unilateralism than to the implementation of supranational agendas.

A precursor in this respect was the Economic Recovery (Adjustment) Programme (ERP), launched in 1983 by then-president Jerry Rawlings, for the purpose of reducing Ghana's debts and improving its trading position within the global economy.[37] By the end of the 1980s, its implementation had already severely dented the ability of neighboring francophone states to build upon cross-border differentials. The gap between Ghana's official currency rate and that negotiated on the black market had also considerably narrowed. Since Ghana's cocoa prices were now close to those offered on the international market, the country had even become an attractive destination for cocoa from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire and Togo.[38]

The economic liberalization policy that was implemented had not necessarily stimulated the domestic production of goods, but it had definitely helped to restore competitive prices for commodity producers. Liberalization also meant the end of import shortages that had fueled the smuggling of manufactured products from Côte d'Ivoire and Togo.

In 2002, Ghana was also the first African state to launch its own National Single Window (NSW) system, with the ambition of becoming a "gateway" to West Africa.[39] The system, patterned after the decade-long experience acquired by Singapore, was introduced progressively.[40] It handled 98 percent of declarations made along land borders, in the ports, and at the airports. As a recent assessment noted:

> [The automated system] has resulted in improved trade statistics, as well as greater transparency and efficiency. Governmental officials report that in the automated system's first year, customs revenue grew almost 50 per cent, with a substantial reduction in clearance times owing to less paperwork and fewer human interactions. Revenues have averaged annual growth of 23 per cent due to reduced corruption and greater efficiency. Clearance times at Kotoka International Airport fell to 1 day from 2–3 days before the NSW, while clearance times at Tema and Takoradi Ports fell to 1–3 days from 2–3 weeks. Infrastructure upgrades have also vastly improved working conditions.[41]

In Western, Southern, and Eastern Africa, defragmentation through the simplification of border crossing accounts for current programs designed to substitute simultaneous inspection—the one-stop border posts (OSBP) and border post management systems—for the traditional sequential control of cross-border flows. The elimination of what is euphemistically described as "non-physical barriers" to regional transit represents a precondition to the establishment of the continental FTA.[42]

The "Rising Continent" Syndrome: Africa as a Pioneering Front

The discovery of oil reserves in the late 1990s rejuvenated international perceptions of Africa, prompting outside investors to see it as a new frontier (see also chapter 6 in this volume). The continent has since become synonymous with expanding markets and high returns on investments.[43]

Defragmentation is also being stimulated by the redeployment of banking and finance services beyond national boundaries. In October 2014, the global banking sector was described as "bullish" about Africa's trajectory.[44] Ecobank and its pan-African network of branches no longer featured as the exceptional, but isolated, example they had been for several decades.[45] Private banks established in South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria then followed suit through the development of regional strategies. By the beginning of 2014, two Kenyan banks, the Equity Bank and the Kenya Commercial Bank, had plans to expand beyond East Africa toward Mozambique and Zambia. In West Africa, the United Bank for Africa was also claiming a presence across 19 African states, while Access Bank was engaged in seven African countries, with the explicit ambition to support the expansion of Nigerian businesses.[46]

The rise of a whole generation of globally connected African entrepreneurs is contributing to changing the business climate, as accumulation no longer exclusively revolves around the capture of the state or the privatization of public functions by their incumbents. The personal trajectories and truly global investment strategies pursued, within and outside the continent, by such figures as Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote, are perfect illustrations of this new trend.[47] For such players, cross-border disparities and the fragmentation of markets are more a hindrance than a source of opportunities.[48]

Defragmentation is also being powered by the quantum leap resulting from the dissemination of cell-phone technology. Within a decade, Africa has graduated from what Manuel Castells once described as the "black hole of informational capitalism"[49] to the status of the most dynamic market worldwide.[50] The number of mobile-phone subscriptions in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to rise from 635 million at the end of 2014 to about 930 million by the end of 2019. Mobile data traffic should undergo a 20-fold increase between 2013 and 2019—twice the rate expected in the rest of the world.[51]

As cell phones provide affordable access to the Internet, they also create opportunities for innovative technological solutions. In Eastern and Southern Africa first, then India and Romania, Vodafone has become famous for its creation of a quasi-currency through the M-Pesa mobile money transfer system. The development of M-Pesa illustrates how innovative transformations can reshape the dividing line between the formal sector and the informal. This platform, launched in 2007 for the purpose of transferring money between mobile-phone accounts, was initially meant to retain customers in Kenya's volatile mobile-phone market. By the end of 2013, it had become profitable in its own right, with 16.8 million active customers who generated about €900 million in transactions per month. In Kenya, the M-Pesa platform is already so widely used that a third of the country's $44 billion economy is transiting through the system.[52]

M-Pesa offers a solution to the inaccessibility of banking services to large sections of the population of the countries concerned. Yet, simultaneously, as observed in Kenya, private citizens and entrepreneurs are given the opportunity to become part of the formal financial system and benefit from a secure system of payment for bills, schools fees, and flight tickets. Since the end of 2012, M-Pesa's ambition to operate as an interface between the so-called informal and formal sectors has gained renewed traction with the creation of a loans and savings platform, M-Shwari.[53] The operator is also developing mobile-based medical education programs in countries such as South Africa.

Defragmentation is most tangibly associated with the considerable expectations generated by prospects for substantive investment into infrastructure rehabilitation and development projects: 16 African states are landlocked, with a total population of 200 million and transport corridors to harbors that range between 1,000 and 1,500 kilometers in length.[54] However, defragmentation through infrastructure development represents a tall agenda if it is to successfully combine the rehabilitation of the radial nature of transport corridors dating back to the colonial period, with the critical need to link rail systems that (except in South Africa) are incompatible due to different track gauges (see also chapter 5 in this volume).[55]

Launched in 1996, the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) still features as a unique case of successful transformation of a transport corridor (associated with one-stop border posts and single-window border management facilities) into a spatial development initiative.[56] Within a decade after it was formally launched, the MDC was already associated with an impressive array of transfrontier projects, most of them funded by the private sector. This involved the establishment of the toll road to Mozambique, the establishment of the world's third largest aluminum smelter near Maputo, the modernization of its harbor (now operated by an international consortium), the rehabilitation of the South Africa–Maputo rail link (operated by South Africa's rail utility Transnet), the creation of an industrial park in the city, and the creation of a gas pipeline.[57]

No comparable achievements have been associated with the 20 or so development corridors in Africa listed in the early 2000s, despite the exponential growth of China's engagement in infrastructure construction on the continent.[58] China's construction projects in Africa already represented an estimated 20 percent of pledges for infrastructure support in 2011.[59] The omnipresence of Chinese companies in transport infrastructure projects in Southern and Eastern Africa has unquestionably contributed to an upgrade of transport infrastructure, but the primary motivation of Chinese companies, conclude the authors of a survey of Southern and Eastern Africa, has been to access lucrative construction markets.[60] Related priorities have been the export of natural resources and unlocking access to China's special economic zones in Tanzania and Zambia. In Africa, China's approach has therefore come under criticism for being purely bilateral and devoid of interest for regional cross-border infrastructure development.[61]

A Stress Test for the RECs: The EPA Negotiations

A key but largely unnoticed aspect to the EPA negotiations was their progressive transformation into a stress test for the RECs of the African continent. In the course of the 12-year-long negotiations, it was their credibility and relevance that were eventually at stake.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), signed in 2000, ambitioned to set the foundations for a comprehensive arrangement that would do more than organize the implementation of a reciprocal FTA that would be compatible with WTO rules.[62] This was to go along with support to regional integration and the provision of development aid, both viewed as steps toward an ambitious intercontinental relationship.[63] The EPA negotiations, meant to be concluded by December 31, 2007, turned out to be far more complex and contentious than initially anticipated.[64] In January 2008, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) economic partnership agreement was the only comprehensive agreement that had been concluded. The regional EPAs that were eventually agreed during 2014 merely focused on "shallow trade in goods," a reflection of what Isabelle Ramdoo describes as the level of "(un-)readiness and (un-)willingness of African countries to negotiate more comprehensive agreements."[65] A sense of urgency had led to an acceleration in the negotiations, so as to meet the EU's October 1, 2014, deadline if duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access to the EU was to be retained.[66] In accordance with the so-called rendezvous clause inserted in the text of the agreements, the parties postponed to future discussions, without any further precision on the calendar, the deep integration issues—services, competition, investment, and trade-related regulatory matters like public procurement, competition, and intellectual property rights. Another contentious issue, most favored nation (MFN) status, had been resolved through its adoption as a principle, but without automaticity to its implementation.[67]

The negotiations toward the conclusion of EPAs focused therefore on reciprocity and WTO compatibility in trade arrangements.[68] EPA negotiations also brutally exposed the weak foundations of the RECs due to their member states' multiple and overlapping affiliations (see chapter 11 in this volume). The negative effects of decades of procrastination over rationalizing and harmonizing the African "spaghetti bowl" were suddenly highlighted as the EU required that states could be part of only one negotiating group. Within the RECs, a wedge was also driven by the distinctive trade-regime offers made to the least-developed countries (LDCs) and to the middle-income countries: the LDCs were eligible for DFQF access for all products except arms under the EU's specific Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which was a continuation of the nonreciprocal preference system. For the middle-income countries, reciprocal trade liberalization had to be negotiated, in compliance with WTO rules.

Within the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the shallow commitment of member states to their economic integration agendas was not much of a surprise. Some of them decided to join other negotiating configurations, while others simply opted for individual EPA negotiations or EBA offers, thus rejecting the idea of a regional EPA. For COMESA and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the EPA negotiations turned out to be a factor of institutional "disarticulation."[69] This was highlighted, in the case of COMESA, by the need to form an ad hoc regional negotiation group so as to accommodate, under the name of the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) regional configuration, the gathering of 5 out of the 15 SADC members (Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) along with 11 out of the 20 COMESA states; 9 COMESA members were not party to the ESA group, as they were not eligible for EPAs (Egypt and Libya) or chose to belong to SADC (Swaziland), the East African Community (EAC) (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda), or the Central Africa (DRC) configurations.

In Southern Africa, the SADC regional EPA, concluded with the EU in July 2014, was in effect concluded by the five members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) plus Mozambique. It was therefore a SACU+ agreement that was concluded after difficult negotiations. Following South Africa's decision to join in the negotiations toward a regional SADC economic partnership agreement, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (the BLNS states) had been compelled to endorse the terms of South Africa's own EPA. In the case of the SACU+, as for ECOWAS and the EAC, the stress test of the EPA negotiations operated as an incentive that revealed a capacity to craft common policies (ECOWAS) or build upon common policies (EAC, SACU). ECOWAS and the EAC were the only RECs that negotiated on behalf of all their members. They were also the only cases where RECs were able to build upon common policies due to their adoption of a common external tariff (CET).[70]

Besides the adoption of its long-awaited customs union, ECOWAS (plus Mauritania, which had been a signatory of the ECOWAS Lagos Charter in 1975) capitalized on its earlier decision to bury the hatchet with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and promote a policy of convergence through the endorsement of the smaller grouping's CET. The formation of an EAC EPA group had been made possible by the decision of Tanzania to leave the SADC EPA negotiations, following what is described as substantial pressure from the European negotiators.[71] The five member states of the EAC first negotiated as a group within the ESA, then formed an independent grouping and concluded, in December 2007, a specific interim economic partnership agreement (IEPA) with the EU. The move was interpreted as a sign of regional cohesion, since, with the exception of Kenya, all the other member states were LDCs and, as such, were eligible for the EBA nonreciprocal trade offer.

Conclusion

The dynamism of Africa's transborder networks and spaces offers a sharp contrast with the modest achievements of the RECs. This chapter has discussed cross-border flows in Africa and how regionalization refers to "open, diverging and complex processes."[72] Transborder forms of regional integration depend and build upon the preservation of tariff and nontariff barriers. The adoption of trade liberalization policies, far from bringing to an end the exploitation of cross-border differentials within Africa, has encouraged the internationalization, and at times the criminalization, of the products and networks involved. The African continent is today a global interface and at times a key hub for an eclectic list of products: second-hand cloth and cigarettes[73]; gold,[74] gemstones, diamonds,[75] and ivory[76]; narcotics[77]; fake drugs; and petroleum products (in conjunction with the development of "illegal bunkering" in Nigeria).[78] Transborder flows and networks also thrive on these new opportunities. In the case of state failure, the emergence of entrepreneurs of insecurity opens new perspectives, based on the fragmentation of national territories and dilution of state authority.

Regionalization also proceeds from the defragmentation of economies and markets. Frequently depicted as an alternative to the stalled integration agendas of the RECs, defragmentation reflects a changing political landscape whereby unilateral policy initiatives combine with enhanced state capacity to enforce public policies and a private sector friendly climate stimulated by the African frontier syndrome. The rehabilitation of transport corridors and the effects of the dissemination of cell-phone technology represent tangible contributions to the deepening of Africa's global integration. However, it is too early to conclude whether this will also contribute to the build-up of enhanced regional capacity. If the 12-year-long EPA negotiations with the EU are to be considered as a stress test for the RECs, only two, ECOWAS and the EAC, passed. In Southern Africa, a reinforcement of SACU has been achieved at the expense of SADC (see also chapter 11 in this volume). The failure of the remaining RECs to demonstrate an ability to make sense in the negotiations does not augur well of their future at a time when Africa needs to craft its own responses to the scramble for "deep" and quasi-multilateral (mega-regional) agreements.[79]

Notes

1. Dominik Kopińsky, Andrzej Polus, and Wojciech Tycholiz, *Africa-Europe on the Global Chessboard: The New Opening*, Central and Eastern Europe Development Institute, 2013, http://ceedinstitute.org/report/1732 (accessed November 2, 2014), pp. 14–38.
2. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Union (AU), and African Development Bank (AfDB), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V: Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area*, June 2012, http://www.uneca.org/publications/assessing-regional-integration-africa-v (accessed November 2, 2014), pp. 29–60.
3. Paul Brenton and Gözde Isik (eds.), *De-Fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional Trade Integration in Goods and Services*, World Bank Development Policy Review no. 68490, 2012, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default

/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/05/03/000333038_20120503000714/Rendered/PDF/684900ESW0Whit00Box367921B00PUBLIC0.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), pp. 1–4.

4. See Daniel C. Bach, *Regionalism in Africa: Genealogies, Institutions and Transstate Networks* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).
5. Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, "Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands," *Journal of World History* 8, no. 2 (1997), 211–42.
6. Tanja Börzel, "Do All Roads Lead to Regionalism?," in Tanja Börzel, Lukas Goltermann, Mathias Lohaus, and Kai Striebinger (eds.), *Roads to Regionalism: Genesis, Design, and Effects of Regional Organizations* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p. 255; Shawn Breslin and Richard Higgott, "Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New," *New Political Economy* 5, no. 3 (2000), 333–52; Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, "Introduction," in Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds.), *Regionalism and World Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), pp. 1–20.
7. Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (1995), 332; Emmanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Millennium* 26 (1997), 249–77; Ben Rosamund and Alex Warleigh-Lack, "Studying Regions Comparatively: Back to the Future?," in Alex Warleigh-Lack, Nick Robinson, and Ben Rosamond (eds.), *New Regionalism and the European Union: Dialogues, Comparisons, and New Research Directions* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 18–35.
8. Andrew W. Axline, "Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World," *International Organization* 31, no. 1 (1977), 83.
9. On sovereignty-enhancing versus sovereignty-pooling, see Richard Higgott, "Economic Co-operation in the Asia Pacific: A Theoretical Comparison with the European Union," *Journal of European Public Policy* 2, no. 3 (1995), 361–83.
10. Michael Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998); John Harrison, "Re-reading the New Regionalism: A Sympathetic Critique," *Space and Polity* 10, no. 1 (2006), 21–46.
11. Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Theorizing the Rise of Regionness," *New Political Economy* 5, no. 3 (2000), 457–73.
12. Joseph S. Nye, "Introduction," in Joseph S. Nye (ed.), *International Regionalism: Readings* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. vii.
13. Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence," 334; Lukas Goltermann, Mathias Lohaus, Alexander Spielau, and Kai Striebinger, "Roads to Regionalism: Concepts, Issues, and Cases," in Börzel, Goltermann, Lohaus, and Striebinger, *Roads to Regionalism*, p. 4; Lousie Fawcett and Hélène Gandois, "Regionalism in Africa and the Middle East: Implications for EU Studies," *Journal of European Integration* 32, no. 6 (2010), 619.
14. Daniel C. Bach, *Regionalism, Regionalisation, and Global Integration across the African Continent* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
15. Daniel C. Bach, "Contraintes et Resources de la Frontière en Afrique," *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* 2, no. 3 (1995), 533–41; Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju, "Introduction: The Paradox of African Boundaries," in Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju (eds.), *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities* (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 1–17; Karine Bennafla,

Le Commerce Frontalier en Afrique Centrale: Acteurs, Espaces, Pratiques (Paris: Karthala, 2002); Wolfgang Zeller, "Special Issue: African Borderlands," *Critical African Studies* 5, no. 1 (2013), 1–3; Olivier Walther, "Border Markets: An Introduction," *Articulo: Journal of Urban Research* 10 (2014), http://articulo.revues.org/2532 (accessed November 12, 2014).

16. Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists, and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier* (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), p. 232.
17. Boubacar Barry, "Histoire et Perception des Frontières en Afrique aux XIXe et XXe Siècles: Les Problèmes de l'Intégration Africain," in United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (ed.), *Des Frontières en Afrique du XIIe au XXe Siècle* (Paris: UNESCO, 2005), pp. 55–72; Anthony I. Asiwaju, *Western Yorubaland Under European Rule, 1889–1945* (London: Longman, 1976), pp. 141–8; Aiden Southall, "Partitioned Alur," in Anthony I. Asiwaju (ed.), *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884–1984* (London: Hurst, 1985), pp. 91–2; S. H. Phiri, "National Integration, Rural Development, and Frontier Communities: The Case of the Chewa and the Ngoni Astride Zambian Boundaries with Malawi and Mozambique," in Asiwaju, *Partitioned Africans*, p. 115.
18. T. L. Maliyamkono and Mboya S. D. Bagachwa, *The Second Economy in Tanzania* (London: James Currey, 1990); Janet MacGaffey (ed.), *The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).
19. Alice Sindzingre, "Réseaux, Organisations et Marchés: Exemples du Bénin," *Autrepart* 6 (1998), 86; John O. Igué and Bio Soulé, *L'Etat-Entrepôt au Bénin: Commerce Informel ou Solution à la Crise?* (Paris: Karthala, 1993); Jegghan Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958–1994* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2008); Stephen Golub and Ahmadu A. Mbaye, "National Trade Policies and Smuggling in Africa: The Case of the Gambia and Senegal," *World Development* 37, no. 3 (2009), 594–606.
20. The CFA franc zone is made up of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
21. Unless otherwise stated, this account of the Senegambia confederation draws from Ebrima Sall and H. Sallah, "Senegal and the Gambia: The Politics of Integration," in Momar C. Diop (ed.), *Le Sénégal et ses Voisins* (Dakar: Sociétés Espaces Temps, 1994), pp. 117–41; and Ebrima Sall, *Sénégambie: Territoires, Frontières, Espaces et Réseaux Sociaux*, Travaux et Documents du Centre d'Étude d'Afrique Noire no. 36, 1992, http://www.lam.sciencespobordeaux.fr/old/pageperso/td%2036.pdf (accessed September 8, 2014).
22. Senghor, *Politics of Senegambian Integration*, pp. 213–17.
23. John O. Igué, *Le Territoire et l'État en Afrique: Les Dimensions Spatiales du Développement* (Paris: Karthala, 1995), p. 184.
24. Judith Scheele, "Circulations Marchandes au Sahara: Entre Licite et Illicite," *Hérodote* 142 (2011), 143–62; Ashley Neese Bybee, "The Twenty-First Century Expansion of the Transnational Drug Trade in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 66, no. 1 (2012), 69–84; Antonio Mazzitelli, "Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa: The Additional Challenge," *International Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2007), 1071–97.
25. Ken Vlassenroot, Sandrine Perrot, and Jeroen Cuvelier, "Doing Business Out of War: An Analysis of the UPDF's Presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (2012), 3; Kate Meagher, *Identity*

Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2010), p. 165; William Reno, "Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000), 433–60.

26. Brenton and Isik, *De-Fragmenting Africa*.
27. Marcelo Giugale, "Foreword," in ibid., p. xi.
28. Jan Tinbergen, *International Economic Integration*, 2nd rev. ed. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1965).
29. Giugale, "Foreword," p. xv–xvi.
30. Richard Baldwin, *21st Century Regionalism: Filling the Gap Between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rules*, World Trade Organization, April 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201108_e.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014).
31. Ibid., p. 16
32. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, "Mega-Regionals: What Is Going On?," in Global Agenda Council on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, "Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System?," World Economic Forum, July 2014, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Report_2014.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014), p. 13.
33. Baldwin, *21st Century Regionalism*, p. 3.
34. Giugale, "Foreword," p. xv.
35. Daniel C. Bach, "Thick Institutionalism vs Lean Integration: 'New' Regionalism in Africa," in Candice Moore (ed.), *Regional Integration and Social Cohesion: Perspectives from the Developing World* (Brussels: P.I.E. Lang, 2013), pp. 93–106.
36. Ibid., p. 49.
37. Paul Nugent, "Educating Rawlings: The Evolution of Government Strategy toward Smuggling," in Donald Rothchild (ed.), *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 81.
38. Ibid., p. 82.
39. This allows parties involved in trade and transport to log standardized information and documents with a single entry point. On the (slow) dissemination of similar programs across the continent, see UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI: Harmonizing Policies to Transform the Trading Environment*, 2013, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria_vi_english_full.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014), pp. 23–42.
40. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, *Key Factors in Establishing Single Windows for Handling Import/Export Procedures and Formalities: Trade Facilitation and the Single Window*, Economic Development and Globalization Division, E/ESCWA/EDGD/2011/5, November 10, 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/case_studies_e/escwa_e.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014), p. 29.
41. UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI*, p. 54
42. Ibid., p. 41.
43. Daniel C. Bach, "Africa in International Relations: The Frontier as Concept and Metaphor," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 1 (2013), 1–24.
44. Andrew England, "Africa's Expanding Financial Sector Draws Increasing Interest from Investors," *Financial Times*, October 5, 2014.

45. Arnold Ekpe, chief executive of Ecobank from 1996–2001 and 2005–12, recalls how "we took a near bankrupt bank with a $500m balance sheet operating in five countries and with no profits to speak of and turned it into the leading pan-African bank with $20bn in assets, 1,200 branches and pre-tax profits of over $380m." Quoted in William Wallis, "African Banks: Fragile Dream," *Financial Times*, March 12, 2014.
46. England, "Africa's Expanding Financial Sector."
47. Williams Wallis, "Aliko Dangote: Africa's Richest Man," *Financial Times*, October 11, 2013.
48. Scott D. Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa: From Patrimonialism to Profit* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012); Barbara E. McDade and Anita Spring, "The 'New Generation of African Entrepreneurs': Networking to Change the Climate for Business and Private Sector–Led Development," *Entrepreneurship and Regional Development: An International Journal* 17, no. 1 (2007), 17–42.
49. Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium: The Information Age, Economy, Society, and Culture*, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 92.
50. UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI*, p. 46.
51. Daniel Thomas, "Lower-Cost Handsets Help Drive Africa's Internet Revolution," *Financial Times*, October 5, 2014.
52. Daniel Thomas and Katrina Manson, "Africa's Digital Money Heads to Europe," *Financial Times*, March 30, 2014.
53. Thomas and Manson, "Africa's Digital Money Heads to Europe"; Wallis, "African Banks."
54. UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI*, p. 31.
55. Except in South Africa, most networks have been operating within their original structures and have used (but for a few exceptions) the same tracks for over a century. Ibid., pp. 34–5.
56. Cayley Bowland and Lisa Otto, "Implementing Development Corridors: Lessons from the Maputo Corridor," South African Institute of International Affairs Policy Briefing no. 54, August 2012, http://www.mcli.co.za/mcli-web/downloads/docs/PB54-MaputoCorridor.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014).
57. Daniel C. Bach, "The Lure of Parochialism: Cross-Border Regionalism as a Gateway," in Ian Taylor and Fredrik Söderbaum (eds.) *Afro-Regions: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Micro-Regionalism in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2005), pp. 177–8.
58. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Economic Development in Africa Report 2013: Intra-African Trade—Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism*, UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2013, 2013, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014), p. 111.
59. Anna Alves, "China's 'Win-Win' Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals in Africa," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (2013), 217.
60. Sören Scholvin and Georg Strüver, "Tying the Region Together or Tearing It Apart? China and Transport Infrastructure Projects in the SADC Region," in André du Pisani, Gerhard Erasmus, and Trudi Hartzenberg, *Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Yearbook 2012*, Trade Law Centre, http://www.tralac.org/publications/article/4655-monitoring-regional-integration-in-southern-africa-yearbook-2012.html (accessed November 14, 2014), p. 189.

61. Alves, "China's Win-Win Cooperation," p. 231. In May 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of a $2 billion fund to promote multilateral initiatives. Javier Blas, "China Changes Tack on Africa with $2bn Multilateral Investment," *Financial Times*, May 18, 2014.
62. Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stipulates that "substantially all the trade" must be liberalized within a reasonable time frame. World Trade Organization (WTO), *The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, July 1986, entered into force January 1, 1948, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014).
63. Sanoussi Bilal, "Can the EU Be a Model and a Driving Force for Regional Integration in Developing Countries?," paper presented at the second annual conference of the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and Trade, October 29–30, 2004, http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/11119a03.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014), p. 12.
64. Isabelle Ramdoo, *ECOWAS and SADC Economic Partnership Agreements: A Comparative Analysis*, European Centre for Development Policy Management Discussion Paper no. 165, http://ecdpm.org/publications/ecowas-sadc-economic-partnership-agreement-comparative-analysis (accessed November 14, 2014).
65. Ibid., p. 11.
66. Ibid., p. 3.
67. Ramdoo (ibid., p. 9) states that "any future preferences would have to be examined before [most favoured nation (MFN) status] is extended to the EU." She notes that the MFN clause also "excludes agreements among African regions and countries, ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group] countries and other developing countries and LDCs [least-developed countries]."
68. The ECOWAS economic partnership agreement (EPA) is an exception, as it covers trade and development cooperation, to be provided under the West African Programme Accords de Partenariat Économique pour le Développement (PAPED).
69. Rodrigo Tavares and Vanessa Tang, "Regional Economic Integration in Africa: Impediments to Progress?," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18, no. 2 (2011), 228.
70. The ECOWAS common external tariff (CET) was agreed in January 2014 and is to be effective from January 1, 2015. EPA negotiations would seem to have contributed to stimulating the conclusion of decade-long negotiations among ECOWAS member states.
71. Ulrike Lorenz-Carl, "When the 'Not So Weak' Bargain with the 'Not So Strong': Whose Agency Matters in the Economic Partnership Negotiations?," in Ulrike Lorenz-Carl and Martin Rempe (eds.), *Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p. 69.
72. Steffen Wippel, "Conceptual Considerations of 'Space' and 'Region': Political, Economic, and Social Dynamics of Region-Building," in Steffen Wippel (ed.), *Regionalizing Oman: Political, Economic, and Social Dynamics* (New York: Springer, 2013), p. 29.
73. Olivier Walther, "Business, Brokers and Borders: The Structure of West African Trade Networks," University of Southern Denmark Department of Border Region Studies, Working Paper no. 01/14, March 20, 2014, http://repec.sam.sdu.dk/sdn/wpaper/1-Walther-2014-BBB-WP.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014); Emmanuel Grégoire, "La Trilogie des Réseaux Marchands Haoussa: Un

Clientélisme Social, Religieux et Étatique," in Emmanuel Grégoire and Pascal Labazée (eds.), *Grands Commerçants d'Afrique de l'Ouest: Logiques et Pratiques d'un Groupe d'Hommes d'Affaires Contemporains* (Paris: Karthala-Orstom, 1993), pp. 71–100; Daniel C. Bach, "Régionalisme et Régionalisation à Travers le Prisme de l'Aire Saharo-Sahélienne," in Laurence Marfaing and Steffen Wippel (eds.), *Les Relations Transsahariennes à l'Époque Contemporaine: Un Espace en Constante Mutation* (Paris: Karthala, 2004), pp. 457–79.

74. Kate Meagher, "The Hidden Economy: Informal and Parallel Trade in Northwestern Uganda," *Review of African Political Economy* 17, no. 47 (1990), 64–83.
75. In the early 1980s, it was estimated that 40 percent of emeralds on the international market came from Zambia, 80 percent of which were illegally exploited and exported. See Terence Musuku, "Zambie: La Ruée Vers l'Émeraude," *Politique Africaine* 9 (1983), http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/009063.pdf (accessed December 15, 2014), pp. 63–8.
76. Iain Douglas-Hamilton and Oria Douglas-Hamilton, *Battle for the Elephants* (London: Doubleday, 1992); Samuel K. Wasser, Bill Clark, and Cathy Laurie, "The Ivory Trail," *Scientific American* 301 (2009), 68–76.
77. Éric Fottorino, *La Piste Blanche: L'Afrique sous l'Emprise de la Drogue* (Paris: Balland, 1991); Alain Labrousse and Alain Wallon (eds.), *La Planète des Drogues: Organisations Criminelles, Guerres et Blanchiment* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1993).
78. Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force, *Final Report of the Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force*, Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources (Nigeria), November 1, 2012, http://publicaffairs.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/final.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014); William Wallis, "Bunkering: Evidence Suggests It Is On the Rise," *Financial Times*, November 27, 2012.
79. David Camroux, "Regionalism in Asia as Disguised Multilateralism: A Critical Analysis of the East Asia Summit and the Trans-Pacific Partnership," *International Spectator* 47, no. 1 (September 2012), 97–115.

Chapter 5

Infrastructure and Regional Integration in Africa

Afeikhena Jerome and David Nabena

Introduction

There is a compelling case for regional integration in Africa as the right strategy for developing its crippled infrastructure, accelerating industrialization, and boosting further integration into the world economy. Despite the much acclaimed rhetoric of an "Africa rising," the number of poor individuals on the continent is increasing, and inclusive growth and structural transformation remain elusive.[1]

The process of integrating Africa gained traction when the Abuja Treaty, adopted in June 1991, entered into force in May 1994.[2] Article 28 of the treaty proposed regional economic communities (RECs) as the building blocks of integration in Africa. It sought to create an African Economic Community (AEC) through the gradual harmonization, coordination, and effective integration of Africa's eight RECs as the "pillars" of the AEC.[3] Moreover, the Abuja Treaty delineated a clear plan for the establishment of a continental free trade area by 2017, and the integration of the RECs into a single customs union with a common currency, a central bank, and a pan-African parliament by 2028. Progress toward achieving these objectives has been slow because the RECs are moving at different paces, making the attainment of the AEC by 2028 an illusion.

The spotlight of scholarly and policy literature has tilted toward the record of failure of regional integration, despite Africa having more RECs than elsewhere in the world. Regional integration in Africa is still largely an affair of government, rather than of the people. A recurring challenge is the issue of overlapping REC memberships of African states (see also chapter 11 in this volume). Of the 55 countries in Africa, only 8 are members of just one regional community, while Kenya belongs to five regional schemes.[4] Overlapping memberships are a major hindrance to the implementation of regional integration schemes in Africa, leading to limited trade benefits from regional agreements.[5]

A major criticism of Africa's integration process is centered on Africa's adherence to a "linear" integration model (see also chapter 2 in this volume).[6] Deep integration could improve Africa's record on regional integration, since border measures represent only a fraction of the impediments facing regional trade on the continent, with the larger role played by structural economic shortcomings such as lack of infrastructure and critical skills.

A sorely neglected aspect of integration in Africa is the link between regional integration and Africa's regional infrastructure. Currently, Africa is the least-integrated continent physically and economically; intra-African imports accounted for only 14 percent of Africa's total imports in 2013,[7] and Africa's share of total global exports was only 3 percent in 2014.[8] Africa's mounting infrastructure deficit has been frustrating integration efforts and stunting growth. Experiences from elsewhere in the world, as reviewed in this chapter, demonstrate that infrastructure, in both hard and soft forms, facilitates regional integration. The European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have shown how integrating infrastructure can deliver economies of scale in production and support spatial integration, enabling market efficiency and trade as well as the mobility of production factors, such as capital and skilled labor. Moreover, infrastructure integration constitutes an integral part of many regional integration schemes such as ASEAN and the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR).

Africa's Infrastructure Stock

Africa has the smallest infrastructure stock of any region in the world, particularly in energy and transportation. A 2011 study under the auspices of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Union (AU), and the African Development Bank (AfDB) reported that the road access rate (the proportion of people living within two kilometers of an all-season road) in Africa was only 34 percent, compared to 50 percent in other parts of the developing world, and that transport costs were up to 100 percent higher than in other developing parts of the world. It was also estimated that only 30 percent of the African population had access to electricity, compared with 70–90 percent in other developing regions of the world. Internet penetration on the continent was just 6 percent, compared with an average of 40 percent in the rest of the developing world.[9]

Lack of adequate access to physical infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, and logistics is often highlighted as a major impediment to trade, investment, and cross-border mobility of labor in Africa. A 2013 study conducted under the auspices of the World Economic Forum, the AfDB, the World Bank, and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs found that poor infrastructure partly explains the low competitiveness of African countries relative to other developing economies. Africa's low levels of productivity, low share of world exports, and low levels of intra-African trade also attest to the infrastructure gap.[10] Furthermore, the study found that the poor state of infrastructure in many parts of Africa is stunting the growth of the continent's gross domestic product (GDP) by about 2 percent every year, and diminishing business productivity by as much as 40 percent.[11] All of this has resulted in Africa having the lowest productivity levels in the world.[12]

Since the turn of the millennium, many African countries have made progress in improving their infrastructure, but results have been mixed across sectors and country groups. The African Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI), compiled by the AfDB, shows some overall progress between 2000 and 2010 (see figure 5.1). The AIDI covers four sectors: transport, electricity, information and communications technology (ICT), and water and sanitation. These sectors are measured by nine indicators. The AIDI is a weighted average of the normalized subindices of the four sectors.[13] The most rapid progress has occurred in sub-Saharan Africa's low-income countries, with more fragile countries lagging behind.[14]

The top five ranked countries in the 2010 AIDI were Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa, while the bottom ten countries were Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Tanzania. The results by subregion indicate that North Africa occupies the top position, followed by Southern Africa. Central



Figure 5.1 African Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI) scores for 2010

Source: AfDB, *The Africa Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI)*, May 2013, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic_Brief_-_The_Africa_Infrastructure_Development_Index.pdf (accessed March 26, 2015), p. 6.

Africa held the third position from 2000 through 2009, but then fell to fourth place, behind West Africa, in 2010. East Africa remained in its bottom position throughout the entire period. In sum, Africa has insufficient and low-quality infrastructure on the one hand, and inefficient and expensive services on the other.

Transport Infrastructure

Reliable transport infrastructure in the four subsectors—roads, railways, air transport, and ports—is essential for regional integration. Infrastructure is particularly crucial for landlocked countries because their inability to directly access maritime transportation networks creates additional burdens, including significantly higher transport costs. The continent's 16 landlocked countries are constrained in getting their goods to markets and in importing goods because of the lack of multimodal infrastructure that can accommodate their trade requirements.[15]

Road Infrastructure

Although roads are the predominant mode of transport for freight and passengers in Africa, major deficits exist in road infrastructure throughout the continent. A significant percentage of Africa's road networks (52.8 percent in 2011) are unpaved.[16] The Trans-African Highway (TAH), currently at the heart of regional connectivity, has stalled.[17] The TAH was proposed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) as far back as 1971, when a majority of African countries had completed decolonization.[18] The aim of the TAH was to give every African country access to markets and ports. As planned, the TAH comprises nine primary highway routes totaling 56,683 kilometers. Apart from the 8,640-kilometer Cairo–Dakar highway, which was fully completed in 2005, all other routes have significant missing links.

Rail Infrastructure

Africa's railway infrastructure is as poorly developed as its roads. In 2005, Africa had a total railway network of 90,320 kilometers (3.1 kilometers of rail for every 1,000 square kilometers), most of which was disjointed. The railways served only 1 percent of the global railway passenger traffic and carried 2 percent of global goods. The Gautrain, which was launched in South Africa in 2010, is Africa's only state-of-the-art high-speed rail project.[19]

Railway networks in Africa are generally old, some over one hundred years old, and technically outdated, with ageing tracks that suffer from insufficient ballast, rail-wear, and deteriorating earthworks. This poor railway network has resulted in a low share of rail freight in intra-African trade. The rehabilitation of old railways largely built during the colonial era is, however, gaining steam across Africa. Over 350 kilometers of the Uganda–Kenya railway, which broke ground in 1896, will be rehabilitated by 2017. Meanwhile, Ethiopia is expected to reopen its 724-kilometer colonial-era rail line in early 2016.[20] Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is also making progress, with over 90 percent of its existing railway lines (about 3,500 kilometers) being rehabilitated.

Air Infrastructure

Fostering the aviation industry would be a major boost for regional integration in Africa. However, Africa remains the world's smallest air traffic market despite recent growth, accounting for only 2.85 percent of global revenue passenger kilometers and 3 percent of revenue ton kilometers in 2011.[21] African airlines also operate a small share of the world's commercial passenger and freight aircraft, at 5.5 percent from September 2012 to August 2013, thereby having the lowest level of aircraft per capita of any world region. The average age of these fleets is the oldest of any in the world, at 17 years in the same time period compared to a global average of 13 years.[22]

Ironically, connectivity from Africa to other continents is more developed than connectivity within the continent. Of the African airlines that service the intercontinental market, five are dominant: Royal Air Maroc, Egyptair, Ethiopian Airways, Kenyan Airways, and South African Airways, operating from their respective hubs in Casablanca, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Johannesburg. West Africa's airline activity fractured and declined sharply after the demise of several carriers, including Air Afrique in 2002, Nigerian Airways in 2003, and Ghana Airways in 2004.

In 1999, the Yamoussoukro Decision was adopted, the single most important air transport reform initiative for Africa. Notwithstanding the binding nature of this policy decision, which calls for the full liberalization of air transport services, aviation services have not effectively developed in Africa, resulting in uncoordinated, erratic, and poor air transportation services, with a poor safety record. As John Tambi, a NEPAD infrastructure expert, noted in 2010: "25% of all global aviation incidents occur in Africa, which is quite concerning."[23]

Energy Infrastructure

Africa's largest infrastructure deficiency is in the energy sector, whether measured in terms of energy consumption, generation capacity, or security of supply. The energy sector in most parts of Africa is characterized by a lack of access (especially in rural areas), low purchasing power, low energy efficiency, and overdependence on traditional biomass for meeting basic energy needs. Biomass accounts for as much as two-thirds of total final energy consumption in Africa. In comparison, biomass accounts for about 3 percent of final energy consumption in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.[24] A large segment of the continent's population lives in conditions of acute "energy poverty."[25]

In recent years, nearly two-thirds of states in Africa have experienced an acute energy crisis, with frequent and extended electricity outages. Even the more developed states of the continent, like South Africa, have had problems in this regard as recently as 2015.[26] The energy deficit is the result of the continent's limited generation capacity. As David Appleyard noted in 2014: "Africa holds about 12% of the world's hydropower potential, with a technically feasible output of about 1,800 TWh/year [terawatt-hours per year]. Yet, Africa produces only about 3% of the global hydropower and exploits less than 10% of its technical potential, the lowest proportion of any of the world's regions."[27] Many African governments have national power systems below the minimum efficient scale of a single plant. If African countries could share wide-scale and cost-effective energy resources, regional trade could reduce electricity expenses by $2 billion annually. African governments are also implementing a growing number of cooperative energy projects. Beginning with the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP), created in 1995, the five regions now have, as Callixte Kambanda notes, power pools that are "specialized institutions in their respective [RECs]." But "although all power pools are working hard to promote energy trade, the level of energy traded in 2009 ranged only between 0.2% (in CAPP [Central Africa Power Pool]) and 7.5% (in SAPP)."[28]

Information and Communications Technology Infrastructure

Since the mid-1990s, Africa has seen dramatic growth in access to telecommunications services. Mobile-cellular network penetration reached 71.2 percent in 2014 from 12.4 in 2005 (see figure 5.2). Internet-access penetration, however, was just 18.9 percent in 2014—roughly half of the developing-country average—and only 9.7 percent of households had Internet access at home. ICT is also revolutionizing development in Africa. In Nigeria, the electronic wallet (e-wallet) is helping to boost fertilizer distribution and reduce corruption. In Kenya, M-Pesa has transformed mobile banking,[29] while telemedicine is also helping to overcome the lack of trained healthcare workers and specialists in rural areas.[30]

Africa has witnessed considerable growth in the number of undersea telecommunications cables (see figure 5.3), from barely one in 2000 to fifteen in 2015, with two more scheduled to become active in 2016. This essentially ended the inflated pricing of satellite telecommunications that prevailed until recently.

While considerable advances have been made in the area of telephony, Africa has been left behind in the shift to broadband Internet connectivity (the delivery of Internet at speeds of 256 kilobits per second or more). The Broadband Commission for Digital Development's 2014 *State of Broadband* report indicates that the highest-ranking African countries (out of a total of 190 countries) in terms of fixed (wired) broadband subscription in 2013 were Seychelles at 63, with 12.9 percent of the population having such subscriptions; and Mauritius at 65, with 12.5 percent access. Tunisia was next, with 5 percent access, and in most other African nations fewer than 2 percent of the population had access to wired broadband Internet.[31] Botswana, the highest-ranking African country in terms of mobile broadband Internet access, was nineteenth globally with 74 percent access, while Ghana (second in Africa) was a distant follower, ranked at 52 with 39.9 percent of the population having access to mobile broadband.[32] African governments cannot afford to be on the sidelines. Governments must put in place policies to revolutionize broadband deployment on the continent.



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015*
Fixed-telephone subscriptions	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2
Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions	12.4	17.8	23.5	32.2	8	45.4	52.3	58.9	65.6	71.2	73.5
Active mobile-broadband subscriptions	0	0	0	0	0	1.8	4.6	8.5	10.3	12.9	17.4
Fixed broadband subscriptions	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5
Households with a computer (%)	2.9	3.3	3.9	4.4	4.9	5.4	6.6	7.7	8.2	9.1	9.9
Households with Internet access at home (%)	1	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.5	3.7	5.9	7.5	8.6	9.7	10.7
Individuals using the Internet (%)	2.4	3.3	3.9	5.9	7.3	9.8	12.6	14.4	16.7	18.9	20.7

Figure 5.2 African trends in information and communications technology

*Estimate.

Data Source: Data based on the ITU BDT Regions, see: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/definitions/regions.aspx.

Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database.



Figure 5.3 Africa's undersea cables

Source: Steve Song, "African Undersea Cables", Many Possibilities, July 2015, https://manypossibilities.net/african-undersea-cables (accessed 14 July 2015).

Transnational and Cross-Border Infrastructure in Africa

Bridging the infrastructure gap has been identified as an important element of promoting regional integration in Africa, and several regional initiatives have been put in place.

New Partnership for Africa's Development Projects

As a 2010 review of NEPAD's infrastructure projects explained: "The New Partnership for Africa's Development…had launched the Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) in 2002 to kick-start the process of developing regional infrastructure in Africa. STAP consisted of approximately 120 regional infrastructure projects spread across the continent, covering four sectors—Energy, ICT, Transport and Trans-boundary Water."[33] A media report on the program pointed out: "The project portfolio constitutes a selection of infrastructure programmes or projects that support regional integration, with a value estimated at $20 [billion]."[34]

STAP was expected to be completed in 2007 and complemented by a more comprehensive medium- to long-term action program, which was never unveiled. The review of the project "reveals that the implementation progress of the STAP programme has been below expectations." In all, 103 STAP projects were reviewed; of these, only 16 reached completion.[35]

Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa

There is a growing focus on the regional dimension of infrastructure development in Africa. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) in July 2012 as the integrated strategic blueprint for continental infrastructure transformation from 2012 to 2040. The program merges various continental infrastructure initiatives, such as NEPAD's short-term action plan and medium- to long-term strategic framework (MLTSF). Its first batch of projects, the priority action plan consists of 51 cross-border programs (24 in transport, 15 in energy, 9 in transboundary water, and 3 in ICT) aimed at bridging the infrastructure gap, boosting intra-African trade, and enhancing regional integration.[36]

PIDA is projected to cost $360 billion up to 2040, with the elements of the priority action plan requiring $68 billion by 2020. By 2040, if completed according to plan, PIDA projects would create 37,300 kilometers of modern highways; 30,200 kilometers of modern railways; 1.3 billion tons of added port capacity; 61,099 megawatts of hydroelectric production; 16,500 kilometers of interconnecting power lines; 21,101 cubic hectometers of new water storage capacity; and 6 terabits of broadband Internet capacity.[37]

The AfDB will take the lead in PIDA's implementation, which will be managed by the RECs working closely with their respective member states and specialized agencies of the AU. In this regard, the AfDB has already established "Africa50" as an infrastructure investment platform with an initial investment of about $500 million to champion its implementation.[38]

The Financing Summit for Africa's Infrastructure, held in Dakar, Senegal, from June 14 to 15, 2014, prioritized the financing of the 16 infrastructure projects listed in table 5.1 to accelerate the implementation of PIDA.

Regional Economic Communities and Infrastructure Development

As UNECA notes: "There is a complex relationship, often in a two-way direction, between regional integration [and infrastructure]. For instance, while infrastructure development is an essential component of regional integration, through physical connectivity, a regional approach to infrastructure development can substantially reduce infrastructure costs through economies of scale—especially in the energy sector."[39] Many regional economic groupings in Africa have laid out specific objectives and provisions for infrastructure development, though many of them are still at inception stages.

Table 5.1 Projects approved by the Dakar Financing Conference

Abidjan–Ouagadougou–Bamako multimodal transport corridor
Abidjan–Lagos coastal corridor
Batoka Gorge hydropower project
Brazzaville–Kinshasa road and rail project, and railway line to Ilebo
Dakar–Bamako rail revitalization and signaling
Dar es Salaam port expansion
Douala–N'Gaoundéré–N'Djamena corridor project
Juba–Torit–Kapoeta–Nadapal road
Jinja–Kampala road upgrade
Lusaka–Lilongwe information and communications technology link
Nigeria–Algeria gas pipeline
North African power transmission corridor
Ruzizi III hydropower project
Sambangalou hydropower project
Serenje–Nakonde road
Zambia–Tanzania–Kenya power transmission line

Sources: AU and NEPAD, *The Dakar Agenda for Action: Moving Forward for Financing Africa's Infrastructure*, June 15, 2014, http://www.nepad.org/sites/default/files/Dakar%20Agenda%20for%20Action%20-%20English.pdf (accessed May 27, 2015), p. 2 (note 1); NEPAD, "Financing Africa's Infrastructure Development: Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships for Regional Infrastructure Transformation," June 14–15, 2014, http://www.nepad.org/system/files/DFS%20Brochure%20-%20English%20version.pdf (accessed May 27, 2015).

The five-nation East African Community (EAC), which has made the most progress on integration in Africa (see also chapter 10 in this volume), has aggressive plans to develop roads, ports, railways, transmission lines, and oil and gas infrastructure over the next decade as part of its 2015–25 strategy. It is also making concerted efforts to improve handling capacity and efficiency at the ports of Dar es Salaam and Mombasa.

In the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan is a major component of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP).[40] The master plan, which was signed by member states at the August 2012 SADC summit, will be implemented over three five-year intervals: short-term (2012–17), medium-term (2017–22), and long-term (2022–7). Under the RISDP, SADC has collaborated with initiatives pursued under PIDA and the tripartite free trade area among SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the EAC (on the tripartite free trade area; see also chapter 11 in this volume).

COMESA has both the Priority Investment Plan and the Energy Master Plan, which seek to "make the region more competitive by reducing the high costs of infrastructure," with the transport, ICT, and energy sectors as the main priorities. As rolling programs, they will "continuously be updated as new priority projects are identified" and "aligned to [PIDA], as well as the COMESA-EAC-SADC Inter-Regional Infrastructure Master Plan."[41]

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with the assistance of the French consulting firm SOFRECO, is in the process of developing a 30-year regional master plan for infrastructure for 2015–45, taking PIDA into account. In October 2014, the organization also established the Project Preparation and Development Unit in Togo, with the mandate to prepare bankable infrastructure projects to facilitate private and public sector investments.

Despite these overtures, all of Africa's RECs have poor infrastructure, as shown in table 5.2 (and reflected as well in figure 5.1). Overall, SADC has better infrastructure compared to the other RECs.[42]

Not surprisingly, Africa has high-cost infrastructure relative to other regions of the world. As shown in table 5.3, the cost to export a container from Africa ranges from \$1,598 in ECOWAS to \$2,932 in ECCAS, compared to just \$743 in ASEAN and \$1,035 in the EU.

Lessons for Africa from Other Regions

The experiences of the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and South America provide lessons that Africa should consider in reforming its own policies for infrastructure development. These three regions demonstrate that the success of regional infrastructure projects is contingent upon the efficacy of regional institutions and the harmonization of regulatory practices in the participating countries. Some of these include the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects in the EU, the Asian Highway and Greater Mekong Subregion projects in Asia, and the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA).

Table 5.2 Regional Economic Community (REC) infrastructure indicators, 2011

	ECOWAS	EAC	SADC	ECCAS
Paved-road density (km/100 km^2 of arable land)	38	29	92	4
Mainline phone density (lines per thousand people)	28	6	80	13
Mobile-phone density (lines per thousand people)	72	46	133	84
Internet density (percentage of households with access)	2	2	4	1
Generation capacity (megawatts per million people)	31	16	176	47
Electricity coverage (percentage of households)	18	6	24	21
Improved water (percentage of households)	63	71	68	53
Improved sanitation (percentage of household)	35	42	46	28

Note: ECCAS is the Economic Community of Central African States.

Source: Rupa Ranganathan and Vivien Foster, "ECOWAS's Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 5899, December 2011, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5899 (accessed March 26, 2015), p. 14.

Table 5.3 Cost to export and import containers, 2014

	Export ($ per container)	Import ($ per container)
ECCAS	2932	3970
EAC	2459	3350
IGAD	2424	3311
COMESA	2125	2900
SADC	1904	2428
CEN-SAD	1905	2459
ECOWAS	1598	2111
AMU	1084	1388
EU	1035	1070
ASEAN	744	788

Note: IGAD is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development; CEN-SAD is the Community of Sahel-Saharan States; AMU is the Arab Maghreb Union.

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, *Facts & Figures: Regional Integration—Uniting to Compete*, August 23, 2014, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/publications/2014/2014-facts-&-figures-regional-integration-uniting-to-compete.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), p. 20.

The European Union

Infrastructure development is a priority on the policy agenda of the EU, which is generally regarded as a model for regional integration despite its current economic travails (see also chapters 2 and 15 in this volume). As the TEN-T website points out: "[The EU's] 27 Member States currently have five million km of paved roads, more than 215,000 km of rail lines and 41,000 km of navigable inland waterways."[43]

Realizing that "a well-running transport infrastructure is essential to maintaining the EU's competitiveness"[44] and achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda on growth and jobs, the TEN-T policy was established by the European Parliament and Council in 1996.[45] TEN-T is intended to form part of a wider system of trans-European networks, including the eTEN telecommunications network and the TEN-E energy network.[46]

As noted in a 2009 review, the TEN-T guidelines, adopted in 1996 and last amended in 2004, include two layers of planning: a comprehensive network (which outlines plans for rail, road, inland waterway, and combined transport, airport, and port networks), and a second layer of 30 priority projects of common interest.[47] As the European Commission's Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) notes: "The projects represent all transport modes—air, rail, road, and maritime/inland waterway—plus logistics and intelligent transport systems, and involve all EU Member States."[48] The program was budgeted at €8 billion for 2007–13.[49]

According to the INEA: "The TEN-T Executive Agency, created by the European Commission in 2006, [manages] the Programme on behalf of the European Commission."[50] However, "the transport ministries of the Member States also remain fully involved in their TEN-T projects, because of their strategic importance also on the national level. Often, national implementing bodies are charged with carrying-out the construction."[51]

The TEN-T program has no doubt played a vital role in financing transport infrastructure in Europe, allowing for a multimodal network that permits people and goods to circulate quickly and easily. TEN-T projects are also helping to build an environmentally friendly transport system in Europe.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Infrastructure has been an integral component of regional economic integration in Asia. Many initiatives are currently under way in Asia for the promotion and development of regional infrastructure in various sectors including roads, railways, seaports, airports, telecommunications, power, and logistics.

One notable project in the Asian Highway, first initiated in 1959, which became one of the three pillars—alongside the Trans-Asian Railway and the facilitation of land transport projects—of the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project when the latter was launched in 1992. While development of the Asian Highway slowed when financial assistance through the UN system was suspended, regional interest in the highway and its aim of promoting the development of an international road transport system was rekindled after the political and economic changes in the 1980s and 1990s in Southeast Asia.[52]

ALTID was to develop an integrated network of highways, railways, seaports, and airports linking Asia to selected locations in Europe. Silvia Dian Anggaraeni and Ali Muhyidin argue: "As a system of standardized roads intertwining many Asian countries and with links to Europe, the [Asian Highway] network has considerably supported the realization of Asian regionalism. The . . . network comprises about 143,000 kilometers of roads passing through 32 member countries; mostly developing countries."[53]

The project is largely supported by the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), which continues to promote the development of the Asian Highway network as part of its overall strategy of developing an integrated, intermodal transport and logistics system for the ASEAN region.[54]

South America

IIRSA, one of the most successful regional infrastructure initiatives in South America, was established in 2000 by the 12 countries of UNASUR to spearhead infrastructure development on the continent.

S. K. Mohanty and Piyadarshi Dash note:

> Twelve countries . . . are parties to this initiative [and] hold regular dialogue for effective conception, formulation, and implementation of regional infrastructure projects. Unlike [in the] EU where policies on infrastructure development evolved in a gradualist fashion, IIRSA has . . . an enabling institutional framework since inception to cater to various functions relating to project development and implementation. Most of the regional infrastructure projects are selected on the basis of consensus among the participating countries.[55]

As a report to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) explains, IIRSA is "expected to integrate highway networks, river ways, hydroelectric dams and telecommunications links throughout the region, particularly in remote, isolated areas to allow greater trade and create a 'South American community of nations.'"[56]

In 2012 the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) further noted: "The IIRSA project portfolio as of August 2011 contains 524 transport, energy and communications infrastructure projects spread over 10 integration and development hubs."[57] Of these, 74 percent (386 projects) had recorded concrete progress, 10 percent (53 projects) had already been completed, 34 percent (176 projects) were being executed, and the remaining 30 percent (158 projects) were in the planning phase.[58]

Mohanty and Dash explain:

> [The institutional architecture is framed around] a number of institutions under the overall guidance and supervision of the Executive Steering Committee (ESC). The ESC is composed of high-level representatives from [the] 12 [participating] countries and bears the responsibility of setting the vision, building consensus, and [issuing] recommendations on the technical work done by the Executive Technical Groups (GTEs) and Technical Coordination Committee (CCT). GTEs have the mandate of analyzing and making recommendations on harmonization and standardization of regulatory and legal frameworks; methods to identify and evaluate projects; environmental, social and economic analyses of projects and hubs; and institutional mechanisms. On the other hand, the CCT provides managerial and operational support for IIRSA activities including support for the GTEs.[59]

IIRSA is supported both technically and financially by a number of institutions, including the Andean Development Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata (Fonplata), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[60]

Conclusion

Although Africa's infrastructure is improving, the continent is deficient in both the hard and the soft infrastructure needed to stimulate regional integration. Poor infrastructure has no doubt contributed to Africa's limited integration and lack of competitiveness. In an effort to scale up deficient infrastructure in Africa, the leadership has unveiled PIDA as the blueprint for infrastructure development on the continent. If it is to succeed, PIDA must be given priority and implemented in an orderly manner, in recognition of the fact that previous continental endeavors have delivered only marginal results.

As experiences from other regions have demonstrated, a regional approach to infrastructure development can deliver substantial benefits. However, as Lesley Wentworth argues, "success . . . relies on willing and competent institutions, political support from the highest level, a community of citizens who understand the rationale for integration, and the need for infrastructure investment, and private-sector partners who come to the table with greater ambitions than simply the 'large profit' motive."[61]

As Dawn Nagar and Rosaline Daniel have pointed out, "development agencies and regional banks have promoted infrastructure development in Asia," as has also been the case in other regions of the world, as explored in this chapter.[62] Nagar and Daniel go on to argue that regional institutions such as the AfDB and the Development Bank of Southern Africa should do the same and step up efforts toward supporting regional infrastructure in Africa. But the RECs also need to play a greater role in PIDA implementation, through coordination of member states; development of regional frameworks, policies, and master plans; and establishment of the legal and regulatory conditions necessary for regional infrastructure, drawing on best practices developed in other regions.

Funding has been a major constraint in meeting Africa's infrastructure needs. A recent report from the Brookings Institution looked at options for improving infrastructure finance, in particular through private investment, official development finance (from both multilateral institutions and OECD donors), and official Chinese financing (an increasingly important element of investment in Africa).[63] Infrastructure financing from these major sources tripled from 2004 to 2012, and was spread widely throughout Africa—only fragile states experiencing severe governance challenges seem to have been left out of this largesse. Despite this, most African infrastructure continues to be funded not through external sources but from public budgets, even though the latter have tended to be ignored by the analytic literature. Subnational infrastructure projects are also not often discussed in the literature, and so could represent hidden infrastructure capacity gaps. To make up the $93 billion the continent needs for infrastructure improvement (as estimated by the Brookings report), African states need to increase their use of alternative funding sources, such as sovereign wealth funds, private sector funds, infrastructure and diaspora bonds, regional stock exchanges, and the securitization of remittances. There is precedent for success in these areas—for example, diaspora bonds and remittances have been used for infrastructure development in Asia.[64]

Notes

1. See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Union (AU), African Development Bank (AfDB), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *MDG 2014 Report: Assessing Progress in Africa Toward the Millennium Development Goals—Analysis of the Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda*, October 2014, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/2014_mdg_report.pdf (accessed May 26, 2015), pp. 12–14. The ratio of people in sub-Saharan Africa living on less than $1.25 per day declined from 1990 to 2010, but the absolute number of people with such low incomes increased.
2. AU, *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, adopted June 3, 1991, entered into force on May 12, 1994, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY.pdf (accessed May 29, 2015).
3. They are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community

of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

4. The countries belonging to only one regional economic community (REC) are Algeria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Kenya is a member of CEN-SAD, COMESA, the EAC, IGAD, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).
5. Elina Fergin, *Tangled Up in a Spaghetti Bowl: Trade Effects of Overlapping Preferential Trade Agreements in Africa*, bachelor's thesis in economics, Lund University School of Economics and Management, Fall 2011, https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/2296032 (accessed March 30, 2015), pp. 12–14, 27 (table), 29–30. See also Mo Ibrahim Foundation, *2014 Facts & Figures: Regional Integration—Uniting to Compete*, August 23, 2014, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/publications/2014/2014-facts-&-figures-regional-integration-uniting-to-compete.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), pp. 4–5.
6. Trudi Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration in Africa," World Trade Organization (WTO) Economic Research and Statistics Division Staff Working Paper no. ERSD-2011–14, October 2011, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201114_e.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), p. 2. See also Dima Noggo Sarbo, "Re-conceptualizing Regional Integration in Africa: The European Model and Africa's Priorities," University of Oxford Global Governance Programme Working Paper no. 2013/78, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/geg-wp-201378-reconceptualizing-regional-integration-africa (accessed March 30, 2015), p. 5.
7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "Data Center," http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed June 8, 2015).
8. WTO, "Statistics Database," http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language= (accessed June 8, 2015).
9. SOFRECO-led Consortium, *PIDA: Interconnecting, Integrating, and Transforming a Continent: The Regional Infrastructure Africa Needs to Integrate and Grow Through 2040*, Study on Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), Phase III: PIDA Study Synthesis, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), AU, and AfDB, November 2011, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/PIDA%20Study%20Synthesis.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), p. 6.
10. Peter Odiege, Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo, and Audrey Verdier-Chouchane, "Developing Africa's Infrastructure for Enhanced Competitiveness," in World Economic Forum, World Bank, AfDB, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (eds.), *The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013*, 2013, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Africa_Competitiveness_Report_2013.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), pp. 69–71, 74–6, 83–4, 86–8.
11. Odiege, Moyo, and Verdier-Chouchane, "Developing Africa's Infrastructure," p. 69.
12. Charles Roxburgh, Norbert Dörr, Acha Leke, Amine Tazi-Riffi, Arend van Wamelen, Susan Lund, Mutsa Chironga, Tarik Alatovik, Charles Atkins, Nadia Terfous, and Till Zeino-Mahmalat, *Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies*, McKinsey Global Institute, June 2010, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/africa/lions_on_the_move (accessed March 30, 2015), p. 23.

13. See AfDB, "The Africa Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI)," May 2013, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic_Brief_-_The_Africa_Infrastructure_Development_Index.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), pp. 1–3.
14. The report defines "fragile states" as those that have been "recently involved in some form of conflict." Ibid., p. 5.
15. The 16 landlocked countries are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
16. Odiege, Moyo, and Verdier-Chouchane, "Developing Africa's Infrastructure," p. 82.
17. AfDB, "An Integrated Approach to Infrastructure Provision in Africa," April 2013, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic_Brief_-_An_Integrated_Approach_to_Infrastructure_Provision_in_Africa.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), p. 7.
18. AfDB and UNECA, *Review of the Implementation Status of the Trans African Highway and the Missing Links*, vol. 1, Main Report, August 14, 2013, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/00473235-EN-TAH-FINAL-VOL1.PDF (accessed May 29, 2015), p. 20.
19. Afeikhena Jerome, *Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa*, United Nations (UN) Habitat, 2011, http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/UN-HabitatReport.pdf (accessed April 6, 2015), p. 33.
20. Sam Sturgis, "How Overlooked Colonial Railways Could Revolutionize Transportation in Africa," *The Atlantic CityLab*, February 2, 2015, http://www.citylab.com/commute/2015/02/how-overlooked-colonial-railways-could-revolutionize-transportation-in-africa/385056 (accessed March 30, 2015).
21. Gordon Pirie, "Geographies of Air Transport in Africa: Aviation's 'Last Frontier'," in Andrew R. Goetz and Lucy Budd (eds.), *The Geographies of Air Transport* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), p. 247.
22. Steer Davies Gleeve, *Opening Up Aviation Services in Africa*, Phase I Review Report, Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Opening_up_Aviation_Services_in_Africa_-_Phase_1_Review_Report.pdf (accessed April 23, 2015), p. 21.
23. Quoted in Benita Nsauba, "Building Africa: By Air, by Road, by Sea," NEPAD, September 9, 2010, http://www.nepad.org/regionalintegrationandinfrastructure/news/1580/building-africa-air-road-sea (accessed May 29, 2015).
24. Jerome, *Infrastructure for Economic Development*, p. 22.
25. Afeikhena Jerome, "Infrastructure, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction in Africa," *Journal of Infrastructure Development* 3, no. 2. (2011), 137.
26. Gavin van der Nest, "The Economic Consequences of Load Shedding in South Africa and the State of the Electrical Grid," Trade Law Centre (Tralac), February 11, 2015, http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7000-the-economic-consequences-of-load-shedding-in-south-africa-and-the-state-of-the-electrical-grid.html (accessed March 24, 2015).
27. David Appleyard, "Africa's Hydropower Future," *Hydro Review Worldwide*, January 1, 2014, http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/print/volume-22/issue-1/regional-profile/africa-s-hydropower-future.html (accessed March 30, 2015).

28. Callixte Kambanda, "Power Trade in Africa and the Role of Power Pools," *Integrating Africa*, AfDB, July 10, 2013, http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/integrating-africa/post/power-trade-in-africa-and-the-role-of-power-pools-12101 (accessed March 31, 2015).
29. M-Pesa is a mobile phone based money transfer system in Kenya. See, for example, Isaac Mbiti and David N. Weil, "Mobile Banking: The Impact of M-Pesa in Kenya," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 17129, June 2011, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17129 (accessed March 30, 2015).
30. See, for example, Sarah E. Smith, John T. Ludwig, Vernon M. Chinchilli, Kanjan Mehta, and José A. Stoute, "Use of Telemedicine to Diagnose Tinea in Kenyan Schoolchildren," *Telemedicine and e-Health* 19, no. 3 (2013), 166–8.
31. Broadband Commission for Digital Development, *The State of Broadband 2014: Broadband for All*, International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), September 2014, http://www.broadbandcommission.org/documents/reports/bb-annualreport2014.pdf (accessed April 22, 2015), pp. 96–7.
32. Broadband Commission for Digital Development, *The State of Broadband 2014*, pp. 98–9.
33. NEPAD and AfDB, *Project Implementation Review of the NEPAD Infrastructure Short Term Action Plan (STAP)*, Third Review, Draft Final Report, July 2010, http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Project%20Implementation%20Review%20of%20the%20NEPAD%20Infrastructure%20Short%20Term%20Action%20Plan%20%28STAP%29.pdf (accessed March 31, 2015), p. 14.
34. "Regional Infrastructure Is Key to NEPAD Objectives for Africa's Growth," *Diplomatic and International News*, August 31, 2007, http://news.ahibo.com/spip.php?article714> (accessed March 31, 2015).
35. NEPAD and AfDB, *Project Implementation Review*, p. 18.
36. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), "Support to the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)," https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/28079.html (accessed March 31, 2015); EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, *Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund*, Final Report, June 2012, http://www.eu-africa-infrastructure-tf.net/attachments/Publications/ITF%20MTE/final-report-of-the-tif-mid-term-evaluation.pdf (accessed May 27, 2015), p. 35. A breakdown of programs included within PIDA can be found in AfDB, AU, NEPAD, and UNECA, *Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa: Interconnecting, Integrating, and Transforming a Continent*, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/PIDA%20note%20English%20for%20web%200208.pdf (accessed May 27, 2015), pp. 17–20.
37. AU, *Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA): Addressing the Infrastructure Gap in Africa, to Speed Up Regional Integration*, Seventh Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Integration, July 14–18, 2014, http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PIDA-%20addressing%20the%20infrastructure%20gap%20in%20Africa%20to%20speed%20up%20regional%20integration.pdf (accessed May 27, 2015), p. 5. The broadband Internet goal is expected to be achieved by 2020.
38. See AfDB, "AfDB and Made in Africa Foundation Launch Fundraising for Africa50 Infrastructure Fund," September 27, 2013, http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-and-made-in-africa-foundation-launch-fundraising-for-africa50-infrastructure-fund-12313 (accessed May 27, 2015).

39. UNECA, "About Regional Integration and Trade," http://www.uneca.org/our-work/regional-integration-and-trade/pages/about-regional-integration-and-trade (accessed April 1, 2015).
40. An executive summary of the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan, as well as sectoral documents, can be found at SADC, "Infrastructure," http://www.sadc.int/themes/infrastructure (accessed May 27, 2015).
41. COMESA, "Regional Infrastructure: The Way Forward," http://www.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=903:regional-infrastructure-the-way-forward&catid=5:latest-news&Itemid=41 (accessed May 27, 2015).
42. For more discussion on the state of infrastructure in African RECs, see the following by Rupa Ranganathan and Vivien Foster: "ECCAS' Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS 5857, September 2011, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/10/15359725/eccass-infrastructure-regional-perspective (accessed March 30, 2015); "East Africa's Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS 5844, September 2011, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/10/15285268/east-africas-infrastructure-regional-perspective (accessed March 30, 2015); "ECOWAS' Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS5899, December 2011, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/12/15527340/ecowass-infrastructure-regional-perspective (accessed March 30, 2015); "The SADC's Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 5898, December 2011, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/12/15527328/sadcs-infrastructure-regional-perspective (accessed March 30, 2015); "COMESA's Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective," World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Country Report, April 2011, http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/system/files/library/2012/02/REC%20COMESA.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015).
43. European Commission, "About TEN-T," http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/en/abouttent.htm (accessed March 31, 2015).
44. Ibid.
45. The Lisbon Agenda (also known as the Lisbon Strategy) was laid out in European Council, "Lisbon European Council, March 23 and 24, 2000 Presidency Conclusions," http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm (accessed May 28, 2015). On TEN-T, see European Parliament and Council, *Decision no 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community Guidelines for the Development of the Trans-European Transport Network*, July 23, 1996.
46. See, for example, Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission: Trans-European Networks—Towards an Integrated Approach," COM/2007/0135, March 21, 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52007DC0135 (accessed May 28, 2015).
47. Commission of the European Communities, *TEN-T: A Policy Review: Towards a Better Integrated Transeuropean Transport Network at the Service of the Common Transport Policy*, Green Paper, COM/2009/44, February 4, 2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0044 (accessed May 28, 2015).
48. Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA), "TEN-T," European Commission, http://inea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-t/ten-t.htm (accessed May 28, 2015).

49. European Commission, "About TEN-T."
50. INEA, "TEN-T."
51. European Commission, "About TEN-T."
52. UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), "Asian Highway," http://www.unescap.org/our-work/transport/asian-highway/about (accessed March 31,2015); ESCAP, "Asian Highway Route Map," December 6, 2013, http://www.unescap.org/resources/asian-highway-route-map (accessed May 29, 2015).
53. Silvia Dian Anggraeni and Ali Muhyidin, "Rejuvenating Connectivity through the Asian Highway Network," *Jakarta Post*, November 29, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/29/rejuvenating-connectivity-through-asian-highway-network.html (accessed June 11, 2015).
54. ESCAP, "Asian Highway."
55. S. K. Mohanty and Piyadarshi Dash, *Regional Cooperation for Infrastructure Development: Towards an Institutional Framework for Investment in the IOR-ARC*, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, September 2013, http://www.ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/IOR-ARC%20infrastructure%20Report.pdf (accessed March 30, 2015), p. 48.
56. Global Environment Facility (GEF), *Draft GEF-6 Programming Directions Part II*, Second Meeting for the Sixth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, GEF/R.6/13/Rev.01, August 23, 2013, http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Signature%20Program_Revision_August23-2013.pdf (accessed May 29, 2015), p. 124.
57. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), *UNASUR: Infrastructure for Regional Integration*, February 2012, p. 49.
58. Ibid.
59. Mohanty and Dash, *Regional Cooperation*, p. 49.
60. International Rivers, "Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America," http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/initiative-for-the-integration-of-regional-infrastructure-in-south-america (accessed March 31, 2015).
61. Lesley Wentworth, *The Complexities of Regional Infrastructure Planning*, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) and European Centre for Development Policy Management, August 2013, http://ecdpm.org/publications/complexities-regional-infrastructure-planning (accessed March 26, 2015), p. 1.
62. Dawn Nagar and Rosaline Daniel, "Regional Integration Is the Key to Africa's Prosperity," *Business Day* (South Africa), December 15, 2014, http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2014/12/15/regional-integration-is-the-key-to-africas-prosperity (accessed June 11, 2015).
63. The discussion in this paragraph follows Jeffrey Gutman, Amadou Sy, and Soumya Chattopadhyay, *Financing African Infrastructure: Can the World Deliver?*, Brookings Institution, March 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/03/financing-african-infrastrastructure-gutman-sy-chattopadhyay (accessed May 29, 2015), pp. 2–4, 22, 41, 45, 57.
64. See, for example, Asian Development Bank, "Forum on Promoting Remittances for Development Finance," March 18–19, 2015, http://www.adb.org/news/events/forum-promoting-remittances-development-finance (accessed May 29, 2015).

Chapter 6

African Agency Post-2015: The Roles of Regional Powers and Developmental States in Regional Integration

Timothy M. Shaw

Introduction

African "agency"—the ways in which Africa's political, economic, social, and security actors can and do exert influence both on the continent and in global politics, as opposed to simply being passive targets or victims of others' actions—is an effect not only of the continent's regional powers, but also of its developing state and nonstate networks.[1] If "regional integration" is redefined as more than just a set of formal, interstate relationships, it will become apparent that Africa has already experienced more regional integration and more expansion of African agency than has sometimes been appreciated. After half a century of formal independence, the continent is no longer overly dependent but self-sustaining, and is becoming a policymaker rather than a perpetual "policy-taker." William Brown anticipates that "future work on African agency [will] be able to engage seriously with the continent's role in international politics in a way that presents Africa as actor and not just acted upon; and a historical agent, and not just history's recipient."[2]

As the authors of a recent Chatham House report point out, the "rules" of global economics and governance are changing in intertwined ways, which brings Africa (and its heavily resource-based economies) both challenges and opportunities to innovate:

> The political economy of natural resources is increasingly shaped by the large, structural shifts underway in the world...The world must now contend not just with growing environmental threats such as climate change and water scarcities, but also with the shift in consumer power from West to East, concentration of resource ownership and the rise of state capitalism. All these moving pieces are changing the rules of the game.[3]

Indeed, Africa and Africans have created a number of innovations in global governance. The regionalisms developing in Africa draw on notions from contemporary global governance analysis, like the importance of transnational nonstate actors, the nexus between licit and illicit markets, and the distributed nature of global harms (like climate change).

These issues are often marginalized in traditional conceptualizations of regional integration. But they are central to novel forms of regional development adapted to twenty-first-century challenges. As Lisa Ann Ritchey and Stefano Ponte suggest, "development" is increasingly about innovative sets of alliances as well as a heterogeneous range of actors.[4] New regionalisms, formal and informal, serve as catalysts for the continent's renaissance by advancing its capacity to transcend fragility. African innovations in these areas have served to encourage international law to recognize a wider spectrum of global governance, reflecting the variety of pressures on twenty-first-century governance.

This chapter discusses these innovations in an attempt to address two key questions. First, what is the future of regional development in Africa, as the continent progresses beyond 2015 and enters the post–Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) era? And second, are governance structures linking the formal and informal, the state and the nonstate sectors, drivers of Africa's future development?

Informed by contemporary international relations, and in particular by development studies perspectives, this chapter identifies emerging opportunities for—as well as challenges to—African agency post-2015.[5] It especially focuses on whether the emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; or the "second world," to use Parag Khanna's term) and "frontier markets" are presenting unanticipated possibilities or threats (or both) to a heterogeneous continent that includes burgeoning "developmental" as well as "fragile" and "failed" states.[6]

The chapter has three interrelated parts. First, Africa has generated an innovative range of "new regionalisms" involving nonstate actors. These forms of regionalism not only are important for understanding African agency, but also may be useful for comparative studies of the European Union (EU)—especially as it confronts its own financial crisis around the euro—and other non-African regional arrangements.[7] African actors have also been pivotal in transnational governance structures, or "new multilateralisms." In some cases, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), African actors are partnered with organizations from parts of the "developed" world. In many other cases—including the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and extractive industries—African actors are asserting their own agency in ways that are at odds with the agenda of historically powerful actors in the global North.

Second, post-Washington Consensus, under which markets were privileged, official development assistance (ODA) from members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is of declining importance or attraction.[8] Instead, African actors, encouraged by the "Leading Group" of more original policymakers, are making use of a range of innovative sources of finance beyond familiar development finance institutions (DFIs) and ODA.[9] These include nontraditional sources of state revenue, like carbon taxes; nonstate channels for transferring wealth, such as remittances; emerging state donors, such as the Gulf states; and new private donors, some with pockets nearly as deep as states, such as the Gates and Mo Ibrahim Foundations. These innovations support the increasing agency and importance of Africa's own markets and corporations, the "African Lions."

Third, despite these innovations, the continent still faces serious challenges. Some of these have only been gaining serious attention in the context of region-building relatively recently, such as climate change. Others are long-standing problems for regional integration and the expression of African agency, such as the prevalence of conflict and insecurity. At the same time, new technologies and other factors are helping to drive new African solutions to such problems.

There are many analysis and policy implications of this trio of novel directions. Who are the agents, innovators, and animators in contemporary regional projects like the 2008 Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (T-FTA)? How can African agency enable a turn away from dependency and neoliberalism toward a different model of economic growth, like the more *dirigiste* Beijing Consensus developed in Asia?[10] And how can African actors innovate to maximize regional cooperation and minimize intra- and interregional conflict?

African Agency and New Regionalisms

Regionalisms are in transition, especially in the global South. Both the existential nature and conceptual understanding of regionalism are in flux as they respond to a succession of global changes and crises in the first decades of the twenty-first century.[11]

Africa is being recognized as a potential leader in this new regionalism. For instance, the African Capacity Building Foundation's (ACBF) 2014 report is titled *Capacity Imperatives for Regional Integration in Africa*; and two recent collections highlight how Africa is demonstrating agency, becoming more a driver of its own development in spearheading integration instead of remaining primarily dependent on others.[12]

But who will define the range of regionalisms in 2015 and beyond: states or nonstate actors?[13] The answer, for Africa, to a large extent, is both. Reflective of its 56 states, Africa already has been the leading region in the South in advancing regional innovations and institutions—even though it has been afforded less analytic attention than Asia.[14] In Africa, the changing character of regionalisms in part reflects a need for innovation driven by the inadequacy of the end-colonial federations, especially the Anglophone Commonwealth and La Francophonie.[15] After colonialism was thrown off, the initial, one-party nationalist period was characterized by jealous defense of newly realized independence, resulting in "old" intergovernmental arrangements. This attitude has dissipated. In the postbipolar era, regionalisms are becoming less exclusively state-centric and more inclusive. Heterogeneous coalitions are emerging around issues such as climate change, continuing conflicts, health threats, natural resources, and transnational organized crime.[16]

Furthermore, the mix of fragile and failed states, proliferating global issues, and pressures for democratization have generated innovative forms of transnational "private" governance on the continent.[17] African agency and regionalisms in sub-Saharan Africa now take place in an assortment of constellations, within and beyond various kinds of borders—not only national boundaries but also the lines between the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal. In the new century, regionalisms on the continent are embracing a spectrum of levels—macro, meso, and micro—and sectors—including civil society, corporate networks, and security.[18] The new regionalism in Africa may also be incorporating analytic shifts that transcend perspectives developed in other regions such as Europe, especially in the ebullient global South.[19]

New Regionalisms and Regional Entities

Already, African actors have generated a large number of regional innovations in global governance. The revived East African Community (EAC) of 1967 is a testament to this "new" African regionalism. It now has five member states (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) rather than the initial trio, and South Sudan was expected to join by 2015. The EAC exhibits vibrant civil society, media, and parliamentary institutions, as well as a security architecture.[20]

Moreover, African "drivers" or catalysts have created the Maputo Corridor between southern Mozambique and northern South Africa; transfrontier peace parks; and the 2008 T-FTA between the Southern African Development Community (SADC), EAC, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).[21]

New Regionalisms and Transnational Entities

Beyond these African-led and -created initiatives, African stakeholders have been central to a set of innovations in transnational governance (however problematic). Such processes include global instruments like the Ibrahim Index for African Governance (IIAG); the ICBL and Ottawa Process; the Fisheries Stewardship Council (FSC); and the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), the latter pair now part of the extensive, inclusive, heterogeneous International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance.[22]

Of particular note are initiatives on extractive industries and illicit and dangerous goods. In extractive industries, these include the Kimberley Processes for control of "conflict diamonds" (and the recent Diamond Development Initiative), augmented by the Forestry Certification Scheme (FCS) and Marine Certification Scheme (MCS) (for the last decade part of ISEAL); the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), supported by the Group of Eight (G8)—with the latter being particularly timely given the dangers of the "resource curse" confronted by many African states and windfall profits around the BRICS, as well as the increasing demand for energy and minerals by the BRICS; transparent supply chains out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for "conflict minerals," monitored by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (including the Enough Project, Global Witness, and Partnership Africa Canada) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

The Africa Mining Vision (AMV) is especially interesting—it represents an authentic African alternative to the global approach promoted by Paul Collier and the World Bank's Natural Resource Charter (NRC). The AMV was developed partly in response to dramatic changes in the extraction of natural resources, energy as well as minerals, and reinforces the hope that Eastern Africa could become an energy region, spanning South Sudan to northern Mozambique, by 2015.[23]

As anticipated in early 2013 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), supply chains for transnational organized crime have migrated from the smaller states in Central America and the Caribbean to West Africa.[24] Africa has responded to this threat with the West African Commission on Drugs,[25] which parallels the Latin American[26] and Global Commissions.[27] Further, African nations have been central to the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT); agreement on the latter was eventually reached in mid-2013, but its implementation has been stalled by US congressional opposition. And finally, albeit controversially, moving beyond the "formal and legal" to "gangs and guns," more novel forms of African agency are taking shape, particularly in regional conflict zones like the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa, and Sahel regions.[28] For example, there are almost as many Somalis in the diasporas in the Horn, the Gulf, Scandinavia, and the United States as at home: how to effect an African response to al-Shabaab when "Little Mogadishu" in Nairobi is their economic hub and Dadaab is the largest refugee camp on the continent?

Each of these governance processes includes the participation of not only individual African states, corporations, civil societies, and media, but also African regional programs and engagement by Africans in the diaspora.

African Agency and New Multilateralism

In the emerging "post-American world," "the rest," both state and nonstate—middle powers, multinational corporations (MNCs), criminal networks, and all the elements that go into new regionalisms—increasingly set the pace.[29] The traditional North-South axis is being superseded by an East-South "turn."[30] Furthermore, analysis and advocacy of "global governance" are burgeoning; they increasingly challenge the established place of international law, international organizations, and international relations.[31]

In such a world of both global paradigm shift and global financial crisis, Africa's pattern of interregional relationships is in flux.[32] Classic, inherited North-South dependencies are giving way to a novel East-South axis primarily around China and India (but also Japan and Korea). These shifting dependencies are not only economic and political, but also cultural: including athletics, film, music, and football. And as MNCs, now from new economic powers like China, India, and South Africa, rather than only the North, have increased their investments in energy and minerals, franchises and shopping malls, so their logistics and supply chains have come to define their own regional networks.[33] Just in December 2014, MNCs announced nearly $8 billion in merger and acquisition deals with African companies.[34]

Symbolically, the reluctance of African states and regions to sign economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the EU at the turn of the decade—despite a mix of pressures and incentives—may mark a turning point as global rebalancing continues. The warm "Afro-Asian" tone of the annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) palavers can be contrasted to that at the third EU-Africa summit in Tunis in November 2010, where memories of colonial injustices lingered.[35] Any embryonic Beijing Consensus reflects such an evolution: lessons from the successes of developmental states in the East rather than ideologies from Washington, which recently endured a wrenching "subprime" economic contraction.

South Africa is one of the five BRICS, which are often discussed as emerging markets or economies, but giving them their full due as agents may require recognizing them as emerging powers, and raising questions about whether they can become a true bloc, as reflected in the fact that the acronym was proposed at the turn of the century by Jim O'Neil, a senior financial economist at Goldman Sachs, not by the political leadership of the BRICS themselves.[36] And, if they are indeed powers, are they emerging powers or traditional middle powers; that is, are they more like the G8 or the Group of 20 (G-20), Germany or India?[37] As Jan Pieterse and Boike Rehbein ask, are we seeing emerging powers, emerging (or frontier) markets, emerging economies, and/or emerging societies?[38] These formulations are all similar—they focus on "emerging"—but with different emphases and disciplinary dimensions: international relations, business, economics, and sociology, respectively.

Certainly for some analysts, South Africa is a regional power rather than just an emerging economy, let alone an emerging society; its economy has been based on agriculture, industry, and mining rather than on information technology—despite the ubiquitous presence of mobile phones—and its society remains very unequal, now exacerbated by uncontrollable migration across its borders from DRC, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.[39] But have South Africa's recognition and elevation in the BRICS come with or without the support of its region, whether defined more narrowly (SADC) or broadly (all of sub-Saharan Africa)?

African Agency and New Finance: Africa Rising?

In March 2013 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released its *Human Development Report* on "the rise of the South" and *The Economist* published a special report titled "Emerging Africa," declaring the continent now hopeful rather than hopeless.[40] The somewhat surprising African economic renaissance points to another aspect of African agency: regional development in the global South in the post-2015 and post-MDG world will build on innovations from outside the established and troubled North Atlantic; that is, it will be reinforced by the emerging Beijing Consensus rather than stalled by the lingering, discredited Washington Consensus.[41]

African economies have three features that make them fertile ground for innovation: the emergence of African "developmental states," the emergence and recognition of "frontier markets," and the willingness and ability to take advantage of new sources of financing. These features have been important to the growth that has earned them the moniker "African Lions" to complement the "Asian Tigers."

Lion Economies

Economic prospects in Africa look increasingly promising, despite the Ebola outbreak. Steven Radelet, of the well-regarded Center for Global Development (CGD), suggests that 17 African countries are "leading the way"[42]; recent McKinsey reports laud the continent's "lions"[43]; and the Boston Consulting Group has identified 40 African corporations as global "challengers."[44] African countries are overrepresented in *The Economist*'s lists of fastest-growing economies, and have been for more than a decade, ranging from Ghana, the best-case example of democratic development, to Angola, a new oil giant.[45] In the second decade of the twenty-first century, a variety of forms of regional agency are thriving and may continue to blossom on the African continent:

> Over the next five years [2011–16]... the average African economy will outpace its Asian counterpart... Africa's economy will grow at an average annual rate of 7% over the next 20 years, slightly faster than China's... Africa's changing fortunes have largely been driven by China's surging demand... but other factors have also counted... Without reforms, Africa will not be able to sustain faster growth. But its lion economies are earning a place alongside Asia's tigers.[46]

These positive economic developments, after a rather lackluster first half-century of independence, are surprising enough to be labeled "miracles" by some analysts.[47] It is worth exploring the agency of at least some African nations and organizations (for instance, the Africa Progress Panel) in bringing about these developments.

New Regionalism, the BRICS, and South Africa: From the Outer Core to the Semi-periphery

Africa's unanticipated prospects are in part a function of continuing growth courtesy of the BRICS, especially China, whose engagement now goes well beyond assistance with infrastructure and demand for raw materials to include a million new immigrants on the continent.[48] These prospects also result from global rebalancing reflected in the metamorphosis of the G-8 into the G-20, as the initial trans-Atlantic crisis at the end of the first decade spills over into the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) of the eurozone while ODA from OECD countries is becoming less central and salient.[49] By comparison, the global South, particularly Africa, was much less negatively impacted by the financial crisis than the established trans-Atlantic core in both "old" and "new" worlds.[50]

But Africa's progress is not being driven entirely by dynamics from beyond the continent. South Africa has been elevated and recognized as the fifth member of the BRICS since 2010. South Africa's agency, and its leadership aspirations—on the regional, continental, and global levels—are a significant part not only of Africa's economic story, but also of the global one, and should be explored.[51] South Africa is not as dominant a regional power as the original four BRIC members, as its foreign policy is very divided between state and nonstate dimensions (the latter being civil society, corporations, and the media), which may compete with, rather than reinforce, each other. However, possible competitors on the continent—like Egypt and Nigeria—are likewise diverted, opening Africa to a range of new state donors, like Korea and Turkey.

New Regionalism and the Resource Curse: From the Outer Core to the Periphery

Economic growth in Africa will be impacted by the changing patterns of its extractive industries as well as energy, particularly in oil. South Sudan is now an independent country, taking with it the vast majority of Sudan's oil reserves—but leaving it dependent on oil pipelines through Sudan for its ability to export that oil, at least in the near term. Oil has been discovered around the Rift Valley lakes in northwest Uganda, along the border with DRC; such oil production may propel Uganda into the ranks of the developmental states, but it may endanger some of its environment and wildlife, as well as local communities.[52]

And, in early 2012, new discoveries of oil and gas were announced in northern Kenya, southern Ethiopia, northern Mozambique, and southern Tanzania by a series of global energy players.[53] This holds the potential to transform Eastern Africa into an emerging energy-exporting region. The second East Africa Oil and Gas Summit (EAOGS) took place in Nairobi in October 2013, and discussed pipelines from Juba (South Sudan) to Lamu (Kenya), and from Mtwara (Tanzania) to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Mombasa (Kenya), as well as a refinery in northern Uganda. Some 150–200 global energy companies, from 30 countries, are involved in this new Eastern Africa—including the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC); Anardarko and ExxonMobil of the United States; and European corporations including BG Group, Eni, Statoil, and Tullow.

In addition, there are three factors in Africa's recent economic development that bear special examination: the emergence of developmental state strategies, the presence of "frontier markets," and the continent's ability to take advantage of new sources of financing for its development.

New Regionalism and Developmental States: From the Periphery to the Semi-periphery

Africa's current relatively optimistic economic prospects reflect, in part, African nations' adoption of the 2011 recommendation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) that the continent should adopt a "developmental state" strategy.[54] This has led to some significant state and nonstate expressions of agency that would have been unimaginable in previous, more "neoliberal" decades.[55]

Africa experienced a long period of economic stagnation and political and economic instability—the "lost decades" of the 1970s and 1980s—getting a reputation as a continent full of fragile and failed states.[56] At least some of that stagnation can be traced to many African nations' swings between rigidly state-directed economies (under Soviet influence) and rigidly privatized economies (under the influence of the United States and the Bretton Woods institutions, including through widespread adoption of structural adjustment programs [SAPs]). Developmental state strategies represent an innovative middle path: a pragmatic, nonideological mix of market and state, including dynamic state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as in China and India.

As the UNECA report further indicates, "global developments have significant implications for African countries, though the direction and magnitude of impact naturally vary among countries. On the whole, African economies have recovered from the crisis better than expected."[57]

Frontier Markets

Africa is the continent of frontier markets, which are smaller and riskier than emerging markets, but generate higher returns. Just as South Africa is the most problematic of the five BRICS, so also sub-Saharan economies and companies are largely located in the frontier category, with considerable potential but also more risk. The "new" Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is the hub for frontier market exchange-traded funds (ETFs), but distinct from the state's foreign policy, and indicates another form of ebullient "new" regionalism.

Financial Innovation

In the post-ODA era, development requires forging alliances with "emerging donors," such as new members of the expanded EU, members of the BRICS, the Gulf states, and members of the MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey).[58] For example, the FOCAC has become increasingly central to flows of aid to Africa.[59]

New sources of state-level financing are being identified, encouraged by the "Leading Group" of European, mainly Scandinavian, states, including a global solidarity fund, currency transaction taxes, carbon taxes and trading, climate change funds, controls on money laundering, and remittance taxes. These all give the continent novel choices; that is, they expand the possibilities of and prospects for African agency. One example is that a dozen African states, including Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, were able to raise some $6.9 billion in bond sales from January–September 2014, an unprecedented amount.[60] Until 2006 the only African state to sell bonds was South Africa. In addition, new private foundations have emerged around the turn of the century to parallel established ones like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller. Notably, these include the Gates

Foundation, but now also the Blair, Clinton, and Ibrahim Foundations (the latter being especially important as an expression of African agency).[61] And Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) recruits volunteers for 24-month development assignments from Kenya as well as Britain, Canada, the Netherlands (including diasporas from the global South), and the Philippines.[62]

Similarly, faith-based organizations increasingly span many religions, particularly the more pragmatic, mainstream dominations—for example, the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Islamic Relief, Lutheran World Relief (LWR), and World Vision. With new as well as established private foundations, they increasingly partner with international organizations such as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI).[63] Together, such initiatives indicate enhanced prospects for African agency post-2015.

Finally, if we expand our purview from the continent itself to its diasporas, concentrated in Europe and North America, agency through remittances is likely to become even more influential in the years ahead, as such revenue flows come with explicit or implicit conditions favoring democracy, accountability, and transparency.

Challenges to, and Drivers of, African Agency

Climate Change—A Spoiler?

The Kyoto Protocol presses developing countries to commit to reducing greenhouse gases by 25–40 percent by 2020 (though these targets are not formally binding). This has led to an influx of global actors forming partnerships in Africa.[64] Climate change may yet emerge as the spoiler for Africa's development, hence the importance of the Conference of Parties (COP) at the turn of the decade, where the BRICS-related BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) was ever more active. Kyoto norms could impede growth in these nations, but drastic climate change could also spell disaster.

The continent's river basins are receiving exponentially increasing attention as regional centers of biodiversity, energy, food, and water—as well as centers of conflict over these resources.[65] Africa has an abundance of river-valley organizations—based around the Congo, Niger, Nile, and Zambezi, for example. It is also home to initiatives that encompass other cross-border formal and informal micro-regions. The Maputo Corridor has advanced growth in southern Mozambique as well as the eastern Witwatersrand, reinforcing the cross-border dimensions of the Lesotho Highlands water project for generating hydroelectricity. The Lesotho project was informed by the only global commission based outside the North (in Cape Town) that included MNCs as well as NGOs and states in its membership—the World Commission on Dams.[66]

While export-processing zones (EPZs) are associated with Asia and gas pipelines with Central Europe, development corridors and peace-parks are largely a function of Southern Africa's distinctive political economy, addressing both economic and environmental concerns that are unlike EPZs and pipelines. Africa's other evolving corridors are transforming from designated transportation corridors into more multipurpose and multifunction arrangements including generating electricity from renewable energy sources besides water, such as wind and nuclear.[67]

Conflict and Security

Africa, unfortunately, has been beset by a number of persistent violent conflicts, and many attempts have been made at regional peace-building—from Darfur, to Côte d'Ivoire, to the Great Lakes. To best promote its development and security, Africa needs to continue to innovate in the areas of conflict resolution, sustainable peacekeeping, and security techniques. One element of this should be the continued advancement of "network" rather than traditional "club" diplomacy. While traditional diplomacy focuses on states and formal intergovernmental agencies, twenty-first-century network diplomacy involves civil society and private companies as well.[68] Network diplomacy can also take advantage of new forms of media and communications, such as the technologies discussed here.

Network diplomacy addresses the character of conflict and security in Africa, which is characterized by "new wars" and nonstate actors. With its numerous landlocked states (16 out of 55), Africa has always experienced informal cross-border migration and trade in various forms of illegal goods, such as drugs and small arms. Building on this, contemporary conflicts involve a fluid range of actors in heterogeneous coalitions, from international NGOs to MNCs. Private security actors, both national and global, such as G4S (formerly Group 4 Securicor), have proliferated alongside these privatized conflicts and coalitions, making the situation even more problematic.[69]

Such conflicts are always about "greed" as well as "grievance." Resource extraction and accumulation proceed in tandem with violence. This is particularly the case concerning energy and mineral extraction involving supply chains, as their products attract the attention of transnational as well as local criminal networks. Violence follows lines of social power as often as traditional economic or state-like objectives, leading to the targeting of vulnerable populations, particularly women and children, as successive UN reports on DRC have revealed.[70]

Traditional state-to-state regional solutions to conflict often cannot coherently address such informal networks. Achieving durable peace in Africa's conflicts is possible with implementation of longer-term norm-creation that advances sustainable development. Norms, such as adherence to certifiable, conflict-free supply chains, should be formed to address the regulation of the flow of conflict-inducing scarce minerals like the "3Ts"—tin, tantalum (coltan), and tungsten—and others like diamonds and gold.

Technology and Other Factors and Actors

Regionalisms in the twenty-first century incorporate a range of factors and technologies that have appeared in recent years, such as cellular networks and airline alliances. They also include informal and illegal networks for trade in sought-after resources—and many of these informally or illegally traded goods are of increased importance to formal networks of trade, such as the central importance of coltan to contemporary electronics. And, as noted earlier, MNCs are defining their own regions through the construction of logistics networks.

Exponential infrastructural development could further new regionalisms on the African continent post-2015, as seen in a burgeoning mobile-phone revolution and the increased interregional roles of supply chains such as those operated by telecommunications providers MTN and Celtel/Bharti. These infrastructural networks may define regions in ways different from the way states do. For instance, mobile brands may define a region in terms of calling charges and network reach and bandwidth.

However, overlapping and conflicting policy regimes—resulting in significant part from many states' membership in multiple, overlapping regional economic communities (RECs)—can undermine the development of this new infrastructure that undergirds new regionalism. Overlapping memberships frustrate the building and rebuilding of the necessary infrastructure required at both the regional and continental levels, such as information technology networks. States that belong to more than one REC must adhere to different and sometimes conflicting mandates and protocols, including that of paying dual membership fees. Such behaviors lead to an ever-widening resource gap and the inability of regional institutions to form coherent policy, or implement the policy they have formed. Such incapacities at the regional level also filter down to the national level, hampering Africa's developmental efforts. It is hoped that the innovative 2008 T-FTA will address the regional and continental technological gap to advance the continent's developmental prospects. Hence the attraction of TradeMark in Southern and East Africa (TMSA and TMEA) as well-resourced drivers or animators facilitating regional infrastructures, networks, and supply chains.

Conclusion: African Agency and New Analyses

At the start of its second 50-year period of independence, Africa faces a welcome challenge: to take what it has learned during its first half-century and apply and adapt it to the significantly transformed global context of the twenty-first century. If it can do so successfully, Africa could seize the opportunity to become a primary driver of regional development post-2015. Africa's development may also provide comparative insights into the better-discussed cases of Asia and Latin America.[71]

Burgeoning varieties of governance, regionalisms, and finance pose challenges to public policy in the global South.[72] They also present challenges to new analyses of African agency, as they demand innovative perspectives and policies, both state and nonstate. Simultaneously, the focus of regional development is shifting from older intergovernmental paradigms around the formal economy to newer technologies and service sectors such as mobile telecommunications, Internet platforms, and outsourcing, perhaps best symbolized by the T-FTA.

But many questions remain. In particular, the direction that South Africa takes as the fifth of the BRICS may be central—for whom or what will it exercise its growing agency?[73] Africa in 2015 is at a crossroads in terms of growth, development, governance, regionalisms, and sustainability.[74] Can it seize its second chance and transcend its somewhat lackluster first half-century to advance developmental states and regions?

If it can, a number of hopeful possibilities arise. Africa's place at the center of innovative sources of finance—such as through new donors and frontier markets—and styles of governance—such as advances in inclusive public or network diplomacy of nonstate as well as state actors—points in an optimistic direction. But the continuing conflicts and persistence of fragile and failed states point in a pessimistic direction. What balance will Africa find between regional conflict and regional development beyond 2015? The answer will have implications not only for its own future, but also for all of the global South, including its ubiquitous diasporas.

Notes

1. This definition of African "agency" is based on William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds.), *African Agency in International Politics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 1–3.
2. William Brown, "A Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics," *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 10 (2012), 1889.
3. Bernice Lee, Felix Preston, Jaakko Kooroshy, Rob Bailey, and Glada Lahn, *Resources Futures*, Chatham House, December 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy%2C%20Environment%20and%20Development/1212r_resourcesfutures.pdf (accessed September 15, 2014).
4. Lisa Ann Ritchey and Stefano Ponte, "New Actors and Alliances in Development," *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2014), 1–21.
5. Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru, and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Africa and International Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), especially Timothy M. Shaw, Fantu Cheru, and Scarlett Cornelissen, "Conclusion: What Futures for African International Relations?," pp. 194–209; Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, Second Classics Paperback ed. (London: Palgrave, 2013), especially Timothy M. Shaw, "African Foreign Policy in the New Millennium: From Coming Anarchies to Security Communities? From New Regionalisms to New Realisms?," pp. 204–19.
6. On the "second world," see Parag Khanna, *The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 2009). On capacity and fragile states, see African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), *Africa Capacity Building Indicators 2011: Capacity Development in Fragile States*, http://elibrary.acbfpact.org/acbf/collect/acbf/index/assoc/HASHe1dc.dir/doc.pdf (accessed September 3, 2014); Lothar Brock, Hans-Henrik Holm, Georg Sørenson, and Michael Stohl, *Fragile States* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).
7. See Alex Warleigh-Lack, Nick Robinson, and Ben Rosamond (eds.), *New Regionalism and the European Union: Dialogues, Comparisons, and New Research Directions* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

8. The term "Washington Consensus" is generally attributed to John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in John Williamson (ed.), *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), pp. 5–21.
9. For an overview of what the Leading Group means by "innovative sources of finance," see Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development, "FAQs—Innovative Financing," January 16, 2012, http://www.leadinggroup.org/rubrique325.html (accessed November 24, 2014).
10. See Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus*, Foreign Policy Centre, 2004, http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf (accessed November 24, 2014).
11. Timothy M. Shaw, J. Andrew Grant, and Scarlett Cornelissen (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).
12. ACBF, *Capacity Imperatives for Regional Integration in Africa*, 2014, http://www.acbf-pact.org/knowledge-learning/africa-capacity-report/africa-capacity-report-2014-capacity-imperatives-regional (accessed December 3, 2015); Brown and Harman, *African Agency*; Ulrike Lorenz-Carl and Martin Rempe (eds.), *Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
13. Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: Zed Books, 2012), especially Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, Dawn Nagar, and Chris Saunders, "Introduction," pp. 1–21.
14. Tanja A. Börzel, Lukas Goltermann, Mathis Lohaus, and Kai Striebinger (eds.), *Roads to Regionalism: Genesis, Design, and Effects of Regional Organizations* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).
15. Ibid.
16. Shaw, Cheru, and Cornelissen, "Conclusion."
17. See Stuart Brown (ed.), *Transnational Transfers and Global Development* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 11–13; Klaus Dingwerth, "Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (2008), 607–34.
18. Fredrik Söderbaum and Ian Taylor, "Introduction: Considering Micro-Regionalism in Africa in the Twenty-First Century," in Fredrik Söderbaum and Ian Taylor (eds.), *Afro-Regions: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Micro-Regionalism in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2008).
19. Kobena T. Hanson, George Kararach, and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Rethinking Development Challenges for Public Policy: Insights from Contemporary Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
20. Dirk Hansohm, "South Sudan, Sudan, and the East African Community: Potential of Enhanced Relationships," United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Working Paper no. W-2013/4, 2013, http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/W-2013-4.pdf (accessed September 4, 2014); Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru, and Timothy M Shaw, "Introduction: Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century: Still Challenging Theory?," in Cornelissen, Cheru, and Shaw, *Africa and International Relations*, pp. 1–20.
21. Trudi Hartzenberg, Gerhard Erasmus, Colin McCarthy, Ron Sandrey, Mark Pearson, Hans G. Jensen, J. B. Cronjé, Taku Fundira, Paul Kruger, Wilhelm Viljoen, and Sean Woolfrey, *The Tripartite Free Trade Area: Towards a New African Integration Paradigm?* (Stellenbosch: Tralac, 2012). See also chapter 11 in this volume.

22. For examples of new forms of governance from the forestry sector in particular, see Timothy Cadman, *Quality and Legitimacy of Global Governance: Case Lessons from Forestry* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Fred Gale, *The Tropical Timber Trade Regime* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).
23. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Africa Mining Vision, "About AMV," http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html (accessed November 28, 2014). For a brief analysis of the AMV that gives some of its context, see Hany Besada and Philip Martin, *Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a "Fourth" Generation?*, North-South Institute Research Report, May 2013, http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Mining-Codes-in-Africa-Report-Hany.pdf (accessed November 28, 2014), pp. 17–18.
24. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, February 2013, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf (accessed September 15, 2014).
25. See website of the West Africa Commission on Drugs, http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org (accessed November 17, 2014).
26. See Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*, March 2009, http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_ingles_site.pdf (accessed November 17, 2014).
27. See website of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org (accessed November 17, 2014).
28. See Hany Besada, Ariane Goetz, and Karolina Werner, "African Solutions for African Problems and Shared R2P," in Hany Besada (ed.), *Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); Michael T. Klare, *The Race for What's Left: The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources* (New York: Metropolitan, 2012); Laurie Nathan, *Community of Insecurity: SADC's Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).
29. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World: Release 2.0* (New York: Norton, 2012).
30. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Global Rebalancing: Crisis and the East-South Turn," *Development and Change* 42, no. 1 (2011), 22–48.
31. On the development of concepts and indicators of global governance, see Sophie Harman and David Williams, "Introduction: Governing the World?" and "Conclusion: Governing the World?," in Sophie Harman and David Williams (eds.), *Governing the World? Cases in Global Governance* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 1–10, 197–205; Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, "Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving International Relations," *Global Governance* 20, no. 1 (2014), 19–36.
32. Rick Fawn, "'Regions' and Their Study: Wherefrom, What for, and Whereto?," *Review of International Studies* 35, supplement S1 (2009), 19–36.
33. Marcus Power, Giles Mohan, and May Tan-Mullins, *China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Powering Development?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 1–36; Andrea Goldstein, *Multinational Corporations from Emerging Economies: Composition, Conceptualization, and Direction in the Global Economy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 1–6.
34. Javier Blas and Andrew England, "M&A Activity Hots Up in Africa as Investors Bet on Growth," *Financial Times*, December 2, 2014.
35. Ian C. Taylor, *The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

36. Timothy M. Shaw, "Can the BRICs Become a Bloc?," *China Monitor* 52 (2010), 4–6.
37. Eduard Jordaan, "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers," *Politikon* 30, no. 2 (2003), 165–81.
38. Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Boike Rehbein, "Introduction: Development and Inequality," in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Boike Rehbein (eds.), *Globalization and Emerging Societies: Development and Inequality* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1–3.
39. See Philip Nel and Detlef Nolte, "Introduction: Special Section on Regional Powers in a Changing Global Order," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 4 (2010), 877–9; Philip Nel, Dirk Nabers, and Melanie Hanif, "Introduction: Regional Powers and Global Redistribution," *Global Society* 26, no. 3 (2012), 279–87.
40. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South—Human Progress in a Diverse World*, 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf (accessed November 17, 2014); *The Economist*, "Emerging Africa: A Hopeful Continent," March 2, 2013, pp. 1–16.
41. On Africa's surprising renaissance, see Timothy M. Shaw, "Africa's Quest for Developmental States: 'Renaissance' for Whom?," *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (2012), 837–51.
42. Steven Radelet, *Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2011).
43. Charles Roxburgh, Norbert Dörr, Acha Leke, Amine Tazi-Riffi, Arend van Wamelen, Susan Lund, Mutsa Chironga, Tarik Alatovik, Charles Atkins, Nadia Terfous, and Till Zeino-Mahmalat, *Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies*, McKinsey Global Institute, June 2010, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/africa/lions_on_the_move (accessed November 17, 2014); Allan R. Gold (ed.), *McKinsey on Africa: A Continent on the Move*, McKinsey & Company, June 2010, http://mckinseyonsociety.com/mckinsey-on-africa (accessed November 17, 2014).
44. Boston Consulting Group, *The African Challengers: Global Competitors Emerge from the Overlooked Continent*, 2010, http://www.bcg.de/documents/file44610.pdf (accessed September 3, 2014).
45. *The Economist* shows six African countries (Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda) among the 10 fastest-growing from 2001 to 2010 and seven African states (Congo, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia) among the 10 expected to grow the fastest from 2011 to 2015; *The Economist*, "The Lion Kings? Africa Is Now One of the World's Fastest-Growing Regions," January 8, 2011, pp. 72–3. More recent numbers show four African nations among those expected to grow the fastest in 2014, though these are a different group: Eritrea, Libya, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan; *The Economist*, "The World in Figures: Countries—Top Growers," November 18, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/21589184-top-growers (accessed November 17, 2014)
46. *The Economist*, "The Lion Kings?"
47. See, for example, Norbert Dorr, Susan Lund, and Charles Roxborough, "The African Miracle: How the World's Charity Case Became Its Best Investment Opportunity," *Foreign Policy*, November 29, 2010, pp. 80–1.

48. See Seifudein Adem (ed.), *China's Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); Li Xing with Abdulkadir Osman Farah (eds.), *China-Africa Relations in an Era of Great Transformations* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
49. See Ritchey and Ponte, "New Actors"; Andy Sumner and Richard Mallett, *The Future of Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation and the New Geography of Global Poverty* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Mathias VomHau, James Scott, and David Hulme, "Beyond the BRICs: Alternative Strategies of Influence in the Global Politics of Development," *European Journal of Development Research* 24, no. 2 (2012), pp. 187–204.
50. Pieterse, "Global Rebalancing."
51. See Jordaan, "The Concept of a Middle Power"; Nel and Nolte, "Introduction."
52. Keith Johnson, "East Africa May Lose Before It Even Enters Energy Game," *Foreign Policy*, October 15, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/15/out_of_africa_mozambique_kenya_uganda_tanzania_oil_gas (accessed November 17, 2014). On environmental and community impact, see Brookings Institution, "East Africa's Oil and Gas Boom: Promise and Peril," event transcript, February 20, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/2/20%20africa%20oil%20boom/20140220_east_africa_transcript.pdf (accessed November 17, 2014).
53. *The Economist*, "African Energy: Eastern El Dorado?," April 7, 2012.
54. UNECA and African Union (AU), *Economic Report on Africa 2011: Governing Development in Africa—The Role of the State in Economic Transformation*, 2011, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/era2011_eng-fin.pdf (accessed November 17, 2014), pp. 7–9, 95–114; Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor, "Botswana and Uganda as Developmental States (?)," in Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor (eds.), *The Potentiality of "Developmental States" in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005), pp. 1–15.
55. On the concept of a "developmental state" and its implications for Africa, *see for example* Thandika Mkandawire, "Thinking About Developmental States in Africa," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25, no. 3 (2001), pp. 289–313; and Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal (eds.), *Development Policy Review* 25, no. 5 (2007), special issue: "Developmental States in the New Millennium."
56. Brock, Holm, Sørenson, and Stohl, *Fragile States*, pp. 1–25. In 2014, all five countries identified by the Fund for Peace as "very high alert" were in Africa (South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, DRC, and Sudan), along with five of eleven "high alert" countries (Chad, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau). Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index 2014*, http://ffp.statesindex.org (accessed November 17, 2014).
57. UNECA and AU, *Economic Report on Africa 2011*, p. 2.
58. See Hany Besada and Shannon Kindornay (eds.), *Multilateral Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Kevin Gray and Craig Murphy, "Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2013), 183–93; Emma Mawdsley, *From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape* (London: Zed Books, 2012).
59. Taylor, *The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*.
60. Javier Blas and Elaine Moore, "Sub-Saharan Africa Debt Sales Hit Record High," *Financial Times*, September 11, 2014.
61. See Michael Moran, *Private Foundations and Development Partnerships: American Philanthropy and Global Development Agendas* (Abingdon: Routledge,

2014); Sumner and Mallett, *The Future of Foreign Aid;* VomHau, Scott, and Hulme, "Beyond the BRICs."

62. Links to various Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) country-specific recruitment sites can be found at VSO, "Other VSO Websites," http://www.vsointernational.org/vso-today/contact/other-vso-websites.asp (accessed November 17, 2014).
63. Simon Rushton and Owain David Williams (eds.), *Partnerships and Foundations in Global Health Governance* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
64. David Simon, "Climate Change Challenges," in Saunders, Dzinesa, and Nagar, *Region-Building in Southern Africa*, p. 231.
65. See, for example, Larry A. Swatuk and Lars Wirkus (eds.), *Transboundary Water Governance in Southern Africa: Exploring Underexamined Dimensions* (Bonn: Nomos Press, 2009).
66. Sanjeev Khagram, *Dams and Development: Transnational Strategies for Water and Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
67. Maano Ramutsindela, "Transfrontier Conservation and the Spaces of Regionalisms," in Shaw, Grant, and Cornelissen, *Ashgate Research Companion*, pp. 361–73.
68. Jorge Heine, "On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy," Centre for International Governance Innovation, Working Paper no. 11, October 2006, http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/paper11_jorge_heine.pdf (accessed September 4, 2014).
69. See, for example, Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
70. See Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, "Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC)," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2009), 495–518; Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, and Problems in the Congo and Beyond* (London: Zed Books, 2013).
71. Emmanuel Fanta, Timothy M. Shaw, and Vanessa T. Tang (eds.), *Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the 21st Century: Insights from the Global South* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
72. Hanson, Kararach, and Shaw, *Rethinking Development Challenges.*
73. Nel and Nolte, "Introduction"; Nel, Nabers, and Hanif, "Introduction."
74. *The Economist*, "Emerging Africa."

Chapter 7

The Political Economy of Africa's Region-Building and Regional Integration

Samuel K. B. Asante

Introduction

Region-building and regional integration are not new phenomena. They are characteristic, in varying forms, of the international system of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. They are processes in which states enter into an agreement in order to enhance regional cooperation through institutions and rules. The objectives of the agreement range from economic to political to environmental, although regional integration has typically taken the form of a political economy initiative, wherein commercial interests have been the focus for achieving broader sociopolitical and security objectives, as defined by national governments. Many issues in international economic relations, such as the use of shared water resources, are currently subordinated to the quest for regional economic associations among more or less geographically contiguous areas.

In the case of Africa, region-building and regional integration actually started off as aspects of the pan-African movement, which aimed at the "unification of African forces against imperialism and colonial domination."[1] Region-building was recognized as an essential component of strategies of economic decolonization long before the attainment of political independence. Region-building and regional integration are now widely recognized and accepted as necessary conditions for the long-term sustainable development of African countries, as recognized, for example, by Adebayo Adedeji, a proponent and architect of regional integration in Africa since the early 1970s. Consequently, many formal initiatives have been established to further this goal, under the overarching umbrella of the African Union's (AU) plan to achieve a continental common market by 2028.[2]

However, despite great expectations, half a century of Africa's region-building and regional integration has not been able to achieve its goals, and the level and scope of integration remains stubbornly low. This has provoked a number of searching questions. To what extent, for example, have African countries been willing to take the measures that will give practical effect to the declared objectives of their region-building and regional integration schemes? Why is there this striking contradiction between the general emphasis on the need for economic integration in Africa and the scanty evidence of practical success? Why has the success of Africa's economic groupings so far been rather limited, with little or no impact on the economic growth of the cooperating countries? This chapter attempts to explore the political-economic dimensions of Africa's region-building and regional integration, highlighting the critical issues and experiences of the first and second "waves" of regionalism, the approaches taken to regional integration, and the need to reconsider Africa's model of region-building and regional integration.

Africa's Region-Building and Regional Integration: Experience of the First "Wave"

Africa's region-building and regional integration during the first "wave" of regionalism—roughly from the 1960s through the beginning of the 1990s—was characterized by two interlocking challenges. The first challenge was related to the division of African leaders "horizontally into pro-East and pro-West blocks [*sic*]" during the period of the Cold War, and "vertically into revolutionaries, progressives, reactionaries, capitalists, socialists, traditionalists, and middle-of-the-roaders," which had a serious impact on the viability of pan-Africanism as an integrative force.[3]

The second challenge was the sustained tension between continentalism and regionalism, exemplified by the coexistence of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the regional economic communities (RECs). Because of the link with pan-Africanism, strategies for regional integration adopted during the early years of African independence favored an all-embracing continental organization, as reflected in the 1958 First Conference of Independent African States, held in Accra, Ghana.[4] Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president, was the greatest advocate of full continental integration. However, given the environment of the early 1960s, the concept of continental unity of interests was tenuous, despite the common heritage of colonialism in Africa. Continental economic integration, therefore, remained a "dream of unity."[5] Neither Nkrumah's enthusiasm for the noble pan-African ideal of political unity and economic continentalism nor Julius Nyerere's preferred incremental regionalism, leading eventually toward pan-Africanism, went beyond the stage of theoretical discussions.[6] The creation of the OAU in 1963 provided a compromise that, for a while, appeared to have resolved the divisive debate between continentalism and regionalism. As a continental structure, the OAU did satisfy advocates of continentalism, while regionalism, as reflected in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Development of Africa (LPA), adopted by the OAU in 1980, met the aspirations of advocates of regionalism.

The decision by African countries to seek to create regional entities capable of promoting region-building and regional integration was the most significant development in the 1980s. To this end, the OAU produced two legal documents that form the basis of Africa's region-building and regional integration: first, the celebrated LPA, and second, the 1991 Abuja Treaty, establishing the African Economic Community (AEC).[7] The former envisages the development of Africa through region-building and regional integration, providing the first legal basis for the creation of the RECs; the latter proposes the establishment of regional configurations in Africa's five geographical regions and envisages the creation of a continental economic community with the RECs as building blocks.

Region-building and regional integration were given new leases on life with the adoption of the LPA, a historic document that constitutes the first comprehensive continent-wide formulation and articulation of preferred long-term development objectives of the African countries. Regionalism, which is discussed in virtually every chapter of the LPA, constitutes an integral condition for its implementation. So central is the concept of regionalism to the plan's goal of collective self-reliance that, as Robert Browne and Robert Cummings stress, "without regional integration the LPA collapses as a concept . . . so no allowance is made for failure in achieving it."[8]

Ironically, however, by the 1980s, when the LPA was adopted, frustration with the growing gap between the high initial expectations and the actual achievements of the first phase of integration considerably reduced the interest in region-building and regional integration as policy issues. As the economic crisis of the 1980s, dubbed "Africa's lost decade," deepened, concern over national stabilization and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gradually began to take precedence over considerations of region-building and regional integration. Jean-Claude Boidin, in an exciting study, sought to determine whether structural adjustment was "a plus or a risk" for African regionalism, concluding that SAPs were incompatible with region-building and regional integration.[9] Member states of the economic communities resorted to purely national measures of short-term crisis management, thereby often compromising their obligations to their respective groupings. Specifically, the regional element was missing from the SAPs. For example, Ghana's SAP, known as the "Economic Recovery Programme," focused attention solely on maxi-devaluation, fiscal austerity, and tight monetary control. The main purpose was to lower inflation through stringent fiscal, monetary, and trade policies.[10]

Region-Building and Regional Integration: The Second "Wave" and Africa's Renewed Interest in Regionalism

The shortcomings of the first "wave" of regionalism did not end efforts to achieve regionalism. "Notwithstanding the dismal outcome from the first generation of integration initiatives," noted a 2000 African Development Bank (AfDB) report, the post–Cold War second "wave" of Africa's region-building and regional integration witnessed a "renewed and keen interest" by African countries in "reinvigorating their integration efforts."[11] Consequently, the question of region-building and regional integration was once again at the top of policy agenda in almost all the subregions of Africa. It was being looked at again as a way to achieve faster, more diversified, and sustainable economic growth.[12]

As the AfDB report went on to explain:

> This [had], in part, been influenced by rising trends of globalization and deepening regional integration with demonstrable gains in trade, investment and economic growth in Europe, North America and Asia at the same time that Africa was becoming more isolated and marginalized. The trend in global regionalism was reflected in the creation and increase in the membership of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA); European Union (EU) leading to the adoption of Euro; and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). There is a rising realization among African countries that progressive integration holds great potential for minimizing the costs of market fragmentation and thus represents a precondition for integrating African economies into the global economy. These observable benefits from progressive integration in other parts of the world appear to have contributed to the rising trend in the adoption of outward-looking, export-oriented development approaches vis-a-vis [*sic*] the old and discredited inward-looking import substitution development strategy.[13]

The emerging world of trading blocs, globalization of world production, and rapid changes in technology compelled reassessment of the entire integration project. Hence the adoption of fresh initiatives resulting in the creation of new regional economic integration schemes, revitalization of the existing economic communities, and the transformation of others into more dynamic groupings that would enable them to adjust to the rapidly changing economic landscape.

The aforementioned Abuja Treaty of 1991 was one of the last gasps of the exhausted first "wave," but it was also a part of the reassessment that started the second. The AEC was a giant step toward Africa's long-cherished goal of unifying the continent's fragmented and vulnerable economies into a single, more powerful economic bloc—translating into reality the dream of pan-Africanism and continental integration and responding to challenges posed by the regionalist fever that had spread rapidly all over the globe.

Subsequently, in 1993, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a Revised Treaty, while the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), originally established in 1980, was transformed in 1992 into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Similarly, the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), originally established in 1981, was transformed in 1993 into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), while the defunct East African Community (EAC), originally established in 1967, was revived and reestablished with the launch of the secretariat of a new permanent tripartite commission in 1996.[14]

These post-1990 regional initiatives in Africa and elsewhere are based on the precepts of economic openness and market efficiency. They embrace different principles for achieving progressive economic cohesion than their fiat-driven predecessors, which were based on protectionist, closed-economy policies of the kind that pervaded development thinking, particularly in Africa, for more than three decades. Not only did the new groupings in Africa reflect respect for and observance of certain fundamental principles and basic undertakings, but they also shifted the exclusive focus away from government-to-government relationships. The new regional initiatives involved the people, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, and the private sector—reflecting the new regionalism, as critically examined by contributors to volumes edited by Andrew Grant, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Timothy Shaw.[15] ECOWAS, for example, decided in 2010 to "transform its conceptual notion of 'ECOWAS of States' to 'ECOWAS of People,' in which the people should be the focus of regional integration, rather than the state."[16] This broadening of stakeholders and participants included promotion of accountability, economic justice, popular participation in development, and provisions for regional and pan-African parliaments and courts of justice, thus ensuring the involvement of the people in the development and integration process of the continent.

Besides addressing socio-economic conditions and including a broader range of stakeholders, the second "wave" of regionalism in Africa breaks new ground by including issues of supranationalism. Following the example of the Abuja Treaty (Article 10[2]), the framers of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty (Article 9[2]), the SADC Treaty (Article 19[8]), and the COMESA Treaty (Article 8[3]) have endowed the new and transformed regional communities with supranational powers as an indispensable instrument for effective integration.[17] The COMESA Treaty states, for example:

> Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, the directions and decisions of the Authority taken or given in pursuance of the provisions of this Treaty, shall as the case may be, be binding on the Member States and on all other organs of the Common Market other than the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction, and on those to whom they may be addressed to under this Treaty.[18]

Africa's Region-Building and Regional Integration: Between Standstill and Progress?

Evidence tends to suggest that, to date, Africa's region-building and regional integration have not made any appreciable inroads toward the objective of creating a regional economic market, let alone an economic community, despite the human and financial resources deployed. Although Africa's regional integration strategy was expected to play a vital role in the socioeconomic transformation of the African economies and help alleviate poverty through sustained recovery and growth, this has not been the case. There is general consensus that the many and costly economic schemes set up to promote regionalism in Africa have produced only mixed results both regionally and Africa-wide, and that Africa has repeatedly failed to transcend the confines of the nation-state, as Adedeji regrettably notes.[19] Africa's region-building and regional integration suffer from a litany of seemingly intractable problems, ranging from overlapping memberships, through unfulfilled commitments, to unrealistic goals.[20] Why has this been the case? What has gone wrong? The answer is twofold: concern for sovereignty, and a tendency to emulate inappropriate European models.

Sovereignty

Region-building and regional integration are intensely political processes and, when most African states are still defining their national identities, it is difficult to agree on cooperation that requires sovereignty in certain areas to be handed to a regional organization. No matter what the rhetoric, political leaders in Africa jealously guard their sovereignty and are unwilling to reduce the power and authority of the state.[21] John Ravenhill argues that this is "compounded by the lack of perception of significant gains from trade liberalisation."[22] While this does not rule out joint endeavors in some form of region-building and regional integration, it does suggest the existence of very real limits on the extent to which African states will be willing to part with or pool their sovereignty.

The success of Africa's region-building and regional integration will remain limited so long as members of the AU and the RECs continue to maintain their sovereignty. This will continue to rob supranational institutions of the powers they need to perform their functions effectively. The issue of sovereignty therefore poses a fundamental challenge to the effective operation and viability of African regional economic integration schemes, as guarding sovereignty in this way requires an interstate approach based on the maintenance of national sovereignty and the dominance of member states over the working of regional institutions.[23] This explains the weakness of the regional institutional architecture of the regional economic communities, which lack the authority, power, and resources to enforce decisions and see the implementation of programs through to their logical conclusions.

No state willing to maintain its independence and sovereignty will give the supranational institutions more powers than they do to make it act against its interests. Hence, more than two decades after the adoption of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, the empowerment of ECOWAS as a supranational institution and enhancement of its authority, recently reinforced by the restructuring of its secretariat into a commission in 2006, are still being awaited. Such a situation is sadly the norm rather than the exception, as reflected in the experience of the supranational powers provided in both the SADC and COMESA treaties. In the case of the former, for example, the effective functioning of the SADC National Committees (SNCs), designed to provide inputs at the national level in the form of regional policies and strategies, as well as coordinate and oversee the implementation of programs at the national level, has been thwarted by governments. They have little interest in engaging civil society in the process. Specifically, governments have been unwilling to rationalize efforts to integrate the SNCs into their activities and agendas.[24]

Sovereignty and nationality concerns drive African member states to become reluctant actors in their approach to integration because of unintended consequences that could undermine the sovereignty of their states. One of these consequences is the supranational potential of institutions that emerge out of the African political integration process. This concern thus drives regional actors toward centralization of decision-making at the intergovernmental bargaining level.

Misapplying the European Model to Africa

The poor return on Africa's region-building and regional integration efforts also has to do with the continued emulation of the European integration model and institutions, which are not suitable to the African situation. Many states in sub-Saharan Africa do not have the capacities to manage development processes or engage in complex institutional forms of economic integration along the lines of the European Union. Peter Draper draws attention to this problem, contending that the dominant model pursued in Africa mimics European forms, and as such "is not appropriate to regional capacities and in some cases may do more harm than good."[25] While the European model may be useful as an aspiration, given its unique geopolitical foundations, complex governing institutions, elaborate coordination mechanisms, and levels of internal economic integration, it is very difficult to see how it could be replicated under the circumstances of African political economy.

The adoption of the classical EU prototype market integration approach is a prime example of Africa's mimicking the European integration model. This model is designed for developed countries; the model's underlying assumptions, to which Ahmad Aly has drawn attention, are "far from relevant in the African context."[26] It is worth stressing that the classical EU model is based on the existence of processing industries and adequate infrastructure. Since African states all have primary products to offer, with no complementarity between them, and since there are insufficient manufacturing or processing industries in Africa to absorb the raw materials, it is not clear how the mere formation of a common market will enhance the flow of trade in Africa. Successful market integration in Africa would require fostering production integration and regional complementarities, and the development of regional infrastructure (especially transport and communication) to support trade.

Carrying out such reforms to infrastructure and production would provide the context in which trade liberalization would be meaningful; regional cooperation in Africa should focus on creating the basis for trade, rather than presuming that the problem is artificial barriers to trade. Notwithstanding the fact that market integration has failed miserably on the continent, it continues to be highly regarded by most African leaders as a solution to Africa's growing marginalization within the world economy.[27] But without deeper regional cooperation, market integration and trade liberalization will merely be a vehicle for promoting non-African goods and services.

The colonial heritage has also militated against the effectiveness and viability of Africa's strategy of region-building and regional integration. Colonial and neocolonial patterns of trade politics have left many African countries dependent on their former metropolitan countries, which tends to work against viable regional groupings. Commercial and political links with Europe, for example, continue to be more important than links within Africa, and communication and transport networks oriented toward former colonial centers do not facilitate intraregional trade.

The Lomé system is a clear case in point. Implementation of the key provisions of the Lomé Convention constitutes one of the most important constraints, at least in the long run, on the degree of economic cooperation schemes attainable in Africa.[28] Promoting intraregional trade expansion through elimination of continental barriers to trade is incompatible with the Lomé arrangement, which is geared toward intensification or reinforcement of the existing pattern of trade links between Europe and Africa. Critically, the Lomé regime is geared toward institutionalization of the North-bound vertical orientation of the African economy, or Euro-Africanism, symbolizing the continuation of an unequal division of labor between Europe and Africa.[29] The four successive Lomé Conventions, signed in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990, were the first postcolonial trading agreements concluded between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. It is not surprising, therefore, that Shaw is pessimistic about the future: "Inter-African trade is unlikely to increase much, other than through smuggling and the black market, until the continent escapes from its colonial heritage of North-South links and produces goods with markets on the continent as well as outside."[30]

The current negotiations over economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between the ACP and the EU also have the potential for detrimental impact on region-building and regional integration.[31] Regional integration constitutes a crucial item for African nations in the EPA negotiations. African countries are therefore concerned with the extent to which the EPAs could help to build and strengthen Africa's region-building and regional integration initiatives.[32] But already, the manner in which the EPAs are being negotiated and signed has split the African front. Europe seems to be Balkanizing Africa through the EPAs by creating its own convenient groupings (e.g., Eastern and Southern Africa) or drafting interim EPAs with individual countries, as, for example, Côte d'Ivoire on December 7, 2007, and Ghana on December 13, 2007. At the time of writing, however, these West African interim EPAs have been largely superseded by an ECOWAS-wide EPA that would cover "substantially all trade" in goods and services (at least 80 percent). The ECOWAS EPA was endorsed for signature by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on July 10, 2014, and is currently awaiting ratification by individual states.[33]

Reconsidering Africa's Model of Region-Building and Regional Integration

At the beginning of the new millennium, it is imperative that African countries begin seriously to redefine both the theory and the practice of region-building and regional integration. The challenge is to develop a strategy that enhances the political, economic, social, and cultural integration of the continent, while simultaneously ensuring that Africa is not further marginalized within the world economy. In essence, this means determining how regionalism and globalization can coexist and be conduits for, rather than hindrances to, growth and development in Africa.

A formal EU-like structure is neither useful nor appropriate to Africa's regional capacities. The current approach of integrating through formal arrangements, particularly customs unions and their common external tariffs, poses substantial policy coordination challenges to states with often diametrically opposed industrial interests and very limited capacities to harmonize industrial policies. Africa requires a limited regional economic integration agenda that steers clear of formal, institution-intensive arrangements that parrot European forms.

Draper suggests a rethinking of Africa's integration model, away from the European track and onto a path that ensures a much more limited approach, one that prioritizes trade facilitation and regulatory cooperation in areas "related primarily to the conduct of business; underpinned by a security regime emphasizing the good governance agenda at the domestic level."[34]

While Draper's suggestion is worth considering, the models that the Asian countries have developed to incorporate regional realities are also worth critical study. Elie Ngongang argues that "these models may well be the secret of the relative success of Asia's regional integration efforts."[35] For example, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), unlike the EU and existing African RECs, does not impose a common external tariff, but allows each member state to set its own national schedule of import tariffs. Instead, AFTA's Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme focuses on reducing tariffs within the region, limiting them to a range of between 0 and 5 percent.[36]

Africa's model of region-building and regional integration should be reconsidered against the background of the rapidly changing global economy. The ingredients for successful regional integration and global competitiveness today are no longer the same as those that were assumed to be indispensable 30 years ago. Richard Baldwin argues that today's effective forms of region-building and regional integration are qualitatively different from those of the twentieth century with which African countries have been preoccupied.[37]

African countries can no longer ignore the fact that twenty-first-century forms of region-building and regional integration are not primarily about preferential market access; they are about "disciplines that underpin the trade-investment-service nexus." This means that twenty-first-century regionalism is driven by a different set of political economy forces; the basic bargain is "foreign factories for domestic reforms"—not "exchange of market access."[38] As twenty-first-century regionalism is about regulation rather than tariffs, regulatory economics is needed rather than Vinerian tax economics.

Simply put, twentieth-century trade is about "made here, sold there" goods, while twenty-first-century trade is about "made everywhere, sold there" goods. International commerce thus involves twentieth-century trade, plus complex cross-border flows related to international production networks. It includes trade in intermediate goods, services, ideas, know-how, capital, and people. As twentieth-century trade was mostly about goods crossing borders, twentieth-century regional trade agreements (RTAs) were mainly about trade barriers at the border—especially tariff preferences and related rules of origin. Twenty-first-century RTAs are quite different. As noted already, all of them include tariff preferences, but they are not primarily about preferential market access. Rather, they focus on disciplines underpinning international supply chains.

The need to reconsider the model of Africa's region-building and regional integration has been reinforced in a recent report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), urging African countries to shift from a traditional approach to integration, which does not fit with the African situation, to "developmental regionalism."[39] Developmental regionalism, UNCTAD explains, "encompasses cooperation among countries in a broader range of areas than just trade and trade facilitation to include—for example—investment, research and development, as well as policies aimed at accelerating regional industrial development and regional infrastructure provision, such as the building of better networks of roads and railways."[40] Thus, developmental regionalism can "involve a variety of policy tools which are not generally included in market integration initiatives."[41]

One important element of African developmental regionalism is the need to strengthen the capacity of the private sector. Regional cooperation and government attention to the private sector could help with this, and in return a stronger private sector could drive expanded regional integration. So far in Africa, governments have been the only active force for region-building and regional integration, while the private sector has remained a passive participant in the process. The UNCTAD report stresses the need to create mechanisms for constant dialogue between the state and the private sector so that the problems and challenges faced by existing and prospective businesses are made clear to governments, and "well-coordinated plans . . . [are] established for dealing with them."[42]

Another element of developmental regionalism noted in the report consists in building economic linkages among African economies in specific sectors of activity, "through the creation of development corridors."[43] As already noted, what needs stressing here is that developmental regionalism goes beyond trade. It involves cooperation among African countries in a wide range of areas, such as investments in transport and production-related infrastructure, as well as in agriculture and industrial projects. In other words, to meet the key challenge of economic transformation, regional integration initiatives need to be designed and carried out within a broader development framework.

Conclusion

Region-building and regional integration in Africa are seen as priorities by many of the continent's elites and policymakers, and support for them runs high among Africa's development partners as well. The pursuit of these goals has been confronted with a series of complex challenges, resulting in modest results—at best. The problem is the approach Africa has taken to region-building and regional integration, which is focused more on creating a European-style institutional structure (and assuming this will deliver European-style results) than on asking substantive questions about what is needed for African countries to grow and how regional cooperation could meet those needs.

With regard to the institutions, the supranational template for region-building and regional integration may not be appropriate for Africa. Hence, flexible cooperation arrangements aimed at involving shared sovereignty must be considered as a step in the right direction. Rather than striking at once for strong and independent supranational institutions with considerable powers and resources, African countries could be less ambitious and aim to create more flexible institutions that can be linked more closely to national priorities and interests. This implies arrangements that are less binding and more project-oriented, and involve more action on certain themes or by certain actors that offer more immediate benefits. What is really needed for a shared sovereignty is a bold recasting of the political and institutional structure of the regional economic integration schemes, along truly integrative lines. This would involve substantial transfers of state power to a federal type of community authority responsible for issues fundamental to the economic future and well-being of the people of the subregions.

Africa's colonial heritage has also been most unhelpful to the cause of the continent's region-building and regional integration. The colonial heritage has directly or indirectly contributed to African countries' mimicking of the EU's integration model, which is not responsive to the economic and political reality of Africa.[44] Closely related to this is African leaders' continued preoccupation with the twentieth-century form of region-building and regional integration, which is qualitatively different from the regionalism needed today. On a more practical level, the Lomé system could be described as perpetuation of African dependence rather than promotion of interdependence, and the EPA agenda being currently negotiated has the potential for being a stumbling block rather than a steppingstone for Africa's region-building and regional development. All this has necessitated a reconsidering of Africa's model of region-building and regional integration to enable the continent to effectively respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The need to reconsider Africa's integration model has been reinforced by the rapidly changing world—in practical terms of economic structure, patterns of trade, and global governance, as well as in "the prevailing economic orthodoxy."[45] It has become increasingly necessary that African countries also adapt their approach to region-building and regional integration in order to adapt to the change. Hence a developmental integration agenda that goes beyond trade liberalization to include broader economic and industrial policies aimed at addressing real constraints on economic capacity, strengthening the domestic private sector, and facilitating diversification and structural transformation holds great potential for Africa. This agenda can help to minimize the costs of market fragmentation and provide the necessary conditions for further integrating African economies into the global economy.

Notes

1. Adebayo Adedeji, "Comparative Strategies of Economic Decolonisation in Africa," in Ali A. Mazrui (ed.), *General History of Africa VIII: Africa Since 1935* (London: Heinemann, 1993), p. 408.
2. Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), *The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects*, Berlin, August 30–1, 2012, http://www.fes.de/afrika/content/downloads/AU_Report_FINAL.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014), p. 8.
3. S. K. B. Asante in collaboration with David Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration," in Mazrui, *General History*, p. 726.

4. S. K. B. Asante, *Ghana and the Promotion of Pan-Africanism and Regionalism* (Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2007), p. 44.
5. S. K. B. Asante, "Towards a Continental African Economic Community by the Year 2000?," in Christopher Fyfe (ed.), *African Futures: Proceedings of a Conference Held in the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 9–11 December 1987* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, Centre of African Studies, 1988), p. 80.
6. Ibid., p. 80.
7. *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa*, adopted April 1980, http:/msuweb.montclair.edu/-lebelp/lagos_plan.PDF (accessed September 5, 2014); *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, adopted June 3, 1991, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY.pdf (accessed September 5, 2014).
8. Robert S. Browne and Robert Cummings, *The Lagos Plan of Action vs The Berg Report: Contemporary Issues in African Development*, Monographs in African Studies (Washington, DC: Howard University, 1984), p. 37. For an extensive analysis of the LPA and Africa's regionalism, see S. K. B. Asante, "Development and Regional Integration Since 1980," in Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy Shaw (eds.), *Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development Problems and Potentials* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1985), pp. 79–99.
9. Jean-Claude Boidin, "Regional Cooperation in the Face of Structural Adjustment," *The Courier* 112 (1988), 67. See also S. K. B. Asante, "Structural Adjustment Programmes: An Obstacle to Regionalism in Africa?," *Development and Cooperation* 6 (1991), 13–14.
10. "Ghana—The Economic Recovery Program," Mongabay.com, November 1994, http://www.mongabay.com/history/ghana/ghana-the_economic_recovery_program.html (accessed October 20, 2014).
11. African Development Bank (AfDB), *Economic Cooperation and Regional Integration Policy*, February 2000, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/10000021-EN-ECONOMIC-COOPERATION-AND-REGIONAL-INTEGRATION-POLICY-PAPER.PDF (accessed September 22, 2014), p. 5.
12. S. K. B. Asante, *Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality, and Challenges* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp. 87–9.
13. AfDB, *Economic Cooperation*, pp. 5–6.
14. Asante, *Regionalism and Africa's Development*, pp. 87–9. A new EAC treaty came into force in 2000; see EAC, "About the Treaty," last amended August 20, 2007, http://www.eac.int/treaty/index.php (accessed September 22, 2014).
15. Andrew Grant J. and Fredrik Söderbaum (eds.), *The New Regionalism in Africa* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2003); Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy Shaw (eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
16. Adebusuyi I. Adeniran, "Regional Integration in the ECOWAS Region: Challenges and Opportunities," Africa Portal Backgrounder no. 19, January 2012, http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32531/1/Backgrounder%20No.%2019.pdf?1 (accessed October 20, 2014), p. 2.
17. Asante, *Regionalism and Africa's Development*, p. 96.
18. *COMESA Treaty*, signed November 5, 1993 in Kampala, Uganda, ratified December 8, 1994 in Lilongwe, Malawi, http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014).

19. Adebayo Adedeji, "History and Prospects for Regional Integration in Africa," paper presented at the third meeting of the African Development Forum, Addis Ababa, 2002.
20. Tesfaye Dinka and Walter Kennes, "Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges," European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper no. 74, September 2007, http://ecdpm.org/publications/africas-regional-integration-arrangements-history-challenges (accessed 5 September 2014); United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and Africa Union (AU), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa III: Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa*, 2008, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default /files/publication/aria3_eng.pdf (accessed September 5, 2014).
21. Jeggan C. Senghor, "Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in Africa: An Overview," in Peter Anyang' Nyang'o (ed.), *Regional Integration in Africa: Unfinished Agenda* (Nairobi: Africa Academy of Sciences, 1990).
22. John Ravenhill, "The Future of Regionalism in Africa," in Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds.), *The Future of Regionalism in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 214.
23. Luabu Lumu Ntumba, "Institutional Similarities and Differences: ECOWAS, CEEAC, and PTA," in Réal Lawrence (ed.), *Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1997), pp. 303–20.
24. Oguchukwu Nzewi and Lungi Zakwe, *Democratising Regional Integration in Southern Africa: SADC National Committees as Platforms for Participatory Policy-Making*, Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report no. 122, October 2009, http://www.cps.org.za/cps%20pdf/RR122.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014), especially p. 45.
25. Peter Draper, "Rethinking the (European) Foundations of Sub-Saharan African Regional Economic Integration: A Political Economy Essay," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Working Paper no. 293, October 25, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/dev/46013902.pdf (accessed November 26, 2014), p. 6.
26. Ahmed A. H. A. Aly, *Economic Cooperation in Africa: In Search of Direction* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 35.
27. Bela A. Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood: Richard Dale, 1961), p. 1.
28. S. K. B. Asante, "Whither Africa? Euro-African Integration or African Regional Cooperation?," *Development and Cooperation* 5 (1986), 9–11.
29. Asante, *Regionalism and Africa's Development*, pp. 127–8.
30. Timothy M. Shaw, "The Revival of Regionalism in Africa: Cure for Crisis or Prescription for Conflict?," *Jerusalem Journal of International Affairs* 11, no. 4 (1989), 10.
31. S. K. B. Asante, *Europe's Brand of a Trojan Horse? Africa and the Economic Partnership Agreements* (Tema: Digibooks Ghana, 2010), pp. 49–52. On the current status of EPA negotiations, see the link to the "Overview of EPAs—state of play" at European Commission, *Economic Partnerships*, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships (accessed November 26, 2014). At the time of writing, the most recent summary of the EPA negotiations is European Commission, "Overview of EPA Negotiations," October 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf (accessed November 26, 2014).
32. Asante, *Europe's Brand of a Trojan Horse?* pp. 49–52.

33. European Commission, "Overview of EPA Negotiations"; ECOWAS, "Final Commiqué: Forty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government," press release no. 134/2014, July 10, 2014, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=134&lang=en&annee=2014 (accessed December 3, 2014). On the ECOWAS-area EPAs, see also The Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, "ECOWAS heads of state Approve Economic Partnership Agreement with EU," International Brussels Office Weblog, October 15, 2014, http://brussels.cta.int/index.php?option=com_k2&id=9303&view=item&Itemid= (accessed November 27, 2014); Chinazor Megbolu, "ECOWAS-EU Agreement: Private Stakeholders Proffer Way Forward," *This Day* (Nigeria), October 7, 2014, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ecowas-eu-agreement-private-stakeholders-proffer-way-forward/190691/ (accessed November 27, 2014).
34. Draper, "Rethinking the (European) Foundations," p. 293.
35. Elie Ngongang, "New Regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Means to Attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and to Legitimate Democratic Governments," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (2009), 17.
36. *Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)*, signed in Singapore, January 28, 1992, http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/agreement-on-the-common-effective-preferential-tariff-cept-scheme-for-the-asean-free-trade-area-afta (accessed October 20, 2014), art. 2.
37. Richard E. Baldwin, *21st Century Regionalism: Filling the Gap between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rules*, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight no. 56, 2011, http://dev3.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/PolicyInsight56.pdf (accessed October 21, 2014).
38. Ibid., p. 3.
39. Patrick Osakwe, Janvier Nkrurunziza, and Bineswaree Bolaky, *Economic Development in Africa Report 2013: Intra-African Trade—Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism*, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2013, 2013, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014). See also Mathew Doidge, "From Developmental Regionalism to Developmental Interregionalism? The European Union Approach," National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), Working Paper no. 07/01, July 2007, http://aei.pitt.edu/10937/1/Doidge_workingpaper0701_developmentalregionalism.pdf (accessed December 3, 2014).
40. UNCTAD, "Shift from Traditional Approach to Integration to 'Developmental Regionalism', Report Urges," press release, UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2013/034, 11 July 2013, http://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=146 (accessed 23 September 2014).
41. Osakwe, Nkurunziza, and Bolaky, *Economic Development*, p. 97.
42. UNCTAD, "Shift from Traditional Approach."
43. Ibid.
44. See also chapter 4 in this volume.
45. Osakwe, Nkurunziza, and Bolaky, *Economic Development in Africa*, p. 129.

Part III

The African Union (AU) and Subregional Organizations and Initiatives

Chapter 8

The African Union and Regional Integration in Africa

Kasaija Phillip Apuuli

Introduction

The ideal of African unity can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when the idea of pan-Africanism first gained traction.[1] The establishment of the African Union (AU) in July 2002 began the third phase in the project of forging pan-African unity; the first phase was the institutionalization of pan-Africanism through the six Pan-African Congresses held between 1900 and 1945, and the second phase was the inauguration of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963.[2]

This chapter discusses the role of the AU in the integration process of the continent. Since its creation, the AU has been the premier regional integration arrangement for Africa and the African voice on matters that affect the continent. The AU was established with the idea that it should be a vehicle for promoting "African solutions to African problems," and it has created a broad set of institutions and frameworks to operationalize this idea: an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); normative frameworks in the areas of democracy, human rights, and good governance; and economic infrastructure arrangements to promote economic growth and independence.

Little more than a decade old, the AU is still a work in progress. It continues to face the challenges of weak members and resource constraints, but has made modest strides toward achieving its goals of promoting African political and economic integration.

Historical Background

Pan-Africanism has its origins in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century activities of Henry Sylvester-Williams, W. E. B. DuBois, William Marcus Garvey, and other leaders of African descent domiciled in the West Indies and the United States.[3] The meetings of the Pan-African Congress that began with the early pan-Africanists were "significant event[s] in the history of decolonization and African reassertion."[4]

In 1900, the first Pan-African Conference was held in London, bringing together Africans and people of African descent then living in Europe and the United States to discuss the questions of colonialism, foreign domination of black peoples, racial prejudice, the treatment of Africans in South Africa and the United States, the future of Africa, and the international standing of the only three free black states existing in the world at the time (Haiti, Ethiopia, and Liberia).[5] Subsequently, Pan-African Congress meetings were held in 1919 (Paris), 1921 (London, Paris, and Brussels), 1923 (London and Lisbon), 1927 (New York), 1945 (Manchester), 1974 (Dar es Salaam), and 1994 (Kampala). The sixth congress, held in Manchester, England, in 1945, was remarkable because, by this time, the pan-Africanist initiative had been picked up by Africans themselves. While earlier meetings of the congress had had African delegates, Africans were often in the minority and were dominated by the diaspora. The 1945 meeting was the first organized primarily by Africans, with emerging African political organizations having a strong presence.[6] The meeting was organized by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone; S. L. Akintola, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Magnus Williams of Nigeria; and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, among others. Almost all of these men were radical and militant in their pronouncements on how the issues facing Africa were to be tackled. For example, they demanded immediate independence for all colonized people. The key outcome of the Manchester meeting was the declaration that "all peoples of Africa and of African descent everywhere should be freed forthwith from all forms of inhibiting legislation and influences, and be reunited with one another."[7] The 1945 meeting launched pan-Africanism into a new era.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, two schools of thought emerged among independent African states on the alternatives that were open to the continent for its unification.[8] The first school of thought, the "Casablanca group" led by Nkrumah, who had become president of an independent Ghana in 1957, advocated a strong "federalist" view according to which Africans had to unite or perish. A fully integrated organization, responsible for managing common defense, currency, foreign relations, and diplomacy, was needed to achieve that aim.[9] The second school of thought, the "Monrovia group," which was supported by the majority of the African leadership, favored a more classical, "confederal" approach according to which individual state sovereignty would be preserved in the framework of a much looser arrangement.[10]

The 1963 establishment of the OAU led to the disintegration of the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs. Nevertheless, the debate on what integration trajectory Africa should take was reopened several times. Around the founding of the AU in 2002, there was an exchange between Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi on one hand, and former South African president Thabo Mbeki and former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo on the other. Gaddafi favored a rapid political union of Africa, capable of countering the influence of the Western countries, while Mbeki and Obasanjo "advocated for a more cautious and gradualist approach" to African integration.[11]

In the mid-2000s, the establishment of a Union Government for Africa was placed on the agenda of the AU. Timothy Murithi notes: "The need to create several ministerial portfolios for the AU was discussed during the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja, Nigeria on 30 and 31 January 2005."[12] The AU agreed to the proposal made by the Libyan government regarding the establishment of ministerial portfolios for the organization.[13] The debate culminated in the establishment by the Assembly of a committee, chaired by Uganda, to study the matter.[14] Following consultations with the regional economic communities (RECs), technical experts, academics, the media, civil society, and representatives of the diaspora, the committee concluded in November 2005 that "the necessity of an AU government [was] not in doubt;...that its creation must come about through the principle of gradual incrementalism; and that the role of the RECs as building blocks for the continental framework should be highlighted."[15] Notwithstanding the conclusions of the committee, the AU Assembly established another Committee of Seven, chaired by Nigeria, to study the process, structure, and timeframe necessary to realize the Union Government for Africa, among other issues. The Committee of Seven's July 2006 report identified 16 strategic areas on which a Union Government should focus.[16] Hitherto, the committees' reports have not been implemented, and so the debate on the establishment of the Union Government is yet to be concluded.

Murithi notes: "The creation of the OAU was supposed to herald greater Pan-African solidarity, political liberation, economic development, and security."[17] The Charter of the OAU called for "the unity and solidarity of the African states" and established basic principles to guide the organization, including the sovereign equality of member states, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state.[18] Unfortunately, the OAU did not live up to these principles. As Murithi argues, it "was not effective in monitoring and policing the affairs of its own Member States when it came to issues such as violent conflict, political corruption, economic mismanagement, poor governance, lack of human rights, lack of gender equality, and poverty eradication."[19] In the end, a culture of impunity and indifference was cultivated and became entrenched in the international relations of the African countries.[20]

The OAU had a mixed record. Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein argue that the organization's record in the field of decolonization is by far its most impressive contribution.[21] According to them, "It legitimised the actions of liberation movements and was successful in maintaining the [issue] on the international agenda for a long period of time."[22] The organization's involvement in the settlement of disputes on the continent was much less significant. The fact that the Charter did not provide the organization any role in the resolution of internal disputes—which proved to be much more frequent in Africa than interstate conflicts—as well as the growing personal involvement of heads of state and governments in the settlement of disputes, rendered the organization obsolete.[23] The establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in 1993 (hereafter the Mechanism) did not improve the organization's role in the settlement of disputes and conflict on the continent.[24] Eki Omorogbe[25] and Paul Williams[26] have both observed that the weakness of the

Mechanism was that its primary objective was the anticipation of and prevention of conflicts rather than intervention once a conflict broke out.

The OAU's "limited ability to provide a regional response" to the many problems facing the African continent resulted in questions being raised about its "sustainability in the circumstances of contemporary Africa."[27] In 2007, the AU published the report of a self-audit conducted under the leadership of Adebayo Adedeji, a former United Nations (UN) under-secretary-general and executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The audit said of the OAU: "The apparent inability of the Organisation to take initiatives that would overcome the growing crises of human suffering on the continent led many Africans to dismiss it as an increasingly expensive irrelevance."[28] Moreover, the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), introduced in the 1980s and 1990s by the Bretton Woods institutions in some African countries, hampered the commitment of those countries to the continent's integration (see also chapter 7 in this volume). Thus, in the end, a decision was taken by the African leadership to make African integration more effective by transforming the OAU into the AU.

Establishment of the African Union

The establishment of the AU represented a shift from the way the OAU was organized and carried out its work. Nowhere has the AU more evidently demonstrated this clear break from the mode of operation of the OAU than in the areas of institution-building, peace and security, establishment of normative frameworks, and crafting of economic programs to integrate the continent.

Institution-Building

The renewal of the integration process in Africa can be seen in the kind of institutions that have been established under the AU. The key organs of the AU include the AU Commission, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

Many of the organs of the AU were inherited from the OAU. Nevertheless, there are new institutions that have been established, including pan-African suprafinancial institutions in the form of the African Central Bank (ACB), the African Monetary Fund (AMF), and the African Investment Bank (AIB).[29] While all these institutions are still works in progress, their establishment is a total departure from the structure of the OAU, which did not even contemplate the creation of similar institutions. Generally, as Adekeye Adebajo has observed, the main drawback in the functioning of the AU as an institution is the fact that it is an "elite-driven [body] that [suffers] from a democratic deficit in which citizens [are] not properly consulted or informed sufficiently about decisions taken in their name . . . decisionmaking within the AU remains dominated by its heads of state."[30]

Peace and Security

The AU Constitutive Act was drafted with issues of peace and security at the top of the agenda. The OAU Charter's provisions defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states came to be translated into the norm of nonintervention. The AU adopted a much more interventionist stance in its legal frameworks and institutions, marking a shift away from the notion of noninterference to that of nonindifference.[31]

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU replaced the Central Organ of the Mechanism. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (hereafter the Protocol) was adopted by the inaugural meeting of the Assembly of the Union held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, and entered into force in December 2003.[32] The Protocol established the African Peace and Security Architecture, including the AU Commission, the PSC, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. The RECs are also an integrated part of this architecture. While the structures are not all fully developed, the APSA as it stands today provides the AU with a framework through which the continent can deal with its numerous peace and security challenges.[33]

Another innovation by the AU in the area of peace and security is the institutionalization of the right to intervene by the organization, under articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. Hitherto, these articles have not been explicitly tested. However, since 2003 the African Union has undertaken the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB, 2003–4),[34] the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, 2004–7),[35] the AU Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC, 2006),[36] the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007–present), the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA, 2013),[37] and the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA, 2013–14).[38] While these missions have met with both successes and challenges, it can generally be observed that the AU has firmly established a foothold in conducting peace support operations in Africa.

Establishment of Normative Frameworks

The AU has distinguished itself as a norm-setting organization. The framers of the Constitutive Act had no doubt at all about their mission of institutionalizing democratic governance in Africa.[39] The core elements of the AU normative framework on good governance are the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the principle of condemning and rejecting unconstitutional changes of government.[40] The APRM aims, among other things, at helping countries to address their "democratic deficits" by "initiating dialogue between private and government stakeholders and civil society actors on areas for improvement and challenges such as corruption, capital flight, and tax avoidance."[41]

Any government that violates the principle condemning unconstitutional changes of government is sanctioned by not being allowed to participate in the activities of the AU.[42] This is not an idle threat. Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and

2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Mali (2012), and Egypt (2013) have suffered the wrath of the AU after undergoing what the organization considered to be unconstitutional changes of government.[43] The ban on unconstitutional changes of government has been strengthened by the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (hereafter the Charter).[44] The Charter, which came into force in 2012, has "accentuated the resolve of the AU to [promote] democratic culture, practice and governance in Africa."[45]

Economic Integration

The 1960s—declared the "Development Decade" by the UN[46]—saw substantial steps initiated by UNECA, especially the 1964 creation of the African Development Bank (AfDB).[47] These developments encouraged and sustained the efforts of the various African states toward regional economic cooperation, with a view to pulling national and external resources together for collective self-reliant development.[48] In 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, with a view to establishing the African Economic Community (AEC).[49] The AEC was established by a treaty adopted in 1991 (commonly known as the Abuja Treaty), which entered into force in 1994.[50] The AEC reflects Africa's desire, as a UNECA report notes, "to transform itself from a continent of individual least developed and developing economies to a strong, united bloc of nations."[51] Under the Abuja Treaty, the AEC was to be established in six stages over a period of 35 years.[52] These stages of implementation are summarized in table 8.1.

According to Amadou Sy, "The Abuja Treaty relies on eight building blocks—the RECs—to achieve its goal of establishing the AEC."[53] The regional economic communities are: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community

Table 8.1 Stages of African Economic Community (AEC) implementation

Stage	Duration	Tasks
1	Six years (1994–1999)	Strengthen existing RECs; create new RECs
2	Eight years (2000–2007)	Stabilize tariff and nontariff barriers; strengthen sectoral integration; coordinate REC activity
3	Ten years (2008–2017)	Establish regional free trade areas and customs unions
4	Two years (2018–2019)	Harmonize REC tariff and nontariff systems to establish continental customs union
5	Four years (2020–2023)	Establish African Common Market
6	Five years (2024–2028)	Final establishment of AEC: monetary union and other institutions of the community

Source: AU, *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, adopted June 3, 1991, entered into force May 12, 1994, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015), arts. 6(1), 6(2).

of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Over the years, these RECs have taken strides toward the building of the AEC. Unfortunately, however, the RECs "are moving towards implementing the Abuja Treaty with different rhythms."[54] The different speeds with which RECs have moved toward the AEC targets have slowed the pace of integration. However, a study conducted in 2013 by UNECA, the AU, and the AfDB painted a more positive picture of African integration, noting that "the RECs are making progress" in several key areas, such as trade and infrastructure development.[55]

Challenges to and Possible Solutions for African Integration

This chapter would not be complete without mention of some of the major challenges that the AU continues to face, as well as possible solutions that the AU can proffer to advance the African integration agenda.

Dependency and Financing

The first major challenge is the dependent nature of the African state. Martin Doornbos has argued that African states, whatever their differences, share a pervasive dependence on external actors.[56] This is partly explained by dependence theory, according to which the world trading system tends to keep most developing states in a condition of economic and political bondage, resulting in a neoimperial and neocolonial relationship between the rich and the poor countries (see also the discussion of Raúl Prebisch in chapter 3 in this volume).[57] The autonomy of the African state has increasingly been eroded by the international community, including through prescriptions to states that receive donor funds regarding their national budgetary and policy processes.[58] More recently, William Brown has found that aid affects the policy autonomy of aid recipients.[59] Given the limited financial resources of African states, the role of the national government has become necessarily limited to accepting ready-made policy packages prepared elsewhere or already agreed by the main donors. This is the situation that many members of the AU face, who thus cannot contribute meaningfully to the promotion of Africa's agenda.[60]

Connected with this is the issue of financing for integration in Africa. In 2004, a UNECA report lamented that African regional integration continued to depend heavily on donor financing:

> Africa's integration cannot be funded solely by the traditionally unreliable financial contributions of Partner States or outside support. Relying principally on assessed contributions has proven unsustainable for regional economic communities . . . Building an effective African Union and ensuring a brighter future for Africa's integration require . . . more innovative and sustainable approaches to achieve an autonomous and self-dependent integration process.[61]

The 2007 audit of the AU observed that the situation had not substantially improved. Donors have continued to foot the lion's share of the AU's program and project financing. The 2015 AU budget confirms the fact that donors continue to heavily fund the organization. Out of a total budget of $522 million, "international partners" are providing a sum of $375 million, or approximately 72 percent.[62] Wafula Okumu has observed that "the donors are the ones who have drawn up roadmaps for setting up key institutions and determined which aspects of the peace and security agenda are implemented."[63] A similar dynamic has played out in economic policy.

The AU has been searching for ways to improve its financial standing. In pursuance of a 2013 decision on alternative sources of financing, a high-level panel chaired by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo was set up to deal with the issue.[64] The panel presented its report at the twenty-first ordinary session of the AU Assembly in May 2013. After debate, the report was adopted, with two options being considered for further study: imposing a $2 hospitality levy on tourists staying in hotels in African countries, and imposing a $10 levy on flights originating from Africa or with destinations in Africa.[65] While the AU Assembly has yet to finally decide on the matter,[66] René Kouassi, the AU director of economic affairs, has been quoted as observing that the two options have been accepted by all AU members.[67] Alternative sources of financing should enable Africa to take charge of the continent's integration agenda itself.

Regional Integration and Regional Economic Communities

Another major challenge is the paucity of regional integration in Africa. The Abuja Treaty designated the RECs as building blocks of African integration. Sadly however, the AU audit observed that in this regard, "Africa is still a long way from the achievement of the goals of political and economic integration."[68] The building of the RECs in Africa has faced a number of challenges.

First, there is lack of convergence among the existing RECs.[69] As the audit noted: "Several years after the adoption of the Abuja Treaty, certain RECs have not yet achieved the foundational stage [for the creation of the AEC] within the envisaged timeframes."[70] The RECs seem to have adopted an approach to integration "based more on deadlines than concrete achievements."[71] Generally, the existing RECs, as Sy observed, "have different levels of advancement across components of regional integration, for example, freedom of movement of capital and goods, unification of currencies, and labor mobility."[72]

Second, the establishment of the RECs was supposed to generate more intraregional trade between the member states, based on competitiveness and creation of larger markets. Unfortunately, the RECs have not significantly increased intra-REC trade.[73] Intraregional trade in Africa is the lowest in the world at 12 percent of total trade, compared to 30 percent in Asia and 60 percent in the European Union (EU).[74] Total imports to and exports from Africa accounted for only 3.2 percent of global trade in 2012.[75] The AU audit attributed these low levels of African trade to

> the failure [by African countries] to address structural issues associated with trade such as employment creation, diversification of production structure, the regime

> of free market liberalisation and trade . . . the failure of RECs to effectively remove tariff and non-tariff barriers, as a result of multiple membership in different RECs with conflicting or overlapping standards, procedures and obligations and failure to coordinate and harmonise extra-community import policies in key sectors.[76]

African leaders have recognized these problems and hence the eighteenth ordinary AU summit endorsed the framework, roadmap, and architecture for fast-tracking the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and the action plan for boosting intra-African trade.[77] Under the framework, roadmap, and architecture, the summit decided that the CFTA should be operationalized by 2017.

Third, the harmonization and coordination of REC policy envisaged under the Abuja Treaty was to ensure that the various steps in the treaty were consistently followed throughout the continent. In other words, sectoral policies within the RECs should be compatible with each other so that there is convergence toward the creation of the African Common Market (ACM) and ultimately the AEC and political federation.[78] However, this has not been possible to achieve, because countries belong to different RECs with divergent integration timelines. As the AU audit notes, the proliferation of RECs has "weakened the logic of regional integration" through irrational configurations: "Member states that belong to more than one REC find themselves burdened with the technical, administrative and financial rigors of multiple memberships."[79] But steps are being taken to deal with this problem. COMESA, the EAC, and SADC established the Tripartite Free Trade Arrangement in 2008, under which they are working toward joint activities to avoid duplication (see also chapter 11 in this volume).

The problems of region-building are further compounded by the unstreamlined relationship between the RECs and the AU. While this relationship is governed by a number of legal instruments, including the AU Constitutive Act and the 1998 and 2007 protocols on relations with the RECs, the operationalization of the relationship has not been smooth.[80] The RECs are key implementing arms of the AU and, in turn, as the AU audit notes, "it is the responsibility of the AU to support the RECs in the areas of human, financial and technical development."[81] Unfortunately, the AU has hitherto not been able to provide this support to the RECs. Generally, "the activities of the RECs in various areas are . . . largely uncoordinated at continental level, within and across the RECs, with the AU and with external partners."[82] The situation is exacerbated further by the fact that "the RECS are reluctant to cede significant aspects of their sovereignty to . . . continental entities [like the AU]."[83] This problem is being resolved partly by the AU and the RECs opening liaison offices at each other's headquarters, with the aim of promoting coordination of their activities.

Conclusion

The integration of the continent has gone through different stages. The development of the idea of pan-Africanism was the first stage, followed by the second, the founding of the OAU, in 1963. The establishment of the AU in 2002 began the third stage. However, the AU was formed precisely so that there could be pan-African solutions for African problems and it should therefore resume ownership and become accountable to its members.[84] The building of the AU into a viable institution is still work in progress. The challenges identified here notwithstanding, the organization is putting in place institutional and normative infrastructure in the economic, peace and security, and political fields that will surely deliver Africa to the promised land of continental integration.

Notes

1. Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora Since 1787* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. vii.
2. Kay Mathews, "Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The AU and the New Pan-Africanists," in John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, and Timothy Murithi (eds.), *The African Union and Its Institutions* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008), p. 28. Some writers do not count the 1900 Pan-African Conference as one of the congresses, counting the 1919 Pan-African Congress as the first. See, for example, Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 133.
3. C. O. C. Amate, *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice* (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 34.
4. Richard Rathbone, "Pan-Africanism: 50 Years On," *History Today* 45, no. 10 (1995), 6.
5. Amate, *Inside the OAU*, p. 34. Two women addressed the conference, namely Anna H. Jones and Anna Julia Cooper.
6. Brenda Gayle Plummer, *In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 321. Rathbone ("Pan-Africanism," p. 6) also notes that this meeting "differed from earlier meetings in that this was dominated by young Africans and West Indians and not . . . by mostly African-American intellectual activists."
7. Amate, *Inside the OAU*, p. 37.
8. African Union (AU), *Audit of the African Union: Towards a People-Centred Political and Socio-Economic Transformation of Africa*, 2007, para. 11.
9. Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, *Bowett's Law of International Institutions*, 5th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001), p. 244.
10. Maurice Glélé-Ahanhanzo, *Introduction à l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine et aux Organisations Régionales Africaines* (Paris: Librairie Général de Droit et Jurisprudence, 1986), pp. 21–2.
11. John Akokpari, "Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa," in Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba, and Murithi, *The African Union*, p. 99.
12. Timothy Murithi, "Introduction: Contexualising the Debate on a Union Government for Africa," in Timothy Murithi (ed.), *Towards a Union Government for Africa: Challenges and Opportunities,* Monograph no. 140 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, January 2008), p. 5.
13. Murithi, "Introduction," p. 5. Further: "In the 6th Ordinary session of the Executive Council . . . Libya proposed the establishment of posts of Minister of Transport and Communications, Defence and Foreign Affairs."
14. The other members were Botswana, Chad, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia.
15. Ibid., p. 5.
16. These included, as Murithi (ibid., p. 6) notes: "continental integration; education, training, skills development, science and technology; energy; environment;

external relations; food, agriculture and water resources; gender and youth; governance and human rights; health; industry and mineral resources; finance; peace and security; social affairs and solidarity; sport and culture; a trade and custom union; and infrastructure, information technology and biotechnology."

17. Ibid., p. 3.
18. Organisation of African Unity (OAU), *OAU Charter*, adopted May 25, 1963, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf (accessed January 20, 2015), arts II(1)(a), III.
19. Timothy Murithi, "The Role of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Implementation of Article 4(h)," in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds.), *Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 141.
20. Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, "The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis, and the Notion of 'African Solutions to African Problems,'" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, no. 1 (2013), 117.
21. Sands and Klein, *Bowett's Law*, p. 248. See also Murithi, "The Role of the African Peace and Security Architecture," p. 141. Murithi observes that "the OAU succeeded in its primary mission . . . [of] liberating the continent."
22. Sands and Klein, *Bowett's Law*, p. 248.
23. Ibid., p. 248.
24. OAU, *Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution*, AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-decl-3-xxix-e.pdf (accessed April 21, 2015).
25. Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, "Can the African Union Deliver Peace and Security?," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 16, no. 1 (2011), 37.
26. Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), p. 150. Williams adds that "African governments hoped that by focusing on preventive diplomacy, they would dramatically reduce the need for subsequent peacekeeping missions on the continent."
27. David J. Francis, "Peacekeeping in Africa," in Rachel E. Utley (ed.), *Major Powers and Peacekeeping* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), p. 109.
28. AU, *Audit*, para. 16.
29. AU, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, adopted July 11, 2000, entered into force May 26, 2001, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015), art. 19.
30. Adekeye Adebajo, "Paradise Lost and Found: The African Union and the European Union," in Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), p. 60.
31. Apuuli, "The African Union," p. 117.
32. AU, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, adopted July 9, 2002, entered into force December 26, 2003, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015).
33. For comprehensive assessments of these structures *see* AU, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study*, 2010, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-of-the-apsa-assessment-study-july-oct-2010-eng.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015); Williams, *War and Conflict*, pp. 156–66.
34. See Timothy Murithi, "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan,

and the African Union Mission in Somalia," *African Security Review* 17, no. 1 (2008), 74–6; Devon Curtis, "South Africa: 'Exporting Peace' to the Great Lakes Region?," in Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg (eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), p. 261. The AU mission transitioned to a United Nations (UN) mission in June 2004.

35. See Murithi, "The African Union's Evolving Role," pp. 76–8. In December 2007, AMIS had fully transitioned to the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
36. The mandate was changed in 2008 and the mission became the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES). See Emma Svensson, *The African Union's Operations in the Comoros: MAES and Operation Democracy*, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), September 2008, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5040~v~The_African_Union__8217s_Operations_in_the_Comoros.pdf (accessed April 21, 2015).
37. See Freedom C. Onuoha and Alex Thurston, "Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 19, 2013, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/2/19/201321984326956734FrancoAfrican_Intervention_Mali.pdf (accessed June 8, 2015). In July 2013, the African mission transferred its authority to the Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA).
38. The Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) took over from an earlier Economic Community of Central African States mission, the Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique (MICOPAX), in December 2013, and transitioned to a UN mission, the Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Centrafricaine (MINUSCA), in September 2014. See AU, "Transfer of Authority from MICOPAX to MISCA," December 19, 2013, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/transfer-of-authority-from-micopax-to-misca (accessed June 2, 2015); UN, "MINUSCA Background," http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/background.shtml (accessed June 2, 2015).
39. John Gasu, "The African Union and the Democratic Project: Examining the Challenges for Task Accomplishment," in Mammo Muchie, Phindil Lukhele-Olorunju, and Oghenarobor Akpor (eds.), *The African Union Ten Years After: Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa [AISA], 2013), p. 35.
40. On unconstitutional changes of government, see AU, *Constitutive Act*, art. 4(p).
41. Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), *The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects*, Berlin, Germany, August 30–1, 2012, p. 20.
42. AU, *Constitutive Act*, art. 30.
43. On the Togo, Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, and Mali suspensions, see Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, "A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and *Coups d'État*," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 44, no. 123 (2011), 138–53. On Mali, see Celeste Hicks, "Mali Suspended from African Union," *The Guardian* (London), March 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/23/mali-suspended-african-union-coup (accessed January 21, 2015). On Egypt, see "Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) at its 384th Meeting on the Situation in the Arab Republic of Egypt," July 5, 2013, http://au.int/en/content/communiqu%C3%A9-peace-and-security-council-african-union-au-its-384th-meeting (accessed January 21, 2015).

44. AU, *African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance*, adopted January 30, 2007, entered into force, February 15, 2012, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_DEMOCRACY_ELECTIONS_AND_GOVERNANCE.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015).
45. Gasu, "The African Union," p. 38.
46. A/RES/1710 (XVI), *United Nations Development Decade: A Programme for International Economic Co-operation (I)*, December 19, 1961.
47. AU, *Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank*, adopted August 4, 1963, entered into force September 10, 1964, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015). The African Development Bank (AfDB) began operations on July 1, 1966; see AfDB, "African Development Bank (AfDB)," http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/african-development-bank-afdb (accessed January 21, 2015). The AfDB was created under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA); see UNECA, *Final Act of the Conference of Finance Ministers on the Establishment of an African Development Bank*, E/CN.14/FMAB/38, August 4, 1963.
48. Wilfrid A. Ndongko, "Introduction," in Wilfrid A. Ndongko (ed.), *Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa* (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa [CODESRIA], 1985), p. 3.
49. OAU, *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000*, adopted April 29, 1980, p. 99.
50. AU, *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, adopted June 3, 1991, entered into force May 12, 1994, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015).
51. UNECA, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*, 2004, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria1english_full.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015), p. 28.
52. AU, *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, arts 6(1), 6(2).
53. Amadou Sy, "Will There Be an African Economic Community?," transcript of testimony before a hearing of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, January 9, 2014, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20140109/101628/HHRG-113-FA16-Wstate-SyA-20140109.pdf (accessed April 23, 2015), p. 3.
54. AU Commission, *Status of Integration in Africa (SIA IV)*, 2013, http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/SIA%202013%28latest%29_En.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015), p. 9.
55. UNECA, AU, and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI: Harmonizing Policies to Transform the Trading Environment*, 2013, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria_vi_english_full.pdf, p. 3, and Chapter 2 generally.
56. Martin Doornbos, "The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 2 (1990), 180.
57. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Santa Barbara: Longman, 1988), p. 122.
58. Doornbos, "The African State," 188.
59. William Brown, "Sovereignty Matters: Africa, Donors, and the Aid Relationship," *African Affairs* 112, no. 447 (2013), 262–82.
60. Apuuli, "The African Union," p. 123.

61. UNECA, *Assessing Regional Integration*, p. 65.
62. AU, *Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2015 Financial Year*, Assembly/AU/3(XXIII), in AU, *Assembly of the Union, Twenty-third Ordinary Session, 26–27 June 2014, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea*, June 27, 2014, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20517%20-%20545%20%28XXIII%29%20_E_1.pdf (accessed December 28, 2014), p. 1. The $375 million figure represents both $226 million in "secured" funds and $149 million "to be solicited."
63. Wafula Okumu, "The African Union: Pitfalls and Prospects for Uniting Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 2 (2009), 105. Various proposals have been made to fund the African integration agenda. See AU, *Report of the High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding the African Union*, EA10423, July 2013.
64. See AU, *Decision on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union*, Assembly/AU/6(XXI), Assembly/AU/Dec.486(XXI), May 27, 2013.
65. See AU, *Modalities of Implementation of the Two Options Retained by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU on Alternative Sources of Financing of the AU*, July 2013, http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Alternative%20Sources%20_E.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).
66. See AU, *Decision on the Report of Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union*, Assembly/AU/6(XXIV), Assembly/AU/Dec. 561(XXIV), January 30–1, 2015.
67. See Christabel Ligami, "AU Makes Inroads into Air Travel, Hotels for Funds," *The East African*, April 11, 2015, p. 6.
68. AU, *Audit*, para. 349.
69. AU, *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, art. 88; AU, *Audit*, para. 349.
70. AU, *Audit*, para. 351.
71. Ibid.
72. Sy, "Will There Be an African Economic Community?," p. 7.
73. AU, *Audit*, para. 352.
74. Sy, "Will There Be an African Economic Community?," p. 2.
75. CCR and FES, *The African Union at Ten*, p. 18.
76. AU, *Audit*, para. 352.
77. See AU, *Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast Tracking the Continental Free Trade Area*, EX.CL/700(XX), Assembly/AU/Dec.394(XVIII), January 29–30, 2012.
78. AU, *Audit*, para. 354.
79. Ibid., paras 356–7.
80. AU, *Constitutive Act*, arts 33–4; AU, *Protocol on the Relations Between the African Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities*, adopted February 25, 1998, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/AEC-RECs-Protocol-on-relations-1998.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015); AU, *Protocol on the Relations Between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities*, adopted July 3, 2007, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/AU-RECs-Protocol.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).
81. AU, *Audit*, para. 366.
82. Ibid., para. 367.
83. Ibid., para. 369.
84. Apuuli, "The African Union," p. 132.

Chapter 9

Region-Building in Southern Africa

Scott Taylor

Introduction

For much of recent history, Southern Africa has laid claim to a collective identity that eludes most other geopolitical regions on the African continent.[1] Its nations possess myriad informal ties, commonalities of history, colonial and settler legacies, and economic links, which are bound up with more than a generation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in its current institutional form. Numerous scholarly collections focus on Southern Africa on the basis of a regional distinctiveness that warrants systematic treatment.[2] In contrast to other African regional blocs (in West and Central Africa, for example), Southern Africa remains one of the most durable communities, neither wracked by widespread conflict and security crises nor threatened by state collapse.

Yet despite its seemingly auspicious conditions, Southern Africa's progress in region-building has been halting at best.[3] Various aspects of integration—whether at a basic level, like compliance with trade protocols and labor movement, or at a more comprehensive level, like the inculcation of shared norms of governance and politics—have been weakly or incompletely fulfilled. To some extent, Southern Africa's difficulties are emblematic of the difficulties of regionalism globally. However, the region also faces a particular set of persistent challenges. Whereas Southern Africa arguably was once an exemplar of region-ness, the coherence and commonalities that once distinguished it have deteriorated, along with the institutional structure embodied in SADC.

This chapter begins by briefly examining the shared historical foundations of regionalism and regionalization in Southern Africa. Many of the factors that once served to bind the region together persist, yet in the contemporary context they are—paradoxically—developing in ways that simultaneously threaten to unravel it. Two such self-contradictory forces are the effects of regional business and cultural factors. "Business" and "culture" exert both centripetal and centrifugal forces on region-building, although the divisive effects are increasingly discernible.

After discussing these forces, which form the principal focus of the chapter, I address how the SADC institutional framework is designed to alleviate these tensions and serve the common interests of the member countries, but more often exacerbates them. The chapter concludes with some possible ways forward for the region.

Regional Foundations

In Southern Africa, the promulgation of regional norms and practices has been an evolutionary process based in a context of shared history and values. Southern Africa's putative norms include security and development, human rights, and democracy—although the strength and interpretation of these norms, and the conviction with which regional member states embrace them, vary widely across states.[4] The uneven diffusion of norms has significant implications for region-building.

Nonetheless, "the notion of Southern Africa" as "a single and indivisible one" remains an important part of the regional narrative, as Sandra MacLean notes. This narrative is a powerful one for Southern Africa. MacLean describes regions as "social constructions . . . processes based on shared interests and intersubjective understanding."[5] As such, Fredrik Söderbaum argues, "there are no 'natural,' 'organic' or 'given' regions," nor are there fixed or given regionalist interests. Rather, "interests and identities are shaped by a variety of state and nonstate actors in the process of interaction and intersubjective understanding. To define a region is a political act as well as a social construction itself." Therefore, while analysts such as Söderbaum endorse the "notion" of Southern Africa, the region is also dynamic: "multidimensional and heterogeneous, constructed and reconstructed by various groups of state, market, society as well as external actors."[6]

The dynamic of regional construction, and reconstruction, entails innovation, occasional duplication, and adaptation; these are elements of a complex process of *learning*. According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink: "The mechanisms that lead to learning include interaction (with domestic and international actors), comparison (with prior national experiences and with other countries' experiences), reflection (including internal debates and self-criticism) and personnel change."[7] African regional communities, including SADC, have adapted many aspects of the European model, and indeed, ideas about regional integration and the efficacy and utility of regional communities derive to a significant degree from the European experience. However, the lessons and institutional forms have been endogenized, resulting in unique patterns and challenges.[8] This endogenization, Söderbaum suggests, is an element of the regular *re*construction of the region. In other words, such adaptation and learning are part of the normal ebb and flow of a rather amorphous "body" that has both formal and informal elements.[9]

Yet what Söderbaum considers "normal" and fairly innocuous processes can actually lead to unfavorable outcomes. Indeed, it remains unclear in Southern Africa whether the lessons being learned, and the practices that derive from them, promote "reconstruction" that yields a more cohesive regionalism, or regional *de*construction. Before exploring this concern, however, let us examine the core elements of the Southern African regional narrative.

Historical Links

The duration of the colonial period in Southern Africa led to the formation of a host of resistance movements in the region that were longer and generally more violent than elsewhere on the continent. Indeed, many of the postcolonial regimes in Southern Africa were born of armed struggle, often against entrenched white settler regimes. As countries in the region gained independence and implemented majority rule, many, including Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, became important sanctuaries or training grounds, or offered vital rearguard bases on their territories. Although host countries did not all back the same independence movements or factions, their support for the struggle helped to weaken the capacity of incumbent settler regimes to continue in power.[10] The fact that armed resistance movements occurred in five states—Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe—of the region's 15 fostered anticolonial pan-African nationalism and a genuine sense of solidarity that persisted after independence and the achievement of majority rule throughout the region.[11]

This legacy of mutual support and collective behavior is an important element in regional identity today. The fact that one-time liberation movements remain the governing parties in so many countries confers upon them an important degree of legitimacy and gravitas. The nationalist legacies help impose a general resistance to altering the regional status quo. In addition, this legacy of shared struggle impacts the capacity and willingness to cooperate, and leads states to demonstrate an external solidarity.[12]

Economically speaking, the long duration of settler rule in Southern Africa had the somewhat ironic effect of leaving it more industrially and economically developed than other regions. Linkages between settler-dominated Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia), for example, enabled a regional infrastructure. Prior to the end of settler rule in Northern Rhodesia (now part of Zambia), significant rail and road connections were established from the south, extending to the Zambian copper belt. Postsettler Zimbabwe and South Africa inherited substantial manufacturing bases as well, which were among the most formidable on the continent (though ultimately uncompetitive with imports from outside Africa). Thus, most of Southern Africa's independence-era economies were more diversified and performed better than those of other African countries, which experienced massive emigration of white settlers and European capital following independence (including, in Southern Africa, Mozambique).[13]

Ethnocultural Ties

Southern African states are ethnically and culturally heterogeneous, but communities overlap and transcend borders, resulting in familiar and sometimes shared traditions, languages, and cultural practices. This is the result of historical migration patterns, the artificiality of colonially imposed borders, and a system of labor migration that began in the late nineteenth century.[14] Labor flowed first to South African mines, and later to mining, commercial agriculture, and other sectors in countries such as Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. One study of Zimbabwe, for example, showed that fewer than 20 percent of commercial farm workers were of Zimbabwean origin, the majority coming from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia.[15] Swazis and Sotho migrants have long represented a significant percentage of South African mineworkers and other laborers. Although the relations between autochthons and noncitizen migrants were never devoid of conflict, the constant interactions of peoples from across the region, including frequent intermarriage, did contribute to the creation of a regional identity.[16] For example, Christina Steenkamp notes that, during apartheid, black South Africans and "fellow Africans were integrated into black townships, intermarriage was relatively common and they were seen as comrades in the struggle."[17]

Political Regimes

The relatively recent political transitions in the region both bind it together and contribute to new constructions of difference. For instance, whereas all the countries in Southern Africa can claim some tradition of elections, their respective electoral systems have widely varying degrees of legitimacy and political impact. A majority can fairly claim to be democracies, though not without some caveats, not least the dominant-party states that characterize much of the region.[18] Even in the most participatory polities, like Botswana, turnover is nonexistent and an entrenched party dominates.

But competitiveness notwithstanding, several polities have made other important strides to deepen aspects of democracy, particularly human rights, participation, and access. At the same time, however, electoral autocracies remain firmly entrenched in at least two laggard countries, Angola and Zimbabwe, and a substantially closed monarchical system prevails in Swaziland. Still others, including Mozambique and Zambia, have experienced a discernible weakening in the quality of their democracies.[19] Thus, where ideologically—and to a large extent politically (in terms of regime type)—the old Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and Frontline States (FLS) enjoyed a high degree of commonality, today a wedge has developed between the handful of genuine democracies and those that are "partly free" (in Freedom House's terms), and the rest. This theme is revisited later.

A history of shared culture and common economic and political linkages help to bind the region together. At the same time, however, each of these factors also exerts outward pressures on the region.

The Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces of Region-Building

South Africa was the regional power at least since the beginning of the colonial era. Ideationally and formally, South Africa is the fulcrum of Southern Africa: South Africa, or opposition to it, provided a key rationale for the invention of "Southern Africa" in the first place, and it remains central to the region's evolution and reconstruction—or perhaps deconstruction. By the 1970s, as ideological and political struggles intensified between apartheid South Africa and neighboring majority-ruled states, the latter coalesced into a grouping of seven countries known as the FLS.[20] These were joined economically by Swaziland and Malawi to form SADCC in April 1980.[21]

Even before the end of apartheid and the demise of the National Party regime in 1994, South Africa emerged, if sometimes reluctantly, as the regional hegemon of Southern Africa. The reaction to South Africa in this period was both welcoming and apprehensive. South Africa was received as the hope, the glue, of a new regional compact; there was both expectation and consternation, for instance, about which regional body, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) or SADC, would be the primary beneficiary of South African membership.[22] South Africa was reluctant—because of its own internal chaos and postapartheid processes, as well as the circumspection of new leadership under Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki—to throw its weight around in regional politics and governance.[23] Other leaders and countries were less hesitant to assert authority in regional bodies like SADC. This included Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe who, as the head of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security in the 1990s, outmaneuvered South Africa and Mandela, especially over the destructive "SADC" intervention in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998.[24] Mugabe's government aggressively sought to engage Zimbabwean troops in DRC, ostensibly under the auspices of SADC, which added the Central African country as a member in 1997. DRC lacks most of the traits that characterize the other SADC members, but it does possess vast resources and unexploited markets. The Zimbabwean army, among other groups, is widely believed to have used the intervention as a rationale to loot DRC resources.[25]

South Africa's somewhat tentative stance toward its regional partners in the early years, however, has transformed into a greater willingness to assert South African interests. This is manifested in a variety of areas, including trade, security, and international relations. I focus first on one external dimension of this trend, which is a more muscular approach to South African public and private corporate interests around the continent; and, second, on one internal or domestic aspect (albeit one with a regional impact), the treatment of migrants to South Africa.

The "business" and "cultural" dimensions of South Africa's role in the region each contain positive elements (centripetal forces that promote region-building) and negative elements (centrifugal forces that undermine and deconstruct the region), flowing in sometimes unpredictable patterns. Business investment throughout the region can be an indicator of economic integration, as firms transcend state borders. Alternatively, the proliferation of South African brands and products—and of South African firms that use primarily South African inputs—has often signaled the denouement of a process of deindustrialization that began in Africa's uncompetitive economies in the 1990s. Whether South African firms act as "good corporate citizens" of the region or as "corporate colonialists" is crucial to the prospects for region-building.[26]

Similarly, the treatment of migrants in the region, especially in South Africa, offers a clear illustration of the ways in which regional cultural affinities, particularly interpretations of identity and belonging, are being reshaped. Whereas in an earlier era a distinct regional culture seemed ascendant, contemporary Southern Africa appears subject to more divisive pressures.

South Africa's "Corporate Colonialism"?

The inexorable march of South African firms in the region since 1994 has had some unquestionably positive impacts. Regional stability and shared infrastructure enable South African firms to do business across borders with relative ease, not only in the more traditional extractive sectors, but also in the areas of food and beverage production, retail, distribution, transportation, financial services, travel and tourism, telecommunications, and information technology (IT).[27] South African firms, because of culture and proximity, have managed better than non-African competitors, particularly in Southern Africa. They have opened up previously closed markets and demonstrated viability, and delivered essential products and services to economies that had contracted severely in the 1980s and 1990s.[28]

Regional neighbors represent the biggest nondomestic trade *and investment* markets for many companies. South Africa runs substantial trade surpluses with most of its SADC counterparts.[29] In addition, the South African corporate footprint in SADC is substantial, and includes firms from the retail, grocery, hospitality, mining, and energy sectors, as well as some para-statals.[30] A recent study by the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) indicates that there are more than 50 South African companies doing business in Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland each; more than 40 in Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia each; more than 30 in Malawi and Zimbabwe each; and more than 10 in Angola and DRC each. Thus, South Africa is the leading investor in most of these regional economies.[31] Literally and figuratively, Southern Africa has been the backyard for South African business.

But South African corporate migration is hardly limited to Southern Africa. Söderbaum notes that "apart from the fact that there is a special historic presence in the BLNS [Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland] countries, South African businesses do not appear to have a strong ideological vision confined to Southern Africa as such, and by no means to the SADC."[32] In sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, nearly one-fourth of the foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, or $93 billion of $393 billion, originated from South Africa as of 2007. Moreover, 50 percent of South Africa's FDI outflows went to other African states. They cut across all sectors of the economy, with the largest investments being in telecommunications, mining, electricity, steel, and energy (oil and gas). Other major investments, including food, leisure, banking, transport, and general retail, composed 7 percent of outgoing South African FDI. South Africa's big businesses have both continental and global aspirations.[33]

South African firms in Africa portray their forays into Africa as emblematic of their cultural sympathies and commonalities with the continent. Indeed, executives (who are overwhelmingly white) have highlighted their capacity not just to understand African identity, but to *convey* one as well.[34] But they are also in something of a precarious position vis-à-vis sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, South African firms and their managers may be "better versed in the bureaucratic politics of Africa and are often more effective politically than outsiders."[35] On the other hand, as Daniel Malan, a former official of financial advisory firm KPMG, notes, whereas they aim to be viewed as "good corporate citizens" comprised of fellow Africans, South African firms—of various sizes and generally identified with whites—must also at times contend with being perceived as representatives of "settler capital," and thus as corporate "colonialists."[36]

Regardless of the accuracy of the "colonialism" label, the South African-izing of the region also has a downside, and in some cases has contributed to undermining local producers, farmers, small-scale industry, and commercial sectors. If South Africa has been reluctant to play the role of benign, developmental hegemon in the region, it has shown little compunction about "a neo-realist regional economic policy in which it uses its economic power to address domestic problems at the expense of the rest of the region."[37] According to Balefi Tsie, this self-interested neorealist orientation directly promotes the externalization of "South African corporate capital" and its rapid domination of the region's economies. There is less evidence of a more idealist developmental regionalism strategy that would promote greater cooperation and mutual benefit among SADC states.[38]

Instead, the countries of Southern Africa have undergone massive deindustrialization in the wake of neoliberalism and structural adjustment policies that removed trade barriers and exposed previously protected domestic enterprises to international competition. South Africa, as a leading trade partner (and particularly exporter), and major originator of FDI to the region, has stepped into this vacuum. As local food-processing industries collapsed, for example, they have been replaced by South African products. Local retailers have been supplanted by South African retail firms. Of course, FDI is considered beneficial, if not essential, for developing economies; hence the duality of South Africa's regional role.[39] Yet the inexorable march of South African goods and investment, where that investment has few forward and backward linkages with the local economy, has fostered considerable resentment among businesspeople, and others, in the recipient countries.[40] Whether or not this is simply nostalgia for an unrecoverable past is less important to the narrative of regionalism than the fact that the resentment is deeply held.[41]

Zimbabwe provides an illustration of the problematic impact of South African corporate influence. Zimbabwe once boasted the second most industrialized economy in sub-Saharan Africa and a thriving food products sector. Zimbabwean industry began a marked decline even prior to the wider economic crisis induced by the government's commercial farm seizures in 2000.[42] Today, in a less volatile but still parlous economic environment, local business leaders decry what they see as the wholesale replacement of Zimbabwean products with South African products.[43]

The dynamic has been repeated elsewhere in the region. Zambian farmers long protested the circumvention of their goods by South African chain Shoprite, which maintained its fresh-produce supply chains in South Africa. Though some of this was rectified, Shoprite stores in Zambia, like those of other South African retailers throughout the region, are still dominated by South Africa–sourced goods.[44] Similarly, South Africa's presence in Tanzania faced frequent criticism over the policy of favoring South African suppliers, which even contributed to Shoprite's decamping the country in 2014.[45]

A report commissioned by SADC itself illustrated mistrust of South African business and dismay over the unequal benefits afforded to South African companies in the region. Respondents in Zimbabwe and Zambia, respectively, accused South Africa of enjoying "easy entry into regional economies but blocking entry of regional business into its economy," and of using "strict regulatory processes to protect itself" while spreading its goods "across the region."[46] For the host countries, the various expressions of economic nationalism may not be consistently economically rational, but such sentiments clearly matter—the decimation of local industry, whether by or merely perceived to be by South African firms, has an impact on people, even in those countries for which investment and trade goods are desperately needed.

Other conflicts emerge besides competition with local firms. Indeed, whereas South African investors bring some jobs to target economies, sectors such as IT, retail, and mining do not necessarily lend themselves to hiring or training of large numbers of highly skilled labor and managers; many such employees are still drawn from corporate headquarters in South Africa. Further, South African management style is often resented by host countries.[47] In more extreme cases among some white South African business émigrés, particularly small-scale entrepreneurs and commercial farmers, accusations of racial insensitivity or hostility toward their black African "hosts" are hardly unheard of.[48] Although extrapolating from the household or small firm is problematic, such treatment hardly helps to engender regional comity.

Yet the resentments of South Africa by regional populations or companies seem unlikely to affect policy outcomes, at least in the near term. Domestic firms, perceiving themselves to be victims of South African "corporate colonialism," often have limited capacity to affect national or regional investment policy.[49] Moreover, national and regional policymakers may have vastly different interests from their populaces, especially in nondemocratic states, which face scant pressure to respond to their electorates. Indeed, regardless of regime type, state actors and official institutions of the SADC region largely lack the capacity or incentive to counter South African "neo-liberal regionalism."[50] Such regionalism, when manifested as the march of South African corporations, will go on more or less unfettered; a populist backlash against South African international property rights is highly unlikely.[51]

Nonetheless, given that the notion of region-building and integration is to some degree predicated on narratives and *trust*, simmering resentments impede region-building. It is these intersubjective dimensions that affect the constitution, the meaning, of "Southern Africa" at this point in the region's history.

"How is Africa?": Integration versus Alienation

The second dimension, a cultural one, also exerts both centrifugal and centripetal forces on region-building. As already noted, movements of people, as displaced persons, temporary labor, or permanent migrants, have characterized Southern Africa for millennia, although the establishment of national borders permanently altered these patterns.

More recently, Scarlett Cornelissen suggests that there has been a "hardening of attitudes" toward migrants *throughout the region*, reflected in a "protectionist" set of migration policies and the "tacit endorsement of growing intolerance" by many of the region's governments.[52] Such negative attitudes toward immigrants are shared by the public.[53] Migration itself is increasingly treated as a threat to state sovereignty, and this securitization of immigration manifests itself in "deportations and expulsions and border detention centres."[54] Pervasive anti-immigrant attitudes and policies illuminate the realist agenda underlying regional politics, with its emphasis on zero-sum competition, sovereignty and security, and exclusive forms of citizenship. These trends, in turn, have created the context for deepened xenophobia in the region.[55]

Hostility toward migrants is region-wide. A 2003 study found that 97 percent of Namibians would support deportation of "illegals."[56] Botswana has seen intolerance of Zimbabweans.[57] Zimbabwe, led by the political class, has targeted farm laborers of Malawian and Mozambican ancestry, who bore the brunt of the farm invasions and the massive land alienation and resulting unemployment after 2000—the same migrants who were subject to political intimidation from the late 1980s in an effort to discourage their pursuit of land rights.[58]

The region's frayed cultural fabric is most starkly revealed within South Africa, however, through persistent resentments of foreign Africans, which culminated in xenophobic violence in 2008. South Africa, a magnet for the continent, likely has between 2 and 5 million undocumented migrants, though some estimates run far higher.[59] In 2006, 37 percent of South Africans favored blanket prohibitions on immigration.[60] As many as 4 million Zimbabweans have decamped for South Africa, and they in particular have been targets of hostility there (as well as in Botswana).[61] The xenophobia came to a head in the anti-immigrant violence of May 2008, resulting in some 35,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and at least 62 killed.[62] But this was only the most severe (and internationally visible) representation in a long series of anti-immigrant violence in the postapartheid period, including harassment and intimidation by police and other state authorities.[63]

Much of the hostility toward foreigners in South Africa appears to be based on economic competition, the perception that foreigners are stealing jobs, and the failure of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) to deliver on its promises of an improved economic situation for average black South Africans.[64] The alienation and antipathy are not solely directed at working-class Africans—and economic competitors—however. "South Africans still see themselves as apart from the rest of Africa, as [an] exception, and therefore [they] struggle to identify with other Africans."[65] In this vein, a professional Zambian couple, following their relocation to Cape Town, recounted their incredulousness upon hearing multiple variations of the query, "How is Africa?"[66] That South Africans could pose such a question, and without irony, provides a glimpse into attitudes about the continent and their perceived place in it. According to Steenkamp, the reference to other black Africans as *amakwerekwere*, or speakers of an unintelligible language, offers another window into tensions and ways of "othering."[67]

Steenkamp contends that the deeper origins of this "othering" lie not just in perceptions of economic competition, but also in foreign policy, media discourses, and perpetuation of stereotypes.[68] Others point to a "fear-mongering discourse."[69] At bottom, difference is constructed, and it fosters mistrust that is, in turn, reciprocated.[70]

The prevailing patterns of regional migration will almost surely continue, but backlash against the perceived saturation of local economies by "foreigners" has stressed the system; it gives the lie to MacLean's "indivisible" Southern Africa and frustrates the region-building project.[71] Regionally, as Cornelissen suggests, the emphasis is increasingly on "exclusion rather than assimilation," and citizenship has become "an instrument for division."[72]

Leadership by regional institutions could alter these dynamics, but SADC has been ineffectual at crafting a migration regime.[73] As Cornelissen notes, "For the most part, the region's leaders have shown a strong disinclination to extend closer cooperation to the sphere of migration, and the central thrust for the drafting of migration policies lies at the national, not the regional level." The Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons was squelched by the SADC Summit of Heads of State in 1996, and subsequent iterations, watered down and more restrictive, were not ratified by the requisite nine members.[74]

"Toward a Common Future?": SADC and Institutional Constraints on Region-Building

Hostile publics, recalcitrant states, and a diminished SADC provide a weak foundation for "New Regionalism." Since its inception, SADC has suffered from severe deficiencies of resources, commitment, and actionable protocols. Despite more than 20 years in its current form, and the commonalities identified earlier, progress toward region-building has been halting. SADC has also proved incapable of combating the twin region-weakening phenomena of corporate expansionism and xenophobia. In fact, in some cases SADC has exacerbated these pressures.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in a prolonged critical analysis of SADC.[75] It is useful, however, to point to three interrelated constraints that bear on the themes of this chapter. First, the SADC Secretariat lacks institutional capacity due to severe resource constraints. Second, the wide variation in political regimes across the SADC member states at times results in incompatible domestic and international priorities (the prevalence of dominant-party states among the countries that compose SADC is one aspect of this). Third, and relatedly, the region has ineffective governance and rule-of-law processes, despite the existence of 26 protocols.

SADC faces major resource constraints. It is comprised mainly of poor countries and weak states, which "furnish fragile bases for regionalism."[76] Even those with "middle income" status face severe development challenges. Hence, in 2004, SADC "received approximately 80 percent of its project funding from the European Union (EU) and other foreign sources."[77] In 2009–10, donors funded nearly 52 percent of the secretariat's budget.[78] And in 2011, "as much as 72 percent of SADC's total budget of $83 million was expected to come from foreign funders."[79] SADC, therefore, is even more donor-dependent than most sub-Saharan African countries.[80] As important as the practical constraints scarce resources impose, however, is that SADC's financial straits evince a lack of commitment to the body by members.

A clear illustration of this poverty can be found in SADC's health and pharmaceutical initiatives, part of the Protocol on Health. The Social and Human Development Secretariat, for example, is woefully understaffed: there are entire units with only a single (often self-serving) professional staff member. Moreover, several of the individuals in key posts are deeply entrenched, and SADC employment is a sinecure.[81] The health unit, a key focal point in the region, had a 2012 budget of just $34,000 to implement its annual operational plan (within the SADC Social and Human Development and Special Programmes Directorate). Despite the extreme human and financial constraints, however, the SADC Protocol on Health has 22 priorities given current resources.[82] Ironically, one of SADC's principles, affirmed in the October 2012 Midterm Review, calls for *reduced* dependency on donor funds.[83]

The second constraint is the wide variation in regime type that characterizes the region. SADC proclaims a "democratic identity," as Anna Van Vleuten and Andrea Hoffmann observe, noting that

> the promotion and consolidation of democracy are considered part of SADC principles as stated in the Treaty. In the original 1992 Treaty, Article 5 committed the Member States to "evolve common political values, systems and institutions." The revised treaty of 2001 has strengthened this objective considerably, committing states to "consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability"...The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (2001) provides that SADC shall "promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties."[84]

Yet these regional values are, at best, aspirational.[85] The presence of nondemocracies and dominant-party states affects what form, if any, regional collective action may take; it is usually at the lowest common denominator.

This is linked to the third weakness, in the region's ability to enforce its avowed rule-of-law commitments. As noted earlier, South Africa has seldom played a hegemonic role. Yet absent hegemonic leadership, enforcement of SADC protocols and the achievement of collective action, particularly related to democracy or human rights, will not take place—despite the centrality of democracy to the SADC Treaty.[86]

Unfortunately, the tepid commitment to democracy, one of SADC's pillars, threatens the integrity of the entire edifice. The failure to intervene rapidly or meaningfully in Zimbabwe—where democratic processes have faced systematic obliteration at the hands of the incumbent regime since 2000—clearly illustrates the hollowness of democracy at the regional level. As Van Vleuten and Hoffmann demonstrate, SADC's reticence vis-à-vis Zimbabwe both undermined one of its core principles and violated its own protocols.[87] Indeed, SADC's own Tribunal ruled in 2008 that Zimbabwe's farm seizures were illegal and a violation of the human rights, rule-of-law, and nondiscrimination principles of the SADC Treaty.[88] Zimbabwe ignored the ruling. Yet "instead of upholding the Treaty and defending the Tribunal, in 2011 the SADC Summit of heads of state suspended the regional court," effectively dissolving it.[89]

The resistance of SADC and South Africa to formidable donor pressure to intervene in Zimbabwe perhaps could be portrayed as regional solidarity and a defense of SADC's "African identity."[90] Yet this solidarity was merely instrumental, and put in the service of guarding sovereignty. Zimbabwe hid behind solidarity to flout the regional rules, and South Africa hid behind it *not* to act. The other SADC members calculated that action against Zimbabwe meant potentially subjecting themselves to a supranational authority in the future—and were unwilling to countenance that. As Laurie Nathan concluded in his analysis of the SADC Tribunal: "The crux of the matter is that the SADC states will not relinquish sovereignty to regional institutions."[91] Nathan's observation would appear to have broad applicability to the entity as a whole: each of SADC's regional objectives can be similarly subverted by states and state elites. The inability of SADC to bind members to comply with these agreements, a result of the unwillingness of states to subordinate key processes to SADC, is a devastating shortcoming.

At bottom, according to Nathan, SADC's elaborate rule structure of legal and institutional protocols merely created "the illusion that the SADC countries were willing to be constrained by communal rules and relinquish some sovereignty to a supranational authority."[92] Individual states' ability to act with impunity, and the feckless response of SADC and regional leaders, fatally undercuts the institution's credibility.[93] The prolonged crisis in Zimbabwe, the disbanding of the Tribunal, and the triumph of nondemocratic politics starkly reveal SADC's inability to enforce its own rules.[94] Shared rules and norms once helped bind the region together; their deterioration impacts the flow of refugees, xenophobia, and the diminution of intraregional trust, and serves to deconstruct Southern Africa.

Conclusion: Prospects for Regional Identity and Region-Building

The development of Southern Africa depends on the movement of capital, in the form of investment; goods, in the form of trade; and people, who provide the skilled and semi-skilled labor that drives growth and employment. Yet in SADC these essential elements of region-building also fuel division and resentments that actually contribute to pressures of deconstruction. The sociocultural pressures (xenophobia and South African superiority) and economic pressures (business neocolonialism) persist; while not necessarily obstacles to the establishment of *formal* institutions, these factors are certainly barriers to a more holistic and comprehensive project of "region-building."

Countering these pressures, as well as shoring up the other deficits plaguing Southern Africa, requires a formidable regional body. The "easy" answer, of course, is to strengthen SADC. Yet SADC is in desperate need of resources, both human and financial.

SADC-strengthening is also confounded by the varied interests of its politically disparate membership, which includes nondemocracies in Angola, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe; dominant-party states in Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa; and, of course, persistent violence and state collapse in DRC. The absence of democracy in so many of the region's countries suggests that one avenue for better regional and state governance alike is the development of common democratic norms and metrics.

In fact, as Nathan notes: "When the [SADC] Treaty was amended in 2001, the formal commitment to democracy was strengthened…Moreover, SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan [of 2003] maintains that democracy is a precondition for stability and economic development and growth, which 'will not be realised in conditions of political intolerance, the absence of the rule of law, corruption, civil strife and war.'"[95] This suggests strongly that SADC's architects themselves realized the major constraints on region-building in the founding documents. It is perhaps too facile to suggest that a (or the?) solution for SADC is simply "more democracy." Given the present overrepresentation of nondemocracies and "partly free" countries, however, this seems a tall order in any event.[96]

Söderbaum does not see this regional diversity as problematic, noting, for example, that "Southern Africa is by no means a homogeneous region. Its boundaries are neither natural nor given, but blurred, penetrated and contested. The layeredness and multidimensionality of Southern Africa are likely to persist, and may eventually increase. In essence, 'Southern Africa' is in the making, continuously being constructed, penetrated and reconstructed."[97] Perhaps rather than suggest, as I have in this chapter, that the divisive processes of corporate colonialism and cultural xenophobia are *de*constructing the region, a more hopeful conclusion is to view this as a complex of reconstruction and rebuilding. Precisely what form of institutional edifice is to be built, however, remains unclear.

Notes

1. There are a few different groupings to which "Southern Africa" can refer, but currently the term is most commonly taken to apply to the 15 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This chapter focuses chiefly on the continental, geographically contiguous African countries, as many of the dimensions of culture, history, and economy do not apply to the island nations. DRC, which joined SADC in 1997, is omitted for similar reasons; see Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa: Transition and Transformation*

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011), p. 5, n. 7. Institutionally, my emphasis is on SADC, not the other regional configurations, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) or the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), many of whose memberships overlap.

2. See, for example, Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: Zed Books, 2012); Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*; York Bradshaw and Stephen Ndegwa (eds.), *The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Peter Vale, Larry Swatuk, and Bertil Oden (eds.), *Theory, Change, and Southern Africa's Future* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 1996). See also Sandra MacLean, "Peacebuilding and New Regionalism in Southern Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 5 (1999), 943–56.
3. See, for example, Tom Nevin, "SADC Members Ignoring Own Rules," *African Business* 400 (2013), pp. 66–7.
4. Problematically, one of the norms that has been widely disseminated appears to be "sovereignty." While a vital principle for post-Westphalian international relations, a preoccupation with national sovereignty presents major obstacles for region-building; seeking recourse in sovereignty would seem to directly contradict or at least undermine an all-encompassing regional project. See Nevin, "SADC Members"; Laurie Nathan, "The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale," *Human Rights Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2013), 880–1.
5. MacLean, "Peacebuilding and New Regionalism," p. 947.
6. Fredrik Söderbaum, *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 210.
7. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001), 407.
8. Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, p. 13.
9. Söderbaum, *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, p. 214.
10. Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, p. 16.
11. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "The SADCC and Its Approaches to African Regionalism," in Saunders, Dzinesa, and Nagar, *Region-Building in Southern Africa*, pp. 25–30.
12. This legacy of shared struggle has also promoted a culture of deference to long-serving leaders in the region who were principals in their national and regional struggles—most prominently Robert Mugabe. Anna Van Vleuten and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, "Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy by Regional Organizations," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 3 (2010), 754.
13. Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, p. 7.
14. Ibid.
15. Vincent Mabvurira, Tawanda Masuka, Richard Gamuchirai Banda, and Rangarirai Frank, "A Situational Analysis of Former Commercial Farm Workers in Zimbabwe, a Decade After the Jambanja," *Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences* 3, no. 3 (2012), 224.
16. Scarlett Cornelissen, "Migration Regimes and the Politics of Difference in Contemporary Southern Africa," *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 98, no. 402 (2009), 347–60.
17. Christina Steenkamp, "Xenophobia in South Africa: What Does It Say About Trust?," *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 98, no. 403 (2009), 442.

18. See the entries for individual countries in Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2014*, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VBBtyWMXPfI (accessed September 10, 2014); Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002), 51–65.
19. Freedom House, "Sub-Saharan Africa Fact Sheet," http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/sub-saharan-africa-fact-sheet#.VEcWrovF-pq (accessed October 20, 2014).
20. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and (after majority rule) Zimbabwe.
21. Margaret C. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
22. James J. Hentz, *South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 57–61.
23. Balefi Tsie argues, however, that South Africa was merely reluctant to play the role of *benevolent* regional hegemon. This interpretation is revisited in more detail later in the chapter. Balefi Tsie, "International Political Economy and Southern Africa," in Vale, Swatuk, and Oden, *Theory, Change, and Southern Africa's Future*, p. 141.
24. Herbert Moyo, "Masire Reveals Mugabe, Mandela Rivalry," *Zimbabwe Independent*, December 13, 2013, http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/12/13/masire-reveals-mugabe-mandela-rivalry (accessed September 10, 2014).
25. Global Witness, *Branching Out: Zimbabwe's Resource Colonialism in Democratic Republic of Congo*, 2nd ed., February 2002, http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/branch.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014).
26. Daniel Malan, "Corporate Citizens, Colonialists, Tourists, or Activists? Ethical Challenges Facing South African Corporations in Africa," *Journal of Corporate Citizenship* 18 (2005), 49–60.
27. Bobby Berkowitz, Yash Ramkolowan, Matthew Stern, Fouchè Venter, and Melissa Webb, *The Role of South African Business in Africa: South African Outward Investment*, National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) Fund for Research into Industrial Development, Growth, and Equity (FRIDGE), November 29, 2012, http://www.safpi.org/sites/default/files/publications/regional_investment_development_report.pdf (accessed September 10, 2014), p. 6.
28. Scott D. Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa: From Patrimonialism to Profit* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), p. 173.
29. Ibid.
30. Among the 122 South African investors in other African nations were 18 South African parastatals, as of 2005. Ibid.
31. Berkowitz, Ramkolowan, Stern, Venter, and Webb, *The Role of South African Business*, pp. 7–8.
32. Söderbaum, *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, p. 213.
33. Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business*, p. 173.
34. Ibid., p. 168.
35. Ibid., p. 172, citing Dilek Akuyt and Andrea Goldstein, "Developing Country Multinationals: South-South Investment Comes of Age," in United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ed.), *Industrial Development for the Twenty-First Century: Sustainable Development Perspectives* (New York: United Nations, 2007), pp. 98–101.

36. Malan, "Corporate Citizens," p. 54.
37. Tsie, "International Political Economy and Southern Africa," p. 141.
38. Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, p. 358. However, Hentz (*South Africa*, p. 4) suggests that regional cooperation is a South African priority.
39. On the importance of FDI, see, for example, Theodore H. Moran, *Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment for Development* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006).
40. Resentment and rivalry occasionally spill into public view. See, for example, David Smith, "Zambian Vice President: 'South Africans Are Backward,'" *The Guardian*, May 1, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/01/zambian-vicepresident-south-africans-backward (accessed September 10, 2014). Smith quotes Zambian vice president Guy Scott as saying: "I dislike South Africa for the same reason that Latin Americans dislike the United States, I think. It's just too big and too unsubtle."
41. Importantly, consumer perceptions may differ from those of political elites, who are preoccupied with regional sovereignty, and from those of businesspeople, whose firms suffer competitively vis-à-vis their South African counterparts. Not surprisingly, consumers report satisfaction with the presence of South African firms and products. See Berkowitz, Ramkolowan, Stern, Venter, and Webb, *The Role of South African Business*, p. 52.
42. Pádraig Carmody, *Tearing the Social Fabric: Neoliberalism, Deindustrialization, and the Crisis of Government in Zimbabwe* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2001).
43. Author interviews with members of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), Harare, June 2012. See also Scott D. Taylor, *Business and the State in Southern Africa: The Politics of Economic Reform* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).
44. Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business*, p. 177. Where South African firms have sought to integrate value chains locally, they are more likely to generate social and political capital with local suppliers and possibly consumers, versus those that are overwhelmingly linked to supply chains in South Africa. Local linkages are probably advantageous financially as well, assuming that standardisation and quality controls are met.
45. Florence Majani and Simon Cluri, "Nakumatt Set to Acquire Shoprite Stores in Tanzania," *The Citizen*, December 19, 2013.
46. Pamela Machakanja and Martin Ott, *The SADC We Need: Towards Values-Based Regional Integration and Development* (Mutare and Gabarone: Africa University Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance and SADC Council of Nongovernmental Organisations, 2013), pp. 48, 50–1.
47. Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business*, p. 175, citing Malan, "Corporate Citizens," p. 50.
48. Personal interview with Mabel Mung'omba, chief executive, Citizens Economic Empowerment Commission, Lusaka, January 21, 2010.
49. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "Regional Integration and Business Interests: A Comparative Study of Europe and Southeast Asia," *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 6, no. 2 (2007), 217–43; Taylor, *Business and the State*.
50. Ian Taylor, "Globalization and Regionalization in Africa: Reactions to Attempts at Neo-Liberal Regionalism," *Review of International Political Economy* 8, no. 2 (2003), 310–30.
51. Even the economic nationalism of Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe, with its indigenisation policies, has limitations. Periodic threats to seize Zimplats, the

Zimbabwe-based subsidiary of South African platinum producer Implats, have proved empty. The economic cost to Zimbabwe and the political impact of ruined economic relations with South Africa are simply too high. Personal communication, Harare, July 2, 2012.

52. Cornelissen, “Migration Regimes,” p. 348.
53. Francis Nyamnjoh and Patience Mususa, “Migration and Xenophobia,” in Saunders, Dzinesa, and Nagar, *Region-Building in Southern Africa*, pp. 215–29.
54. Cornelissen, “Migration Regimes,” p. 356.
55. Ibid., p. 349.
56. Nyamnjoh and Mususa, “Migration and Xenophobia,” p. 219.
57. Cornelissen, “Migration Regimes,” p. 355.
58. Mabvurira, Masuka, Banda, and Frank, “Situational Analysis,” p. 225.
59. Cornelissen, “Migration Regimes,” p. 354.
60. Steenkamp, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” p. 441, citing data from the South African Migration Programme (SAMP).
61. Cornelissen, “Migration Regimes,” p. 355.
62. Steenkamp, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” p. 439.
63. Ibid., p. 441.
64. Richard Grant and Daniel Thompson, “City on Edge: Immigrant Businesses and the Right to Urban Space in Inner-City Johannesburg,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association of Geographers, Tampa, FL, April 9, 2014.
65. Steenkamp, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” p. 443.
66. Personal communication, June 14, 2013.
67. Steenkamp, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” p. 441.
68. Ibid., p. 444.
69. Nyamnjoh and Mususa, “Migration and Xenophobia,” p. 217. See also Michael Neocosmos, *From “Foreign Natives” to “Native Foreigners”: Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa—Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity, and Politics* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2010).
70. Steenkamp, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” p. 445.
71. MacLean, “Peacebuilding and New Regionalism,” p. 947.
72. Cornelissen, “Migration Regimes,” p. 357. Steenkamp (“Xenophobia in South Africa,” p. 410) reaches a similar conclusion.
73. Nyamnjoh and Mususa, “Migration and Xenophobia,” p. 215.
74. Cornelissen, “Migration Regimes,” pp. 355–6.
75. See the chapters collected in Saunders, Dzinesa, and Nagar, *Region-Building in Southern Africa*; and chapter 11 in this volume.
76. Khadiagala, “The SADCC and Its Approaches,” p. 149.
77. Nathan, “The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal,” p. 882. See also James Sidaway and Richard Gibb, “SADC, COMESA, SACU: Contradictory Formats for Regional Integration in Southern Africa?,” in David Simon (ed.), *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998), p. 166.
78. Chris Landsberg, “The Southern African Development Community’s Decision Making Architecture,” in Saunders, Dzinesa, and Nagar, *Region-Building in Southern Africa*, p. 67.
79. Nathan, “The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal,” p. 883.
80. For example, only 15 percent of Kenya’s public expenditures were donor-financed in 2011. Uganda and Tanzania, which were more in line with other African

donor-dependent countries, received 41 and 45 percent, respectively. Wolfgang Fengler, "Three Myths about Aid to Kenya," World Bank, *Africa Can End Poverty* blog, November 14, 2011, http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/three-myths-about-aid-to-kenya (accessed October 24, 2014).

81. Author interview with a member of the SADC staff, Gaborone, June 17, 2013.
82. SADC, *Protocol on Health in the Southern African Development Community*, signed August 18, 1999, entered into force on August 28, 2004, http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/804 (accessed December 18, 2014).
83. "SADC Budget," in *SADC Today* 16, no. 4 (2014), http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sadctoday/documents/v16n5.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014), p. 5.
84. Van Vleuten and Hoffmann, "Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy," pp. 750–1. Internal references removed.
85. Ibid., p. 751; Nathan, "The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal," p. 872.
86. Van Vleuten and Hoffmann, "Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy," p. 742.
87. Ibid., pp. 750–3.
88. Nathan, "The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal," p. 873. Nathan notes that the SADC Tribunal, approved in 2000 and formally established in 2005, is an institution explicitly charged with adjudicating disputes and ensuring member states' adherence to the SADC Treaty.
89. Ibid., p. 871.
90. Van Vleuten and Hoffmann, "Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy," p. 754.
91. Nathan, "The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal," p. 872.
92. Ibid., p. 873.
93. Van Vleuten and Hoffmann, "Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy," p. 740.
94. Nathan, "The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal," p. 879.
95. Ibid., p. 873.
96. "There is no comparable normative congruence and trust in Southern Africa. The region encompasses diverse political systems, which precludes the SADC states from being bound—either in the sense of being united or in the sense of being constrained—by the democratic principles espoused in the SADC Treaty." Ibid., p. 890.
97. Söderbaum, *Political Economy of Regionalism*, p. 214.

Chapter 10

Region-Building in Eastern Africa

Gilbert M. Khadiagala

Introduction

Regional integration in East Africa has long fascinated scholars and policy-makers. Part of this interest stems from the long history of experimentation with integration in the region, going back to various colonial schemes, such as the 1917 Kenya-Uganda customs union. In 1967, the East African Common Services Organisation—which had come into being in 1961, on the eve of decolonization—became the East African Community (EAC), one of the most successful models of integration on the globe until its demise in 1977.[1] Fifteen years since its revival in 2000, the EAC still generates significant interest in understanding the links between economic and political regionalism.

This chapter focuses on the actors and processes that have propelled East Africa's integration since the early 2000s. The revival of the EAC has been dominated by questions about the lessons from the past, how to overcome previous constraints, and how to construct sound institutions for integration. Although East African actors have seized opportunities to promote more economic convergence, friction between different political systems and cultures impedes the objective of an East African Federation. I argue in this chapter that East African regionalism is built on solid foundations of geographical contiguity and common historical, economic, and infrastructural ties. Yet, as during the first incarnation of the EAC, the centripetal forces of integration face formidable obstacles from the centrifugal dynamics of political fragmentation, the polarizing effects of authoritarianism and nationalism, and an increasingly insecure and fragile regional environment.

After the Fall, Avoiding the Past?

The consensus in the literature that documented the collapse of the EAC in 1977 was that political concerns dominated economic issues in integration schemes, contrary to the assumptions on which early integration regimes were built.[2] Since the 1950s, a functionalist perspective had suggested that the gradual accretion of shared economic capacities (primarily through increased trade) would submerge political differences, leading to solid region-building. Colonial integration attempts proceeded from this logic, and the uniform political institutions imposed by British colonialism strengthened the momentum for economic integration.[3] At its height, the EAC was characterized by institutions that demonstrated the power of functionalism: common services such as postal and communications; an airline; systems to manage power, railways, and harbors; and several research organizations. Although erected to lend meaning to regionalism, these institutions came under severe strains from the postcolonial nationalist impulses that gripped the region, forcing the breakup.

The return to multiparty democracy throughout the region and the diminution of the ideological and idiosyncratic conflicts of the 1970s generated movement toward political convergence. The emergence of a common set of political values lent firmer grounding to fresh bids to revive the EAC in the 1990s. This phase coincided with a groundswell of pressures from below and above, making the revival even more urgent. Pressures from below emanated from the natural "pull" factors that had sustained East African integration from the outset: the power of geography and proximity compelled informal trade links that endured even during the times of disintegration, and informal traders sought to recreate forms of exchange and networks that flourished during the collapse of functional institutions (see also chapters 4 and 9 in this volume).[4] From above, East Africa responded to the broad pan-Africanist demands captured in the 1991 Abuja Treaty for regional economic communities (RECs), which would provide the bedrock for the African Economic Community (AEC).[5] The fissiparous forces of state collapse, which unleashed regionalized insecurities that needed to be managed through new regional economic and security institutions, were also germane in spurring the revival of the EAC. Finally, some advocated regionalism to manage the specter of globalization.[6]

While functionalism furnished the promise of integration of the 1960s and early 1970s, theories of "new regionalism" elaborated the directions of integration in the 1990s.[7] The new regionalism made three distinctive claims. First, that there are no "natural" regions on which integration could be anchored; rather, regions are geographical spaces through which states struggled to construct institutions. Second, that elites play prominent roles in determining the nature of regional institutions. Third, that alongside state actors, various non-state actors have emerged to shape the pace of regional integration.[8]

Starting with the 1993 Permanent Tripartite Commission for Cooperation, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda set in motion the process that culminated in the revival of the EAC. The EAC treaty was signed in November 1999 and entered into force in July 2000,[9] and Burundi and Rwanda joined in 2007, transforming the geographical geometry of the region.[10] As of 2013, the EAC had 143 million people and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $75 billion.[11] The EAC sought to

> improve the standards of living of the population through increased trade and competitiveness, value-added production, trade, and investment. This is aimed at

> promoting the sustainable development of the region with a view to creating a prosperous, internationally competitive, secure, stable, and politically united region. The five EAC Partner States are keenly aware that by pooling their resources and potential, they are in a better position to realise and sustain common development goals more easily than by working alone.[12]

The EAC has seven governance structures:

1. The summit of Heads of State drives the integration agenda and provides the general direction to achieve objectives.
2. The Council of Ministers, made up of the ministers responsible for regional cooperation, is the main policy organ of the EAC. Occasionally, the council has established Sectoral Committees (see item 4) to pursue more effectively matters raised under the EAC treaty.
3. The EAC Coordination Committee is made up of the permanent secretaries responsible for regional cooperation, or other permanent secretaries attached to the EAC. The committee reports directly to the Council of Ministers and coordinates the activities of the various Sectoral Committees.
4. Sectoral Committees are established by the Council of Ministers and are responsible for devising ways to implement EAC programs, defining priorities in line with the various sectors, and monitoring the execution of these priorities.
5. The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was initially established to interpret the application of the EAC treaty, but the jurisdiction of the court has gradually expanded to encompass human rights (as discussed later).
6. The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) consists of nine elected members from each state (forty-five total, since the accession of Burundi and Rwanda), plus seven ex-officio members: the five ministers responsible for regional cooperation, the secretary-general, and the counsel to the community.
7. The Secretariat serves as the EAC's executive organ and is headed by the secretary-general, assisted by two deputies, the counsel to the community, and other officers appointed by the Council of Ministers. Although the Secretariat is funded by equal contributions from member states, the projects and programs are funded through resources largely mobilized from external donors.[13]

An innovative feature of decision-making in the reconstituted EAC was the removal of the policymaking role from the Heads of State to the Council of Ministers to avoid the institutional paralysis previously experienced when the Heads of State did not get along.[14] Also unlike in the past, the EAC has sought to inject the principles of market-driven and people-centered integration into its work. For this reason, the EAC regards the private sector, such as the East African Business Council, and civil society organizations, such as the East Africa Law Society, as major partners in integration.[15]

The revised treaty envisaged incremental integration, ultimately leading to a political federation.[16] Although a November 2004 report on fast-tracking the East African Federation recommended its creation by 2010,[17] in August 2007 the Heads of State resolved to prioritize a common market and a single currency by 2012 before contemplating a political federation.[18]

Constructing Common Economic Institutions

Reflective of the priority the EAC accorded to developing a single market and investment area in East Africa, the organization expeditiously negotiated a customs union, which entered into force in January 2005. The objective of the customs union protocol was to deepen integration through promoting liberalization, intraregional trade, efficiency in production, and industrial diversification.[19] With the establishment of the EAC customs union, a common external tariff took effect, along with progressive partial liberalization of tariffs on intra-EAC trade.[20] Although the EAC customs union called on all states to gradually remove nontariff barriers (NTBs), there has been slow progress in implementation of this provision.[21] The fourth EAC development strategy articulated key achievements:

> The outcome of the EAC CU [customs union] has resulted in diversification of product range, improved market access, and business activities for the region's SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises]; increased awareness of the EAC integration agenda…common external trade policy starting with negotiations of EPA [Economic Partnership Agreement (Europe)] and AGOA [African Growth and Opportunity Act (United States)] investment as a block [*sic*]; accessibility to cross-border resources and FDIs [foreign direct investments]; wider stakeholder involvement and enhanced government revenues. The Customs Union has also led to improvement of EAC intra-trade performance between 2006 and 2008. Intra-EAC total trade increased from US$1,979.2 Million to US$3,339.4 Millions [*sic*] during this period.[22]

Despite this progress, the customs union has faced many problems, including the persistence of cumbersome customs procedures, inappropriate trade facilitation, inadequate revenue management, the slow pace of NTB elimination, national delays in the implementation of regional commitments, trade challenges created by states' membership in multiple regional organizations, and inappropriate harmonization and application of rules of origin.[23]

The EAC made equally vigorous efforts to negotiate a common market, starting in April 2008 with the first round of meetings of a high-level task force on negotiation of the EAC common market protocol.[24] Over a two-year period, the negotiations tackled issues of transport, the rights of establishment and residence, and the free movement of services and capital. The EAC formally created the common market in July 2010, and it is scheduled to be completely implemented by 2015.[25] The common market protocol seeks gradual currency convertibility and macroeconomic convergence, adoption of common travel documents and work permits, common international negotiating frameworks, free movement of capital, and harmonization of transport facilitation instruments.[26] Among its highlights:

1. Companies and firms from member states receive equal treatment in other member states, creating a new wave of opportunities for business expansion.[27]
2. Citizens of the five member states are free to travel across borders without visas, enabling free movement of labour.[28]
3. A regional Common Transport Policy is to be established which will provide adequate, reliable, safe, and internationally competitive infrastructure services.[29]

To complement the EAC common market, in October 2008 the East African countries agreed to market the region as a single tourist destination and began introducing a single tourist visa to maximize the benefits of tourism and wildlife.[30] At the same time, the EALA passed the East African Community Tourism and Wildlife Management Bill, to manage tourism and wildlife sectors jointly.[31] Another milestone in integration was the introduction of the East African Payment System (EAPS) in May 2014, designed to harmonize payment systems. Used mostly by traders and commercial banks, EAPS is popular and has encouraged growth in cross-border trade.[32]

Consistent with the EAC treaty, the Heads of State authorized the start of negotiations for a common monetary union in January 2011. A high-level task force to negotiate the draft monetary union protocol was given a deadline of June 2012 to discuss, among other things, the scope of the monetary union, macroeconomic and monetary policy, exchange rate policy and exchange rate mechanisms, and instruments of monetary control.[33] By July 2012, however, the negotiations had made little progress. Critics charged that a monetary union would not work, since the member states were still dependent on foreign aid to sustain their economies and since severe economic imbalances among member states existed.[34] The 2011 economic crisis in the eurozone further dampened the impetus for a monetary union and forced a reconsideration of the pace of integration around a single currency.[35] Despite these concerns, the EAC Heads of State met in January 2013 and urged the Council of Ministers to expedite the conclusion of the protocol establishing the monetary union by November 2013.[36] At the November 2013 meeting, EAC leaders signed a protocol laying the groundwork for a monetary union within ten years. In the run-up to a common currency, the EAC outlined a roadmap toward a monetary union that included the establishment of a fully fledged customs union and common market, harmonization of related laws to enable the attainment of the agreed macroeconomic convergence criteria, and the creation of institutions to implement the monetary union.[37]

The roadmap underscores the EAC's keenness to set up a monetary union, but profound obstacles persist. As in the past, protectionism, bureaucracy, and poor infrastructure are some of the problems confounding economic integration.[38] In addition, Tanzania has shown reluctance to embrace some of the regional programs. For instance, Dar es Salaam declined to be party to the joint tourist visa scheme that was launched in January 2014, citing a fear of losing revenue.[39]

Tanzania also opted out of a regional program established in 2014 whereby member states use national identity cards as travel documents across the region.[40] The conflicts between Tanzania and the rest of the EAC members have escalated to questions of landownership and harmonizing transport infrastructure, potentially retarding implementation of a monetary union.

Recent bids to create a tripartite grouping that unites the EAC with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have further transformed the integration landscape (see also chapter 11 in this volume). The first tripartite summit in Kampala in October 2008 proposed a merger into a single REC and recommended the formation of a free trade area (FTA) of the three RECs, with the ultimate goal of establishing a single customs union.[41] This "Grand FTA" would have a combined population of 625 million people and a combined GDP of $1.2 trillion. A follow-up summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in June 2011 called for acceleration of negotiations to harmonize trading arrangements, permit free movement of business persons, promote joint implementation of interregional infrastructure programs, and establish institutional arrangements to foster cooperation.[42] At a tripartite sectoral ministerial meeting held in Bujumbura, Burundi, in October 2014, the 26 countries of the three RECs decided to launch the Grand FTA in 2015.[43]

Institutions for Politics, Peace, and Security

Global trends in regionalization that focus on markets, investments, and infrastructure have pushed the EAC to take its boldest steps in economic areas of integration. Furthermore, there has been a return to the functionalist logic holding that the power of economic factors will diminish political differences. Some leading actors in the EAC seem sold on the mantra that "economics will speed up integration faster than politics." Yet inasmuch as there are attempts to transcend the past legacies of political conflicts, peace and security questions retain a bearing on the pace of integration. Despite the cosmopolitanism of regional integration, the EAC still operates in a neighborhood of weak states, civil wars, and enormous governance deficits.[44]

Democracy and Governance

Democratization across the EAC region has been uneven. Kenya and Tanzania have made progress, holding elections that have produced rotations in leadership even though the institutional horizon is still dominated by narrow elite structures.[45] Kenya faced electoral violence in 2007,[46] but the country has pulled itself together, embarking on national rejuvenation through a new constitution that came into force in 2010.[47] Tanzania also launched consultations for a new constitution in 2011, leading to a draft constitution that was to be promulgated in 2015, if approved by a national referendum.[48]

Rwanda and Uganda have lagged, however, retaining strong executive institutions dominated by Presidents Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni, respectively.

More troubling is the lack of definitive succession plans in Rwanda and Uganda and the muzzling of opposition parties and civil society by the authorities.[49] Burundi is in between, slowly recovering from a long period of civil war against the backdrop of weak political institutions.[50] After its 2015 elections, Burundi will face the question of whether it will emulate the path of Kenya and Tanzania, or opt for the semi-competitive and authoritarian route of Rwanda and Uganda.

With the accession of Burundi and Rwanda to the EAC, there have been discussions to broaden the community to include South Sudan and Somalia.[51] Although negotiations for South Sudan's accession began in March 2012, the resumption of its civil war in December 2013 forced their discontinuation.[52] It is unlikely that South Sudan or Somalia will be invited to join the EAC until they find peace and security, which may not be any time soon. Sudan also applied in 2011, but the application has not been considered because the country is not a geographical neighbor of any EAC member state, as stipulated in the conditions for membership.[53]

Divergent political systems in East Africa are major impediments to the political will needed to overcome obstacles to integration and to the ultimate objective of a political federation. The EAC has a draft protocol on good governance, but this has yet to be adopted.[54] Broad governance problems are worsened by the weak technical capacity that characterizes the EAC Secretariat and its institutions. Some observers have called for increasing the powers of the EAC Secretariat to allow sanctions against members that do not implement policies; but with a budget of only $55 million, the Secretariat is under-resourced to assume such additional powers.[55]

Rule of Law and Human Rights

Partly to fill the normative vacuum regarding human rights, the EACJ has emerged as a key player since it was established in 2001. Although it is primarily charged with interpreting and enforcing the EAC treaty and has no competence to hear individual complaints of alleged human rights violations, EACJ judges have teamed up with civil society organizations to decide on important human rights cases. These partnerships have put the court at the center of debates on human rights, the rule of law, and good governance.[56]

In one seminal case, the EACJ overturned the Ugandan military's arrest of individuals who had been granted bail by Uganda's High Court in November 2005. On appeal to the EACJ, the judges ruled that the action contravened the principle of the rule of law enshrined in the EAC treaty.[57] Examining the cases of human rights litigation in the EAC, James Gathii argues: "The EACJ's activism…is a reflection of the determined efforts of the judges to make the court relevant and accessible to East Africans, who built the EACJ's role in the integration process through innumerable formal and informal contacts with lawyers, civil society groups, and governmental agencies of EAC member states, among other groups."[58]

When the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and vice president William Ruto for crimes committed during the 2007 electoral violence, East African leaders made frantic attempts to extend the jurisdiction of the EACJ to cover crimes against humanity. In April 2012, the EALA passed a resolution seeking transfer of the Kenyan cases to the EACJ. As part of the resolution, the EALA requested that the Heads of State amend Article 27 of the EAC treaty to expand the court's jurisdiction to deal with international crimes.[59] Subsequently, the summit of Heads of State in April 2013 directed the Council of Ministers to finalize the expansion of the court's jurisdiction (but this process has not been completed).[60]

Regional Military Cooperation

The EAC has been central to the establishment of an Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) as part of the African Union's (AU) African Standby Force (ASF) plan.[61] The ASF would include military and civilian forces to carry out preventive deployments, rapid interventions, peace support operations, and peace enforcement missions. After almost ten years of preparation, ten Eastern African countries—Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Rwanda—adopted the EASF plan and its accompanying protocols, on the sidelines of the AU summit in Malabo in June 2014.[62] As part of the agreed plans, the EASF was to be fully operational and ready for deployment in crisis situations by the end of 2014. The experiences of core EASF countries—Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda—in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) indicate that there is already sufficient regional capacity for intervention.[63]

To boost regional security, the five EAC partners signed a peace and security protocol in Dar es Salaam in February 2013.[64] The protocol outlines cooperation in various areas, including combating terrorism and piracy, prevention of genocide, disaster management and crisis response, transborder crime, curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and management of refugees. In addition, the EAC adopted a regional counterterrorism strategy at an extraordinary Heads of State summit in April 2014 that sought to coordinate joint initiatives and information-sharing on terrorist threats in the region.[65]

Other significant regional security mechanisms have excluded Burundi and Tanzania. For example, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda signed the EAC's mutual pact on defense, peace, and security in January 2014; under the arrangement, they pledged to form a single defense territory, meaning that an attack on one will be considered aggression against all three. The agreement also permits the parties to conduct joint military operations against several armed groups, particularly the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), who were founded by perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and currently operate primarily across the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); the Allied Democratic Forces–National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), who oppose the Museveni government (and are also currently centered in the DRC); Somalia's al-Shabaab militants, who have carried out attacks in Kenya; and transnational criminal networks in the region.[66]

The exclusion of Tanzania dovetailed with misgivings in the EAC about Dar es Salaam's commitment to regional integration. As a result, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda formed an informal grouping in mid-2013, dubbed the "coalition of the willing," to deepen the search for economic and security ties. Several summits by the coalition on fast-tracking political integration and financing infrastructure projects raised the ire of Tanzania, which made veiled threats to quit the EAC and strengthen ties with other neighboring countries. As Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete complained to parliament in 2013:

> We are being side lined because we insist that we should not jump key integration steps such as the Monetary Union for the political federation. But in this and all other issues we have the EAC Protocol to back us. They call the tripartite "the coalition of the willing." My question is "who, then, is not willing in the EAC integration process?" Why don't they invite us and see if we are willing or not?[67]

The other key explanation for Tanzania's isolation in the EAC is its participation, alongside Mali and South Africa, in the intervention brigade authorized in March 2013 under the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) to assist the government of the DRC in fighting rebels. The brigade initially focused on the March 23 Movement (M23)[68] in the east of the country, who had support from Rwanda and Uganda.[69] Relations between Rwanda and Tanzania were worsened by Kikwete's public suggestion that Rwanda should open a dialogue with the FDLR. Furthermore, Tanzania expelled 7,000 Rwandan refugees and 15,000 Burundians in August 2013, accusing them of being illegal immigrants.[70] As the rift between Rwanda and Tanzania widened, Kenya made diplomatic overtures to Tanzania to help resolve the tensions, while Dar es Salaam stepped back from its threats to withdraw from the EAC. Although the cold war between Rwanda and Tanzania has abetted, it remains a potentially disruptive fault line in the integration endeavors and may tax the diplomatic energies of Kenya and Uganda.

Conclusion

For most of the postcolonial era, East African integration has been touted as the role model for the rest of Africa. Through the customs union, the common market, and the monetary union, East Africa has embarked on a steady process of rebuilding an economic space that may potentially transform the entire region. Small experiments in allowing the free movement of people, the gradual reduction of cross-border tariffs, and cooperation in infrastructure projects are the stepping-stones to the regional confidence that may yield more substantive forms of integration.

But the promotion of trade and commerce needs to be distinguished from the challenges of forging a political community in a region where different states' political cultures and practices diverge. As the only African REC with the aim of transforming into a political federation, the EAC has established an aspirational benchmark consistent with the ideals of pan-Africanism. Yet the EAC will need to better articulate the common values and standards that underpin the political project. Furthermore, given the magnitude of insecurity in Eastern Africa, investments in sturdy regional security mechanisms may be one way of deepening the integration that has been unleashed through economic processes.

Notes

1. The history of colonial and early-independence regional organizations in East Africa is discussed in Joseph S. Nye, "East African Economic Integration," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 1, no. 4 (1966), 475–502. Of particular note, Nye points out (495), is the fact that East African Airways managed to become one of the most profitable airlines in the world. Nye was only one of the Western scholars, particularly from the functionalist school, who turned attention to the EAC. See also Arthur Hazelwood, "The East African Common Market: Importance and Effects," *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics* 28, no. 1 (1966), 1–18; Colin Leys and Peter Robson (eds.), *Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965); Robert Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in British East and Central Africa, 1889–1953," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 2, no. 2 (1963), 141–60; Donald Rothchild (ed.), *Politics of Integration: An East African Documentary* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968). Emerging African scholars were equally interested; see, for example, Julius Nyerere, "East African Federation," in Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity: Uhuru Na Umoja—A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952–65* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 358–68; James Gikonyo Kiano, "The Emergent East African Federation," in David Currie (ed.), *Federalism and the New Nations of Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Ali A. Mazrui, "Tanzania Versus East Africa: A Case of Unwitting Federal Sabotage," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 3, no. 3 (1965), 209–25.
2. See, for example, Aggripah T. Mugomba, "Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the East African Community," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16, no. 2 (1978), 261–72; Christian P. Potholm, "Who Killed Cock Robin? Perceptions Concerning the Breakup of the East African Community," *World Affairs* 42, no. 1 (1979), 45–56; Domenico Mazzeo (ed.), *African Regional Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Arthur Hazelwood, "The End of the East African Community: What Are the Lessons for Regional Integration Schemes?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 18, no. 1 (1979), 40–58.
3. See, for example, Jane Banfield, "The Structure of the East African Common Services Organization," in Rothchild, *Politics of Integration*, pp. 261–300.
4. For accounts of the emergence of this new phase and the actors involved, see Adams Oloo, "East Africa: One Identity or Multiple Identities?," in Society for International Development (SID) (ed.), *East African Scenarios Project: Research Compendium*, 2007, http://www.sidint.net/docs/scenarios_compendium.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015), pp. 13–48; Donald Deya, "An Institutional Analysis of the East African Community: Some Initial Reflections," in SID, *East African Scenarios*, pp. 107–44.
5. African Union (AU), *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, adopted June 3, 1991, entered into force May 12, 1994, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN

_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY.pdf (accessed January 22, 2015). The treaty (arts 4[2][a] and 6[2][a]) makes strengthening existing regional economic communities (RECs) and creating new ones where necessary the first stage in the plan to create an African Economic Community.

6. Rok Ajulu, "A Region in Transition: Towards a New Integration Agenda in East Africa," in Rok Ajulu (ed.), *A Region in Transition: Towards a New Integration Agenda in East Africa* (Midrand: Trust Africa and Institute of Global Dialogue, 2010), pp. 1–5.
7. Peter Robson, "The New Regionalism and Developing Countries," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 3 (1993), 29–48. See also chapters 2 and 6 in this volume.
8. See Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Theorising the Rise of Regionness," *New Political Economy* 5, no. 3 (2000), 457–72; Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, "Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New," *New Political Economy* 5, no. 3 (2000), 333–52; Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy Shaw (eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Andrea Goldstein, "The New Regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa: More Than Meets the Eye?," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Policy Brief no. 20, May 6, 2002, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-new-regionalism-in-sub-saharan-africa_744208327104 (accessed January 23, 2015).
9. EAC, *Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*, adopted November 30, 1999, entered into force on July 7, 2000, http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=166&Itemid=28 (accessed January 22, 2015).
10. EAC, *Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Burundi into the East African Community*, adopted June 18, 2007, http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=187&Itemid=28 (accessed January 22, 2015); EAC, *Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Rwanda into the East African Community*, adopted June 18, 2007, http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=188&Itemid=28 (accessed January 22, 2015).
11. EAC Secretariat, "East African Community: Facts and Figures—2014," September 2014, http://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/EAC/EAC_Facts_and_Figures_2014.pdf (accessed June 10, 2015), pp. 16, 30. See also Office of the Secretary-General, "The Future of East African Integration," EAC press release, http://www.eac.int/sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=110:the-furue-of-eac&catid=40:sgs-blog&Itemid=1 (accessed April 9, 2015); African Development Bank (AfDB), "Eastern Africa: Regional Integration Strategy Paper, 2011–2015," September 2011, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/East%20Africa%20-%20Rev%20RISP%20.pdf (accessed April 22, 2015), p. 3.
12. EAC, *Progress, Achievements, and Benefits of the East African Community*, http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=397&Itemid=160 (accessed June 10, 2015), p. 3.
13. EAC, *Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*, Chapters 4–10.
14. Prior to the demise of the EAC, Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Idi Amin of Uganda could not even sit together to discuss conflicts between them.
15. Ibid., Chapter 25.

16. Ibid., arts 75–6; EAC, *Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation*, November 2004, p. 3.
17. EAC, *Report on Fast Tracking*, p. 3.
18. EAC, *Communiqué of the 6th Extraordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State*, August 20, 2007, http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=142&Itemid=73 (accessed January 22, 2015). See also Semboja Haji Hatibu, "East African Integration: Base Case Economic Analysis," *African Integration Review* 3, no. 2 (2009), 192–3 (though Hatibu incorrectly gives the year of the summit as 2008).
19. EAC, *Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union*, adopted March 2, 2004, entered into force on January 1, 2005, http://www.customs.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2%3Acustoms-union-protocol&catid=3%3Akey-documents&Itemid=78 (accessed January 22, 2015), art. 3.
20. EAC, *Protocol on the Customs Union*, arts 10–12.
21. Catherine McAullife, Sweta Saxena, and Masafuni Yabara, "Sustaining Growth in the East African Community," in Hamid R. Davoodi (ed.), *The East African Community After Ten Years: Deepening Integration* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund [IMF], January 2013), p. 41. The EAC publishes a quarterly report on NTBs. As of this writing, the most recent available was EAC, *Status of Elimination of Non Tariff Barriers in the East African Community* vol. 7, September 2014, http://www.tralac.org/images/docs/6653/eac-ntbs-vol-7.pdf (accessed January 22, 2015), in which the EAC noted (p. 16) that there were still 22 unresolved NTBs in the region, with 8 new ones reported (in violation of the Protocol on the Customs Union).
22. EAC, *EAC Development Strategy (2011/12–2015/16): Deepening and Accelerating Integration*, August 2011, http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=650&Itemid=163 (accessed January 22, 2015), p. 32. See also Meredith McIntyre, "Trade Integration in the East African Community: An Assessment for Kenya," IMF Working Paper no. WP/05/143, July 2005, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05143.pdf (accessed January 22, 2015).
23. Duncan Okello and Gladys Kirungi, "Introduction: Enhancing Equity in the East African Regional Integration: An Overview," in SID (ed.), *East African Integration: Dynamics of Equity in Trade, Education, Media, and Labour*, 2011, http://www.sidint.net/docs/EA_integration_report_2nd_ed.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015), p. xix; World Bank, *East African Community: Reshaping Economic Geography of East Africa: From Regional to Global Integration*, Report no. 65699-AFR, June 2012, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16814562/east-african-community-reshaping-economic-geography-east-africa-regional-global-integration-vol-1-2 (accessed January 23, 2015), p. viii.
24. The task force was established in September 2007, but it held its first meeting in Kigali from April 14 to 22, 2008. EAC, "Fourteenth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the East African Community," press release, September 27, 2007, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/EAC14COUNCILSEP07.PDF (accessed January 22, 2015), p. 2; EAC, "EAC Common Market Protocol Begins to Take Shape As Bujumbura Round of Talks Winds Up," press release, September 27, 2008, http://eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=166%3Aeac-common-market-takes-shape&catid=146%3Apress-releases&Itemid=194 (accessed January 22, 2015).

25. EAC, *Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market*, adopted November 20, 2009, entered into force on July 1, 2010, http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=48&Itemid=6 (accessed January 22, 2015). The protocol itself, in its preamble (p. 6), simply states that implementation will be "progressive," but it is accompanied by two schedules for liberalization (in capital and services), the latest deadlines of which are in 2015. EAC, *The East African Community Common Market Schedule of Commitments on the Progressive Liberalisation of Services (Annex V)*, November 2009, http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=42&Itemid=6 (accessed January 22, 2015); EAC, *The East African Community Common Market Schedule on the Removal of Restrictions on the Free Movement of Capital (Annex VI)*, November 2009, http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=43&Itemid=6 (accessed January 22, 2015).
26. EAC, *Protocol on the Common Market*, art. 5(3).
27. Ibid., art. 13.
28. Ibid., arts 7(2), 10.
29. Ibid., art. 38.
30. Above and Beyond Safaris, "East Africa to Form Joint Tourism Body," http://www.toursgorilla.com/ugandagorillatours/east-africa-to-form-joint-tourism-body/ (accessed April 9, 2015).
31. Allan Odhiambo, "Joint Tourism Body Bill Passed by EA House," *ETN Global Travel Industry News*, February 15, 2010, http://www.eturbonews.com/14405/joint-tourism-body-bill-passed-ea-house (accessed April 9, 2015).
32. Henry Lyimo, "East Africa: New Payment System Boosts EAC Trade," *Tanzania Daily News*, July 8, 2014.
33. Laetitia Lepetit, Clovis Rugemintwari, and Frank Strobel, "Monetary, Financial, and Fiscal Stability in the East African Community: Ready for a Monetary Union?," *World Economy* 38, no. 8 (2015), 1179–1204.
34. See, for example, Sanjeev Gupta and Jimmy McHugh, "East African Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy: Current and Future Challenges," in Davoodi, *The East African Community*, pp. 59–75.
35. Ann W. Kamau and Jessica Smith, "The Eurozone Crisis and Lessons for the Formation of an East African Monetary Union," Brookings Institution, December 19, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/19-eurozone-monetary-union-kamau (accessed January 23, 2015); Dick Durevall, "East African Community: Preconditions for an Effective Monetary Union," University of Gothernburg Working Paper in Economics no. 150, December 2011, pp. 1–39.
36. Eric Kabeera, "East Africa: EAC Heads of State Want Monetary Union by November 2013," *New Times* (Kigali), April 29, 2013.
37. EAC, *Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Monetary Union*, adopted November 30, 2013, http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=204&Itemid=47 (accessed January 23, 2015). For discussion, see "East African Nations Agree on Monetary Union," *Al Jazeera*, November 30, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/11/east-african-nations-agree-monetary-union-20131130175336476127.html (accessed January 23, 2015); EAC, "East African Community: Draft Monetary Union Protocol Finalized," press release, December 2013.
38. Muthoki Mumo, "Tough Road Ahead for EAC Single Currency," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), November 30, 2013; Rogelio Morales, "Monetary Policy

Harmonization in the East African Community," in Davoodi, *The East African Community*, pp. 76–87.

39. Gashega Muramira, "East Africa: Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda Launch Single Tourist Visa," *New Times* (Kigali), February 21, 2014.
40. John Mbanda and Eric Kabeera, "East Africa: EAC Presidents Launch Use of National IDs to Cross Borders," *New Times* (Kigali), February 20, 2014.
41. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC, and Southern African Development Community (SADC), *Final Communiqué of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government*, October 22, 2008, http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/FinalCommuniqueKampala_20081022.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015). See also AfDB and African Development Fund, *Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper, 2011–2015*, September 2011, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/East%20Africa%20-%20Rev%20RISP%20.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015), pp. 16–17, 18, and annex 9.
42. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, *Communiqué of the Second COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit*, T/TS/II/6, 12 June 2011, http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite.org/node/112 (accessed January 23, 2015).
43. "$1 Trillion 'Grand' Africa Tripartite Free Trade Area 'To Beat 2016 Schedule,'" *Mail and Guardian Africa*, August 17, 2014, http://mgafrica.com/article/2014-08-17-africa-economy-africas-grand-fta-negotiation-progressing-well-sadc-officials (accessed January 25, 2015).
44. Jacob Aketch, "The East African Community: Mirage or Miracle?," in SID, *East African Scenarios*, pp. 81–106.
45. A. G. G. Gingyera-Pinycwa, "Governance and Regional Integration in East Africa," in SID, *East African Scenarios*, pp. 145–76.
46. See, for example, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), *Report from OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya, 6–28 February 2008*, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/OHCHRKenyareport.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015).
47. Kenya National Council for Law Reporting, *The Constitution of Kenya*, rev. ed., 2010, https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015). For optimism about the impact, see, for example, Peter Greste, "Kenya's New Constitution Sparks Hopes of Rebirth," *BBC News*, August 27, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11103008 (accessed January 23, 2015).
48. Lucas Jackson, "Tanzania to Hold Vote on New Constitution, Possibly After May," *Reuters*, October 8, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/08/uk-tanzania-politics-idUKKCN0HX22I20141008 (accessed January 23, 2015).
49. "Smooth Transitions in Rwanda, Uganda Crucial for the Region," *The East African*, April 27, 2013, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Smooth-transitions-in-Rwanda--Uganda-crucial-for-the-region/-/2558/1760062/-/wc78s0z/-/index.html (accessed January 23, 2015).
50. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Sub-Regional Report on East Africa*, presented to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Union (AU), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Eighth African Governance Forum (AGF-VIII) on Democracy, Elections, and the Management of Diversity in Africa, Addis Ababa, July 18–19, 2012.

51. See, for example, "East African Body Rejects S. Sudan, Somalia Membership Bids," *Sudan Tribune*, December 4, 2012, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44743 (accessed January 23, 2015); George Omondi, "Somalia, South Sudan Likely to Join EAC This Year," *The East African*, January 23, 2014, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-and-South-Sudan-likely-to-join-EAC-this-year/-/2558/2158728/-/13ly891/-/index.html (accessed January 23, 2015).
52. Anne W. Kamau, "South Sudan's Quest for Regional Integration," in Brookings Institution Africa Growth Initiative (ed.), *South Sudan: One Year After Independence—Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country*, June 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/6/south%20sudan/06%20south%20sudan.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015), pp. 23–5; Pierre Sauvé, "South Sudan's Accession: Framing the Issues," International Growth Centre, South Sudan Policy Note no. 5, December 2012, http://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Suave-2012-Policy-Brief.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015).
53. "Sudan's Bid to Join EAC Rejected As South Sudan's Deferred," *Sudan Tribune*, November 30, 2011, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article40873 (accessed January 23, 2015).
54. EAC, *The East African Community Protocol on Good Governance*, undated draft.
55. Jesper Carlsen Cullen, "East African Monetary Union: An Impossible Project?," *The Foreign Report*, December 21, 2012, http://www.theforeignreport.com/2012/12/21/east-african-monetary-union-an-impossible-project (accessed January 23, 2015).
56. Lucyline Nkatha Murungi and Jacqui Gallinetti, "The Role of Sub-Regional Courts in the African Human Rights System," *Sur: International Journal on Human Rights* 7, no. 13 (2010), 118–43.
57. East African Court of Justice (EACJ), *Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the East African Community and Another (Ref No. 1 of 2007)*, November 1, 2007, http://www.saflii.org/ea/cases/EACJ/2007/3.html (accessed January 23, 2015). For a discussion of the case and its import, see James Gathii, "Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice's Human Rights Strategy," *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 24, no. 249 (2013),. 254–6.
58. Gathii, "Mission Creep," p. 295.
59. East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), "Transfer ICC Cases to EACJ, EALA Resolves," press release, April 26, 2012, http://www.eala.org/media-centre/press-releases/345-send-icc-case-to-the-eacj--eala-resolves.html (accessed January 23, 2015); Gibson Kamau Kuria, "Is the Urgency for an Expanded EAC Judiciary Justified?," *African Review* (Nairobi), May 3, 2012.
60. EAC, *Communiqué of the 11th Extraordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State*, 28 April 2013, http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=332&Itemid=73 (accessed January 23, 2015), para. 6.
61. See, for example, Colin Robinson, "The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects," *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 1 (2014), 20–36.
62. EAC, *Communiqué of the 3rd Extraordinary Meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Eastern African Region*, June 26, 2014, http://www.easfcom.org/images/documents/Communique_june2014.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015).

63. See, for example, Matt Freear and Cedric de Coning, "Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 2, art. 23 (2013), 1–11.
64. EAC, *Protocol on Peace and Security*, adopted February 15, 2013, http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=203&Itemid=47 (accessed January 23, 2015).
65. "EAC States Implement Joint Anti-Terror Strategy," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), April 30, 2014.
66. "Uganda: Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya Sign Defence Pact," *Rwanda Focus* (Kigali), January 9, 2014.
67. "President Kikwete Asserts Tanzania Will Not Quit EAC," *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam), November 7, 2013. A Tanzanian minister further charged: "We shall demand to be told whether we shall continue as five countries or (whether) our friends are joining South Sudan to form [a] coalition of four and the remaining partners, Burundi and Tanzania, can form an economic and strategic partnership with the DRC"; Peter Clottey, "Tanzania Concerned with 'Isolation' in Regional Group," *Voice of America*, November 6, 2013.
68. S/RES/2098 (2013), Resolution 2098 on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted by the United Nations Security Council at its 6943rd meeting, 28 March 2013, op. paras 9–12. See also Andre Roux, "South Africa and the UN Intervention Brigade in the DRC," *ISS Today*, April 24, 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-and-the-un-intervention-brigade-in-the-drc (accessed January 23, 2015).
69. See, for example, Jason Stearns, *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*, Rift Valley Institute, 2012, http://www.riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23#.VMKwUf7F9B0 (accessed January 23, 2015), pp. 46–8.
70. Clottey, "Tanzania Concerned"; "Humanitarian Crisis Looms for Migrants Expelled in Tanzania," *IRIN*, September 10, 2013.

Chapter 11

COMESA and SADC: The Era of Convergence

Dawn Nagar

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the convergence of two of Africa's regional economic communities (RECs), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).[1] Various divergence and convergence models demonstrate how regional groups and countries could achieve economic growth through eliminating discriminatory policies that purport to favor endogenous growth factors such as industrialization, technology, and knowledge-driven production. Considering these growth models, the literature also highlights that convergence can be achieved by poorer countries' economies becoming on par with those of rich countries over a long-run convergence period. Poorer countries in a regional scheme with a stronger partner that conducts North-South trade can also benefit from technology and knowledge spillover.[2] Two main questions are posed here: What have COMESA and SADC managed to achieve with regard to the agreements and protocols outlined in the 2008 Tripartite roadmap for the period 2008–15? And how are COMESA and SADC (as both institutions and member states) managing the issue of multiple memberships?

COMESA and SADC began their existence separately, but have since sought closer cooperation and integration, especially following the adoption of the Tripartite agreement among COMESA, SADC, and the East African Community (EAC) at a summit of heads of state in Kampala, Uganda, in October 2008.[3] This chapter examines the reasons for the growing partnership among the three RECs, and the significance of this partnership for Africa's integration agenda. It examines the main actors, factors, and diplomatic efforts that led to COMESA and SADC's decision to converge in 2008 and sign the Tripartite partnership with the EAC.

The Tripartite bloc includes 26 of the African Union's (AU) 54 member states, and has a combined population of approximately 530 million people and a gross domestic product (GDP) of $630 billion as of 2013 ($1,180 per capita). All three of the Tripartite RECs were identified by the AU 2000 Constitutive

Act and the Abuja Treaty as the building blocks to achieve an African Economic Community (AEC).[4]

Africa's economic integration has largely been driven by efforts to promote free trade, entailing tariff reductions among states and other methods of lowering transaction costs between them. Programs to reduce nontariff barriers have included common currencies and removal of restrictions on labor and capital mobility; these require effective policy mechanisms that are focused not only on the formal barriers to trade condemned by conventional integration theories, but also on the economic prerequisites for achieving efficient trade. In order to understand the merger that occurred and the continuation of multiple memberships of COMESA and SADC member states, this chapter takes a neoclassical economic approach that defines how market economies, through open trade, can generate wealth.

Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin note that absolute convergence within regional integration schemes is more likely to occur when countries in the region have common policies, ideally policies embedded in shared institutions.[5] Common policies provide a supportive framework for convergence and include legal policies, removal of trade barriers, harmonization of trade regulations, liberalization of capital, facilitation of labor mobility, and common currencies. These policies reduce costs for settling payments. Convergence of factor prices across a region can occur only with convergence in economic structures, which leads to convergence in per capita incomes.[6] Barro and Sala-i-Martin argue that governments need to place more emphasis on government institutions in order to obtain economic growth. Sovereign states are important in formulating rules for economic activity, as "referees" that ensure compliance with the rules of the market, and as "providers of infrastructure."[7]

Diplomatic Efforts toward the Tripartite Agreement

The regrouping of COMESA and SADC was sparked by the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) decision to revive the Yamoussoukro Decision of 1988.[8] The Yamoussoukro Decision was reinstated in 1999 and signed in 2000 with a view toward fully liberalizing Africa's airspace market by 2002.[9] COMESA and SADC were invited to join the Yamoussoukro Decision in 1999, and the EAC joined much later, in 2005. In order to spearhead the process of cooperation and harmonization, the chairpersons of the COMESA Authority and SADC Executive met in Egypt in 2004 and agreed to set up a joint COMESA-SADC bilateral task force at the secretariat level to discuss and agree on the harmonization of programs for airspace, initially for just the two organizations.[10]

In October 2008, COMESA, the EAC, and SADC signed and ratified an important memorandum of understanding on interregional cooperation and integration. In order to accelerate their efforts toward a free trade area (FTA), a legal and institutional framework was necessary to underpin the Tripartite body.[11] To comply with the Yamoussoukro Decision, COMESA and SADC had to form a joint legal protocol and harmonize implementation of guidelines for a liberalized regional airspace, as well as harmonize their provisions and procedures for regulating airline competition. The harmonization process involved several meetings between 2001 and 2005. The fact that a number of states were members of both COMESA and SADC presented a challenge for the harmonization of policies in the Yamoussoukro Decision process. The EAC, which had a competitive airline, Kenyan Airways, showed interest and was invited to the meetings with COMESA and SADC. The EAC's joining in 2005 was significant to the COMESA-SADC integration process, as it paved the way for the convergence of regional policies across COMESA, the EAC, and SADC, and for the emergence of the Joint Commission and Tripartite Task Force.[12] Rwanda and Burundi were also invited to join the proposed liberalized regional airspace when they joined the EAC in 2007.

Focusing on harmonization of programs for the Yamoussoukro Decision process, the Tripartite Task Force met several times under the guidance of the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the three RECs to address how to collaborate and harmonize regional programs.[13] The CEOs also charged the Tripartite Task Force with establishing an institutional framework for cooperation that could move into deeper integration, such as an FTA and later a customs union—as it was hoped that this would also help solve the problem of multiple memberships.[14]

The Joint Competition Authority for a liberalized airspace was formed for the three RECs in May 2007. The joint authority was to oversee the full implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision for air transport in the three RECs, as well as the harmonization of programs in the areas of trade, customs, free movement of people, and infrastructure development.[15] The competition guidelines were adopted by the policy organs of COMESA in May 2007, the EAC in June 2008, and SADC in August 2008, but also required ratification at a summit of heads of state.[16] The Joint Competition Authority was formalized and launched at the first Tripartite heads-of-state summit in October 2008 in Kampala, Uganda.

Poor trade logistics and infrastructure services have severely impeded interregional and intracontinental trade (see also chapter 5 in this volume). COMESA and SADC rely excessively on global trade, which constitutes up to 80 percent of their total trade, since it is far more cost effective to trade outside the region. At the continental level, for the period 2000–10, intra-African imports averaged 14.2 percent of total annual African imports, and intra-African exports averaged 10.4 percent of total annual African exports.[17] South Africa contributed $6.2 billion to regional infrastructure in 2012, through the Industrial Development Corporation, for 41 projects across 17 African countries in mining, industrial infrastructure, agro-processing, and tourism.[18] An example that member states might follow is the alternative project funding methodology provided by the South African office of the Deloitte and Touche auditing firm. This methodology does not require donor funds that could help support governments in major infrastructure projects through the inclusion of new pools of investors and financiers.[19]

The Tripartite Merger

The Tripartite memorandum of understanding, first discussed at the first Tripartite summit meeting, in October 2008, came into force on January 19, 2011.[20] The memorandum defines a roadmap for establishing an FTA that would take into account the principle of variable geometry, and a legal and institutional framework to underpin the FTA.[21]

Since the signing of the 2008 Tripartite agreement, annexes have been concluded on nontariff barriers, customs cooperation, trade facilitation, transit, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. Annexes on tariff schedules, trade remedies, and rules of origin are still under negotiation.[22] As of the tenth meeting of the Tripartite Trade Negotiating Forum, in Bujumbura, Burundi, in 2014, tariff offers had been prepared by 15 of the 26 member countries of the Tripartite bloc. Since then, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) bloc has offered to reduce duties to zero on 60 percent of tariff lines as soon as the Tripartite FTA is launched, and reduce duties on another 15 percent of tariff lines gradually over a period of five years.

Fostering cooperation through establishing institutional arrangements and harmonization of programs is important to the member states of the three RECs. The 2008 Tripartite summit directed the chairpersons of the RECs' ministerial councils to ensure that secretariats coordinate and harmonize positions on the economic partnership agreement (EPA) negotiations with the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round development negotiations, and other multilateral negotiations. There was no movement at the summit on negotiation of EPAs with the EU. Member states are still negotiating on their own terms, as seen in South Africa's negotiations within SACU—including Mozambique (with Angola invited to join)—with Brussels, which will be finalized in October 2016 under the EU-SADC economic partnership agreement.[23]

The ministers of the Tripartite Trade and Customs Committee held their third meeting in Lusaka in February 2015 and provided a progress report on the free movement of businesspeople.[24] The Tripartite Technical Committee on Industrial Development, established in accordance with the directive handed down by the second Tripartite summit, in 2011, reported that it had developed a work program, an industrial development roadmap, and a draft modalities framework on cooperation in industrial development that would foster value addition and improve productive capacity. It was also noted at the February 2015 meeting that none of the FTA offers, particularly one involving only 14 out of 19 COMESA member states (excluding the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan), would yield a true Tripartite FTA. The ministers argued that a "COMESA plus" was what was required.[25] These issues were discussed and tabled at the June 2015 third Tripartite summit.[26]

Management of Multiple Memberships

Table 11.1 shows the multiple memberships held by members of the Tripartite bloc. Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa are the largest economies in the Tripartite bloc, and none of these three belong to more than one FTA or customs union; these three states have no need for overlapping memberships, given the strength of their economies. Angola belongs to neither an FTA nor a customs union. According to the 2008 Tripartite agreement, liberalization could go up to

Table 11.1 Membership in regional economic communities (RECs) and free trade agreements in the Tripartite bloc

COMESA	EAC	SADC	COMESA FTA	EAC FTA	SADC FTA	No FTA	Membership in other RECs
Burundi	Djibouti	Angola	Burundi	Djibouti	Botswana	Angola	Angola (ECCAS)
Comoros	Kenya	Botswana	Comoros	Kenya	Lesotho	DRC	Burundi (CEPGL)
Djibouti	Rwanda	DRC	Djibouti	Rwanda	Madagascar	Eritrea	Djibouti (CEN-SAD)
DRC	Tanzania	Lesotho	Egypt	Tanzania	Malawi	Ethiopia	DRC (CEPGL)
Egypt	Uganda	Madagascar	Kenya	Uganda	Mauritius		Egypt (CEN-SAD
Eritrea		Malawi	Libya		Mozambique		Eritrea (CEN-SAD)
Ethiopia		Mauritius	Mauritius		Namibia		Eritrea (CEN-SAD)
Kenya		Mozambique	Rwanda		Seychelles		Libya (CEN-SAD)
Libya		Namibia	Seychelles		South Africa		Rwanda (CEPGL)
Madagascar		Seychelles	Sudan		Swaziland		Somalia (CEN-SAD)
Malawi		South Africa	Zambia		Tanzania		Sudan (CEN-SAD)
Mauritius		Swaziland	Zimbabwe		Zambia		
Rwanda		Tanzania			Zimbabwe		
Seychelles		Zambia					
Sudan		Zimbabwe					
Tanzania							
Uganda							
Zambia							
Zimbabwe							

Note: ECCAS is the Economic Community of Central African States; CEPGL is the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; CEN-SAD is the Community of Sahel-Saharan States.

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Study on the Establishment of Inter-RECs' Free Trade Areas in Africa Drawing on Lessons from the COMESA-SADC-EAC FTA Experience, May 2, 2011, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/CTRCI-VII/tripartite_comesa_eac_sadc_fta-study-final-report.pdf (accessed August 31, 2014), pp. 14–20.

85 percent of traded goods. The EAC, in paving the way for creating its own free trade zone, has achieved 100 percent liberalization of trade, has formed its own customs union, and is moving toward a monetary federation (see also chapter 10 in this volume).[27] Of COMESA's 19 member states, 14 participate in the FTA it established in 2000. The exceptions are Ethiopia, which has liberalized only 10 percent of its trade; the DRC, which has liberalized none of its trade and is still charging duty on all goods entering the country; Uganda, which has liberalized 80 percent of trade; and Eritrea, which has liberalized only 10 percent of trade. Swaziland, as a SACU member state, is under derogation and not liberalizing tariffs.

SACU member states have liberalized 90 percent of their traded goods. In SADC, 13 of 15 member states are members of the region's FTA (excluding Angola and the DRC). South Africa, as the largest economy in the Tripartite bloc, belongs to one FTA (SADC's) and one customs union (SACU's). Of SADC's 15 member states, 5 are members of SACU (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa). Of the AU's 54 member states, 26 are members of two RECs and 20 are members of three RECs. The DRC belongs to four RECs. Of the 14 regional integration groupings in Africa, there are 2 or more groupings in other subregions (e.g., SACU in both SADC and COMESA).[28]

The variable-geometry approach adopted by the Tripartite bloc makes tariff adjustments difficult to manage, since different members of the bloc are permitted to liberalize at different paces. Trade liberalization through bilateral trade agreements further hampers the principle of variable geometry, and appears to contrast with the variable-geometry approach of trade protection and incremental integration, since the pace of integration varies between these two approaches. While variable geometry implies a slower pace, trade liberalization requires a faster pace, including trade agreements between COMESA and the EU, COMESA and the United States (as part of the African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA] regime), and SADC and the EU, as well as bilateral AGOA trade agreements between member states and the United States. But the dilemma of trade liberalization also raises the question of how COMESA, the EAC, and SADC are managing multiple memberships, which is not just about negotiating tariff settings, given that Tripartite states are also exploring the benefits they could achieve from integration with other blocs.

Such benefits of integration include those that flow to the economies of poorer members when larger members conduct trade with external parties. For example, the trade partnership between South Africa and the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) bloc (as it was known until South Africa joined in 2010) was a significant one without a tariff structure. Unlike with European EPAs, and the AGOA of the United States, trade liberalization policies have complicated rules of origin (ROOs) that are attached to goods linked to external trade agreements and hence conflict with internal settings of ROOs.[29] As James Gathii notes:

> African RTAs [regional trade arrangements] are trade-plus regimes that reflect a broad set of goals and are not simply trade treaties. Seeing African RTAs as regimes

> adds to the argument that countries that are members of more than one RTA may well regard treaties establishing RTAs as providing a framework for cooperation, but not necessarily as treaties creating binding obligations.[30]

Africa's states have the liberty to form multiple memberships, which states see as offering them the flexibility to retain their sovereignty and accrue benefits.[31] COMESA and SADC's economic integration practices allow further openness of their markets. Article 1 of the Tripartite memorandum of understanding encourages member states to consider the issue of variable geometry within the bloc so that small and infant industries are protected. Within COMESA and SADC, polarization of economic integration has come about due to relaxation of tariffs. In addition, larger conglomerates have taken advantage of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and have monopolies over enlarged markets (as in the case of US trade agreements and the European EPAs), leaving smaller economies at risk against larger economies.[32] A key recommendation is that COMESA, the EAC, and SADC should revisit their trade protocols and agreements and put in place a legal framework that fines member states belonging to the blocs that violate the current trade preferences of the Tripartite bloc through activities with external partners. Member states that jeopardize the trade liberalization of agreed goods should also be sanctioned. Also, COMESA, EAC, and SADC member states that do not pay their dues to their respective secretariats should be barred from voting in heads of state meetings. Similarly, in order to attain a monetary union by 2025, COMESA will need to grow collectively and ensure that all member states have unified economic structures.

Benefits of Regional Arrangements in Relation to Multiple Memberships

Anthony Venables suggests that trade liberalization with external partners in North-South regional trade agreements can bring about economic development and growth in per-capita gross national income (GNI) for poorer economies in a regional trade agreement. Venables makes the observation that, in an FTA that has a member with a high income relative to the world, the lower-income members are likely to converge with the high-income partner and benefit from the FTA. Venables therefore suggests that developing countries are likely to be better served by North-South than by South-South FTAs. This chapter's assessment takes into account economic convergence over a long run of nine years (2005–13).[33] A neoclassical economic approach would predict that open trade in the customs union would produce convergence.

In terms of North-South trade, this assessment takes into account South Africa (as a high-income partner relative to the world) and smaller economies—Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (the BLNS states) within the SACU bloc (as low-income countries forming an FTA with a high-income partner). Barro and Sala-i-Martin provide a further understanding of economic growth convergence as a result of trade liberalization by describing two levels of convergence in their model: beta-convergence, or absolute convergence (also called the "catch-up" process), and sigma-convergence, when the dispersion among a group of countries decreases over time.[34]

Let us expand on the example of the SACU bloc. States' preservation of their membership in SACU while also being member states of the Tripartite bloc exacerbates the problem of managing multiple memberships.[35] The SACU secretariat has already stated that the region has no intention of joining a COMESA-EAC-SADC FTA, due to the extensive tariff adjustments that would be required.

The smaller economies of SACU—the BLNS states—must conform to SACU's tariff regime and are not able to manage the excessive tariff adjustments.[36] Currently, the tariff settings for the Tripartite bloc require that 85 percent of trade in goods be duty-free, with the remaining 15 percent of trade comprising sensitive goods. South Africa, the fifth member of SACU, is determined to remain attached to SACU because of the awkward position it was put in when listed as a "developed" country during the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations (1986–94).[37] Since then, South Africa has been negotiating at the WTO to be recognized as a special case requiring additional flexibility related to its membership in SACU.[38]

From 2000 to 2012, South Africa's exports to other Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) bloc members rose from 5 to 19 percent of South Africa's total exports. Over the same period, the EU's share of South Africa's exports declined from 60 percent to 21 percent. Venables addresses income convergence in trade liberalization in free trade agreements with a high-income member.[39] This chapter is concerned with trade growth, which will have spillover effects and benefits for smaller economies and poorer countries over the long run. If countries see benefits over the long run, they will remain in a regional grouping and thus economic convergence in the grouping will occur, as it did in the case of SACU.

Two variables are therefore relevant here: total trade as a percentage of GDP, and growth of total trade over a long-run period of nine years. Growth in trade in the BLNS countries is of critical importance and will lead to overall GDP growth. The economic gap between these countries and those with stronger economies is so great that attainment of economic parity is highly unlikely; for instance, in 2013 South Africa had a GDP of $366 billion compared to Lesotho's $2.3 billion.[40]

Figure 11.1 shows that growth in trade as a percentage of total trade of poorer countries has improved relative to growth in trade as a percentage of total trade of South Africa, particularly for Lesotho and Swaziland. The convergence between Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa in total trade as a percentage of GDP provides evidence for beta-convergence over the long-run period of 2005–13. Whereas Botswana and Namibia have experienced growth in trade, this does not indicate divergence, but instead demonstrates that these two countries have grown more as smaller economies belonging to an FTA with a strong partner (namely, South Africa). Figure 11.1 also shows that South Africa's trade growth as a share of GDP is smaller than trade growth for some countries in the BLNS group during this period. Botswana in particular experienced 12 percent growth for the period 2012–13 while South Africa had 3 percent. Swaziland's



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Botswana	89	86	91	95	88	82	98	103	115
Lesotho	170	173	170	177	159	157	154	151	—
Namibia	81	87	106	121	125	108	103	103	104
Swaziland	178	156	153	128	135	121	135	113	115
South Africa	55	62	66	75	55	56	61	62	65

Figure 11.1 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), 2005–13

Source: World Bank, "Trade (% of GDP)", http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS (accessed 24 April 2015).

growth increased by 2 percent for the same period; Lesotho had no growth due to the political violence during this period, particularly in 2015.[41] As Venables's theory of South-South and North-South trade predicts, conducting trade with a stronger economic partner that trades more with stronger external economies can benefit the smaller economies within a regional grouping.

To demonstrate the total trade growth of individual SACU members and whether there are benefits for poorer countries belonging to an FTA with a rich partner, figure 11.2 analyzes total trade over the same nine-year period, 2005–13. Figure 11.3 shows convergence in trade growth.

Figure 11.4 shows the trade growth of Botswana and South Africa, and the trade growth convergence point for these two countries, for the period 2005–12.

Figures 11.5 through 11.7 show the convergence points, respectively, for Lesotho (2008–9), Namibia (2006 and 2008–9), and Swaziland (2006, 2008, and 2010) with South Africa. This convergence point illustrates when the smaller economy's trade begins to achieve parity with that of the rich partner in a regional trade grouping, and shows that over a long-run period, poorer countries' trade growth increases. It also shows that poorer partners are growing faster than South Africa.

Various external factors explain why trade growth in the SACU bloc differs among its members. Consider South Africa and Swaziland. For South Africa,



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Botswana	5,277	5,291	6,012	4,999	3,573	4,913	6,964	6279	8151
Lesotho	668	757	872	932	776	925	1,226	1045	907
Namibia	2,483	3,172	3,521	3,695	3,800	4,708	5,148	5445	5540
Swaziland	1,805	1,838	2,119	1,744	1,775	2,063	2,205	2168	2093
South Africa	67,561	78,371	92,510	101,836	82,577	105,676	124,331	115675	110657

Figure 11.2 Total trade of SACU member states, 2005–13

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 5 June 2015).



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Botswana	1.4	72.1	–101.3	–142.6	134	205.1	–68.5	187.2
Lesotho	8.9	11.5	6	–15.6	14.9	30.1	–18.1	–13.8
Namibia	68.9	34.9	17.4	10.5	90.8	44	29.7	9.5
Swaziland	181.95	28.1	–37.5	3.1	–175.437	14.2	–3.7	–7.5
South Africa	1.081	1.4139	932.6	–1.9259	2.0099	1.8655	–865.6	–501.8

Figure 11.3 Trade growth of SACU member states, 2005–12

Source: UNCTAD statistics database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 5 June 2015).



Figure 11.4 Trade growth convergence of Botswana and South Africa, 2005–12

Source: UNCTAD statistics database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 5 June 2015).



Figure 11.5 Trade growth convergence of Lesotho and South Africa, 2005–12

Source: UNCTAD statistics database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 5 June 2015).



Figure 11.6 Trade growth convergence of Namibia and South Africa, 2005–12

Source: UNCTAD statistics database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 5 June 2015).



Figure 11.7 Trade growth convergence of Swaziland and South Africa, 2005–12

Source: UNCTAD statistics database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 5 June 2015).

between 2009 and 2011 both the global economic recession and the strikes at South Africa's platinum mines severely damaged the country's trade. The violence and strikes beginning in 2011 at South Africa's Marikana mine, which continued into 2014 at the Impala, Amplats, and Lonmin mines, resulted in losses of 24.1 billion rand in revenue, 440,000 ounces of platinum, and 20,000 jobs.[42] For Swaziland, the country experienced reduced trade after the United States ejected it from the AGOA regime in January 2015. US trade representative Michael Froman explained: "Our concerns [are] clear to Swaziland . . . and we engaged extensively on concrete steps that Swaziland could take to address the concerns. . . . We hope to continue our engagement with the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland on steps it can take so that worker and civil society groups can freely associate and assemble and AGOA eligibility can be restored."[43] Swaziland was the 173rd-largest goods trading partner with the United States in 2013, with $82 million in total trade ($23 million in US exports to Swaziland and $59 million in imports, meaning a US trade deficit of $36 million).[44]

Managing Multiple Memberships: The Case of South Africa in SACU

SACU manages multiple memberships by adopting a four-pronged approach. The first element of the approach is to factor in a "paymaster." South Africa, as a hegemonic state that is managing the multiple memberships of the SACU bloc (as shown in table 11.1) by incentivizing poorer economies through the trade revenue generated in the bloc. This has benefitted the smaller BLNS economies in SACU. Walter Mattli highlights that a "paymaster" can provide benefits that promote economic convergence in a regional grouping.[45] South Africa is standing guard over its BLNS trading partners because their markets matter. For instance, Botswana's hide and leather market is of great value to South Africa's motor industry, for car seats. According to a 2013 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on SACU-generated revenue as a percentage of GDP, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland are accruing enormous income from the customs union and do not see the benefit of joining another FTA such as the Tripartite COMESA-EAC-SADC arrangement when that is eventually formed. Current account receipts constituted only 28 percent of GDP for South Africa, compared with over 37 percent in Botswana, more than 55 percent in Namibia, and over 100 percent in Lesotho. South Africa is nevertheless the main contributor, constituting 80 percent of intra-SACU trade.[46]

James Gathii[47] and Arvind Panagariya[48] argue that the pace of regional integration is defined by and linked to the benefits of regional integration, and that this explains why African countries join different regional schemes. While there are benefits to multiple regional and bilateral trade agreements, there have also been negative consequences, as discussed by Jagdish Bhagwati.[49] According to the SACU agreement, SACU's present revenue-sharing formula requires that South Africa contribute 98 percent of generated revenue to the revenue pool, which is shared according to intra-SACU trade or imports; South Africa has agreed to this formula because it dominates intra-SACU trade, accounting for over 75 percent of Botswana's and Namibia's total trade, and over 90 percent of Swaziland's and Lesotho's trade.[50] To balance its domination in trade, South Africa's approach includes a second element.

The second element of the approach is recognizing the importance of increasing intraregional trade while balancing external trade. External trade has led to a larger revenue pool being generated from total trade, which benefits the BLNS countries, as shown in figure 11.8 for the period 2005–13. South Africa has conducted trade with Europe since long before this period; in 1999, for example, South Africa and the European Union signed a trade development agreement. Further, South Africa has conducted trade not only with the BRIC bloc since 2010, but also with Asian and Chinese markets since long before the 2005–13 period. As Carolyn Jenkins and Lynne Thomas argue, South Africa must look beyond the region in order to enhance economic growth for poorer economies.[51]

Greater trade and enlarged markets have increased the SACU revenue pool and strengthened the SACU region; for example, South Africa's 2010 merger with the BRIC states—a grouping of the world's fastest-growing economies—is potentially positive for Southern Africa as a whole, by providing greater trade prospects. South Africa has been reaping the benefits of intra-SACU trade ever since the 1910 SACU trade agreement (revised in 1969 and again in 2002). Even though South Africa has been conducting trade with Chinese and Asian markets since before the 2010 merger, the BRICS agreement has provided a more formalized relationship for its trade with African markets, resulting in increased trade among the BRICS bloc between 2010 and 2014, with 2013 showing the greatest trade, as seen in figure 11.9.



Figure 11.8 Total GDP of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS) member states, 2005–13

Source: UNCTAD statistics database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed 5 June 2015).



Figure 11.9 South Africa's total trade with Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) states, 2010–14

Source: Trade database of the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed February 2015).

The third element of the approach is developmental-led regional integration. South Africa, the strongest state within SACU, has taken the lead in infrastructure development. Rob Davies, South Africa's trade minister, points out that in African regions, which are saddled with many weak economies and lagging growth, functional spillovers will not be as significant in intra- and interregional trade given the lack of infrastructure capacity.[52] South Africa has approached infrastructure development through SADC's spatial development initiatives (SDIs) of 1995 and the Southern African Development Bank. The neoclassical growth model also stresses the importance of governments' focus on physical investment in order to expand national outputs. Investment in equipment is just as important as investment in transport infrastructure, since equipment is critical for technological advancement.[53] Kenya's rapid growth, for example, is particularly linked to its growth in banking and telecommunications services (which have expanded to the middle class), urbanization, and investment in infrastructure and railways. Uganda's growth is supported by the increased activity in the construction, financial services, transport, and telecommunications sectors.[54]

Moreover, Barro and Sala-i-Martin outline the linkages between convergence and the increased economic integration that follows from trade liberalization; in particular, increased mobility leads to opportunities for economies of scale and specialization. They also observe that reduced transport and transaction costs lead to greater "spatial agglomeration" as well as specialization.[55]

The fourth element of the approach is to strengthen regional institutions. SACU is not recognized as a regional economic community by the Abuja Treaty of 1991, nor by the AU; rather, it is one of the regional mechanisms promoting convergence on the continent due to its negotiation skills; its access to the BRICS, the EU, and the United States; and its strong security mechanism, which is well-endowed through South Africa's support. Currently, SACU is in negotiations with all the larger markets with which SACU does not share an FTA. Notably, these include Egypt and Kenya in the EAC.

The growth convergence of BLNS members in the SACU bloc will be accelerated by growing mineral-rich countries, which are expected to build on their momentum and accelerate from an average of 3.4 percent GDP growth in 2014 to 4.1 percent in 2015. These include countries in the Southern African region, such as Angola (coal), Botswana (coal, copper, and diamonds), Namibia (diamonds and uranium), and Zambia (copper). Southern Africa's GDP growth is expected to accelerate from 2.9 percent in 2014 to 3.6 percent in 2015, with Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia expected to be the fastest-growing economies in 2015.[56] These growth poles are "mainly driven by an increased investment in the non-diamond sector in Botswana, private consumption recovery in South Africa, and an increase in mining and natural gas investment and exploration in Mozambique."[57] In the EAC, GDP growth is expected to continue to increase from 6.5 percent in 2014 to 6.8 percent in 2015, which will make East Africa the fastest-growing African subregion. Kenya and Uganda have been the key drivers in 2014 and 2015, as indicated by the UN's 2015 economic outlook report.[58]

SACU maintains that there is no point in signing free trade agreements, since it already belongs to an FTA and a customs union, and plans to form loose trade arrangements with those countries it does not already have trade agreements with.[59] Such arrangements will be formed between SACU and Egypt; between SACU and the EAC (excluding Tanzania, because it and SACU members are already in the SADC free trade area; see table 11.1); and between SACU and Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. SACU is hoping that Angola will join the 2016 Southern Africa EPA agreement, and that the DRC will join the SADC free trade area in order to enlarge the SACU trade market.[60]

Conclusion

In examining regional trade agreements in Africa, it becomes clear that the neoclassical economic approach is relevant to understanding regional integration, divergence, and convergence, and provides context for understanding the issues prior to and after the 2008 Tripartite agreement among COMESA, the EAC, and SADC and the benefits of multiple memberships for poorer economies in a regional integration process. The dilemma for the Tripartite bloc is that its decision to implement a variable-geometry approach—allowing for member states of a regional grouping to cooperate in separation from other members, as well as for flexible progression in cooperation in a variety of areas and at different speeds—was an attempt to help manage the multiple memberships of member states.[61] But this approach has hampered regional integration. The Tripartite bloc has also adopted a trade liberalization framework that is reflective of open markets and causing polarization of smaller markets and industries.[62]

The Tripartite bloc has also allowed its member states to conduct external trade, notably with AGOA and the EU. While such agreements are important for generating wealth, they must be negotiated at the Tripartite level to ensure that rules of origin do not hamper regional trade. As a key example, consider that in 2013 the EU's exports to Southern Africa totaled €33 billion, and Southern Africa's exports to the EU totaled €31 billion, the latter mainly comprising diamonds from Botswana and from South Africa; diamonds, platinum, agricultural products (including wine, sugar, citrus fruit, and table grapes), precious stones, metals, uranium, and fish from Namibia; and sugar, fruit, and nuts from Swaziland. The new SADC-EU economic partnership agreement includes domestic shielding of sensitive sectors in SADC states from European competitors. In the new negotiations, the EU had to commit to refraining from subsidizing its agricultural exports to the SADC region; if the EU does not abide by this commitment, South Africa will refuse to sign the EPA in 2016. As of July 2014, a list of 251 EU geographical indications of sensitive products and 105 South African geographical indications of sensitive products had been agreed to.[63] Core trade must be conducted intracontinentally and carefully balanced against external trade. COMESA and SADC should also consider Anthony Venables' suggestion that North-South (external) trade involving a strong partner in a regional trade agreement is important to spurring the growth of smaller economies.[64] It is clear that SACU is integrating with Africa's major trade markets, and will conduct trade within the Tripartite bloc that is advantageous to protecting its infant markets.

The neoclassical model purporting that trade liberalization in regional blocs with a hegemonic partner, such as in the SACU configuration, can spur economic growth and result in the members of such a grouping converging over the long run, is based on four requirements. The first is that the hegemonic state in such a regional grouping must conduct trade with global partners. Second, there must be a compensating trade mechanism, such as SACU's trade revenue disbursement mechanism. Third, there must be actual goods to trade, and infrastructure must be in place to make this trade possible, such as the Maputo Development Corridor between Gauteng province in South Africa and Mozambique. And fourth, trade must expand across the continent and not for the sake of integrating regions. If more amicable relations in SACU with more intraregional trade are to transpire, then South Africa must relax its stringent domestic industrial policies, since trade protectionism—for example, its 60 billion rand in yearly subsidies to its motor industry—can hamper its regional efforts to increase trade with its SACU partners.[65]

Trade agreements must take into account how endogenous factors of growth such as technology, research, and inputs into trade such as rules of origin have prohibited real growth. Endowment factors such as knowledge spillover, research, and technical skills need to be enhanced through harmonization of trade policies.[66] The larger economies of Africa, like Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa, should liberalize all tariffs, while the smaller economies, like Tanzania, Uganda, Lesotho, and Swaziland, should be allowed to retain their tariffs for sensitive goods for a longer period. This would allow industries in smaller economies to adjust to the negotiated tariffs outlined in the Tripartite Agreement of 2008, and provide incentives for integration. Currently, weaker economies are too often pawns in the global economy—continuously exporting primary commodities with low or no value-added, and then importing those same goods back onto the continent as manufactured goods.

Hegemonic states must build value chains in order to grow Africa's industry. While trade in goods is important, so are the people of the continent. Africa must understand that regional economic integration is about its people, from policymaker down to farm laborer, and must view all people as equally important to the trade agenda. Free movement of people and goods must also be implemented, visas between Africa's regions must be abolished, and borders must be opened for people to move more freely. Africa must make a genuine effort to remove the biggest hurdle to its regional integration—its migration policies—in order to grow its economies, diversify its trade in both goods and services, enhance its technological skills and education, and efficiently industrialize itself through regional cooperation.

Notes

1. This chapter is based on Dawn Nagar, *The Politics of Regional Integration in Africa, 1970–2013: The Case of COMESA and SADC*, PhD dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, forthcoming.
2. See, for example, Oded Galor, "Convergence? Inferences from Theoretical Models," *Economic Journal* 106, no. 437 (1996), 1057; Paul M. Romer, "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," *Journal of Political Economy* 94, no. 5 (1986), 1002–37; Robert J. Barro, "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, no. 2 (1991), 407–501; N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David N. Weil, "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107, no. 2 (1992), 407–37; Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2004); Steven N. Durlauf and Paul A. Johnson, "Multiple Regimes and Cross-Country Growth Behaviour," *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 10, no. 4 (1995), 365–84.
3. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, *Final Communiqué of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government*, October 22, 2008, http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite.org/node/78 (accessed April 27, 2015).
4. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Union (AU), and African Development Bank (AfDB), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V: Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area*, 2012, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria5_print_uneca_fin_20_july_1.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015), pp. 13–16.
5. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*, pp. 12–13.
6. Ibid., p. 39. See also Simon Kuznets, "Modern Economic Growth and the Less Developed Countries," in Simon Kuznets, *Economic Development, the Family, and Income Distribution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 68–77.
7. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*, p. 31. See also Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45, no. 1 (1955), 1–28.
8. African Ministers in Charge of Civil Aviation, *Decision Relating to the Implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration Concerning the Liberalisation of Access to Air Transport Markets in Africa*, UNECA, November 14, 1999, http://www.afcac.org/en/documents/conferences/July2012/yde.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015).
9. Personal interview, Lusaka, September 2014; Amos Marawa, "Infrastructure Development," unpublished official COMESA document, Infrastructure

Development Directorate, 2010. *See also* InterVistas Consulting, *Transforming Intra-African Air Connectivity: The Economic Benefits of Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision*, International Air Transport Association (IATA), African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), and African Airlines Association (AFRAA), July 2014, https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/InterVISTAS_AfricaLiberalisation_FinalReport_July2014.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015).

10. Marawa, "Infrastructure Development."
11. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, *February 2011 Summit Report. See also* discussion on continental infrastructure in *SADC Today* (Botswana), May 2012, http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sadctoday/documents/v14n6.pdf (accessed February 20, 2015).
12. Marawa, "Infrastructure Development"; Chair of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Task Force (TTF), *COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Framework: State of Play*, February 2011, http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&id=581&Itemid=201 (accessed April 27, 2015), p. 2.
13. Chair of the TTF, *State of Play*, p. 2.
14. Ibid., p. 1.
15. Marawa, "Infrastructure Development."
16. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, *Final Communiqué of the Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government: Vision—Towards a Single Market; Theme—Deepening COMESA-EAC-SADC Integration*, October 22, 2008.
17. AU Commission, *Status of Integration in Africa (SIA IV)*, 2013, http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/SIA%202013%28latest%29_En.pdf (accessed June 9, 2015), p. 24.
18. Pravin Gordhan, "2013 Budget Speech," South African National Treasury, February 27, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2013/speech/speech.pdf (accessed June 8, 2015).
19. See "Partnering for Future Prosperity: Delivering Successful Infrastructure Projects to Create Globally Competitive South African Cities," *Deloitte*, August 2012, http://deloitteblog.co.za.www102.cpt1.host-h.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/How-do-SA-cities-increase-global-competitiveness-by-improving-their-physical-infrastructure.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015), p. 6.
20. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, *Communiqué of the Second COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit*, June 12, 2011.
21. Carlos Lopes, "Mega Trade Agreement a Step Forward for the Continent," UNECA, June 12, 2015, http://www.uneca.org/stories/mega-trade-agreement-step-forward-continent-%E2%80%93-carlos-lopes (accessed June 30, 2015).
22. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, "Tripartite Update: Trade and Customs Committee Ministers' Meeting," unpublished official document, February 9, 2015.
23. Personal interviews, Windhoek, August and September 2014.
24. Previous meetings of the Tripartite Trade and Customs Committee (TTCM) were held in November 2014 and January 2015.
25. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, "Tripartite Update."
26. SADC, "Tripartite Summit Kicks Off in Sharm El Sheik," June 9, 2015, http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/tripartite-summit-kicks-sharm-el-sheik/ (accessed July 2, 2015).
27. Although trade has been fully liberalized in the EAC, the community is still faced with extensive nontariff barriers. See EAC, *Status of Elimination of Non Tariff Barriers in the East African Community*, vol. 8, December 2014,

http://www.eac.int/trade/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=56&Itemid=132 (accessed April 27, 2015); European Commission, "The Eastern African Community (EAC)," Fact Sheet on the Economic Partnership Agreements, October 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/january/tradoc_142194.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015), p. 1.

28. Raimo Väyrynen, "Regionalism: Old and New," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 1 (2003), 25–51.
29. Prince Heto, "AGOA with Even More Teeth," Habari Network, February 18, 2015, http://www.thehabarinetwork.com/an-agoa-with-even-more-teeth (accessed March 4, 2015).
30. James T. Gathii, "African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes," *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 35, no. 3 (2010), 653.
31. Ibid., p. 653.
32. James T. Gathii, "Neo-liberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements," Albany Law School Legal Studies Research Paper no. 40 of 2010–11, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1775082 (accessed January 20, 2015), p. 16. See also Arvind Panagariya, "The Regionalism Debate: An Overview," *World Economy* 22, no. 4 (1999), 36.
33. The range 2005–13 has been chosen as the assessment period because it is the period for which the most accurate relevant data are available.
34. Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Convergence across States and Regions," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity no. 1 (1991), 112–13.
35. "COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Trade and Customs Committee Meeting," unpublished document, February 9, 2015.
36. Personal interview, Windhoek, August 2014.
37. Brendan Vickers, "South Africa's Economic Diplomacy in a Changing Global Order," in Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review*, vol. 1 (Johannesburg: Africa Institute of South Africa and Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012), pp. 112–38.
38. Ibid., pp. 129–30. See also Richard Gibb, "Southern Africa in Transition: Prospects and Problems Facing Regional Integration," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 2 (1998), 287–306.
39. Anthony J. Venables, "Regional Integration Agreements: A Force for Convergence or Divergence?," Policy Research Working Paper no. 2260, World Bank, December 1999, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-2260 (accessed February 20, 2015).
40. World Bank, "GDP (current US$)," http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed June 9, 2015).
41. "Fears of More Violence in Lesotho After Killing of Ex-Army Boss," *News24*, June 29, 2015, http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Fears-of-more-violence-in-Lesotho-after-killing-of-ex-army-boss-20150629 (accessed July 10, 2015).
42. "Platinum Miners in South Africa Go On Strike," *The Guardian* (London), January 23, 2014.
43. Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), "President Obama Removes Swaziland, Reinstates Madagascar for AGOA Benefits," press release, June 2014, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/June/President-Obama-removes-Swaziland-reinstates-Madagascar-for-AGOA-Benefits (accessed June 9, 2015).
44. Office of the USTR, "Swaziland," https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/swaziland (accessed June 9, 2015).

45. Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 41.
46. Jorge Iván Canales-Kriljenko, Farayi Gwenhamo, and Saji Thomas, "Inward and Outward Spillovers in the SACU Area," International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper no. WP/13/31, January 2013, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1331.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015). Data available from the South Africa Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) trade database at http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en (accessed April 27, 2015); and World Bank, "GDP."
47. Gathii, "African Regional Trade Agreements," pp. 648–53.
48. Panagariya, "The Regionalism Debate," p. 36.
49. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, *The World Trading System at Risk* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), cited in Gathii, "African Regional Trade Agreements," p. 657.
50. South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI), "Namibia Sticks to Its EPA Guns," December 18, 2012, http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/namibia-sticks-its-epa-guns (accessed October 12, 2013). See also Brendan Vickers, "SADC's International Trade Relations," in Charles Harvey (ed.), *Proceedings of the 2009 FOPRISA Annual Conference* (Gaborone: Lentswe la Lesedi, 2010), pp. 129–49.
51. Carolyn Jenkins and Lynne Thomas, "The Macroeconomic Policy Framework," in Carolyn Jenkins, Jonathan Leape, and Lynne Thomas (eds.), *Gaining from Trade in Southern Africa: Complementary Policies to Underpin the SADC Free Trade Area* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 24–57; Margaret Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2003), p. 217.
52. See Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), *South Africa in Southern Africa*, Erinvale Estate, South Africa, November 2012, http://www.ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/vol40_sa_in_southern_africa_8apr2013.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015), p. 25.
53. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*, pp. 16–21.
54. UN, *World Economic Situation 2015*, p. 112.
55. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, "Convergence across States," 112–13.
56. UN, *World Economic Situation 2015*, p. 112.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Personal interview, Windhoek, August 2014. For further reading on SACU debates, see Mills Soko, "The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Southern Africa," Notre Europe, Studies and Research no. 63, http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/etud63-regionalintegrationsouthernafrica-en.pdf?pdf=ok (accessed January 10, 2015).
60. Personal interview, Windhoek, August 2014
61. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, *Final Communiqué*, p. 3. See also Gathii, "African Regional Trade Agreements," p. 573.
62. COMESA, EAC, and SADC, *Memorandum of Understanding on Inter Regional Cooperation and Integration Amongst COMESA, EAC and SADC*, unpublished official document, COMESA Secretariat August 2014, p. 3.
63. European Union (EU), "Southern African Region and the EU Complete Negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement," July 22, 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1135 (accessed August 20, 2014).
64. Venables, "Regional Integration Agreements," p. 2.

65. Personal interview, Lusaka, August 2014.
66. Justin Malewezi, "Regional Integration: The Path to Prosperity?," in Christopher Clapham, Greg Mills, Anna Morner, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), *Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Comparative International Perspectives* (Cape Town: South African Institute for International Affairs [SAIIA], 2001), pp. 19–26.

Chapter 12

Region-Building in West Africa

Said Adejumobi

Introduction

Conflicts and civil wars were a major part of the political landscape of the African continent in the 1980s and 1990s.[1] In West Africa, there were major conflicts in Liberia from 1989 to 2003 and in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 that were infamous for their scale, level of destruction, and brutality. Those conflicts precipitated the growth of war economies that exacerbated the security challenges of the subregion. With those wars, West Africa was turned into a haven for mercenaries, disguised behind the elegant label of "private military companies," who were basically soldiers of fortune profiteering from the misery and suffering of West Africa's people. As David Francis noted, "The involvement in the regionalized war economy of all the warring factions, who exploit the dysfunctional formal economy, the shifting alliances during armed conflict, and the long-standing regional political affiliations and informal commercial networks, all create the firm impression of a 'bad neighbourhood.'"[2] This perception of a dangerous neighborhood led some analysts to classify West Africa as a "failed region," the epicenter of the "coming anarchy," which was of grave strategic danger to the rest of the world.[3]

Given this context, peace and security became an imperative that defined the modus operandi and dynamics of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from the end of the twentieth century into the twenty-first. The logic is self-evident: without peace, security, and a stable political environment, economic cooperation and integration cannot be consummated. As articulated in the 2012 ECOWAS annual report, "Political instability hinders regional integration efforts. In this respect, problems, especially those that degenerate into armed conflicts, strongly disrupt production systems and the marketing of products, and thus hamper efforts to promote intra-regional trade and mobility of factors of production."[4]

ECOWAS has invested a large chunk of its political capital and resources in the process of regional peace-building in West Africa, which constitutes the foundation of regional integration for the subregion. Political cooperation in the realms of peace, security, and governance has in fact provided a new approach to facilitating regional integration and region-building in West Africa. A new cooperative ethos seems to have evolved across the political divides of language, colonial history, and culture—stemming especially from peace operations of the regional body, whose relative success has created a new sense of identity and common purpose for the 15 member states of ECOWAS (see figure 12.1)—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and their people. A bond of care, support, and reciprocity, especially in times of need, has fostered a regional identity among ECOWAS member states.

This chapter investigates the changing landscape, which has shifted from a "dangerous neighborhood" to one with a collective ethos of peace-building. It examines the basis, dynamics, and realities of the shift; the legal, policy, and institutional architecture constructed to facilitate it; and the challenges confronted and opportunities created.

This chapter starts by providing a brief history of the genesis of ECOWAS, including the way in which concern for security was one of the major driving forces in its formation. I then turn to the normative and institutional framework developed to promote security, human rights, democracy, and good governance

Figure 12.1 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Source: Based on Central Intelligence Agency (US), "Africa", in *World Factbook* 2013–14, 2013.

in the region. Next, I discuss some of the successes and failures of ECOWAS in the arenas of security and good governance, and argue that the strategy of political investment in peace, security, and governance issues is a project that ECOWAS needs to nurture and consolidate if the goal of regional economic cooperation and integration is ever to be realized. Finally, I conclude that ECOWAS will have to seek the right balance between economic and political region-building, as these aspects of region-building are mutually reinforcing and complementary.

In this chapter, peace-building is conceptualized from a political economy perspective that focuses on the intervention, preventive, and structural approaches to promoting peace and political stability in the region. However, the emphasis in the chapter is more on the political dimension than on the economic.

The Formation of ECOWAS: The Security Imperative

ECOWAS was established on May 28, 1975, with the goal of creating a free trade area (FTA). It was to do this through promoting economic cooperation and development for its member states in all fields of economic activity: the elimination of trade and nontrade barriers, including disparate customs duties and charges; the erection of a common and harmonized customs regime; the removal of administrative and qualitative restrictions on trade; the removal of border restrictions; and the creation of a conducive environment for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. In addition, the organization was to promote the harmonization of monetary, agricultural, economic, and industrial policies; create a special fund for cooperation, compensation, and development; address uneven development among member states; and reward countries that were economic losers from the FTA or the regional integration process, in either the short or the long term.

The impetus for the formation of a new regional grouping came primarily from Nigeria, joined by Togo. Nigeria and Togo had close economic and political ties dating back to the early 1960s, benefiting from the cordial relationship between their two leaders—Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Sylvanus Olympio, respectively—after the Nigerian civil war. The strong push for the formation of ECOWAS was initiated by Adebayo Adedeji, Nigeria's minister for economic development and reconstruction, who proposed the idea of ECOWAS at a meeting between Nigeria's head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, and Togo's president, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, in April 1972 (see also chapter 3 in this volume). Between then and January 1975, when the draft treaty for the formation of ECOWAS was considered and adopted in Monrovia, Liberia, several ministerial meetings and consultations were held. On May 28, 1975, 11 heads of state and four high-level country representatives converged in Lagos, Nigeria, to sign the ECOWAS treaty. In the communiqué issued at the end of the signing event, the signatories affirmed their determination to make ECOWAS a "pragmatic, dynamic, and effective institution, which will take into account the realities prevailing in member states."[5]

In the literature, economic arguments have largely dominated the rationale for the formation of ECOWAS. Some argue that the cross-cutting challenges of poverty and economic dependence, the emergent economic crisis of the early 1970s driven by oil shocks, the lack of adequate support from Western nations for the economies of West Africa, and the success of the European Union (EU) at regional integration were key motivations for the establishment of ECOWAS.[6] While those reasons may be correct, there was also a major political-cum-security logic behind Nigeria's relentless and decisive push for the formation of ECOWAS.

Undoubtedly, Nigeria's political and security interests were largely powered by an economic strategy, at a time when Nigeria was reveling in petro dollars from the oil boom of the early 1970s. While political and security issues may not have featured in the text of the 1975 ECOWAS treaty, they were no less important than economics in driving the formation of ECOWAS, as would unfold during later events.

Regional security was a major concern for West Africa's leaders and was one of the major driving forces in the formation of ECOWAS, as pushed for by Nigeria in the 1970s after the Nigerian civil war. In 1967, a few years after Nigeria's independence, the eastern region of Nigeria seceded as the Republic of Biafra, which sparked a bloody three-year civil war. The enormity and intensity of the conflict was in part a result of its globalization, with France and South Africa involved militarily and economically in support of the Republic of Biafra, and the British, Chinese, and Soviets supporting federal Nigeria. As Ali Mazrui notes, it was a "world war in microcosm, without the nuclear factor."[7] The international community's involvement in Nigeria's affairs may have been linked to the possibility of having ready access to Nigeria's natural resources, especially oil.

Reeling from the pains of the civil war, in which the Nigerian government suddenly realized that it did not command the support of all of its neighbors (some of them, such as Côte d'Ivoire, oscillated between indifference and support to the rebels), Nigeria adopted a new strategic regional security policy in which West Africa became the nucleus of its security engagement, tying Nigeria's security to that of the subregion. The new approach saw Nigeria using soft power and material incentives to woo its neighbors, as a confidence-building measure aimed at promoting regional security. Francis captures it poignantly:

> The Biafran civil war of 1967–70 and the role played by neighbouring countries, in particular, how they were used by extra-regional actors and powers as a staging post for support to the secessionist group [drove Nigeria to take a leadership role in West Africa]. This was viewed by the government as an attempt to "balkanise" the country, and it led to the realisation that the national security of Nigeria cannot be divorced from regional security and stability. It marked an important turning point in the political history of the country as it led to a paradigm shift in its post-independence foreign and security policy from "isolationism" to "intervention" in regional affairs. The post-civil war foreign policy therefore focused on three inter-related levels, i.e. promotion of regional security and stability through regional co-operation and integration, and leadership roles in African and international affairs. An important consideration was the intrusive role of France and the power politics with Nigeria for the dominance and control of West Africa. *The motivation for the creation of ECOWAS was therefore to provide an instrument to promote Nigeria's foreign and security policy in West Africa as well as to limit the role of France in the sub-region, a region considered by Nigeria as its political, strategic and economic sphere of influence.*[8]

Nigeria provided interest-free loans and grants to West African countries. It also financed projects like power, roads, and telecommunications in the region. According to Okoi Arikpo, former Nigerian minister of external affairs, within a few years after the civil war, Nigeria concluded trade deals and signed agreements with seven neighboring countries in the subregion, air-services agreements with five, and economic cooperation agreements with another five. Nigeria established telecommunication links with five countries, and joint customs posts with three. Cash grants worth about $6 million (at the time) were given to eight countries, while Niger benefited from donations of grain and foodstuffs worth over $1.5 million.[9]

The Legal and Policy Framework of the Regional Peace Project

The legal and policy frameworks of the regional peace agenda for ECOWAS have four important aspects. First, the instruments were created mainly as reactions to specific situations, and are therefore ad hoc in nature and evolved gradually over time. Second, they are cumulative and progressive in nature, forming a consolidated whole. Third, they explore military and political options for promoting regional peace in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way. Fourth, a structural and long-term view is adopted in addressing the challenge of conflicts and insecurity in the region, which establishes the interconnections between poor governance and conflict and the need to address the underlying governance issues confronted by member states.

Four major policy documents define the regional peace project of ECOWAS: the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty[10]; the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (the "conflict prevention protocol")[11]; the 2001 Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (the "supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance")[12]; and the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework.[13] Figure 12.2 depicts the interrelationships between these documents.

The Revised ECOWAS Treaty

The ground norm for a regional peace project is set by the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty. The Revised Treaty, while acknowledging the organization's objective of promoting economic cooperation and integration leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa, makes explicit commitment to a set of political principles and goals, as the fundamental basis of its integration agenda. The Revised Treaty commits parties to the "promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State as envisaged in the declaration of political principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991" and the "promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights."[14]



Figure 12.2 ECOWAS normative framework for peace-building

In addition, it commits member states to the peaceful settlement of disputes, active collaboration between neighboring countries, and promotion of a peaceful environment—all prerequisites for economic development. Issues of accountability, economic and social justice, and popular participation are also given priority in the Revised Treaty. The Revised Treaty therefore establishes a symbiotic linkage between the maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security and economic cooperation and development in the subregion. The Revised Treaty also establishes some new structures, like the Community Parliament and Court, which are central to popular participation in decision-making and the adjudication of disputes among member states in the subregion.

The Conflict Prevention Protocol

The 1999 conflict prevention protocol provides the operational framework for the ECOWAS peace agenda. Its objective is to prevent, manage, and resolve internal and interstate conflicts; strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, cross-border crime, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), antipersonnel mines, and international terrorism; promote cooperation among member states in the areas of peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy; and promote the formulation and implementation of policies on corruption and money laundering.

There are two key aspects of this protocol. First, it outlines the key institutions and their mandates that are involved in conflict resolution and peace operations in the subregion, including the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Second, it sets the interface between military and political aspects of the ECOWAS peace-building agenda in West Africa. The document has provisions for preventive diplomacy and democracy promotion initiatives, although to a limited extent for the latter.

Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance

The 2001 supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance constitutes the normative framework for the ECOWAS democracy promotion agenda. The protocol, enacted at a time when democracy was evolving as the "new game in town" in sub-Saharan Africa, introduced radical changes in the regional governance landscape. Its constitutional convergence principles set new parameters and standards for democratic conduct by member states in the subregion. These include emphasis on the principle of separation of powers among the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judiciary); accession to power through free, fair, transparent, and credible elections and zero tolerance for coups and unconstitutional seizures of power; popular participation in decision-making; depoliticization and professionalization of the military and civilian control of the armed forces; neutrality of the state in religion; nondiscrimination in state policies on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or gender; observance of human rights and the rule of law; open political space and civil liberties, including freedom of expression, association, and thought; freedom of the press; and freedom for political parties and a level playing field among all political parties, including access to electoral resources provided by the state. The supplementary protocol sets new standards and parameters by which democracy and governance were to be conducted in member states including on the conduct of elections and the broad rules to guide them.

The Conflict Prevention Framework

The 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework provides coherence and coordination to the normative and operational structure of the ECOWAS conflict prevention agenda, and seeks to consolidate it in a comprehensive document. The short-term goal of the strategy is to create space within the ECOWAS system and in member states for cooperative interaction within the region and with external partners, and to push conflict prevention and peace-building higher on the political agenda of member states. This will allow member states to take timely and targeted multiactor and multidimensional intervention to defuse or eliminate potential and real threats to human security in a predictable and institutionalized manner. The Framework's long-term objective is to "strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa."[15]

The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework adds value in some important respects. It provides a consolidated frame for the normative texts of the ECOWAS peace-building project, and addresses the problem from a multisectoral angle. Also, it introduces the dimension of human security into the discourse on conflict prevention and peace-building in ECOWAS strategy. It does this by linking the economic, social, and military dimensions of security together as key components of human security for citizens.

The Institutional Architecture

ECOWAS has evolved an elaborate institutional architecture, developed gradually since the 1990s. These institutions support ECOWAS in achieving its regional peace-building project premised on security and good governance. Figure 12.3 shows ECOWAS' peace-building structure.

ECOWAS' peace-building architecture involves both political and technical organs. At the political level, the organs descend in a hierarchical way, led by the Authority of Heads of State and Government, which makes broad policy decisions on issues of peace, security, and development.

The Mediation and Security Council (MSC), established by the conflict prevention protocol, enjoys delegated power from the Authority. It has powers to act on all matters relating to conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, security, humanitarian support, peace-building, cross-border crime, and the proliferation of SALW. The MSC is composed of representatives from nine member states; seven of them are elected by the Authority of Heads of State and Government, while the other two are the current and immediately previous chairs of the Authority.[16] Their term of office is two years, on a renewable basis.

The Council of the Wise (previously called the Council of Elders) is a body of elder statespersons, appointed by the president of the ECOWAS Commission, that deals with mediation and conciliation in conflict situations and assists with preventive diplomacy in crises or perceived crisis situations. The body has also been quite useful in the process of election monitoring in member states, such as in Ghana and Senegal in 2012.



Figure 12.3 ECOWAS institutional architecture for peace-building

The ECOWAS Parliament, established in 2000, though largely a consultative and advisory body, has evolved as part of the institutional architecture of ECOWAS for peace-building. It monitors the democracy and governance trends in member states and provides advice on areas of concern that affect the peace and stability of the region, as it did in Guinea-Bissau and Mali in 2012.

The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, established in 2001, has evolved as another major anchor in the ECOWAS peace architecture. Between 2004 and 2013, the court decided 71 cases.[17]

The technical and operational organs of the ECOWAS peace-building architecture include the Defence and Security Commission (DSC), ECOMOG, and the ECOWAS Early Warning System (ECOWARN) (see figure 12.3). The DSC formulates the mandate of peacekeeping forces, determines their terms of reference, appoints force commanders, and determines contingent composition; it was established through the conflict prevention protocol and first met in Accra in July 2000.[18] ECOMOG is the armed operational organ of ECOWAS, consisting mostly of military and police personnel deployed to keep or enforce peace in desperate conflict situations or civil wars.

The 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty requires that members states "establish a regional peace and security observation system," and the 1999 Conflict Prevention Protocol set out the mandate of ECOWARN in more detail.[19] ECOWARN, which began operating in 2003, is managed by the Observation and Monitoring Centre, based at the ECOWAS Commission, but has four zonal offices, located in Banjul (Gambia), Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Monrovia (Liberia).[20] The function of the zonal offices is to gather, analyze, and interpret data on causes, trends, triggers, and possibilities of conflict in member states. The work of the center is complemented by that of a civil society organization, the West African Network for Peace (WANEP), which has a liaison office in the ECOWAS Commission and offers training on conflict indicators and early warning systems. WANEP uses civil society networks to access information and data on early warning, which it makes available to the ECOWAS Commission.

The ECOWAS Election Assistance and Monitoring Facility is anchored at the Electoral Assistance Unit in the Department of Political Affairs of the ECOWAS Commission. The Facility monitors electoral processes for compliance with the provisions of the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance. It supports member states in capacity development on electoral matters and assists them in conducting successful elections.

The Peace-Building Arenas

The ECOWAS peace-building project comprises both operational and structural interventions. The operational aspect involves the deployment of ECOMOG to keep the peace in conflict situations. The structural part involves preventive diplomacy through mediation and conciliation, and enhancing the culture and practice of democracy through strengthening the electoral process and election monitoring. Structurally, ECOWAS also works to increase the capacity of democratic institutions, including human rights and anticorruption bodies. These two major arenas of the ECOWAS peace project are not mutually exclusive; often they are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Indeed, ECOWAS uses mediation and conciliation within the context of military deployments or during electoral processes.

Liberia and Sierra Leone

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are perhaps the most notable of the peace activities of ECOWAS. They have generated visibility and controversy, and recorded both successes and setbacks. ECOWAS has deployed peacekeeping troops in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and Sierra Leone.[21] The genealogy of those interventions often lay in intense political conflicts and civil wars, which were unmanageable by national governments and which threatened the security not only of the countries concerned but also of the region in general. In most if not in all cases, these conflicts were rooted in bad governance: the monopoly of power by an individual or group; resource misappropriation; marginalization and persecution of groups and communities, especially minority groups; noninclusive citizenship; economic inequalities; or mass poverty.

Liberia was the test case for ECOWAS military peace operations. Unbridled misrule by successive governments in Liberia escalated with the inept regime of President Samuel Doe (formerly a Sergeant in the national army), setting the stage for a political conflagration in the country.[22] By 1989, outright civil war with the insurgency led by Charles Taylor was inevitable. In order to address the looming crisis in Liberia at that time, ECOWAS established the Standing Mediation Committee with a mandate to facilitate the settlement of disputes in member states.

As the situation deteriorated, President Doe made a formal request for support to ECOWAS, which promptly led to the establishment and deployment of ECOMOG in the country. ECOMOG operations in Liberia were very complex, spanning both civil wars. They were later complemented by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL was at the time the largest UN peacekeeping operation ever deployed in any country, with an initial authorized strength of 15,000 military personnel.[23]

The situation in Liberia had negative effects on neighboring Sierra Leone as it plunged into its own civil war in early 1991. The causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone were similar to those in Liberia, with political mismanagement and bad governance as prime factors.[24] The civil war in Sierra Leone continued for over a decade, eventually ending on January 11, 2002. ECOMOG was instrumental in restoring peace to Sierra Leone.

It is important to note that ECOWAS was not only a peacekeeper or enforcer in conflict situations but also a major guarantor and facilitator of peace in those countries. Between 1990 and 1997, there were no fewer than 13 ECOWAS-sponsored peace negotiations on Liberia.[25] The eventual Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of August 8, 2003, signed in Accra, Ghana, among the warring parties and major political stakeholders in the country, was largely negotiated by ECOWAS. The CPA reflected major elements of the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, emphasizing respect for human rights and the rule of law, freedom of association, credible elections, and freedom for political parties.

ECOWAS did not abandon Liberia even after the peace agreement. It accompanied the country through the implementation of the agreement, including the establishment of a transitional government led by Gyude Bryant, active financial and technical support to the transitional government, creation of all necessary political institutions to facilitate the transition process including the electoral commission, mobilization of international support for the country through the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), and active support in organizing elections.[26] Mohamed Ibn Chambas, then ECOWAS executive secretary, a politically suave Ghanaian diplomat, deployed a special representative to Liberia and established an office there. In addition, a special mediator, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, former president of Nigeria, was appointed for the Liberian peace process. His role proved decisive in negotiating peace during the turbulent general elections of October and November 2005.

West Africa's High-Level State Servants as Mediators

In the realm of diplomatic mediation and conciliation, ECOWAS has had mixed results. Liberia, for example, was a huge success story, but the same cannot be said of Guinea-Bissau, Niger, or Mali.

In Liberia, the negotiation of peace and the success of the 2005 elections were largely due to the diplomatic skills of the ECOWAS mediators. During the 2005 presidential runoff in Liberia, tensions were high, especially between the two major political parties and their leaders—the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), led by famous Liberian footballer George Weah, and the Unity Party, led by incumbent President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Weah led in the first round of the presidential elections but fell short of the majority (50 percent plus one vote) required to be declared president.

Hence there was a need for runoff elections. The second round was filled with acrimony, tension, and intense allegations. A relapse into conflict was imminent. Abubakar's negotiation skills made all the difference between war and peace during the November runoff. The ECOWAS mediator succeeded in persuading Weah to accept his loss to Sirleaf.[27] As George Kieh summed it up, "ECOWAS employed three major modes of peace-making—'good offices,' negotiation and mediation—as the pillar[s] of its peacemaking efforts."[28]

However, in Niger in 2009, the ECOWAS mediation team, led by Sirleaf and including Abubakar (as chief mediator) and Chambas, could not get President Mamadou Tandja to reconsider his move of tampering with the constitution for selfish political motives. Tandja was eventually removed from power through a coup on February 18, 2010. The military junta that seized power quickly organized a transition program, and the April 2011 elections returned the country to civilian rule. In recognition of the mediatory role of ECOWAS in its crisis, the Nigerien government conferred the country's highest national honor on

Abubakar in April 2014, on the occasion of the country's fiftieth independence anniversary celebrations.[29]

Electoral support and monitoring constitutes a major front on which ECOWAS promotes a democratic ethos as a structural element of peace-building. Countries including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone have benefited from ECOWAS electoral assistance, while virtually all member states have had their elections scrutinized and certified by ECOWAS. Prior to elections, a fact-finding mission is deployed to assess the electoral process and its credibility. The mission, often led by a prominent West African citizen, reports to the president of the ECOWAS Commission, who is to take prompt action on the report. For example, the ECOWAS Election Observer Team to the 2007 Nigerian general elections was led by Sir Dawda Jawara, former president of Gambia; the 2012 Ghanaian election observer team was led by Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria; and the 2013 general elections in Mali were observed by a team led by John Kufuor, former president of Ghana. The postconflict elections in Sierra Leone, especially the 2007 and 2012 elections, received significant support from ECOWAS. In the 2007 elections, ECOWAS provided human, material, and logistical support to the government and deployed over 150 election monitors. ECOWAS support for the electoral process proved decisive in its huge success.[30]

It is important to note that the ECOWAS verdict on elections of its member states is not usually patronizing but rather critical and fairly objective. ECOWAS election observation missions do not always endorse the elections or share the views of the government or the electoral commission. For example, in the case of the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire in October 2010, ECOWAS was firm and decisive in its position that the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, had lost the elections to Allasane Ouattara, against the verdict of the Constitutional Court, which affirmed that Gbagbo won the elections with 51 percent of the vote. This position was based on the presidential election results released by the electoral commission, which ECOWAS considered credible and reflective of the wishes of the Ivorian people. The firm stand taken by ECOWAS paved the way for the recognition by the African Union (AU), UN, and EU of the results of the elections as announced by the electoral commission.

In Niger, ECOWAS denounced the sham referendum and legislative elections organized by President Tandja in August and October 2009, respectively, as violating the provisions of the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, which forbids member states, during the six-month period prior to elections, from altering either the electoral law or the constitutional provisions relating to elections. Tandja, through constitutional amendments, sought to remove presidential term limits in order to allow himself to run for a third term in office, just like President Abdoulaye Wade sought to do in Senegal in 2012. ECOWAS publicly denounced both attempts.

In keeping with the provisions of the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, ECOWAS frowns on unconstitutional changes of government in member states and reacts with sanctions appropriately. Unprocedural changes of government are potentially destabilizing, and hence inimical to the object of peace and stability in member states. In this regard, ECOWAS overturned military coups in Sierra Leone (1998), Guinea-Bissau (2003), and Togo (2005) and also imposed sanctions after military coups in Guinea (2008), Niger (2010), and Mali (2012).[31] ECOWAS has been firm with member states in this respect.

In its efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, ECOWAS has created networks of national human rights institutions, anticorruption bodies, and forums where political parties in the subregion can share information and experiences, find solutions to common problems, reinforce their capacity, and improve performance. Currently, the organization is undertaking a capacity-gap assessment of political parties in West Africa, together with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which will be used to design a capacity support mechanism for political parties in the subregion. In addition, ECOWAS is providing technical and capacity support to those regional networks it has established. The logic behind this strategy is that if human rights can be well protected, corruption reduced, and political parties made to function properly, the democratic growth and institutionalization necessary for promoting peace, stability, security, and economic development in West Africa will have taken firm root in member states.

The Weak Link: Economic Region Building

It is in the areas of economic cooperation and development through regional economic integration that the performance of ECOWAS has been relatively unimpressive. The object of a free trade area has been promoted with the launching of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) in 1990 and the Common External Tariff in 2008, among other far-reaching policy measures undertaken. However, intraregional trade remains low, at about 11 percent of total trade in 2013 (although informal cross-border trade, largely undocumented, is estimated to far exceed formal cross-border trade).[32] Nontrade barriers continue to hinder commercial activities in the subregion. For instance, while the Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment (1979) is operational, with no fewer than 11 countries using the same ECOWAS standard for national passports, and with ECOWAS travel documents being issued in all member states, administrative barriers erected by immigration, customs, and other security agencies (especially at land border posts) hinder the free movement of persons, goods, and services in the subregion. Corruption and poor administrative governance characterize the activities of agencies at the border posts in most countries, reducing formal trade flows and activities. Also, West Africa's regional transport facilities and networks are some of the worst on the continent.[33] Road infrastructure is abysmal, and road connectivity is awful, to the detriment of intraregional trade performance. Trade relations are still mostly vertical, with Western and Asian countries, rather than intraregional.[34]

Progress made in the area of financial and monetary integration has been rather slow and fragmented. There are parallel structures and processes within the subregion on monetary cooperation and integration. On the one hand, in

1994, eight French-speaking West African countries established the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), building on a common French heritage in their legal and administrative systems. These countries have maintained a common currency (the Communauté Financière Africaine [CFA] franc), a common monetary policy, and a common central bank. On the other hand, the non-WAEMU countries are trying to establish a West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), which could merge with WAEMU to form a single monetary zone by 2020, using a new common currency (the Eco).[35] The launching of the WAMZ has been postponed three times (in 2003, 2005, and 2009), and was rescheduled for January 1, 2015 (a missed deadline). The various ECOWAS institutions—the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)—have been tasked with supporting the harmonization of policies of member states to achieve this goal.

ECOWAS has taken notable steps in promoting private sector development in the subregion. The ECOWAS Investment Guarantee Agency (EIGA) has completed its feasibility study and is about to be established. Also in progress are the Credit Risk Database and the ECOWAS Policy Framework for Private Sector Development and Investment Promotion. In addition, there has been a tremendous upsurge in intraregional private sector investment in West Africa, especially in the banking sector. Banks, mostly Nigerian, have established local branches across the subregion. Some transnational manufacturing firms are also taking advantage of the liberalized regional economic environment to reposition or relocate their investment portfolios in the subregion in a way that will maximize their production and profits. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), 11 of the 12 companies that have market capitalization of over $1 billion in the ECOWAS region are Nigerian companies (7 of these are in the banking sector), and 44 of the 50 largest companies in West Africa are also Nigerian.[36]

However, ECOWAS member states still have modest growth rates, averaging about 7 percent in 2013.[37] Member states are mostly low-income countries, and the region still has one of the highest overall rates of poverty in the world. Nigeria, the region's strongest economy, had a population of 170 million people and a gross domestic product (GDP) of $510 billion in 2014. This equates to an average per capita income of $3,000 per year. But the country's wealth is highly unequally distributed: 130 million Nigerians (60 percent of the total population), mainly in rural areas, lived below the poverty line (on less than $1 per day) as of 2014.[38] Youth unemployment in the region is remarkably high, constituting a potential ticking time bomb for social and political implosion. ECOWAS efforts in this regard have been quite minimal, if visible at all.

Conclusion: Back to the Future

ECOWAS has made remarkable efforts at promoting peace, security, and stability and has recorded notable successes in this regard. It has succeeded in altering the trajectory of the region, away from its trend of becoming a "dangerous neighborhood" and toward a path of collective responsibility, security, and shared peace. However, despite this progress, peace and political stability remain tenuous in many West African countries.

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the insecurity and violence in the Sahel that collapsed democratic rule in Mali are stark reminders of the vulnerability of West Africa to instability and conflict. Indeed, 5 ECOWAS member states (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Nigeria) featured in the top 20 fragile states in the 2014 index compiled by the Fund for Peace.[39] Despite the huge political investments made in peace promotion, the current situation is intolerable.

For ECOWAS to ensure durable peace and stability in the region, it must address the internal and external aspects of conflict. The internal dimension is about how ECOWAS manages its peace project. First, thorough strategic planning and political capacity are needed, including contingency planning for peace operations. The early warning system must be significantly scaled up from a mundane approach of data collection through newspaper, radio, and Internet sources to include sophisticated scenario casting and rigorous conflict projection analysis and forecasting. The reports of the early warning system should promptly feed into the ECOWAS policy process for immediate consideration and action. Also, ECOWAS peace operations through ECOMOG, as noted by Victoria Holt and Moira Shanahan, have faced challenges relating to systematic operational planning and analysis.[40] Information gathering has not been centralized, chains of command and control are often diffused between field commanders and the defense ministries of troop-contributing countries, and financial resources have been erratic and unpredictable. These challenges require that ECOWAS adopt a strategic approach to its peacekeeping and enforcement operations.

Second, the ECOWAS Commission does not have sufficient capacity in critical areas of its peace project. The commission is grossly understaffed and overworked, leaving little time for strategic thinking. ECOWAS needs to substantially increase its staffing in political affairs, peace, security, and early warning. Third, ECOWAS needs to move away from an ad hoc and reactive approach to a more comprehensive, proactive, and tactical approach.

On the external front, the configuration of politics and power in ECOWAS member states deserves closer scrutiny by the organization. Patterns of concentration, control, and use of power (including the distribution of scarce resources) remain a major challenge, making politics a "do or die" situation in many countries and fueling violence. In its democracy-promotion efforts, ECOWAS need to address the challenge of democratic deficits, which include the legacy of authoritarian behavior by political leaders, manipulation of term-limit clauses in constitutions, the existence of unequal electoral playing fields that advantage ruling parties, and the illegal use of state resources for electoral purposes.

Security sector reform must be part of the institutional reengineering for many countries, especially those emerging from wars and moving into postconflict periods. ECOWAS need to undertake a dedicated push to implement the provisions of its supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, and promote a regional policy on good economic governance.

ECOWAS can only go as far as its member states want it to go, and can only be what they want it to be. The challenges faced by ECOWAS are a reflection of the character of its member states and their governance systems. Internal political reordering in member states is necessary if ECOWAS is to avoid a permanent cycle of political firefighting across the subregion. Political investment in peace, security, and governance issues is a worthwhile project, and a necessity for ECOWAS. It must continue to nurture and consolidate peace if the goal of regional economic cooperation and integration is ever to become effective. ECOWAS will need to seek the right balance between its economic and political region-building goals, and streamline both to be mutually reinforcing and complementary. The ultimate dividend of economic and political integration will be an improvement in the social livelihood of the people. If poverty and social deprivation continue to ravage ECOWAS member states, peace and stability will remain under constant threat in the subregion.

Notes

1. The views expressed in this chapter are personal and in no way reflect the views and positions of either the United Nations (UN) or the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).
2. David Francis, "Peacekeeping in a Bad Neighbourhood: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Peace and Security in West Africa," *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9, no. 3 (2009), 91.
3. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic*, February 1, 1994.
4. ECOWAS Commission, *2012 Annual Report*, p. 102.
5. Ralph I. Onwuka, *Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of the Economic Community of West African States* (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1980), p. 75.
6. See, for example, Charles Ukeje, "From Economic Cooperation to Collective Security: ECOWAS and the Changing Imperatives of Sub-regionalism in West Africa," in Charles Ukeje and Alade W. Fawole (eds.), *The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship, and Conflict* (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa [CODESRIA], 2005), pp. 141–2; Julius Okolo, "Integrative and Cooperative Federalism: The Economic Community of West African States," *International Organization* 39, no. 1 (1985), 121–53; E. C. Edozien and Eghosa Osagie (eds.), *The Economic Integration of West Africa* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1982).
7. Ali A. Mazrui, "Introduction," in Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji (eds.), *General History of Africa VIII: Africa Since 1935* (London: Heinemann, 1993), p. 12.
8. Francis, "Peacekeeping in a Bad Neighbourhood," p. 104 (emphasis added).
9. Okoi Arikpo, "Nigeria and the Organisation of African Unity," *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* 1, no. 1 (1975), 8–9.
10. ECOWAS, *Treaty of ECOWAS*, adopted July 24, 1993, entered into force August 23, 1995, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/?id=treaty&lang=en (accessed December 10, 2014).
11. ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping, and Security*, adopted December 10, 1999, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/?id=ap101299 (accessed December 10, 2014).
12. ECOWAS, *Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,*

Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, adopted December 21, 2001, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/protocoles/Protocol%20on%20good-governance-and-democracy-rev-5EN.pdf (accessed December 10, 2014).

13. ECOWAS, *The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework*, Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08, promulgated January 16, 2008, http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014).
14. ECOWAS, *Treaty of ECOWAS*, arts 4(g) and 4(j). See also African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, adopted June 1981, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr (accessed December 17, 2014).
15. ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework*, p. 11.
16. ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, art. 8.
17. See Community Court of Justice, "List of Decided Cases from 2004 Till Date," ECOWAS, http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157&Itemid=27 (accessed December 12, 2014).
18. ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, arts 18–19; ECOWAS, "Executive Secretary's Report: Report 2000: Chapter II—Implementation of the Community Work Programme: IV. Regional Peace and Security," http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=es-rep2000-3-4&lang=en (accessed December 10, 2014), para. 357.
19. ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Treaty*, art. 58(f); ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, Chapter IV.
20. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), "ECOWARN," http://www.wanep.org/wanep/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=59&Itemid=99 (accessed December 10, 2014).
21. For discussions of the extensive security involvement of ECOWAS in West Africa, see, for example, Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Kwesi Aning and Sarjoh Bah, "ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats," New York University Center on International Cooperation, September 2009, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=kwesi_aning (accessed December 12, 2014); Francis, "Peacekeeping in a Bad Neighbourhood"; Thomas Jaye, Dauda Garuba, and Stella Amadi (eds.), *ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-Building* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2011); Dossou David Zounmenou and Reine Sylvie Loua, "Confronting Complex Political Crises in West Africa: An Analysis of ECOWAS Responses to Niger and Côte D'Ivoire," Institute for Security Studies (ISS) paper no. 230, December 2011, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper230.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014); Margaret Vogt (ed.), *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping* (Lagos: Gabumo, 1992).
22. Despite the fact that Liberia was founded in 1822 and declared its independence in 1847, the country has suffered from bad governance until recently. In the latter part of the twentieth century and the early part of the twenty-first, from the rule of William Tubman (1944–71) to Samuel Doe (1980–90) to Charles Taylor (1997–2003), the common denominators had been corruption, aggrandisement of power for the rulers, and poverty for the people. For details on the Liberian crisis, see Said Adejumobi, "Reviving a Failed State: The 2005 General Elections in Liberia," *Journal of African Elections* 5, no. 1 (2006), 126–51.

23. S/RES/1509 (2003), Resolution 1509 on Liberia, adopted by the United Nations Security Council at its 4830th meeting, September 19, 2003, op. para. 1.
24. From its independence, Sierra Leone was characterized by what Alfred Zack-Williams calls "the politics of decline," which constituted the prelude to civil war in the country. Alfred B. Zack-Williams, "Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–1998," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1999), 143–62. See also Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 2 (1998), 203–35; William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
25. Adejumobi, "Reviving a Failed State," 133; Rena L. Scott, "Moving from Impunity to Accountability in Post-War Liberia: Possibilities, Cautions, and Challenges," *International Journal of Legal Information* 33, no. 3 (2005), 377.
26. The members of the ICGL were the AU, the EU, ECOWAS, the UN, Britain, France, Germany, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and the United States.
27. Adejumobi, "Reviving a Failed State."
28. George Klay Kieh Jr., *Liberia's State Failure, Collapse, and Reconstitution* (Cherry Hill: Africana Homestead Legacy, 2012), p. 216.
29. See "Niger Honours ECOWAS Mediation Team," Panapress, August 10, 2012, http://www.panapress.com/Niger-honours-ECOWAS-mediation-team---12-838462-100-lang2-index.html (accessed December 12, 2014).
30. I was one of the leaders of the ECOWAS Technical Observer Election Monitoring mission to Sierra Leone, in my capacity as governance adviser to the ECOWAS Commission.
31. See Aning and Bah, "ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention," p. 4 (mentioning coups through 2005).
32. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Economic Development in Africa Report 2013: Intra-African Trade—Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism*, UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2013, 2013, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014), pp. 17–19.
33. African Development Bank (AfDB), *Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa, 2011–2015*, March 2011, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/RISP%20for%20West%20Africa%20-%20REV%202.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014), pp. 8–9.
34. UNCTAD, *Economic Development*.
35. AfDB, *Regional Integration Strategy*, p. 2; ECOWAS Commission, *2012 Annual Report*, p. 16.
36. AfDB, *Regional Integration Strategy*, p. 7.
37. "West Africa Witnesses 7% Economic Growth Rate—ECOWAS," *Premium Times*, September 23, 2013, http://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/145299-west-africa-witnesses-7-economic-growth-rate-ecowas.html (accessed December 12, 2014).
38. See Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), *Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa*, Cape Town, South Africa, October 2014, http://www.ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/vol49_region_building_29sep2014.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014), p. 25.
39. Fund for Peace, "Fragile States Index 2014," 2014, http://ffp.statesindex.org (accessed December 12, 2014).
40. Victoria K. Holt with Moira K. Shanahan, *African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*, Stimson Center, February 2005, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/African_Capacity-building.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014), pp. 38–40.

Chapter 13

Region-Building in Central Africa

René Lemarchand

Introduction

Nowhere on the African continent is the gap between aspiration and achievement more evident than in the repeated and largely ineffectual attempts of regional organizations to shore up the fragility of Central African states in the face of continuing threats to their stability. No other part on the continent contains states that claim membership in so many subregional organizations and with so few tangible results.

Of the 11 states included in the Economic Community of Central African States—usually referred to by its French acronym, CEEAC—this discussion focuses on only four: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. They belong, collectively or individually, to no fewer than five other regional economic communities (RECs): the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (CEPGL). Significantly, only two of these RECs—the moribund Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (CEPGL) and the paralysis-stricken International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)—include all four of these states.

Multiple membership in more than one REC reflects a deeper problem for the continent, traceable in part to the varying political orientations and thinly veiled enmities of their respective member states. But this is not the only obstacle in the way of effective integration. Aside from the structural constraints inherent in the regional environment, and the history of deadly conflicts within and among member states, the absence of a collective will or capacity to integrate, along with crippling organizational shortcomings, are major impediments to successful regional integration in Africa.

This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I focus on the constraints and potentialities inherent in the geopolitics of the Central African region, with emphasis on the transformative impact of conflicts within and across state boundaries.[1] Second, I assess the devastating consequences of Rwanda's military intervention in eastern Congo for the capacity of the DRC to develop strong and stable political institutions. This conflict and its aftermath have been major contributing factors to Central Africa's failed attempts at integration, and point to a number of broader issues in the Central African "neighborhood." Third, against this somber backdrop, I explore the organizational weaknesses accounting for and contributing to the poor performance of regional organizations. The CEEAC will serve as the main case study for this discussion. Finally, I conclude with some reflections on what Central Africa could learn from the European Union's (EU) uneasy path to regional integration.

The Geopolitics of Central Africa's Integration: Constraints and Potentialities

The DRC: A Delinquent Hegemon

What may seem from one perspective to be a regional setting ideally suited for effective economic integration takes on a radically different meaning once the relevant political variables are factored in. Such is the sad paradox of the Central African region. "The creation of effective systems of regional integration," writes Christopher Clapham, "depends on the success with which potential regional leaders are able to secure political stability and a reasonably working economy within their own territories."[2]

If any state anywhere on the continent could have played such a leadership role, it is the DRC. The DRC's strategic location, enormous geographic size of 2.3 million square kilometers, virtually unlimited hydroelectric resources, rich agricultural base, and vast mineral wealth all add up to an extraordinarily promising potential for development. The DRC stands out as a giant compared to its Lilliputian neighbors to the east: Rwanda and Burundi, each covering about 25,000 square kilometers, each about a hundred times smaller than the DRC, are also among the poorest of the poor.

It is not self-evident why, despite such unparalleled resource endowments, the DRC has failed to translate the promise of its huge potential into effective development benefits for both the country and the region. The anomaly is even more striking when considering the additional prodding the DRC receives from the four regional communities to which it belongs: the CEEAC, COMESA, SADC, and the CEPGL. To the contrary, looking at the DRC makes it seem as if performance in terms of convergent policies on tariffs, public debt ratio, inflation, and taxation is inversely proportional to the density of regional associational ties. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), in the late 1990s the DRC was ranked at or near the bottom of the heap among regional states in terms of its integrative performance: second place out of three in the CEPGL, nineteenth place out of twenty in COMESA, ninth place out of eleven in the CEEAC, and fourteenth place out of fifteen in SADC. By 2009, the performance of the DRC was worsening. Not a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG) was reported to be on track, while the public debt ratio had increased to 140 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).[3]

Donor Dependency and Proxy Wars

The DRC, as the CEEAC's presumptive regional hegemon, with membership in a multiplicity of organizations, bears no relationship to its capacity to promote integration. The paradox is a commentary on the perverse effects of what Jean-François Bayart describes as strategies of "extraversion," "which have at their heart the creation and capture of a rent generated by dependency."[4] Rather than promote integration, their immediate purpose is to instrumentalize dependency relationships with external donors. The hidden agenda is to comply with donors' expectations so as to gain financial rewards and international recognition. This sort of externally induced neo-patrimonial syndrome has as its primary objective freeing up enough funding to lubricate patron-client nets at home and help establish one's credentials abroad. These types of pro-forma commitments to regional integration can thus serve as a tool for creating alternative sources of support where institutional legitimacy is in short supply.

The sheer size and geographical pull of the DRC provides another example of an asset morphing into a liability. As has often been observed, eastern DRC has more in common with East Africa, in terms of its ecology, social landscape, and traditional trading networks, than with the rest of the DRC. While the eastern provinces have deep ties to East African neighbors, the wealthy central Katanga and Kasai regions tend to look toward Southern Africa for trade and commercial exchanges. The presence of distinctive subregional poles, each working at cross-purposes with the other, is another factor that has inhibited any emerging or coherent regional nexus from forming, both within as well as around the DRC.

Predatory Neighbors

Nothing has been more detrimental to the consolidation of an integrating state system—and a greater source of vulnerability to external intervention—than the juxtaposition of the DRC's "geological scandal"—the phrase used by Belgian colonizers upon discovering its huge deposits of copper, cobalt, diamonds, and gold—with the absence of any such wealth among its neighbors to the east. The phenomenon is crucial to an understanding of why the DRC combines the benefits of enormous resource endowments with the vulnerability of a failed state. The extreme fragility of state institutions is what makes its mineral wealth easily accessible through exploitive practices of armed entrepreneurs—from within and outside the Great Lakes region. As Chris Dietrich remarks, "A failed state can offer substantial opportunities to a neighbouring sovereign. Extraction of the resources of a country like the DRC can provide rich pickings for others who, through the deployment of their armed forces, can control and exploit mining ventures that they would otherwise not be able to access."[5]

Arguably, making sure that the DRC would remain a failed state, after it refused to serve as a client state, is one of the unstated foreign policy goals of two of its most aggressively predatory neighbors, Rwanda and Uganda. What needs to be stressed, for the purpose of this discussion, is the singular significance of the extreme weakness of the state in explaining the Congo's abortive attempt at integration, within and outside its boundaries. For this, no other state bears a larger share of responsibility than Rwanda. Directly or indirectly, Rwanda has been the perennial spoiler in every attempt by the DRC to restore its territorial sovereignty.

The Undoing of the Congolese State

Few would disagree with Terrence Lyons that "effective regional organizations are based on strong states." "In Africa," he adds, "weak states have created relatively weak regional organizations that consequently have struggled to be effective in promoting conflict management and more responsible sovereignty."[6] As the prime example of a failed state it is easy to see why, despite its overlapping regional ties, the DRC has performed so poorly in promoting effective regional integration.

Although state decay—here meaning a gradual loss of territorial control, legal authority, and legitimacy—is not reducible to any single factor or set of circumstances, its roots in the DRC are traceable to the legacy of the Mobutist era, which sowed the seeds of the "integral state," an inherently fragile entity as Crawford Young reminds us, before ushering in a period of protracted ethnic violence until its ultimate collapse under the blows of Rwandan-backed rebels.[7] With the emergence of postgenocide Rwanda as a dominant regional force, militarily and economically, the impotence of the Congolese state became all the more striking when compared to the seemingly unstoppable rise to regional preeminence of its dwarfish neighbor.

Postgenocide Rwanda has emerged as a dominant regional force, militarily and economically. Rwanda has been able to reach one of the highest rates of economic growth on the continent, 7.5 percent in 2014.[8] No other state in the region can match its impressive military capabilities. At the heart of this extraordinary reassertion of national sovereignty lie two critical factors. The first was the magnitude of the aid package delivered by the international community as a gesture of atonement for its inaction during the 1994 genocide, amounting to over $500 million in 2004 and totaling $4.2 billion in 2005–12.[9] Second, the Rwandan military was able to siphon off vast amounts of mineral resources from eastern DRC during and after 1996 and 1998, and this on a scale that made its involvement in Africa's "First World War" largely self-financing.[10] The first enabled Rwanda to acquire, free of charge, military hardware that made possible the invasion of eastern DRC; the second meant that the two Congo wars were largely self-financed.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the international community was instrumental in giving Rwanda the necessary military and economic muscle to destroy the Mobutist state; by the same token, it could be argued that international donors were indirectly responsible for preventing the emergence of conditions favorable for the birth of an alternate democratic and stable state system. Herein lies one of the keys to understanding the failure of regional integration in Central Africa. In the absence of a functioning state, it is hard to imagine how taxes can be levied, borders secured, customs agreements enforced, and regulatory decisions put into effect. Worse still, to the extent that some such state activities have been hijacked by rival military factions, the reach of the state is made even more problematic. Not only does the Congolese state lack the capability to implement the policies needed to sustain effective regional integration, but the prospects for achieving meaningful national integration are equally in doubt.

Rwanda is not the only culprit in this tale of woes. During the 1996–2003 wars in the Congo, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola all profited from their military incursions into the DRC. South Africa has been accused of selling arms to Uganda and Rwanda in support of Congolese rebels fighting to topple the Kabila regime in the second war.[11] None of these states can be accused of disinterestedness in their haste to bring down the derelict Mobutist polity or prop up (or help overthrow) its successor. Over the past two decades, however, no other state has been more consistent in its efforts to carve out a sphere of influence for itself in eastern DRC than Rwanda. In putting this objective into effect, Rwanda was able to secure vital assistance from the Tutsi community indigenous to eastern DRC, generally referred to among Congolese as the Banyamulenge. With few exceptions, they served as an important auxiliary movement to the Rwandan army during the first Congo war (1996–7), and then as the driving force behind each of the several pro-Rwandan armed factions that came into existence between 1998 and 2013.[12]

Conflict, Frontiers, and Borders

Porous borders are at the heart of interstate conflicts within the CEEAC region. The "borderland" quality of the frontier area between the DRC and its eastern neighbors helps explain the emergence of semiautonomous politicomilitary enclaves that have resisted incorporation on either side of the border. The Rwandan proxies are the best known of these, but are by no means the only example. Clapham describes the borderland phenomenon this way: "In military and economic terms, the idea of a boundary which marked a reasonably clear line between states was replaced by that of a 'borderland,' a tract of territory in which one state gradually gave way to another, or in which semi-independent warlords were able to maintain themselves against official governments on either side."[13] In such circumstances, things analogous to William Reno's "shadow states"[14] come into view, each "performing many of the functions of statehood"—such as exercising authority in levying taxes, regulating commercial transactions, issuing hunting permits, recruiting police and customs officials, or allocating grazing rights and land for cultivation—"without taking on its obligations."[15] What makes the reconstruction of a viable state system in the DRC difficult is not just the weakness of its governing apparatus, but also the fact that it is at the mercy of competing groups of warlords.

What we have seen in Central Africa, surrounding the DRC, is a kind of regionalism at odds with the stated goals of formal regional organizations.

Daniel Bach refers to “de facto regionalisation through transstate networks” as a situation where

> micro-agents (traders, farmers, but also agents of authority acting in their private capacity) take advantage of opportunities created by porous borders, weak state territorial controls, and disparities in fiscal, tariff and monetary policies. Cross-border transactions are also described as informal, unrecorded, underground trade; smuggling, transit, or re-export trade; bottom-up regionalism; and even grass-roots regionalisation. Each of these expressions captures some key features associated with transstate networks that share a common identity—the borderlands and frontiers.[16]

Hence, regionalism in the form of informal trade networks working at cross-purposes with formal integrative schemes is a fundamental reality of the borderland space of Central Africa.

An Insider’s Perspective on the CEEAC’s Failings

My assessment of the CEEAC draws on my personal experiences and observations as a short-term consultant to the EU during the fall of 2003. My mission was to help reinforce the conflict prevention capacities of the CEEAC. I conducted a three-month investigation that took me to Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea. This allowed me to observe, from the front seat, the extraordinary degree of incompetence afflicting almost all levels of the CEEAC’s General Secretariat. Since then, I am told by reliable participant observers, substantial improvements in operational capacities within the organization (for which I claim no credit) have been achieved, though probably not to the extent that I feel would radically alter my earlier assessment. Furthermore, it is my considered opinion that the ills that beset the CEEAC also apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to several other regional organizations in Africa.

Weak states are likely to generate weak regional institutions. The reverse is also true: where regional organizations lack effective means to resolve conflicts among states—the rule rather than the exception—they contribute, if only by default, to the further enfeeblement of incipient state structures. A closer look at the CEEAC, drawing on my consultancy report to the EU, is instructive in this respect.[17]

Background on the CEEAC

The CEEAC was created in 1981 to replace the defunct Union Douanière des États d’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC). Writing in 1999, Roland Pourtier concluded, having observed the CEEAC’s huge potentialities—“representing a market of 70 million inhabitants spread over a surface of 5.4 million square kilometers”[18]—that it had yet to get off the ground: “it was to remain stillborn.”[19]

The first step toward breathing new life into the organization came in 1998 at a meeting of heads of state in Libreville (Gabon), when the decision was made to find permanent solutions to the region's political problems. This belated recognition of the importance of political issues is not unique to the CEEAC—none of the regional organizations in existence in Africa were created to prevent or resolve conflicts. Their conflict resolution functions materialized by default, as it were. Initially, conflict resolution was the primary function of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) of 1963, more specifically the 1993 Mechanism for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts. This was later replaced by the African Union's (AU) 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).[20] The CEEAC was expected to succeed where its predecessors had failed.

By 2003, the CEEAC's 11 member states (Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic [CAR], Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe), through the intercessions and pleas of its General Secretariat, turned to the EU for assistance in strengthening its conflict prevention capacities. In so doing, they provided me, the regional consultant, with the opportunity to closely examine the dysfunctional peace and security agenda that beset the organization.

My assignment was to explore ways in which to "strengthen CEEAC's capacity to maintain peace, security and stability, [as well as] essential conditions for economic and soil development,"[21] and ultimately to calibrate its request for funding in accordance with the tasks to be performed. This meant paying special attention to three institutional mechanisms: the Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale (COPAX), the Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide de l'Afrique Centrale (MARAC), and the Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMAC). All three form part of an administrative apparatus operating under the authority of CEEAC's core unit, the General Secretariat.

The CEEAC's secretary-general oversees and coordinates the work of three key departments: the Department for Human Integration, Peace, Security, and Stability; the Department in Charge of Programming, Budgeting, Administration, and Human Resources; and the Department for Physical, Economic, and Monetary Integration. Each is subdivided further into three divisions, as well as further subdivisions. The highest authority is represented by the Summit of Heads of State and Government, and, between summit meetings, the Council of Ministers. However impressive on paper, the diversity of interests reflected in its membership casts grave doubts on the functioning of this elaborate bureaucratic machine.

Organizational Flaws

In Central Africa, as elsewhere in Africa, conflict is embedded in the regional environment. The greater the number of member states, the more diversified their social landscape, and the more salient their historical rivalries, the greater is the potential for conflict. By 2003, conflict ran through the membership of the CEEAC like a red skein in the history of their relations with each other—between Rwanda and Burundi, Rwanda and Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, and the CAR and the DRC. The first step in framing a meaningful set of recommendations to address these conflicts was to analyze their key dimensions. These included their historical roots, the precipitating factors, the principal actors, and the salience of their enmities. Only against this background could one assess the institutional capacities of the three subunits specifically charged with managing conflict resolution.

Much to my surprise, after sketching out several conflict situations among member states, I was taken to task in a six-page critical assessment of my report from the deputy secretary-general in charge of human integration, peace, security, and stability—Angolan ambassador Nelson Cosme. His assessment painted a far more peaceful picture of the region than I found to be the case. Specifically, I was criticized for making gratuitous assertions about the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda in 1996, the intervention of Burundi in the DRC in 1996 and 1997, the logistical support of Chad to François Bozizé's coup in the CAR, Nigeria's intervention in São Tomé and Príncipe in 2003, and President Paul Kagame's lack of domestic legitimacy among the majority of Rwanda's population.[22] Cosme wrote: "These are statements that need to be justified so as to know their basis...as far as we are concerned we cannot validate them. The [consultant's] report must not be an occasion to weaken our Community which is still in process of renewal [*en phase de relance*] and therefore needs the solidarity of all its members. We cannot endorse such grave accusations against the member states."[23]

The message, in its pristine absurdity, is straightforward: in order to strengthen the capacity of the organization to resolve conflicts, the best possible approach is to ignore them. Not only will this avoid unfortunate tensions among member states, but it will also significantly enhance the chances of generous financial assistance from the EU. Of the two major issues on the agenda of the CEEAC during my consultancy—strengthening its conflict resolution capacities and its funding—the latter deserved the highest priority in the eyes of the CEEAC leadership. The point was driven home to me in no uncertain terms by Ambassador Cosme during our first meeting in Libreville: "Your job is to ensure that we get proper financial assistance from the EU." Calibrating the funding to the task at hand was not the issue; the point was to downplay the obstacles so as to ensure the funding.

Other surprises awaited me. The most unpleasant of these was the insistence that I should be visiting all eleven states in approximately four weeks. My plea to concentrate on fewer states, representing the more salient conflict arenas, fell on deaf ears. The instruction came from the head of the European delegation in Libreville, a German national, Joachim Krebs, whose knowledge of Africa and administrative skills were in proportion to his sense of practicality. "To do otherwise," said he, "would create jealousies among members." In concrete terms, this meant that at each stop on my itinerary, I had to rush to the embassy of my next port of call to obtain proper visa authorization, and only thereafter contact the head of the local European delegation for further instructions. As it turned out, much to my relief, time constraints made it impossible for me to visit more than seven states (Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea). Even so, the picaresque quality of my safari remained undiminished. Only in three of them—Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Rwanda—had the EU delegation been alerted to my visit ahead of time.[24]

What came across repeatedly in the course of my travels, albeit with some notable exceptions, was the striking lack of foresight, analytic skills, and organizational competence displayed by many of my interlocutors, both African *and* European, with the EU delegate in Libreville deserving pride of place.[25] To elaborate the point would be tedious. Suffice it to note that the bureaucratic overload plaguing the organization seemed tailor-made to generate incompetence: the huge amount of instructions, official documents, diagrams, reports, minutes of meetings, all heavily interlaced with cabalistic acronyms, bear testimony to this phenomenon. I became painfully aware of this as I ploughed my way through piles of documents, many of them defying comprehension.

The Broader Relevance of the Case at Hand

Commenting on the crises that plagued the UDEAC before its ultimate collapse, Pourtier summed up the crucial element missing from attempts at regional integration: "In short, what is missing is a *determined political will*." Absent a common political will, he added, "Integration will be confined to mundane debates between learned men who can extol its merits in the name of abstract economic rationality, while remaining disconnected from realities on the ground."[26] Depressing as it is, Pourtier's assessment applies to many regional organizations besides the UDEAC.

A full-scale discussion of the extent to which the CEEAC's dysfunctions might apply to other regional organizations as well is beyond the scope of this discussion. Passing reference must be made, however, to the ICGLR, whose less than impressive performance in trying to mediate the protracted conflict between the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group that operated in the North Kivu region brings to the fore many of the same shortcomings that have crippled the CEEAC. The potential for conflict inscribed in its broad membership (Angola, Burundi, the CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia) leaps to the eye: to expect anything approaching a consensual agreement on security issues between Rwanda and the DRC, Uganda and the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, Sudan and South Sudan, to mention only the most obvious cases, is nothing short of a chimera.

The ICGLR's less than optimal performance speaks for itself: not only did it fail to bring about a ceasefire, but also, even after the defeat of M23 on the ground, it proved unable to persuade the warring parties to sign a peace accord. The ICGLR's military force failed to create the desirable regional stability. Its failure led to an agreement in February 2013, signed by 11 African states, to create a peace, security, and cooperation framework designed to bring peace in order to resolve the conflict in eastern DRC.[27]

The language of the documents spawned by the ICGLR is only one of the many factors that help explain the gap between aspiration and achievement.

Nonetheless, there are few parallels for the empty verbiage found in the *Guide for the Domestication of the Protocols of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region*, a document produced by the organization's Executive Secretariat in order "to contribute to the capacity building of Member States' institutions in charge of legal instruments, especially by making available to them the necessary tools for carrying out this process."[28] The first of such tools is to keep in mind the distinction between monism and dualism: "It must be underscored that the domestication of protocols must take into consideration various legal frameworks, namely monism and dualism: a) in monism, internal and international legal systems form one unit . . . b) in dualism, dualism shows the difference between a national law and an international law."[29] Irrespective of the usefulness of this distinction in implementing peace protocols, the ongoing discussions surrounding the projected mutual defense and security pacts among member states have yet to translate into an effective legal instrument for conflict prevention.

In its 2009 assessment of the ICGLR, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) succinctly pointed to the major handicaps facing the organization: its lack of legitimacy, and the fact that the member states' regional vision was not shared by neighboring countries, as a consequence of which "they cannot even agree among themselves."[30] At the time of this chapter's writing, five years after the NORAD report was published, the ICGLR's dismal performance through the civil war in eastern DRC retrospectively suggests a far more devastating critique: far from promoting the cause of peace in the Great Lakes, and despite the many communiqués suggesting otherwise, the ICGLR has done little more than ensure the regular payment of salaries and perquisites for hundreds of civil servants, translators, and service personnel enlisted in the ranks of its regional bureaucracy.

The disconnect between formal pronouncements and political realities is nowhere more palpable than in the self-congratulatory statement issued on the eve of the organization's Fifth Ordinary Summit for Heads of State, in Luanda, in January 2014: "The ICGLR has in recent years proved to be a successful platform for leaders to iron out their grievances in one-on-one discussions and avert possible confrontations which would lead to regional war."[31]

Much the same sort of make-believe scenario, only on a larger scale, was captured by Stephanie Wolters on the occasion of the recent summit meeting of COMESA in Kinshasa, where she draws attention to the "surreal" character of the spectacle unfolding before her eyes:

> Ugandan leader and outgoing COMESA President Yoweri Museveni—deaf to the outrage following his decision to sign a draconian anti-gay law—hand[ed] over the reins of the organization to the DRC's Joseph Kabila, a man whose country has to rely on international military interventions to guarantee its security. Museveni and Kabila's countries have been at odds for close to two decades. Museveni still harbors anti-Kabila rebels from M23 in his territory, while much of the Congo's gold, according to a recent UN report, continues to flow out of the country illegally via mafia-esque networks, much of it to Uganda. Still, the two presidents discussed regional integration, common markets and relaxing border restrictions as though these were matters of simple policy adjustments. To top off this surreal scene was

> Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president whose movements are restricted by the fact that he faces an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of crimes against humanity.[32]

To return to a point made earlier, this "surreal" disjunction between formal proceedings and their underlying, though muted, enmities is best understood by reference to Bayart's concept of "extraversion": in their efforts to meet the conditions set by donors, African decision-makers are more concerned to qualify for public aid than to implement policies dictated by domestic needs. Similarly, the energies mobilized at the regional level to initiate integration schemes cannot be understood in isolation from the promises, pressures, and prospects of financial assistance emanating from the international community, be it from the United Nations (UN), the EU, or the AU; in brief, and regardless of their intrinsic merits, in a number of cases—notably the CEEAC, COMESA, and the ICGLR—efforts at regional integration are intimately related to the potential benefits expected in complying to the political models and priorities set by international actors.

Conclusion

Given the active role of the EU in promoting regional integration, and the institutional borrowings from the EU model, it may be useful, by way of a conclusion, to ask whether there are lessons to be learned from the European experience. This is not to imply that the European record is unblemished, or that it should serve as a model for Africa. Africa has no monopoly on mismanagement and corruption, both of which figure prominently in the performance of the European Commission. Yet, for all its failings, the history of European integration is a success story, made manifest by the number of pending candidacies for admission.

At least three major factors help explain Europe's relative success, all of which appear to be sorely lacking from the African context: a determined political will, a core of highly competent international civil servants, and a set of stable governance institutions. On the first point, there can be little doubt about the unbending determination of the founding fathers—notably Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet—to establish the Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as the stepping-stone toward European integration.[33] To this we should add the critical role played by German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French president Charles de Gaulle in framing their policies in accordance with this central objective. But even more important than this early push toward integration, much of the credit for translating such lofty ideals into practice goes to a remarkably competent group of international civil servants, for which there is simply no equivalent in Africa. This fact did not go unnoticed by S. K. B. Asante, a prolific analyst of Africa's regional integration:

> It is a fact that the institutions of the European Union were served by first class European personalities, such as Gaston Thorn, Jacques Delors, [and] Raymond Barre [former Prime Minister of France]. On the other hand, in the case of the

> African economic communities, the quality of staff is low, largely because most of the executive and professional positions are usually filled on political and geographical representation grounds rather than on experience, technical and administrative experience . . . The political appointees at the head of the economic communities do not always fully comprehend the problems of economic integration.[34]

Compounding the shortage of a committed, visionary leadership, critics might point to the dearth of a significant resource base on which to build a strong economic foundation for integration. But, while the creation of a European market could not have materialized in the absence of a promising economic potential and appropriate infrastructures to stimulate production, reverse trade deficits, and increase competitiveness, Africa's economic constraints tell only part of the story. As the case of the DRC in Central Africa demonstrates, just as there are major exceptions to the image of Africa as a resource-poor continent, concentration on economic variables alone offers little help to explain the failure to integrate. The weakness of the state is the key explanatory factor. In the absence of a strong state to fend off intruders, the mere presence of abundant natural resources is enough to generate greed and plunder across boundaries. Translating mineral resources into wealth, and wealth into economic and social development, involves a complex set of policy initiatives at the domestic and international levels. Only through effective and stable political institutions can this be accomplished.

In turn, crucial as they are in setting the agenda for integration, strong governance institutions are unlikely to materialize in the absence of a common will to make them work. It takes sustained determination, exceptional leadership, as well as an unusual set of historical circumstances, for states to be willing to relinquish part of their sovereignty for the sake of an overarching integrative framework, dedicated to serving the greater good of the greater number. Depressing as it is, this is the principal lesson to be drawn from the impressive, though checkered, record of the EU, and which has yet to sink into the consciousness of most African leaders.

Notes

1. In using the term "Central African region," I refer to the CEEAC.
2. Christopher Clapham, "Boundaries and States in the New African Order," in Daniel C. Bach (ed.), *Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration* (Bloomington and Oxford: Indiana University Press and James Currey, 1999), p. 65.
3. François Kabuya Kalata and Tshiunza Mbiye, "Communautés Économiques Régionales: Quelles Stratégies d'Intégration en RDC?," *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2009–10), pp. 336, 338.
4. Jean-François Bayart, "Africa and the World: A History of Extraversion," *African Affairs* 99, no. 395 (2000), 22.
5. Chris Dietrich, *The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa*, unpublished manuscript, January 26, 2001, p. 3.
6. Terrence Lyons, "Can Neighbors Help? Regional Actors and African Conflict Management," in Francis Deng and Terrence Lyons (eds.), *African Reckoning: A*

Quest for Good Governance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), p. 69. Colin McCarthy makes a similar argument—"It is difficult to envisage the successful integration of weak states; the creation of integration arrangements cannot serve as a substitute for poor or weak national governance"—in "Regional Integration," in Stephen Ellis (ed.), *Africa Now: People, Policies, Institutions* (London: Currey, 1996), p. 220.

7. Crawford Young, *The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), pp. 55–62.
8. World Bank, "The World Bank's Rwanda Economic Update: Seizing the Opportunities for Growth with a Special Focus on Harnessing the Demographic Dividend," January 29, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/01/29/the-world-banks-rwanda-economic-update-seizing-the-opportunities-for-growth-with-a-special-focus-on-harnessing-the-demographic-dividend (accessed August 26, 2014).
9. World Bank statistics on Rwanda's donor funding retrieved from The World Bank, "World Bank Search," http://search.worldbank.org/ (accessed November 20, 2014).
10. See discussion by Peter J. Schraeder, "Belgium, France, and the United States," in Gilbert M. Khadiagala (ed.), *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 171–2.
11. Chris Landsberg, "South Africa," in Khadiagala, *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, pp. 128–9.
12. Namely, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), and the March 23 Movement (M23). A major exception to such Tutsi-led movements was the so-called Tous pour le Développement (TPD), founded by a Congolese Hutu, Eugene Serufuli, in 1998, whose members were largely recruited among the Hutu community indigenous to the Kivu provinces, but which was Rwanda-aligned. For a fuller discussion, see René Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Africa* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 27.
13. Clapham, "Boundaries and States in the New African Order," p. 59.
14. William Reno, "Mafiya Troubles, Warlord Crises," in Mark Beissinger and Crawford Young (eds.), *Beyond State Crisis? Post-Colonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002), pp. 107–7.
15. Clapham, "Boundaries and States in the New African Order," p. 59.
16. Daniel Bach, "The Dilemmas of Regionalization," in Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-Region* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 83.
17. René Lemarchand, *Rapport de Mission sur la Prévention des Conflicts en Afrique Centrale, 29 Septembre–15 Novembre 2003* (Brussels: European Commission, Europe/Aid Cooperation Office, 2003).
18. Roland Pourtier, "The Renovation of UDEAC," in Bach, *Regionalisation in Africa*, p. 131.
19. Pourtier, "The Renovation of UDEAC," p. 136.
20. Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), "*Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Post-Cold War Africa*," Stellenbosch, South Africa, May 2014, http://www.ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/V46-Pax%20Africana%20Report%20Web.pdf (accessed October 1, 2014), p. 21.
21. As described in my report, Lemarchand, *Rapport de Mission*, p. 2.

22. On the largely forgotten episode in the history of little-known São Tomé and Príncipe, see Gerhard Seibert, "Coup d'État in São Tomé e Príncipe: Domestic Causes, the Role of Oil, and Former 'Buffalo' Battalion Soldiers," Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Occasional Paper, October 10, 2003, http://issafrica.org/AF/current/stomeoct03.pdf (accessed April 1, 2015).
23. Nelson Cosme, *Lettre du Secrétaire Général au Délégue de la Commission Européenne de Libreville* (Gabon), January 19, 2004. In a radically different commentary, a member of the French military delegation to the EU raised more pertinent issues: "Is there a real political will to strengthen peace in the region? What is one to make of the attitude of Rwanda and Burundi towards RDC, which constitutes an aggression as defined by the Mutual Assistance Pact[?] As for the *Force Multinationale d'Afrique Centrale* (FOMAC), which ought to be the armed wing of the COPAX, where is it to be found? CEEAC in our opinion is not a sufficiently coherent entity to serve as a useful tool to prevent conflict and settle crises" (author's translation). Author's personal files.
24. In Rwanda my appointment with the foreign affairs minister was cancelled at the last minute, as the minister had more urgent matters to attend to. So too was my appointment cancelled in Equatorial Guinea, as the government happened to meet in Rio Muni rather than Malabo at the time of my visit.
25. The most notable exception was in Brazzaville, where I came in contact with a group of remarkably efficient, well-informed interlocutors, from whom I learned more about the flaws and potentialities of the CEEAC than in all the rest of the capitals visited in the course of my mission.
26. Pourtier, "The Renovation of UDEAC," pp. 134–5 (emphasis added).
27. CCR, "*Towards a New Pax Africana*," p. 22.
28. International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), "Guide for the Domestication of the Protocols of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region" (Bujumbura: Executive Secretariat, June 2012).
29. Ibid.
30. Morten Bøås, Randi Lotsberg, and Jean-Luc Ndizeye, *The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)—Review of Norwegian Support to the ICGLR Secretariat*, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) report no. 17/2009, June 2009, p. 23.
31. Stephanie Wolters, "How Kabila Is Buying Time," *ISS Today*, March 3, 2014, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/how-kabila-is-buying-time (accessed April 1, 2015).
32. Ibid.
33. For more on the history of European integration and its founding intellectual lights, see chapters 3 and 15 in this volume.
34. S. K. B. Asante, *The Strategy of Regional Integration in Africa* (Accra: Friedrich Ebert, 1996), p. 35.

Chapter 14

Region-Building in North Africa

Azzedine Layachi

Introduction

This chapter discusses the history of conflict, tensions, and economic misalignment that has prevented the emergence of an effective North African regional union—despite the fact that there has been a Maghrebi regional organization since 1989. North Africa could be an economically and politically powerful region, well-integrated into the global economy, if states could muster the requisite political will.

"North Africa" refers here to the five states that constitute what is known as the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (see figure 14.1)—Algeria (39.2 million people), Libya (6.2 million), Mauritania (3.9 million), Morocco (33.0 million), and Tunisia (10.9 million).[1] Together, they had a combined population of 93.2 million people and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $439.4 billion as of 2013 (see table 14.1).

The region's states are diversely endowed with resources, with Libya and Algeria being resource rich, while Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia are resource poor. Despite the differences in resource strength, these regional states have important complementary resources. This complementarity means that integration could be especially attractive in North Africa, but states so far have been unable to take advantage of the economic benefits of regional integration.

This chapter begins by presenting a historical overview of the AMU and its member states, and then assesses the factors that have affected the AMU and its failures in regional cooperation and trade. It looks more specifically into why this important region of the world, whose member states share many common attributes, has lagged behind most other parts of the world in intraregional cooperation and trade. Finally, the chapter suggests alternative mechanisms and conditions that may help achieve regional integration in the future.

Figure 14.1 The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

Source: Based on Central Intelligence Agency (US), "Africa", in *World Factbook* 2013–14, 2013.

Table 14.1 Gross domestic product (GDP) of Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) states, 2013 (current $ billions)

Algeria	210.2
Libya	74.2
Mauritania	4.2
Morocco	103.8
Tunisia	47.0
Total	439.4

Source: World Bank, "GDP (current US$)," http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed March 20, 2015).

The Arab Maghreb Union

According to the Marrakesh Treaty of 1989, which created the five-state AMU, the main objectives of the union are:

1. to strengthen all forms of ties among member states for the sake of regional stability, policy coordination, and the gradual introduction of the free circulation of goods and services;
2. to allow the free circulation of goods and people among the member states;
3. to eventually integrate the Maghrebi economies through a common market and coordinated economic policies; and
4. to establish common defence mechanisms and prohibit interference in the domestic affairs of member states.[2]

The treaty includes a broad economic strategy based on the development of agriculture, industry, commerce, food security, joint projects, and general economic cooperation programs. While the treaty originally included just the

North African countries, it contains provisions for other Arab and African countries to join the union at a later stage.

Before North Africa gained independence from France, the anticolonial leaders of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia entertained a desire for regional cooperation and eventual integration. They saw their potential union as a natural eventuality. The struggle against colonialism and the ills associated with it stimulated solidarity among the region's people and their leaders and gave an impetus to the idea of building a political and economic union.

However, things did not go as envisioned after colonialism ended in the region with Algerian independence in 1962 (Libya had become independent in 1951, Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, and Mauritania in 1960). The uneasy relationships between all five Maghrebi states since then have contributed substantially to inhibiting most efforts toward regional cooperation and integration, with the negative role played by Algeria, Morocco, and Libya outweighing the more positive attitude of Tunisia, which as early as 1957 expressed a desire for a union of the Great Maghreb.

The Commonalities Facilitating Regional Integration

Before turning to the political factors that have inhibited regional integration in the Maghreb, it is worth recalling other factors that, under different circumstances, would have helped integration in the region.

The central Maghreb countries—Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—not only share geography and spatial contiguity but also have linked histories; a common cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage; and strong affinities between their respective peoples. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia enjoy a common demographic stock of people identified as Arabs and Berbers, and many common cultural traits. They also share Islam as the dominant religion, and share similar languages, mainly Arabic, versions of Berber, and French.

While their particular histories may be distinct, especially in the past two centuries, they nonetheless share a common origin in the Muslim dynasties that controlled North Africa at the beginning of the seventh century. Furthermore, their populations all suffered from European colonial aggression, control, exploitation, and humiliation from 1830 until the mid-twentieth century. Anticolonial solidarity made many North Africans yearn, even before independence, for a common future within some integrative framework.

The independent Maghrebi states have also been facing similar challenges, including underdevelopment and its usual corollaries; external imperatives of neoliberal economic reforms; societal challenges to governance; environmental problems, mainly drought; and regional security concerns associated with instability from within and in neighboring states, including threats from roaming armed groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. These common challenges alone should have inspired the Maghrebi leaders to seek regional cooperation in an effort to combine political and economic resources and coordinate policies and actions for the sake of their citizens' well-being and their countries' development in an increasingly difficult international environment.

The Political Factors Inhibiting Regional Integration

Postcolonial Rivalry between Morocco and Algeria

Only a year after its independence, on October 8, 1963, Algeria was invaded by Morocco, to reclaim what it considered "old land" in Algeria's Tindouf and Bechar regions (in the Southwest), and thereby to expand the Moroccan territory. Morocco claimed then, and still does today, that the land in question was taken from it by France when the latter delineated the territory of colonial Algeria. The conflict and tensions that ensued for a few weeks were resolved through a mediation intervention by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). But relations between Algeria and Morocco soured and suffered substantially as a result of these tensions, and the friction afflicted the whole region, stifling intraregional cooperation, trade, and regional integration. These tensions between Algeria and Morocco also affected relations with the other states of the region and made impossible a simultaneous five state effort to create a union. As a result of this conflict, Morocco left the OAU after the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)—a would-be state founded by the nationalists in the Western Sahara region claimed by Morocco—was accepted as a full member of the organization in 1984. Morocco remains today the only African country that is not a member of the African Union (AU), the successor organization to the OAU. This boycott of the continental organization is related to the Western Sahara conflict that has plagued North Africa since the mid-1970s.

The Western Sahara conflict began after Spain, the colonial power then, decided to vacate the territory, but without going through the decolonization process mandated by the United Nations (UN)—which would have included, notably, a referendum among the indigenous population. Morocco and Mauritania quickly moved to divide the territory among themselves, but were met by a fierce nationalist resistance that was supported by Algeria, Libya, and other countries. While Mauritania quickly abandoned its ambitions in Western Sahara, Morocco was determined to annex the territory. After many years of war, which led thousands of Sahrawis to flee to refugee camps in Algeria, a cease-fire was concluded in 1991 and the conflict was placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council (UNSC). To date, there have been no serious international attempts to resolve this conflict, which has impeded improvement of relations between these two key countries of the Maghreb region.

The constant tensions between Algeria and Morocco over border issues, together with the Western Sahara conflict, have seriously undermined intraregional cooperation, trade, and integration, and inhibited all efforts to give life to the AMU as created on paper in 1989.

Uneasy Unions and Alliances that Led to Nowhere

Despite these setbacks in inter-Maghrebi relations, the states of the region did initiate efforts to build frameworks of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. However, these efforts were dictated more by realist exigencies of domestic or regional political dynamics than by a genuine desire to go beyond paying lip service to integration in the region.

In 1964, the first Conference of Maghreb Economic Ministers met in Tunis and established the Conseil Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM), which included Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. It aimed to coordinate and harmonize national development plans, interregional trade, and relations with the European Economic Community (EEC).

In 1969, a short-lived Friendship Treaty was signed by Algeria and Morocco. Not much happened after that meeting, for a number of reasons. One was the decision of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi in 1970, shortly after he overthrew the Libyan monarchy, to pull his country out of the CPCM. Gaddafi argued that a Maghreb union would be an impediment to a wider Arab union. In 1971, seeing himself as the natural heir to Arab nationalist and former president of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser, Gaddafi announced a plan to create the Federation of Arab Republics, which would include only Libya, Egypt, and Syria.[3]

Also in 1971, Morocco broke off diplomatic relations with Libya, accusing it of direct involvement in a coup attempt against King Hassan II. In 1973, Algeria and Libya signed a union agreement, the Hassi Messaoud Accords. Neither these accords nor another agreement on mutual defense signed in 1975 were ever implemented, but they constituted important political statements against Morocco. Gaddafi despised Morocco's monarchy, and Algeria feared Morocco's irredentist ambitions.

In January 1974, Gaddafi persuaded Tunisia to agree to a merger of the two countries through the Djerba Treaty. The union was to have Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba as president of the new Arab Islamic Republic, while Gaddafi and Tunisia's prime minister Hedi Nouira would serve as vice presidents. Many domestic and foreign observers wondered why small and secular Tunisia would associate itself intimately with Libya. The only possible explanation was the hope that the union would alleviate the economic crisis Tunisia was experiencing as the socialist option began to fail and the major labor union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), became a serious challenge to Bourguiba. However, Bourguiba found himself under heavy pressure from members of his government and European countries, mainly France, not to accept the proposed union. He reversed his decision by way of procrastination on the preparatory steps for the new union.[4]

For the survival of a small state like Tunisia, a Maghrebi union had to serve as a means to counterbalance the regional powers, so that Tunisia could avoid falling prey to them. The Djerba Treaty was quickly abandoned under pressure, but Tunisia surely also realized that it was more a scheme by Libya to swallow its tiny neighbor than to create a union of two equals. Gaddafi reacted to Tunisia's withdrawal from the union plan by expelling Tunisian workers from Libya (where 30,000 Tunisian laborers resided) in 1976, and by supporting Tunisian opposition groups, which raided two cities, Gafsa and Kasserine, in 1980 and 1992.[5] Tensions also arose between the two countries over oil exploration and exploitation in offshore fields; the issue was finally resolved in 1982 by the International Court of Justice in a decision based on equity that delimited which areas of the continental shelf could be exploited by each country.[6]

Under Bourguiba, Tunisia feared its neighbors, but Western commitments to Tunisia's security have since alleviated the Libyan pressures and threats on this small North African country, especially after the rise to power of President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in 1987.[7] The changes that took place in North Africa in the wake of the 2010–11 Arab Spring brought about important changes in the dynamics between Tunisia and Libya. After both had ousted their leaders (peacefully in Tunisia and violently in Libya), Tunisia supported the changes taking place in Libya, but soon became very concerned about the violent and chaotic situation there due to a lack of agreement among various armed factions on the transition to a new system of governance. Tunisia's concerns focused mainly on the infiltration of armed militants, which might contribute to instability and create uncertainty about the future. The fate of Tunisia, as the sole Arab Spring country that succeeded in making a peaceful transition after overthrowing its leaders, may be linked to whatever happens in Libya. The persistence of chaos and violence in Libya could threaten the stability of the ongoing, yet fragile, democratic transition in Tunisia. The latter's October 2014 elections for a new parliament, followed by presidential elections a month later, constituted a major step in securing this transition, but that security will last only as long as the new homegrown threats, such as Ansar al-Sharia, and those from Libya remain contained.[8]

Substantial differences in ideologies and political systems contributed to tensions among Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. The latter two branded the Moroccan monarchy as reactionary and oppressive. When Libya, along with Algeria, began providing assistance to the Sahrawi resistance in the late 1970s, Morocco responded by allowing Libyan dissidents to operate in Morocco (starting in 1979). After diplomatic relations between Libya and Morocco were reestablished, they were broken again by Morocco in 1980, after Libya recognized the SADR.

Disputes over unresolved border demarcation issues almost led to direct confrontations between Algeria and Morocco, but tensions eased by the mid-1980s after Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid started a policy of rapprochement with Morocco, which had accepted in 1982 to pursue a political solution to border issues and to the Western Sahara conflict. The two countries restored the diplomatic relations that Morocco had severed in March 1976 as a reprisal for Algeria's recognition of the SADR. The warming of relations between the two countries started at a time in the late 1980s when their respective societies became restive due to tough socioeconomic conditions. Work began then on a comprehensive Maghreb union. In February 1989, the five states of the region signed the Marrakesh Treaty, which created the Arab Maghreb Union. However, this did not prevent the resumption of tensions between Algeria and Morocco in the subsequent years. These tensions have continued to the present, as indicated by their still-closed land borders.[9]

In March 1983, Algeria and Tunisia signed a Fraternity and Harmony Treaty, which was joined by Mauritania in December 1983. Under this treaty, the parties agreed not to allow any military action or subversive activity against its signatories. While the treaty was in principle open to all Maghrebi states, Morocco did not join because of tensions with Algeria. Libya was refused entrance by Algeria because Gaddafi had not agreed to settle a common border dispute and wanted Egypt to be admitted as a member as well. Later, when Algeria rejected a Libyan call for a wider union between the two countries, Gaddafi resorted to lending support to Berberist and Islamist militants in Algeria. Gaddafi had publicly expressed sympathy for the Algerian Islamists while repressing his own.[10]

In August 1984, Libya and Morocco decided to bury the hatchet, and signed a union agreement known as the Arab African Federation Treaty (or the Oujda Treaty). Thanks to this agreement, Libya stopped supporting the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Polisario) and, in exchange, Libyan opposition figures operating in Morocco were handed over to Gaddafi. The 1984 union agreement, which was an invitation extended to all Arab and African states, and which ultimately aimed to create an Arabic-African Federation, was abandoned two years later after the immediate needs of each party were satisfied.[11]

After Morocco abrogated the treaty with Libya in August 1986, the latter began to endure the long isolation under international sanctions that has marked its recent history. Libya's renewed application to join the 1983 Algerian-dominated alliance defined by the Fraternity and Harmony Treaty with Tunisia and Mauritania was rejected again in 1987 because Libya requested the abolition of all borders as a condition for its joining.

Intra- and Interstate Conflicts and Brewing Tensions

Since its inception, the AMU has been in a dormant state, for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is the almost constant tension between Algeria and Morocco, especially over Western Sahara. After the signing of the AMU agreement in 1989, relations between states in the region went right back to the fractious condition they had been in since independence, but the situation had changed internally and externally for all by the end of the 1980s. Morocco was able to subdue the nationalist movement in Western Sahara and annex most of the territory. Libya fell under international sanctions based on accusations of its involvement in international terrorism: US sanctions began in 1986 after a bomb in Berlin killed and wounded US military personnel, while UN sanctions began in 1992 following the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland. All sanctions were lifted by 2008 after Libya abandoned its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, handed over two of its agents accused of being responsible for the Pan Am bombing, and paid compensation to the families of the victims of the ill-fated flight.

Because the embargo part of the sanctions was respected by all Arab states, including Libya's immediate neighbors, Gaddafi's resentment against Arab states increased. His fear of encirclement by hostile forces increased even more as the Europeans, whom he saw as a "Christian alliance" against the Muslim world, multiplied talks and agreements with the rest of the Maghreb on economic and security issues, and as the United States began a diplomatic offensive in the Maghreb for the sake of improving economic, political, and security ties with Libya's neighbors. Joint military exercises between the United States and Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria increased his concerns even more. These developments and others in the 2000s, such as the US invasion of Iraq, and increased US military presence in the Sahel in search of armed Islamist groups, led Libya finally to do whatever was being asked of it, in order to get the sanctions lifted and diminish threats to its political regime.

Developments in the past two decades have kept the Maghreb countries further apart and even less interested in regional integration. Regional tensions have continued to express themselves in a variety of ways. The Moroccan-Algerian border has been closed since 1994. Tunisia, which became a police state from 1991 to 2011, kept a low profile in the region and avoided close interactions with its neighbors. Among other things, it was highly concerned that violent Islamist rebellion in Algeria in the 1990s would spread into its territory. Libya was, for a decade, isolated from the rest of the Arab states in North Africa and the Middle East by the international economic sanctions and by Gaddafi's disillusionment with the Arab world. Algeria was traumatized for a decade by a bloody internal war in the 1990s that pitted an Islamist rebellion against the state and that kept it isolated from the outside world. Suspecting Libya of giving direct assistance to the Islamist rebels through Tunisia, Algeria closed its border with Tunisia in 1994 and 1995. Mauritania, under the pull of economic despair, political instability, and tensions with its southern neighbor, remained isolated from its northern neighbors. Its biggest problem at that time was the severe tension with Senegal over a host of issues, which almost led to war.[12]

National Interests over Regional Interests, Global Integration over Regional Integration

Due to internal conflicts, cross-border tensions, and divergent interests, the AMU states embarked on separate paths to strengthen their own economies and build ties with the major powers in the international arena. Their national interests dictated a search for global rather than regional economic opportunities and partners. Since independence, all of the economies of the Maghrebi states have become structurally oriented toward global markets, mainly in Europe, for their export and import needs. The trend of national advancement over regional integration has continued in each Maghrebi state, with intraregional trade in 2010 standing at 1.3 percent of the Maghreb's total commerce. Table 14.2 illustrates this tendency with commodity exports.

Table 14.2 Evolution and distribution of commodity exports in North Africa, 2001–11 ($ billions and percentage shares)

Year	North Africa Commodity Exports to			
	North Africa	Rest of Africa	Europe	World (Total)
2001	$1.5 (3.0%)	$0.3 (0.6%)	$34.4 (69.1%)	$49.8
2006	$3.5 (2.6%)	$0.9 (0.6%)	$82.7 (61.1%)	$135.4
2011	$7.6 (4.4%)	$3.9 (2.3%)	$87.5 (51.3%)	$170.6

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), *ECA-NA Economic Report 2012*, "Regional Integration and Development of Intra-Regional Trade in North Africa: What Potential Trade?" http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/regional_integration_eng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2015), p. 6.

Each country developed individual commercial links with the Arab world, Africa, Western Europe, the United States, Russia, and China, but not with its immediate neighbors. This is despite the fact that the region possesses a strong economic base for intraregional trade. The AMU region has plenty of hydrocarbons, with Algeria being the third largest gas provider to Europe after Russia and Norway. Algeria could become Europe's second largest gas provider if the Ukraine crisis escalates. However, that seems an unlikely scenario for now, because Russia, now under stringent US and European sanctions, cannot afford a loss of the large income that Gazprom (Russia's public gas company) brings from its European market. As Terry Macalister notes, "Gazprom supplies a third of Europe's gas and for many European Union (EU) countries it is the main source of power for homes and industry but the Russian firm is a big revenue earner for the Kremlin and any volume cuts would damage the company and country financially."[13]

Morocco has iron ore, uranium, and other minerals, 50 percent of the world's phosphate reserves, as well as a varied and healthy agricultural sector. Citrus fruits constitute the largest category of its agricultural exports, followed by tomatoes, beans, and pumpkins. However, irregularity in rainfall often necessitates the importation of grains, including cereals, and other foodstuffs. Because Morocco is one of the world's largest wheat importers, its imports can fluctuate widely due to rain conditions and the international price of this commodity.

Both Tunisia and Morocco have thriving tourist industries with good tourist potential existing in neighboring countries, such as Algeria and Libya. Open borders in the context of regional integration would be of great benefit to all AMU countries in regard to tourism. The population of the region is fairly young, with those under age 30 making up close to 70 percent. The population growth rate has steadily declined in the past three decades, but is still high (see table 14.3). The region has a relatively high rate of educational attainment.

All five AMU countries have an abundance of labor, except for Libya, which has always resorted to migrant workers. All five countries have extensive desert land, but Morocco and Tunisia have sufficient arable land to permit robust agricultural development. Morocco's arable land constitutes 18.05 percent of total area, Tunisia's constitutes 17.42 percent, Algeria's constitutes 3.15 percent, Libya's constitutes 0.99 percent, and Mauritania's constitutes merely 0.38 percent.[14]

By the early 2000s, the regional state system, instead of moving steadily toward cooperation, increased trade, and eventual integration, regressed in

Table 14.3 Selected demographic indicators in the Maghreb

	Fertility rate (births per woman)					Annual population growth rate (%)				
	1985	1995	2000	2005	2007	1985	1995	2000	2005	2008
Algeria	6.0	3.4	2.5	2.5	2.7	3.1	1.9	1.4	1.5	1.8
Morocco	4.9	3.3	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.3	1.5	1.2	0.9	0.9
Tunisia	4.5	2.7	2.1	2.0	2.0	3.0	1.6	1.1	1.0	1.0

Source: World Bank, data.worldbank.org (accessed March 20, 2015).

interconnectedness. States became more isolated from each other for internal and external reasons. The three main factors that contributed to the further isolation of the Maghrebi countries from one another in the 1990s were the international economic embargo on Libya, the closing of the Algerian–Moroccan border in 1994, and the internal war in Algeria.

Furthermore, new and potentially competitive frameworks of economic cooperation were established within a wider region, including:

1. The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), a grouping of 28 states, which was promoted by Libya in 1998 for the purpose of economic and commercial integration, as well as political rapprochement between all members. The adhesion of Morocco and Tunisia (both in 2001) to this organization may further weaken the AMU project if CEN-SAD starts living up to its promises.[15] If the community starts fulfilling its promise as a framework of economic cooperation, this may forestall the need for Maghrebi economic integration, because such a framework may provide enough benefits (in product and service exports and imports) to make the AMU even more irrelevant as states pursue their interests elsewhere.
2. The 2003 Agadir Agreement, which aimed to establish a free trade zone between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. It was assumed that this would serve as a first step toward implementation of a larger pan-Arab free trade area.

Beyond the region, trade agreements between Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia with the EU, and another between Morocco and the United States, have strengthened the tendency of the Maghrebi states to put increasing stake in future extraregional economic agreements, further diverting the potential from intraregional trade.

While they might be facing a common destiny, each Maghrebi state has opted for its own individual pursuit of a place in the global and Mediterranean economic and security settings, due to changes outside the region and stagnation within the region itself. The North African countries, in particular, have been facing an urgent need to both respond to serious domestic challenges and adapt to Europe's integration, especially since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Because they have been unable even to begin to address the obstacles to regional unity, the regional setting has offered no way to deal collectively with these challenges, and the North African countries have sought, individually, a closer association with the EU and the United States, even at the cost of the bargaining power that an integrated Maghreb might provide.

The 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Barcelona Process was expected to help overcome these obstacles and push the Maghrebi states toward integration. The American Eizsenstat Initiative of the late 1990s also hoped to accomplish the same things.[16] Both failed.

Since the brutal killing of Gaddafi in 2011 by a popular rebellion supported by Western air power, Libya has been trying to steady itself and create basic governance institutions. So far, it has not succeeded, as many armed factions continue to fight for control of Libya's destiny. The remaining key players, Algeria and Morocco, alone hold the prospect of a union in their hands. These two countries are critical because, together, Morocco's 33 million people and Algeria's 39 million people made up 73 percent of the region's population and 66 percent of its GDP as of 2013.[17] Algeria's GDP in 2013 stood at $210 billion, while Morocco's was $104 billion. The two countries have the strongest military capabilities in the region. Yet the lasting political tensions between them have prevented a serious consideration of regional cooperation and integration. Suspicion, distrust, and a defensive realist attitude that frames almost everything in a zero-sum perspective have led all countries of the Maghreb region to look for ways to advance their national interests through interactions outside the Maghreb rather than within it. The economic potential of Algeria and Morocco could make them the effective engines of a regional integration that would bring greater benefit to them and to the other states of the region. Even from a realist perspective, region-building could constitute an arena wherein the individual interests of states could be fulfilled in a context of cooperation rather than one of tension and confrontation as is the case now.

Beyond the Political Stalemate: Hard Economic Factors Inhibiting Regional Integration

It is interesting to note that even if all the political differences and tensions discussed so far are resolved, there are still hard economic facts and processes that also contribute to making a North African regional union a remote possibility, despite a strong yearning for union by citizens and by private economic actors. Based on resource endowment, history, and ideological choice at independence, each country developed a distinct economic system as well as distinct regulatory, trade, and investment environments. Whether they enacted outright socialist policies or market policies, the Maghrebi states ended up with a large role for the state in the economy, a bloated bureaucracy, a large and inefficient public sector, and a relatively costly welfare system.

In a 2006 study titled *Is There a New Vision for Maghreb Economic Integration?*, which focused solely on the economic conditions that affect regional integration, the World Bank argued that, even if there were a political agreement among the three key states of the Maghreb to move forward with integration, such an undertaking would not be feasible.[18] This conclusion was based on the responses to key questions posed in the study's chapter on merchandise trade and investment patterns. The following four questions were posed in order to determine whether current intra-Maghrebi economic interactions constituted conditions that were appropriate for integration:

(i) How integrated into the world economy is the Maghreb? How [do] intra-regional trade and FDI [foreign direct investment] patterns compare with [those of] other countries at similar levels of economic development?

(ii) Are Maghreb economies interdependent? Does the region's economic growth co-move with [that of] its main trading partners [do they have concordant growth patterns]?

(iii) Is the Maghreb's export product-mix diverse enough to support regional merchandise trade integration? How complementary are the Maghreb countries' respective import-export structures?
(iv) What do [the] Maghreb's comparative advantages reveal about the prospects for regional trade integration?[19]

The responses to these questions indicate that a set of necessary economic conditions for integration are absent. However, as the study suggested, these conditions can be put in place over time, using principles such as comparative advantage. For example, Algeria and Libya could provide relatively affordable energy resources to their Maghrebi neighbors that do not have them and are now paying a high price for importing oil and gas. The same applies to necessary fertilizers, which are expensive to buy. As Francis Ghiles notes:

> Morocco has almost half the world's reserves of phosphate but to turn it into fertiliser, it needs energy, sulphur and ammonia: three things Algeria has in abundance, and at competitive prices. Morocco's huge phosphate company, OCP [Office Chérifien des Phosphates], exports most of its fertiliser to India, Brazil and China. A partnership between OCP and the Algerian state-owned oil company Sonatrach could turn the Maghreb into the most competitive centre of fertiliser production in the world, attracting foreign investment, supporting subcontractors and creating a huge number of jobs.[20]

Also, Morocco and Tunisia, which have fared better than the rest of the Maghrebi states in agricultural production and the manufacturing of ready-to-wear clothing, could trade their products in exchange for energy resources from their neighbors. Morocco and Tunisia, which have developed expertise in the tourism industry, could sell their services to their neighbors so as to enhance their potential in this area and also to extend the market in which the whole Maghrebi tourism industry could operate. The scale and competition effects of regional economic integration would benefit all. The removal of trade barriers would help private businesses grow and become more efficient in a larger market and would stimulate investments that seek large environments such as the Maghreb, which has 90 million consumers.

Based on the answers to the questions raised in the World Bank study, the Maghreb region does not appear to have the conditions necessary for market integration, and these conditions have to be put in place progressively so as to facilitate both regional and global integration. As noted in the study: "Based on empirical evidence . . . there is limited potential for intraregional merchandise trade integration in the Maghreb."[21]

Trade Dynamics

In 2010, intraregional trade in the Maghreb amounted to 1.3 percent of the Maghrebi states' total trade with the world, a decline from 2.0 percent in 1990. This is the lowest rate of intraregional trade in the world. According to a 2010

World Bank study, intraregional trade constituted 65 percent of the EU's trade at its inception, 41 percent of trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at its inception, 16 percent of trade of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its inception, and 14 percent of trade of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) at its inception. Thus, "merchandise trade within the Maghreb (as a share of total merchandise trade) is the lowest among comparator regional trading blocs."[22] Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have had good export performance in recent years, but such increase in export volume has not translated into a greater potential for either regional or global integration. For all Maghrebi countries, trade accounted for more than 85 percent of GDP in the period 2000–8, compared to 67 percent of GDP in the 1990s.[23]

These countries' trade and nontrade barriers were lowered substantially in the past decade as a result of free trade agreements with the EU signed by Morocco and Tunisia in the 1990s, and by Algeria in 2001; and as a result of Morocco's free trade agreement with the United States in the mid-2000s, and membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, among the Maghrebi states, only Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco are members of the WTO. Algeria's application is still pending due to ongoing negotiations, with its key concern being that the opening of its markets to global free trade should not undermine its efforts to diversify its economy and to lessen its high dependency on hydrocarbon income. It wants to avoid the WTO-mandated trade liberalization hindering revitalization of its industrial production and promotion of its domestic production. In line with WTO requirements, Algeria has begun a series of reform projects, including steps to improve its business climate and revise its investment law. In this context, it has concluded new trade agreements with several members of the WTO and is working to put in place international standards for investment and trade. Libya's application to the WTO dates back to 2004, and there has been no progress since, as the popular rebellion against the Gaddafi regime pushed aside any potential for negotiation.

Extraregional agreements helped these countries increase trade in the global economy, but not with each other. Furthermore, nonhydrocarbon exports from the region constituted less than 20 percent of GDP in 2004. Tunisia and Morocco depend the least on hydrocarbon exports. While Tunisia produces a very small amount of hydrocarbons, Morocco is a net importer of oil and natural gas (it produces marginal amounts of these products and some refined petroleum products). These two countries have the highest contributions of nonhydrocarbon exports to GDP. The country with the lowest contribution of nonhydrocarbon exports to GDP is Algeria, at only 1 percent of total exports in 2004.[24]

Some states in the region have slowly diversified their exports. Morocco and Tunisia export a wide array of products, and the export-product concentration of each has fallen drastically since the 1980s, especially during the 1990s, in tandem with an increase in international competitiveness of their products. Morocco's exports today, following a fall in the export of its main commodity, phosphates, include clothing and textiles; transistors and electric components; crude minerals and inorganic chemicals; petroleum products and fertilizers (including

Table 14.4 Maghrebi trade with the European Union (EU), 2008

	Exports to EU (% of total)	Imports from EU (% of total)
Algeria	52	53
Libya	77	48
Mauritania	37	46
Morocco	59	59
Tunisia	72	64

Source: World Bank, *Economic Integration in the Maghreb*, October 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Maghrebpub.pdf (accessed June 22, 2015), p. 9.

phosphates); citrus fruits; vegetables; and fish. Tunisia's exports include clothing; electrical equipment; footwear; agricultural products such as fruits, vegetables, and oils; minerals; textiles; and leather goods. For Algeria and Libya, the export product concentration index has remained very high, due to an almost exclusive reliance on hydrocarbons. Overall, despite improvements in Morocco and Tunisia, export diversification has remained fairly weak for the region. The bulk of the Maghreb's trade with the world is still conducted with Europe (see table 14.4). In recent years, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have been trying to diversify their trade partnerships to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, so as to decrease their vulnerability to cyclical changes in European demand and to financial crises such as that of 2008–9.

Trade Structures

Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the economies of Maghrebi states are highly complementary, there appears to be limited intraregional trade complementarity. This is a serious problem for regional integration. The Maghreb's inability to take advantage of economic complementarity is partly due to similarities in trade structures, especially for Morocco and Tunisia, whose export products are relatively similar.

Furthermore, there is little integration of Maghrebi trade into global production chains. If it had existed, such integration into global production chains might have stimulated large-scale production at the regional level, which would have necessitated integration.

Finally, there appears to be little standardization and harmonization of procedures and institutional capacity building (including training and information sharing) among the states of the region, even given the free trade agreements of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia with the EU.

Foreign Direct Investment

FDI in the region remains very low in comparison to other regions of the world, despite an increase in FDI in recent years. There are many reasons for this—for example, the relatively small size of the market of each Maghrebi state and the weak legal and bureaucratic investment environment. If the Maghrebi states want to build regional integration, they should pursue standardization of the common investment environment and promote their tempting market size of more than 90 million consumers.

Since 2000, Tunisia has received the largest amount of FDI, with a 59.4 percent ratio of stock to GDP in 2000 and 77.9 percent in 2010.[25] The trend slowed drastically after the 2011 popular upheaval, but picked up again afterward. From 2000 to 2010, Morocco's stock to GDP ratio increased from 23.0 percent to 46.2 percent, while that of Algeria increased from merely 6.5 percent to 12.2 percent in the same period.[26] According to a 2013 survey by the International Monetary Fund (IMF): "At nearly $6.5 billion (less than 2 percent of the region's GDP), the level of foreign direct investment in the Maghreb is low compared to that in other regions, such as Asia and Latin America" (see table 14.5 and figure 14.2).[27]

Table 14.5 Overview of foreign direct investment (FDI) in states of the Arab Maghreb Union, 2008

	Population (millions)	GDP ($ billions)	GDP ($ per capita)	FDI inflow ($ billions)	FDI stock ($ billions)	WTO member
Algeria	34.4	166.5	4,845	2.6	14.5	No
Morocco	32.1	88.9	2,769	2.4	41.0	Since 1995
Tunisia	10.3	40.3	3,903	2.8	29.1	Since 1995

Source: Tim J. Rogmans, *The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in the Middle East North Africa Region*, PhD thesis, Nyenrode Business Universiteit, November 8, 2011, http://www.nyenrode.nl/FacultyResearch/research/Documents/Dissertations/Rogmans_Tim_Dissertation.pdf (accessed June 22, 2015), p. 61.



Figure 14.2 Comparison of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in states of the Arab Maghreb Union, 1980–2012

Source: World Bank, "Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)", http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS (accessed 22 June 2015).

Foreign direct investment could be very beneficial to North Africa not only as a source of capital inflow, but also as a means of technology spillover, human capital formation, and job creation, as well as a means to stimulate enterprise development, international trade, and financial integration. However, for FDI to benefit the Maghrebi countries, it is important for governments to enact policies that would maximize foreign investment benefits while minimizing negative impacts on people and on the productive capacity of the economy.[28]

In order to increase their attractiveness as an FDI destination, the Maghreb countries have been urged by the IMF and other international institutions to integrate their economies, improve their business environments, harmonize investment laws, and make bureaucratic, legal, and judicial processes more transparent. However, they must be mindful of the potential negative effects of FDI and ensure that these investments contribute to local and regional development to the fullest extent.

Conclusion: Regional or Global Integration, or Both?

According to the World Bank's 2006 study *Is There a New Vision for Maghreb Economic Integration?*, the Maghrebi states, if they are to gain from regional and global trade, need to enact policies based on "comparative advantage, scale economies, import competition, knowledge spillovers, and FDI flows."[29] The World Bank also suggested that "multilateral integration through the WTO" is preferable to regional integration, because it "minimizes trade diversion, increases transparency for traders, and it gives countries recourse to the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO."[30] The World Bank recommended that the Maghreb countries pursue an "open regionalism" that involves "wider" integration beyond the region, that is, with the EU, and "deeper" integration by way of a substantial reform of service policy (infrastructure, finance and banking, and adjudication mechanisms).[31]

Is this a proposition that is worth pursuing, in the sense that it would bring more benefits to the North African countries and their peoples than would deeper regional integration? Unfortunately, the Maghrebi states lack the capacity to handle the challenges that wider integration might bring. Global integration would make the countries highly vulnerable to external shocks, such as the 2008–9 financial crises in Europe and the United States. A wiser option would be to secure regional integration, which might help dampen external shocks and also strengthen the bargaining positions of the region's members in global trade negotiations. Contrary to the recommendations of the World Bank, these countries may be better off taking the regional route, if they can muster the necessary political will to do so.

The path of global integration holds both rewards and risks, and the Maghrebi countries should take careful account of the latter. But given that political will for regional integration is absent, the wider option is the only one available for now, and is already being pursued in practice, notably through free trade agreements with the EU and the United States and through WTO membership.

The World Bank's approach to regional integration does not seem to take into account the political dimensions of regional integration and may thus not be helpful to the Maghreb region. Following the Arab Spring upheavals of 2011, rulers are very sensitive to the moods of the street and will, in the short term, do whatever it takes to keep the peace at home. This might mean maintaining the status quo, refusing to make hard policy choices that could bring long-term benefits to society, and resisting the opening of economic borders to neighboring states. Rulers may thus feel more comfortable working with trading frameworks that are beyond the region, such as those of the EU, and through bilateral agreements, even if the deals they sign are not necessarily the best deals possible for their countries.

The leaders of the Maghreb and elsewhere on the African continent cannot be trusted with making the right decisions at the right time. For this reason, a nonstate-centric approach to regional integration is necessary. The stakeholders must have a say on what needs to be done, how, and at what cost. Also, citizen involvement may force the hands of recalcitrant decision-makers who may be too focused on calculations of the regional power balance, or too busy with personal matters, to take the right actions and make the right policies to the benefit of their societies.

Notes

1. Population figures for 2013. World Bank, "Population, Total," http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (accessed March 20, 2015).
2. *Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union*, adopted February 17, 1989, entered into force July 1, 1989, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/regeco_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=201318 (accessed March 17, 2015).
3. Federation and union proposals involving Libya and Middle Eastern countries included the "Federation of Arab Republics" proposal among Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Sudan (1970–7), another proposal among Egypt, Libya, and Syria (1972–7), and a union between Egypt and Libya within the "United Arab Republic" (1973).
4. Waniss Otman and Erling Karlberg, *The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning* (New York: Springer, 2007), p. 30.
5. See the account given by government official Othman Kechride in "La Tragédie de Gafsa," *Leaders*, January 21, 2013, http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/la-tragedie-de-gafsa?id=10546 (accessed March 17, 2015).
6. International Court of Justice, *Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)*, decided February 24, 1982, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=330&p1=3&p2=3&case=63&p3=5 (accessed March 17, 2015).
7. For more on this, see Marie-Jane Deeb, "Inter-Maghribi Relations since 1969: A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers," *Middle East Journal* 43, no. 1 (1989), 25.
8. See, for example, Aaron Y. Zelin, "Know Your Ansar al-Sharia," *Foreign Policy*, September 21, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/know-your-ansar-al-sharia/ (accessed March 17, 2015).
9. The land borders were closed by Algeria in 1994 after Morocco imposed a visa requirement for Algerians following a terrorist attack in a Marrakesh hotel that

year, which Morocco swiftly attributed to Algeria. It was later found that the perpetrators were members of the Moroccan diaspora. A few years later, Morocco lifted the visa requirement, but Algeria has so far refused to reopen the border, which it said it closed due to extensive weapons and drug trafficking into its territory from Morocco.

10. Jan-Erik Lane and Hamadi Redissi, *Religion and Politics: Islam and Muslim Civilization*, 2nd ed. (London: Ashgate, 2013), p. 143.
11. David Lea and Annamarie Lowe (eds.), *A Political Chronology of Africa* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2001), p. 306. See also "Morocco Canceling Treaty Aimed at Union with Libya," *New York Times*, August 30, 1986.
12. Rone Tempest, "In Senegal and Mauritania, Ethnic Conflict Rages amid Talk of War," *Los Angeles Times*, June 3, 1989.
13. Terry Macalister, "Russia Stokes Tensions with the West by Cutting Gas Exports to Poland," *The Guardian*, September 10, 2014.
14. Trading Economics, "Arable Land," http://ieconomics.com/arable-land (accessed March 20, 2015).
15. For details on the objectives of CEN-SAD, see "CEN-SAD: The Community of Sahel-Saharan States," United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-sahel-saharan-states (accessed April 2, 2015). CEN-SAD's current members are Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia. Its headquarters are in Tripoli, Libya.
16. The initiative was named after Stuart Eizenstat, the US undersecretary of state for economic affairs, who proposed in 1998 the establishment of a US–Maghreb partnership that would break the European monopoly in the Maghreb without being a source of competition with Europe. See Stuart E. Eizenstat, "Transcript: Eizenstat June 16 Press Conference in Tunis," June 17, 1998, http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/1998/june/sd3618.htm (accessed March 20, 2015). See also Stuart E. Eizenstat, "US Foreign Policy towards the Maghreb: The Need for a New Beginning," *L'Anuari IEMed de la Mediterrània 2010*, European Institute of the Mediterranean, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions-en/historic-de-publicacions/anuari-de-la-mediterrania/sumaris/sumari-de-lanuari-iemed-de-la-mediterrania-2010-en (accessed March 20, 2015), pp. 17–22.
17. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Claire Brunel, *Maghreb Regional and Global Integration: A Dream to be Fulfilled* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008), p. 1.
18. World Bank, *Is There a New Vision for Maghreb Economic Integration?*, vol. 1, November 2006, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Vol1JANUAR22.pdf (accessed March 17, 2015).
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. Francis Ghiles, "The Maghreb Refuses to Share," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 2010, http://mondediplo.com/2010/02/15maghreb (accessed March 17, 2015).
21. World Bank, *Is There a New Vision for Maghreb Economic Integration*, p. viii.
22. World Bank, "Economic Integration in the Maghreb," October 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Maghrebpub.pdf (accessed March 17, 2015), p. 7.
23. Ibid., p. 8.

24. By comparison, the share of nonhydrocarbon exports in GDP was 41 percent in East Asia and 32 percent in the EU in 2004. See World Bank, *Is There a New Vision for Maghreb Economic Integration*, p. 7.
25. The stock of inward FDI as a percentage of GDP is used as an indicator of foreign capital penetration in an economy.
26. See ChartsBin, "FDI Inward Stock as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product," http://chartsbin.com/view/2271 (accessed March 17, 2015).
27. International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Closer Ties among Maghreb Economies Would Spur Growth," January 17, 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/car011713b.htm (accessed March 17, 2015).
28. Soumia Zenasni and Abderrezak Benhabib, "Foreign Direct Investment, Financial Integration, and Growth: Panel Data Analysis for North African Countries," paper presented at the 12th annual GEP Postgraduate Conference, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, March 25–26, 2013, p. 16.
29. World Bank, *Is There a New Vision for Maghreb Economic Integration*, p. xv.
30. Ibid., p. xvi.
31. Ibid., p. xvi. This study suggests four types of integration: (1) shallow integration, involving a regional trade agreement in which most tariffs and other trade barriers are eliminated for intraregional merchandise trade; (2) wider integration, involving a regional merchandise trading bloc with the EU; (3) deeper integration, involving investment climate reforms and service sector liberalization affecting trade in services and the efficient provision of key backbone services (such as finance, transport, telecommunications, energy, and water); and (4) deeper and wider integration, involving a regional trading bloc with the EU, service sector liberalization, and investment climate reforms.

Part IV

Comparative Regional Schemes: Lessons for Africa

Chapter 15

Necessary but Not Automatic: How Europe Learned to Integrate

N. Piers Ludlow

Introduction

With over 60 years of history behind it, the process of regional integration in Europe has lasted longer, and gone further, than that seen in any other part of the world. The instinct to look to the European example as a case study of integration, from which other regions might derive both positive and negative lessons, is therefore both strong and comprehensible. But any attempt to draw hard and fast lessons from the European story, or to assume any automatic parallels between the pattern of development observed and that likely to occur elsewhere, would be unwise.

Europe has taken a very distinctive European road to the level of unity that it has so far obtained; other regions, to the extent that they too want and need to develop patterns of cooperation, are always likely to follow somewhat different paths. They may gain some useful insights from looking at the European process from the outside and seeking to identify some of the factors that have helped to drive it onward, but European lessons need to be applied with attention to historical difference, and often tentatively.

The bulk of this chapter will analyze what happened in Europe to create and sustain the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). It then, very tentatively, suggests a handful of conclusions that might be derived from this European process relevant to African regional cooperation and integration.

Two Underlying Imperatives

The first underlying imperative that encouraged many politicians and political thinkers to start contemplating some form of European unity was the need to avoid war and to preserve peace within Europe, and thereby avoid the cataclysms that marked the period from 1914 to 1945.[1] Europe has long been a densely populated but highly divided region, holding within it a multiplicity of states, nations, languages, cultures, ethnic and religious groups, and social classes. The potential for the rivalry and friction between and among these different groupings to break out into actual war has hence always existed. But whereas eighteenth-century British historian Edward Gibbon could regard such periodic outbursts of violence as a healthy tonic and spur to development, the effects of war since Gibbon's time have been harder to view in a positive light.[2] The destructiveness of the two great wars of the twentieth century was so great—whether measured in terms of those killed and wounded, the physical impact on the landscape of the continent, the political or economic disruption caused, or the damage done to Europe's standing in the world—that a need to avert future large-scale conflict has become almost self-evident.

The second and equally important underlying imperative has been the extent of European interdependence in terms of what Europe ate, what it produced, and what it sold. Here too some of the basic realities have been obvious for centuries. Europe has been, at least since the Middle Ages, a region the prosperity of which has been built on extensive economic intercourse. But such economic interaction has always been vulnerable to outright conflict and the state-building processes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Historian Carl Strickwerda has written convincingly about the extraordinary level of interdependence, in capital, in labor, and in trade that grew up in Europe's heavy industry in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, only for this interpenetration to be swept aside by the outbreak of World War I.[3] Similarly, John Maynard Keynes, in his celebrated denunciation of the Versailles Treaty, described the fashion in which the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and its replacement with multiple new and separate states, was likely to destroy patterns of economic interaction that had developed over the centuries and upon which much of the prosperity of the region relied.[4] The underlying realities of how Europe fed itself, how it produced its goods, and where it sold the output of its factories and workshops thus led some thinkers and statesmen to the realization that the political separation of the continent into largely autonomous sovereign entities, unwilling or unable to open themselves fully to intra-European trade, came at a high economic cost. The solution once more would be to soften such divisions by establishing some type of overarching European framework that would facilitate commerce between different parts of the continent.[5]

The presence of such ideas did not lead automatically to the realization of a united Europe. On the contrary, in interwar Europe, those voices raised in favor of building Europe so as to preserve peace and to allow Europe's economic interdependence to be exploited were all but drowned out by the more powerful calls in favor of national or imperial self-reliance. The imperatives for unity were present in the Europe of 1918–39, but far from shaping the course of events, they were instead disregarded as the states of the European system tumbled into economic nationalism, autocracy, and ultimately war.

A Favorable Postwar Context

World War II and its aftermath created the conditions in which these long-present ideas of European cooperation and unity could move from the level of dreams to that of tentative and very partial realities. Exactly how this happened is the subject of intense and detailed scholarly debate, too varied and rich wholly to capture here.[6] But it is possible to identify five factors that helped bring this about: the decline of uncompromising nationalism, the rising communist threat, the decline of European global importance, the jockeying for position within Europe, and a renewed interest in economic planning by European states.

The Decline of (Extreme) Nationalism

The first factor was the discrediting of the virulent nationalisms that had helped speed the descent into war. Contrary to some of the first, slightly simplistic accounts, this did not mean that the leaders of postwar Europe despaired of the nation-state itself.[7] Rather the reverse. Politicians across Britain and the continent pinned many of their hopes for postwar reconstruction on the use of state power to plot the course of their recovery, to dampen the social tensions that had helped undermine democracy, and to rebuild a role for themselves in the recast international system.[8] This approach enjoyed widespread popular support. But such faith in state power did not wholly blind many among Europe's postwar political elite, or its wider population, to the realization that individual states, acting in isolation, had been unable either to avert the Great Depression or to halt the slide into World War II. The rebuilding of individual nation-states would have to be flanked with the construction of a new international order in which states would have to cooperate in order to preserve international prosperity and keep the peace.

Such an order might be universal and global—hence the hopes vested in the new structures of the United Nations (UN). But the divide opening up between the communist East and the capitalist West significantly reduced the effectiveness of global and UN cooperation. Thus, European leaders looked also to regional cooperation centered on the states of Western Europe. Whichever grouping was chosen, however, it was widely accepted that one of the root causes of the interwar crisis had been the failure of international cooperation, and it was therefore vital that such mistakes not be repeated in the post-1945 period.

The Specter of Communism

The powerful, even existential, opposition between Western Europe and the Soviet Union undermined global cooperation, but it was a second important factor in creating the conditions in which ideas of European integration could flourish. The communist danger was double-headed: the presence of sizeable communist parties in many Western European states immediately after World War II meant that the military threat from the Red Army was mirrored by the domestic threat of communist electoral triumph. Both aspects of this menace gave Europe an incentive to unite. An army the size of Moscow's could only be contained by multiple European states acting together (preferably in alliance with the United States).

Cooperation and alliance were hence vital. Furthermore, Europe's strategic vulnerability made all of the states of Western Europe highly conscious that were they to resume their internecine squabbling, as they had after World War I, they would all too likely find themselves sharing the fate of the countries of Eastern Europe. Again, structures would need to be built so as to prevent the type of fratricidal divisions that had beset Europe during the interwar period. The domestic threat, meanwhile, not only helped encourage Europe's noncommunist parties to come together to discuss their shared fears of the far left, but also made many realize that the only truly effective way of neutralizing the electoral appeal of communism would be the delivery of a level of economic growth that would be hard for any individual country to sustain if acting entirely alone. Economic cooperation would be a necessary ingredient in any long-term strategy to defeat communism's political challenge.

Another consequence of this outside threat was US enthusiasm for European unity—the United States regarded European unity as a vital element in strengthening Western Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet challenge and in establishing a partner in the incipient Cold War. One of the most striking features of the early European integration story is the importance of US sponsorship, encouragement, sometimes even downright bullying, in favor of greater integration.[9] The very word "integration," supposedly, was a US coinage, devised by a Marshall Planner, who was told that his European audience did not like his repeated stress on European "unity" and hence reached for his thesaurus in order to find a word that meant the same thing as unity but sounded a little less frighteningly radical.[10] Not all of this American persuasion proved wholly effective, and at times US pressure was even counterproductive. But, viewed with hindsight, US backing was a necessary if not sufficient condition for getting the integration process off the ground.

Europe's Declining Global Power

The combination of Soviet and US power also helped bring home to European elites how much the continent's stock had fallen in world affairs, a third factor in their renewed interest in integration. Those who ruled Europe in the early postwar decades had all grown up on a continent that regarded itself, with some justification, as being at the center of global affairs. The early postwar years were a rude awakening, as power shifted ever more clearly away from Europe and toward the two emerging superpowers. The fact that this same period also saw the increasingly rapid dissolution of Europe's colonial empires further reinforced this acute sense of power loss. Europe was accustomed to mattering in world affairs and to being a subject, not an object, of international diplomacy. Many turned to European unity as a mechanism that might lessen, if not reverse, this precipitous slide toward marginalization in world affairs.[11]

Intra-European Realignments

The fourth factor was European countries' need to reposition themselves vis-à-vis one another after the devastating impact of World War II. This was most obvious in the case of Italy and West Germany. Both perceived integration as a means of rejoining the European family of nations after the disgrace of defeat and occupation. For both countries, membership as equals with the French in a newly established EC was a major step toward reestablishing respectability and throwing off their pariah status. In both countries the political elite also believed that Europeanism would prove an ideal toward which their younger citizens could aspire without reawakening the nationalist demons that had previously led to disaster. And in both countries membership in a European entity would strengthen their tenuous hold on Western alignment.[12]

In Germany's case, *Westbindung*—as the policy became known—would guard against either a deal between the Federal Republic's allies and the Soviet Union in which Germany would be reunited in return for permanent neutrality, or a choice by some later German government to strike a similar deal with Moscow. A neutral Germany, hovering between the blocs, would constitute too great a temptation for either side to leave alone, and would become once more a cause of instability and conflict in Europe. Much better, therefore, to have a Germany firmly anchored to the West through integration.

For Italy, meanwhile, the danger lay within, in the form of the sizeable communist and socialist parties, both of which initially opposed any type of Western alignment. Joining a strong and developing European entity, solidly Western in its orientation, would minimize the dangers of the Italians electing a government able to call into question the Italian choice of April 1948 to look West rather than East in the postwar world.

France too was using integration to position itself, trading in its rapidly diminishing credit as one of the "victors" of World War II in return for a set of European institutional arrangements designed to prevent the German threat from disrupting its recovery and undermining its international position.[13] During the interwar period, France had tried confrontation with a defeated neighbor and found itself cast by world opinion into the role of vindictive villain—a reputation that had further weakened its position once Hitler came to power. After the war, France's initial attempt to adopt an even tougher punitive stance had collided head-on with the very different policy of Britain and America, both of which were intent on rebuilding a strong Germany. The emergence in 1949 of a potentially strong West German state was a stinging defeat for French postwar foreign policy. In such circumstances integration offered a clever way of changing course, attracting praise from the United States for France's new constructive stance, and of gambling on partnership and reconciliation with the Federal Republic rather than risking a renewed confrontation that France was likely to lose. France alone couldn't beat Germany; better then to join it.[14]

(Partial) Embrace of Economic Planning

Geopolitical arguments in favor of unity were flanked by a fifth factor: powerful economic motives. The basic economic interdependence of European economies was nothing new, but it took on new practical importance after World War II, and was increasingly appreciated by political decision-makers.

For instance, the amputation of the eastern third of Germany did mean that the new West German state was deprived of the agricultural heartlands from which it had previously fed itself. This offered a valuable opportunity for major European exporters of agricultural goods, like France and the Netherlands, to take on the role once filled by Prussia.[15]

But the more fundamental change was the way in which the awareness of European interdependence, which had once been the preserve of the private sector, now became a reality of central concern to the state itself. The trend of greater involvement of the state in the running of most European economies had been encouraged by both world wars, and continued into the postwar world as states embraced economic planning, nationalization, and extensive state welfare programs.

As a result, there was no repeat of the pre–World War I situation in which the interdependence and interlinkages perceived by private sector industrialists were disregarded or deplored by politicians intent on national aggrandizement. The single most identifiable clarion call for European action of the early postwar years came from that part of the French state in charge of planning the rebuilding of France, the Commissariat du Plan.[16] As Alan Milward observed, the scheme by Jean Monnet that led to the unveiling of the Schuman Plan in May 1950 was nothing other than a device intended to salvage the Monnet Plan—that is, the roadmap to French economic recovery drawn up by the head of the planning commissariat—and to prevent the programmed reconstruction of French heavy industry being disrupted if not destroyed by the reappearance of competition from German heavy industry.

Under the Schuman Plan, European controls would take the place of the fast-disappearing occupying powers' controls on German industry and help prevent a free-for-all in the heavy-industry sector from which Germany would likely emerge triumphant. The occupation controls were being lifted because the priorities of the United States had shifted from the punishment of Germany to its rapid reconstruction, and US preferences had won out over the ongoing French desire to avoid the reemergence of a strong Germany. The whole story of intra-Allied discussions among the British, Americans, and French over Germany's fate, from about 1947 onward, is a story of consistent French retreat from their earlier hard line and a grudging acceptance that Germany would once more reemerge. The genius of the Schuman Plan was that it accepted this "defeat" and turned it into a positive process from which France could derive both economic advantages and ideological prestige as the initiator of the integration process. One Monnet plan was thus intended to save the other.[17]

Crafting an Integration Plan

These factors could not have resulted in integration without a successful plan. Many different schemes and ideas were put forward in the first postwar decade, many of which failed to get off the drawing board, others of which never lived up to the high expectations that had surrounded their launch.

The ones that mattered were those that managed to bring together a winning combination of purpose, timing, structure, and membership. For example, the Schuman Plan focused on an important sector, characterized by both a long-standing rivalry between French and German industry and a short-term crisis brought about by the imminent ending of Allied controls on German production.[18] It was launched at a time when the German government was still weak enough to be interested, and the French government strong enough to act but already highly conscious of its dwindling leverage over its eastern neighbor. The proposed institutions were powerful enough to do the job they were intended for (controlling heavy industry) and exciting enough to look like a real advance toward European unity, but limited in their scope and hence not unduly threatening to the core of national sovereignty. And the plan's membership was large enough to matter, but small enough for agreement to be feasible. Crucially, four countries (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) joined France and Germany in establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), rendering their tense enforced cohabitation that much more tolerable, and giving some credibility to the rhetoric about "uniting Europe." But, just as crucially, the British did not take part, thereby cutting out of the picture a strong skeptic about the integration process with an established track record of watering down integration schemes. The ECSC member states (often known as "the Six") were almost the ideal grouping within which to launch a scheme of this nature.

In similar fashion, the planned European Economic Community (EEC) had a central purpose (the liberalization of European trade) useful enough and attractive enough to appeal to important constituencies within each of the participating states.[19] But its structures also had enough development potential within them to attract those who wanted a more political Europe and who had been disheartened by the 1954 failure of the European Defence Community (EDC).[20] The timing was also good, with the French government that had overseen the fall of the EDC no longer in office, but with the pro-European momentum that had built up behind the planned European army not having entirely dissipated. The EEC institutions shared plenty of DNA with those of the ECSC, but with substantially less supranational power, thereby reassuring some of those who had been concerned about the loss of sovereignty involved in the EDC. And the membership was once again the winning formula of the Six. The exclusion of Britain—which had been a real problem in an institution with a military purpose like the EDC, not least because of the likelihood of Germany quickly becoming the dominant military player—mattered much less in a more economic entity like the EEC.

Enduring Utility

How though have institutions created over six decades ago been able to preserve their relevance over the ensuing years? After all, the exceptional circumstances that facilitated their birth—Germany's temporary weakness and division, the Cold War, the internal left-wing threat within several European democracies, the vivid and still fresh legacy of World War II—have long since vanished. Why then have the European bodies that emerged in the immediate postwar period not vanished also? This question is all the more interesting given the multiple other ways in which Europe and the EC/EU has evolved and developed over its existence. There are many factors likely to have been responsible for the longevity and success of the EC/EU, but this overview will highlight the three most important: value, adaptability, and openness.

Value

The first key reason why the EC/EU has gone on being relevant is the enduring value of its core activity, namely, the establishment and maintenance of trade liberalization within Europe. This task has the huge merits of being attractive to governments and companies alike, almost attainable, but never complete.

The promise of barrier-free trade within a large and prosperous European market has continued to exercise a strong appeal, thereby helping to win the ongoing allegiance of the member states of the EC/EU, turning it into an important player in international commercial discussions, and allowing it to exercise a powerful magnetic pull upon all of those states that have found themselves geographically close to, but just outside, the integrating Europe. The risks of cutting oneself off from this large market continue, moreover, to act as a powerful disincentive to any state disillusioned with the integration process to withdraw from the Community/Union—as the current debate about "Brexit" within Britain clearly illustrates.[21] The enduring utility of the intra-European liberalization process as first sketched out by the Beyen Plan of the early 1950s has thus continued to play a key role in making the Community and then the Union worthwhile to belong to and dangerous to leave over half a century later.

The perpetual near-completeness of economic integration may seem to be a flaw, but it has provided nations with a continuing need to be involved with the EC, and later the EU, so as to remain part of the process. The EC had dismantled tariffs among its founding members by 1967. This had to be followed up by the negotiation and defense of the integrated European area's trade profile vis-à-vis third countries, by the policing of competition and other rules within the customs union, by the establishment of specialized policies (like the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP]) for those parts of the economy unable simply to liberalize in the fashion expected of most industry, and (especially in the 1980s) by a determined effort to rid the European Single Market of those various nontariff barriers that had partially undone the trade liberalization efforts of the formative decades.

Trade liberalization has also had powerful knock-on effects on other policy areas. Both the renewed emphasis on the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the emergence of what has become the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the Union's activity were closely linked to the drive in the mid-1980s to abolish the remaining barriers within a European Single Market.[22]

Adaptability

The Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the EEC, was remarkably short about the specifics of what the Community that it brought into being would do.[23] Some policy areas, like the establishment of a customs union, were set out in some detail; others, like an agricultural policy, were sketched in much more cursory fashion; and still others, like environmental policy—which today looms quite large in the activities of the EU—were not mentioned at all.

This did not matter, however, since the treaty was what the French call a *traité cadre*, a framework treaty, which set up an institutional system without prescribing exactly what such institutions would do. The exact nature of the treaty's endpoint was never spelled out. The famous objective referred to in the preamble, "an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe," is as vague and as unspecific as it is potentially inspiring. This was quite deliberate. In the short term it allowed a broad coalition to rally behind the original EEC scheme, ranging from those who were merely interested in trade liberalization and nothing more, to those who had little interest in commercial matters but instead regarded the new document as a high road leading rapidly to a full-fledged European federation—not to mention many others with viewpoints somewhere between these two extremes.

The open-ended nature of the Treaty of Rome has been equally important in the longer term, since the flexibility of the basic framework has allowed it to serve any number of policy goals and tasks that were unimagined by the founders. Monetary integration, wealth redistribution from the richer regions of the EC/EU to the poorer, foreign policy coordination, joint discussion of immigration, the funding of scientific research, or the establishment of student mobility schemes like Erasmus—the list of policy areas that the EU is now involved with that were barely referred to in the founding treaties is so long as to almost defy enumeration. Rather than being a precise instrument, carefully calibrated to execute one precisely defined task—and hence liable to become redundant once that task was complete—the Community/Union is instead like a Swiss Army knife, a multipurpose tool capable of being used for any number of policy operations, many of which had never been contemplated by those who drafted the initial treaty text.

The EC/EU has been able to take on these myriad tasks not just because of the adaptability and flexibility of its founding treaties, but also because its institutional system has been able to evolve, often without formal treaty change, so as to adapt itself to changing realities. The core institutional shape sketched out by the Treaty of Rome, with its four key institutions—the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice—and its basic method of establishing a corpus of European law—drawn up collaboratively by all of those taking part, but binding upon all of those who entered the system—have retained their validity throughout the years since 1958. But alongside such constancy there has been a huge amount of flux, both in the manner in which these institutions operate and in the fundamental architecture of the system. The rise from the mid-1970s of the European Council, a body not foreseen in the original treaties, but now arguably at the very core of the Union, is a case in point.[24] As a result of its institutional flexibility, the Community/Union has been able to cope with a vast increase in the number of policy areas that it deals with, a massive expansion in the quantity and complexity of the law-making and decision-taking that is required to carry out, and a prodigious rise in the number of participating member states. Had the basic mechanisms been less flexible, such a degree of change would most likely have overwhelmed the system entirely. Instead it has been able to adapt—albeit messily and sometimes slowly. Their adaptability allowed the institutions of European integration not only to survive, but to do almost incalculably more than the small, six-nation customs union Europe began to establish in 1958.[25]

Openness

Finally, the structures designed to cope with a relatively simple six-member-state Community in the late 1950s have had the merit of being open to the membership of many more countries. Enlargement has never been easy. On the contrary, on every occasion that an expansion of the EC/EU has been contemplated, there have been many on the inside of the Community/Union who have regarded the prospect with dismay, predicting dire economic, political, and institutional consequences. The idea of a trade-off between "deepening" and "widening"—between making integration more comprehensive and extending the EC/EU to include new member states—has become so well established in writing about the European integration process as to become almost a cliché. And after each round of expansion there have been many who have attributed all of the subsequent difficulties encountered by the Community/Union to the negative consequences of undue enlargement.

Despite this, however, the EC/EU has gone on expanding, from 6 to 9 members, from 9 to 10 and then 12, from 12 to 15, from 15 to 25, and most recently from 25 to 27 and then 28. Widening has thus become as constant a feature of the integration process as deepening, with barely a year in the Community/Union's history when it has not been an imminent prospect, a recently achieved reality, or sometimes indeed both at once. Nor, contrary to general belief, has this geographical growth been as destructive as the Cassandras have predicted. Rather the reverse, with new member states often bringing new policy priorities and new perspectives into the integration process, thereby encouraging rather than discouraging new initiatives. The growth of redistributive policies, such as the structural or cohesion funds, for example, is very clearly attributable to the first and second enlargements, which brought into the Community fold a number of countries, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, which were significantly poorer than most of the founding members and hence required sizeable resource transfers in order to be able to cope with closer economic integration. More fundamentally still, the increase in size of the Community/Union has played a key role in ensuring that it remains attractive and appealing to those already inside of it, as well as relevant in international discussions in a world ever more obsessed with huge entities like China or India. Would Germany be content were it still confined to a small European Community of six member states? And would the idea that the EC/EU really represented "Europe" as a whole be at all credible were its membership still restricted to the six Western European states that set it up? That the answers to both questions are so obvious is a strong illustration of how openness to new members has been a third crucial feature in preserving the vitality and relevance of the EC/EU in the six decades since its creation.

Outside Applicability

Do any of these reflections have a wider applicability than Europe? Are the factors that explain how Europe chose the path of integration—and are the reasons that it has opted to remain on this path ever since—of any relevance to Africa (or other parts of the world) in its experiments with regional integration?

There are many reasons to be highly tentative in making any such suggestions. The specificities of any particular region and the challenges that it faces in establishing the structures for regional cooperation are always likely to exceed the clear resemblances to what has happened and is still happening within Europe. But for what they are worth, this chapter will very cautiously advance six ideas derived from the European experience that might be of some utility to African policymakers as they too grapple with the challenges of regional integration.

Integration Is Not Inevitable

The first idea is that there is no automatic link between the objective need for integration and its realization. Interwar Europe needed to integrate as much if not more than postwar Europe. And yet, despite both the political and the economic incentives to follow this course—not to mention the presence of multiple plans and schemes designed to encourage just such a development—no such integration occurred. Instead, Europe became more divided rather than less, and ultimately descended into the destructive chaos of World War II.

In other regions, it will also not be sufficient merely to discern a need to increase regional cooperation; instead, a huge degree of political will is required in order to overcome the very basic reluctance of all nation-states to relinquish any portion of their sovereignty or national independence. The obstacles to integration are always likely to be many and formidable, and as such a potent combination of enlightened leadership and favorable circumstances is needed before such barriers can be overcome. In other words, the halting progress of many African regional integration schemes is no surprise.[26]

Integration Benefits from Multiple Incentives

Second, the European example suggests that a multiplicity of different incentives to integrate is a strength rather than a weakness. In Europe there was no single reason why the integration process began. Instead, different actors perceived different incentives at different times. Rather than being a problem, this was actually central to the success of the integration process. It was the very breadth of the EEC's appeal, its ability to attract the hopes of very diverse groupings, seeking seemingly divergent outcomes, that not only helped get the project off the ground but also has helped sustain it ever since. Needless to say, such underlying differences of opinion have periodically resulted in sharp internal disagreements. This in part explains why the history of European integration is so littered with crisis and dispute.[27] Yet the sheer variety of hopes vested in the integration project has helped keep it going and ensured that it still retains relevance, and utility, decades after its original inception.

In Africa, too, there is no clear consensus on a single reason to integrate. Instead there are a competing range of motivations, which vary from actor to actor and from moment to moment. This need not be a major weakness of the integration process. Rather it may actually be a source of strength.

Multiple Institutional Visions Can Coexist

Third, the competition between multiple institutional visions has been an advantage to Europe, rather than a disadvantage. One of the features of postwar Europe was the huge proliferation of competing cooperative schemes. Many rose and fell with great rapidity. Others lingered on, never quite fulfilling the hopes of those who had founded them, but with too much utility, or too much symbolic value, to be allowed to die.[28] Still others persisted in near-complete obscurity, performing helpful (even vital) functional tasks, but in a manner known only to a tiny minority of sectoral experts.[29]

This dense institutional landscape was a help rather than a hindrance to the early integration process. For one thing, successive institutions could learn from the institutional features, both positive and negative, of earlier structures. The nascent EEC, for instance, quite consciously sought to avoid some of the weaknesses that had beset its predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The almost Darwinian competition between different structures also helped ensure that only the most suitable flourished. Further, the presence of other international bodies relieved the fledgling Community institutions from trying to do too much, too soon. Neither monetary cooperation nor foreign policy cooperation needed to be handled by the Community during its first decade of operation, for instance, because the former was the preserve of the Bretton Woods institutions, the second that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[30]

The huge proliferation of overlapping regional structures within Africa of the early twenty-first century ought not necessarily be seen as a problem. Instead, rivalry and cooperation between these multiple structures, plus others that may yet arise, could reinforce rather than weaken the process of regional integration.

Starting Small Can Be an Advantage

Fourth, the European example also suggests that there can be significant advantages in starting small in terms of membership. An EU of 28 member states does now operate reasonably effectively, despite the lamentations of those nostalgic for the smaller, sleeker entity of 12 or 15. But it is unlikely that a Community so large would have got off the ground in the 1950s or 1960s. Far better instead to have begun with few member states—and few policy tasks—and to have learned to cope with both widening and deepening as time went on. The fledgling EEC benefited from the reality of the Cold War that made membership inconceivable not just for the many states trapped behind the Iron Curtain but also for countries like Sweden, Finland, or Austria that were neutrals in the East-West conflict, as well as from the initial choice of countries like Britain or Denmark to remain on the sidelines.

It might well therefore be the case that elsewhere too, including in Africa, successful regional integration need not initially involve all of those states that might potentially be included. Instead, starting small, operating within just a subregion, and handling only a minority of policy areas can help lessen the initial challenge and make success more realistic. Then, if the process works, others can join in at a later stage.

The Importance of Internal Support

Fifth, the recent difficulties of the EC/EU underline the importance of winning and preserving the support of the wider population for regional cooperation. The fragility of the EU's hold on popular consent could be seen as its greatest historical weakness.

The gap between the ideals of those who govern Europe and the ideals of those who are governed has arisen for reasons that are fairly comprehensible. The structures of the Community/Union are both baffling and distant from the lives of most Europeans. There has also been a recurrent temptation for all national politicians to claim credit for all the gains that integration has brought, while blaming the EC/EU for all the negative consequences of closer cooperation. And it is easier, and in the short term attractive, for politicians and to some extent the media to continue to talk to national populations about European politics in a way that emphasizes national autonomy and freedom of maneuver, rather than fully acknowledging the extent to which all of the EC/EU member states are dependent on cooperation with each other.

But whatever the reasons behind it, this failure fully to educate most Europeans about the realities of the integration process has already become an important check on that process—witness the periodic negative outcomes of referendums—and seems likely to cause future difficulties ahead. It is therefore an error that any other regional cooperative projects, including those in Africa, would be well advised to learn from and avoid.

The EU example does not suggest that doing this will be easy. But so great is the importance of winning sufficient public consent and comprehension that those piloting integration in Africa need to give very serious thought as to how to avoid Europe's mistakes in this regard.

The Importance of External Support

Finally, a sixth lesson touches upon the importance—and limitations—of external support for the integration process. Absent early US support, European integration would at very least have evolved differently and might not even have got off the ground at all. As a result, one might be tempted to argue that Europe's enthusiastic external sponsorship of African regional integration might also prove to be an important source of assistance and encouragement.[31]

A more relevant historical lesson, though, surrounds the very patchy impact of such outside cheerleading. While US backing mattered in the European case, it only proved effective in those instances when there was a sufficient degree of enthusiasm within Europe for greater unity, when it worked with rather than against the grain of what was already happening within Europe. Furthermore, the forms and methods eventually employed by the EC/EU differed greatly from those promoted by its outside sponsor.

Translated into an African context this would suggest that while EU backing may be of some utility, the main impetus for successful regionalism has to come from within. This is all the more so if African regionalism is to capture popular legitimacy. Europe can perhaps help from the sidelines, both as an example of an earlier integration process and as a provider of material assistance. But such outside factors will matter much less to the success or failure of region-building within Africa than the internal dynamics, the degree of strong and purposeful leadership, and the quest for popular enthusiasm.

Notes

1. Derek Benjamin Heater, *The Idea of European Unity* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Élisabeth Du Réau, *L'Idée d'Europe au XXe Siècle: Des Mythes aux Réalités* (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 2008).
2. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. H. R. Trevor-Roper (London: Sadler and Brown, 1963).
3. Carl Strickwerda, "The Troubled Origins of European Economic Integration: International Iron and Steel and Labor Migration in the Era of World War I," *American Historical Review* 98, no. 4 (1993), 1106–29.
4. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1920).
5. Éric Bussière, "Premiers schémas européens et économie internationale durant l'entre-deux-guerres," *Relations Internationales* 123, no. 3 (2005), 51–68.
6. See, for example, the chapters collected in Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *European Union History: Themes and Debates* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
7. For an example of such an early account, see Walter Lipgens, *Die Anfänge der Europäischen Einigungspolitik, 1945–1950* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1977).
8. Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000).
9. Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
10. Michael Charlton, *The Price of Victory* (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1985), p. 69.
11. Josef Becker and Franz Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945–1950* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986); Ennio Di Nolfo (ed.), *Power in Europe? II: Great Britain, France,*

Germany, and Italy, and the Origins of the EEC, 1952–1957 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992).

12. Clemens A. Wurm, *Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945–1960* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1995); Antonio Varsori (ed.), *La Politica Estera Italiana nel Secondo Dopoguerra (1953–1957)* (Milan: LED, 1993).
13. Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman: Homme d'État, 1886–1963* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986).
14. See also William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
15. Gilbert Noël, *France, Allemagne et «Europe Verte»* (Berne: Peter Lang, 1995).
16. François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: Norton, 1994).
17. Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951* (London: Methuen, 1984).
18. Klaus Schwabe (ed.), *Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, 1950/51: Beiträge des Kolloquiums in Aachen, 28.–30. Mai 1986* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988).
19. Enrico Serra (ed.), *Il Rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma: Actes du colloque de Rome, 25–28 Mars 1987* (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1989).
20. See discussion of the revised Pleven Plan in David A. Messenger, "Dividing Europe: The Cold War and European Integration," in Desmond Dinan (ed.), *Origins and Evolution of the European Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 43–5.
21. Barbara Böttcher and Eva Schmithausen, "A Future in the EU? Reconciling the 'Brexit' Debate with a More Modern EU," EU Monitor, Deutsche Bank Research, September 15, 2014, http://www.dbresearch.in/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000341324.pdf (accessed October 24, 2014).
22. N. Piers Ludlow, "From Deadlock to Dynamism: The European Community in the 1980s," in Dinan, *Origins and Evolution*, pp. 218–32.
23. The text of the treaty can be found at "Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957)," Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html (accessed October 24, 2014).
24. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, "Filling the EEC Leadership Vacuum? The Creation of the European Council in 1974," *Cold War History* 10, no. 3 (2010), 315–39.
25. The process of creating a customs union in Europe was begun in 1958, and tariffs and other barriers to trade were abolished in progressive stages, culminating in 1968. See John Pinder and Simon Usherwood, *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 18, 66.
26. For some of the difficulties encountered in Southern Africa, see Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: Zed Books, 2012).
27. Ludger Kühnhardt, *Crises in European Integration: Challenge and Response, 1945–2005* (New York: Berghahn, 2009).
28. The Council of Europe would be a good example of this phenomenon.
29. Like the many specialist bodies in the fields of transport, postal communications, and other international services. See Kiran Klaus Patel, "Provincialising European

Union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective," *Contemporary European History* 22, no. 4 (2013), 649–73.

30. N. Piers Ludlow, "The End of Symbiosis: The Nixon Era and the Collapse of Comfortable Co-existence between European and Atlantic Integration," in Giles Scott-Smith and Valérie Aubourg (eds.), *Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?* (Paris: Soleb, 2011), pp. 60–81.
31. The extent of the EU's backing can be gauged from Daniel Bach, "The AU and the EU," in John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, and Timothy Murithi (eds.), *The African Union and Its Institutions* (Auckland Park: Fanele, 2009), pp. 355–70. See also the chapters collected in Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

Chapter 16

Lessons from Asia: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Mely Caballero-Anthony

Introduction

The goal of achieving an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Community that lives in peace, security, and prosperity by the year 2015 is a lofty one. In the years since this goal was announced at the nineteenth ASEAN summit in November 2011, the optimistic regional mood has been tempered by security, political, and socioeconomic challenges confronting the regional bloc. These challenges have included: the simmering tensions over territorial disputes; challenges of political transitions in some ASEAN member states; widening development divides among and within states, as well as in transborder regions; and nontraditional security challenges such as climate change, food security, energy security, terrorism, and religious extremism. These challenges underscore the need for ASEAN to strengthen the foundations of regionalism in the region by getting to the roots of "community building" and decisively projecting an ASEAN community-building approach by 2015 and beyond.

The overarching goal of establishing an ASEAN Community has attracted significant interest within and outside the Southeast Asian region. To many observers of ASEAN, this adoption of a three-pillared community—comprising the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)—has raised the profile of the grouping as an important actor in the East Asian multilateral processes. ASEAN's elevated status in the wider region has since been depicted through the notion of "ASEAN centrality."[1]

Guided by the importance of truly understanding what building community in the region would entail, this chapter provides a shift from the traditional approaches and thinking used to understand trajectories of region-building and regional integration. Instead, I blaze a new regional trail—a discourse that centers on "community building." Against this backdrop, I interrogate ASEAN's experiences in the region.

This chapter first assesses ASEAN's region-building experiences. Next, it examines the various processes, mechanisms, and challenges faced in managing a transition period and the effects that such a transition has on a regional organization like ASEAN that is almost 50 years old. In developing a community-building regional approach, the chapter expands on the importance of factors such as: building a regional identity against the heterogeneity of the communities in each of the ASEAN member states; managing the differences in the levels of economic development in a rapidly changing global environment; providing assistance for ASEAN member states to reassess their basic foundations at the national level; helping to understand the meaning of "secure" communities among all of ASEAN's member states; refocusing and redressing regional development and security challenges; and looking at how to address growing regional societal divides that are entrenched in fault lines that could impede the realization of a meaningful ASEAN Community.

From Region-Building to Community Building

At the nineteenth ASEAN summit, held in Indonesia in November 2011, 45 years after the formation of ASEAN in 1967, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia proudly announced that ASEAN was now recognized as one of the most—if not the most—successful regional grouping in the world.[2] The 2011 summit was part of a year of celebrations for ASEAN. The year 2011 was also when the United States and Russia joined the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS is one of the latest ASEAN-led regional mechanisms, bringing together ASEAN's ten member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the three countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea), as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. Riding on this success, Yudhoyono encouraged his regional counterparts to "discuss and agree on the role of the ASEAN Community in the global community of nations, in order to equip the region to meet the global challenges ahead."[3]

The discourse in Southeast Asia on regionalism and region-building has significantly shifted to "community building." The notion of an ASEAN Community was first articulated in the late 1990s in the bloc's "Vision 2020" statement, which envisioned a concert of Southeast Asian nations that was "outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies."[4] The idea of community building received a further boost in 2003 with the adoption of the ASEAN Bali Concord II, which outlined a vision for an ASEAN Community founded on the three aforementioned pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.[5]

The three-pillar community defines its own blueprints that pave the way for ASEAN's regional vision.[6] The first pillar, the APSC, urges the people and member states of ASEAN to "live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment." The second pillar of the AEC calls for "a single market and production base" that is "more dynamic and competitive." And the third pillar, the ASCC, notes the need for an "ASEAN Community that is people-centred and socially responsible," to be achieved through "forging a common identity and building a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and harmonious."[7]

Historical Overview of ASEAN

This historical overview of ASEAN discusses how a region on the brink of Balkanization transformed into a concert of nations living in peace, stability, and prosperity. Much has happened in Southeast Asia since ASEAN was formed in 1967, with the long-term objective of establishing a "security community" there. Although its foundational declarations were not very explicit about its security role, ASEAN's formation was essentially a conscious effort on the part of its member states to establish an overall framework for managing conflicts, and the conflictual relationships that might give rise to them.

During that difficult period in the region's history, from the early 1960s until the establishment of ASEAN, relations between states were characterized by animosity and distrust. Malaysia and Indonesia went through the experience of *Konfrontasi* (confrontation) with each other, and Malaysia and the Philippines were involved in a bilateral dispute over the territory of Sabah.[8] As described succinctly by the late doyen of ASEAN studies Michael Leifer, ASEAN had for all intents and purposes become a "diplomatic device" for subregional reconciliation.[9] In a region that was once described as the Balkans of the East, the formation of ASEAN has been credited for maintaining peace and security in Southeast Asia for nearly 50 years. As a result, Southeast Asia has been regarded as one of the more peaceful regions in the world. The region's benign security situation ushered in a conducive environment for economic growth, and allowed ASEAN to become an important player in multilateral processes in the region. The latter is seen through ASEAN's initiative in establishing a number of regional forums on security and strategic affairs—the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit—as well as on economic and financial matters—including the ASEAN Plus Three (APT).[10]

ASEAN's success was mainly credited to the ability of its founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), to carefully manage their relations by preventing conflicts and avoiding escalation of potential conflicts such as territorial disputes. It did so by laying down some basic principles and norms for interstate conduct. These key norms are found in a series of ASEAN agreements and declarations, most notably the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, which established ASEAN; the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration of 1971; and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia of 1976.[11] These pioneering documents of ASEAN outlined the key norms advanced by the member states to define interstate relations.

Often referred to as the "ASEAN Way," these norms include respect for sovereignty, noninterference in the internal affairs of member states, and nonuse of force in dispute settlements.[12] Another important norm is that of "good neighbourliness and cooperation," characterized by member states' adherence to the practice of decision-making through consultation and consensus, and marked by informality and accommodation. This kind of decision-making process can be traced back to traditional practices of *musyawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus) observed in the Malay culture.[13] While the processes involved are often time consuming, the length of time they take is intentional and forms part of the critical socialization process that allows officials from different member states to get to know one another well. These processes are also important in promoting and developing sensitivity among member states, and allowing for the management of differences on difficult political, economic, and security issues.[14]

Challenges to Regional Peace and Security

The 1997–8 Financial Crisis and Other Crises

ASEAN's success and, more important, its approaches to maintaining regional peace and security were seriously challenged starting in the late 1990s, when the region was forced to grapple with a series of crises triggered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8. The region's experience during the crisis—a watershed in ASEAN's history—revealed how, in an interconnected world, a financial crisis can easily and quickly spiral out of control. Some of the impacts of the crisis included[15]:

- *Threat of total economic collapse:* While countries in the region were affected to varying degrees depending on their specific circumstances, in general the crisis dealt a severe blow to economies through massive public and private debt, rising inflation, massive unemployment, and economic dislocation. At the height of the crisis, ASEAN currencies depreciated by 30–40 percent. In the case of Indonesia, the rupiah depreciated at one time by as much as 80 percent.
- *Outbreak of ethnic problems and breakdown of public order:* The impact of economic crisis threatened the social fabric of multiethnic societies in ASEAN. This was seen in Indonesia when ethnic Chinese bore the brunt of public unrest in the wake of the unexpected economic downturn. The crisis also triggered ethnic tensions between Christians and Muslims in the Indonesian provinces of the Moluccas and West Papua.
- *Loss of political legitimacy and pressure for political change:* In Indonesia, the 31-year Suharto regime was brought down in 1998 within less than a year of the onset of the economic crisis, while other governments in the region faced serious challenges, as in the cases of Malaysia and Thailand.
- *Increased labor migration and tensions between ASEAN states:* The sudden economic downturn led to a mass exodus of labor migrants who had sought livelihoods within and across national borders. Some social scientists have referred to this migration as a "people's crisis."[16] The repatriation of migrant workers led to bilateral tensions, such as between Malaysia and Indonesia with regard to Indonesian foreign workers in Malaysia, between Thailand and Myanmar with regard to Myanmar foreign workers in Thailand, and between Indonesia and Singapore with regard to Indonesian foreign workers in Singapore.

- *Rising domestic violence and social problems:* This was particularly apparent among the communities that were severely affected by the crisis.

None of the affected ASEAN countries had anticipated the severity of the impacts, nor the spillover effects on the security of their respective regimes. But the effects exposed the inadequacy of ASEAN to deal with unforeseen regional security challenges.

Regional Crises Shape a Fledgling ASEAN Security Architecture

Aside from the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8, there were other crises that confronted the region. These were the humanitarian crises resulting from the political crises in East Timor in 1999; the emergence of transborder security threats, including transnational drug trafficking and human smuggling; environmental crises as a result of the transborder pollution that affected several states; health crises resulting from the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic in 2003; and “new” (at that time) terrorism and extremism threats triggered by the September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States. The region also witnessed devastating human security crises in the aftermath of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Indonesian province of Aceh, which resulted in the deaths of 250,000 people.

Just as ASEAN was coming to grips with the impact of these multiple crises, another unfolded in Myanmar. The Saffron Revolution in Myanmar in 2007 involved a series of violent demonstrations that convulsed the country. The demonstrations were led by the country’s Buddhist monks against the military regime, and resulted in a number of civilian deaths. A year later, in 2008, cyclone Nargis killed thousands in the country, a crisis aggravated by the perceived indifference of the ruling regime to the victims of the cyclone.[17]

During these crises, ASEAN came across as a “lame duck” with no security mechanism to assist or engage the region. This appearance was, in fact, the effect of one of the key regional norms of ASEAN: noninterference. Due to this norm, and the consequent need to consult with and gain the consent of any states that would be affected by ASEAN action, regional response is slow, and the ability of states in the region to act as a bloc when confronted with regional crises is hampered.

Another major handicap that confronted ASEAN was its lack of effective institutions to deal with these various crises. Given that ASEAN had been mostly concerned with conflict prevention, it was not surprising that its institutional development had been so limited. Institutions established by ASEAN were geared mainly for trust- and confidence-building measures among member states, and were largely a product of its experience during its formative years. ASEAN’s institutions were characterized mainly by regular official meetings, from the summit level of heads of state to the level of senior officials, and were mainly consultative. Regional mechanisms were designed mainly for promoting cooperation, but not for solving regional problems. It was not surprising that

ASEAN struggled to address the crises and challenges that it faced from 1997 to 2007, since these problems required much more than what a loosely structured organization could provide. At the height of the 1997–8 financial crisis, for instance, without a regional funding support mechanism, ASEAN had no regional recourse to resolve the liquidity crisis.

Toward an ASEAN Community: Reassessing ASEAN's Region-Building Approach

ASEAN's experience with this series of crises presented critical points of inflection for member states to seriously assess their approaches to, and modalities for, managing regional challenges. The first came in 2003, when ASEAN began to work on the idea of the APSC. The APSC was initially conceptualized as the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), proposed by Indonesia in 2003 at the ninth ASEAN summit while serving as chair of ASEAN.

The ASC was designed to provide a regional framework for members to handle security matters and disputes more effectively, and to raise the standard of security cooperation. ASEAN member states increasingly realized that most security issues in the region were transnational, that these challenges could no longer be addressed alone, and that it was not enough to rely on bilateral arrangements or on international fora for settling disputes among themselves. In short, the ASC was "meant to provide a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition that all [ASEAN] members should strive for."[18] Therefore, the ASC was transformed into the APSC in 2009. In attempting to develop its community, the APSC Blueprint was created, which proposed five areas of cooperation, or strategic thrusts: political development, norm setting and norm sharing, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and postconflict peace-building.

In an attempt to build a "cohesive, peaceful and resilient Political Security Community," the APSC Blueprint also committed ASEAN to a principle of "comprehensive security" that "goes beyond the requirements of traditional security but, also takes into account non-traditional aspects vital to regional and national resilience, such as the economic, socio-cultural, and environmental dimensions of development."[19] In regard to nontraditional security issues, the Blueprint states that "a key purpose of ASEAN is to respond effectively and in a timely manner, in accordance with the principles of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, including transnational crimes and transboundary challenges."[20] These statements make it clear that the APSC's conceptualization of security constitutes a departure from dominant security discourse in the region, in which "comprehensive security" has been characterized by its perception of the state as the primary security referent. Thus, the stress on nontraditional security issues became another important point of inflection as a number of human security issues that significantly extended the security referent beyond the state to include individuals and societies fell under its broader umbrella.[21]

The initiatives and proposed mechanisms within the APSC are significantly different from ASEAN's usual process-oriented, confidence-building modalities. The majority of its initiatives are problem-solving measures that involve, among other programs, the sharing of information; the development of certain types of regional surveillance systems for early warning on infectious diseases and natural disasters; the provision of relief and assistance in disaster management, rehabilitation, and reconstruction; and, even more significant, the aim of working toward more coordinated responses and attempts at harmonizing legal frameworks in order to address transnational crimes. Although these problem-solving efforts are still being developed, it is clear that, through the APSC, ASEAN is being "re-tooled" to respond to more complex security challenges.

However, there is another side to the APSC that is also quite significant, especially when viewed from the perspective of community building. According to its 2009 Blueprint, the APSC aims not only to "bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane," but also to "ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment."[22] Viewed in the context of ASEAN's history and the "ASEAN Way," the APSC ushered in new thinking about the kind of normative framework that would serve as the foundation for community building in Southeast Asia.

This evolving normative framework is reflected in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, 40 years after ASEAN's establishment. The charter allowed ASEAN to codify—and in the process, advance—the norms not only of interstate relations, but also of intrastate conduct. Respect for fundamental freedoms and the promotion and protection of human rights are clearly outlined in the charter.[23] This was followed by the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009, and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) in 2010. Arguably, these regional institutions present opportunities for the promotion of human security, by embedding a human rights culture in ASEAN, developing conflict prevention norms in the region, and encouraging development of the capacity of states to prevent and respond to the various protection concerns that might affect the security of individuals and communities in the ASEAN bloc.

The challenges are clearly huge in a highly diverse ASEAN, and the results after several years are still mixed. One concern is that, despite the pronouncements, a transformation in the way ASEAN states approach security is yet to be clearly seen. For example, despite the establishment of the AICHR and ACWC, as well as the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights, many ASEAN member states are still not signatories to the major international conventions on human rights and democracy.

On the other hand, the region has also witnessed the dramatic political transformation of Myanmar that began in the 2008 national elections. The country has been transformed from being a pariah state known for having one of the worst records of human rights violations, into a "promising" democratic state with a civilian leader and an elected national parliament in place. The April 2012 by-elections saw the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), win 43 of the 44 seats it contested (out of 45 vacant seats) in Myanmar.[24] Its leader, opposition icon Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi, became a member of parliament and a possible contender for president in the 2015 national elections. Moreover, Myanmar became chair of ASEAN in 2014, after having been bypassed in 2008 because of the aforementioned events that transpired during the Saffron Revolution.

Whither the ASEAN Community in 2015 and Beyond?

The ASEAN of today, compared with that of a decade ago, has certainly come a long way in building up its image as a credible regional body. Many observers have commended the significant progress that ASEAN has achieved in building regional capacity to address the different types of security challenges.

The thrust toward community building in ASEAN and the creation of the APSC have raised the bar for region-building in Southeast Asia. These efforts have also raised expectations for ASEAN to make more progress toward becoming a rules-based organization, with the ASEAN Charter as the foundation, while at the same time upholding the fundamental principles, values, and norms of ASEAN. The charter also emphasizes the need to transform ASEAN into a people-centered organization, sensitive to the challenges faced by its communities. This transformation will be possible only if ASEAN nations can work toward convergence of norms and values, such as democracy—a difficult task considering the different political systems of the ASEAN states.

Having been initially weakened as an institution and after the 1997–8 Asian financial crises, ASEAN is now claiming its centrality in the regional multilateral security architecture. Yet, as discussed earlier, as far as community building is concerned, ASEAN still has a long way to go. Aside from the goals of building a political and security community, there are many equally important issues that ASEAN must address if it is to also achieve its goal of becoming an economic and sociocultural community.

Economic Inequality and Insecurity

One of the most pressing of issues ASEAN faces is the need to promote and ensure economic security for its population of 600 million people. Narrowing the development gaps in ASEAN remains an elusive goal (see figure 16.1), with a large percentage of the region's population still living below the poverty line. Two of the ten ASEAN countries, Cambodia and Myanmar, are still among the poorest in the world, with per capita gross domestic products (GDP) of less than $1,000.

Within the ASEAN region, concerns have already been raised about the emergence of a "two-tiered ASEAN"—with the first tier comprising the six developed countries, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; and the second tier comprising the four less developed countries, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The gap between the average per capita gross national income (GNI) of the six developed ASEAN countries and the average per capita GNI of the four less developed countries reached a high of $19,500 in 2011.[25]



Figure 16.1 Human Development Index (HDI) in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 2008–12

At another level, there is the often ignored yet salient fact that many ASEAN countries have striking *internal* income disparities (see table 16.1), such as those between urban and rural areas and those between provinces, districts, and municipalities. It is important to note that it is also in the remote rural areas inhabited by ethnic and religious minorities that one finds the most deprived and the most vulnerable people.

ASEAN member states thus still have a long way to go in terms of achieving an acceptable level of inclusive growth. For ASEAN's less developed countries, reaching the level of development seen in the region's other countries will be difficult, and spurring equitable growth within a country, especially given the widening urban-rural gaps, will likely be just as challenging.

Unless ASEAN makes significant progress in narrowing the region's development gap, the notion of an ASEAN Economic Community among its own member states may not be fully appreciated. Narrowing the development divide is a strategic priority for ASEAN, and a key program to address this is the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Work Plan. ASEAN has already commenced the second phase of the IAI Work Plan (2009–15) to continue with measures outlined in the earlier phase, particularly in addressing capacity building and development of human resources. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done to significantly bridge and reduce the development disparities across the region, and to ensure that the fruits of integration are evenly spread.

Table 16.1 Income inequality in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Country	Gini coefficient before 2000	Most recently available Gini coefficient (year)	Income inequality
Brunei	NA	0.413 (2005)	Insufficient data
Cambodia	0.383 (1994)	0.444 (2007)	Increasing ↑
Indonesia	0.326 (1996)	0.381 (2011)	Increasing ↑
Laos	0.349 (1997)	0.367 (2008)	Increasing ↑
Malaysia	0.485 (1995)	0.462 (2009)	Decreasing ↓
Myanmar	NA	0.300 (2003)	Insufficient data
Philippines	0.429 (1996)	0.430 (2009)	Increasing ↑
Singapore	0.425 (1998)	0.472 (2010)	Increasing ↑
Thailand	0.429 (1996)	0.394 (2010)	Decreasing ↓
Vietnam	0.355 (1998)	0.356 (2008)	Increasing ↑

Sources: ASEAN, *ASEAN Community in Figures 2012*, March 2013, http://www.asean.org/images/2013/resources/publication/2013_ACIF_2012%20Mar.pdf (accessed April 9, 2015), p. 52 (table 41); Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013*, 44th ed., 2013, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/30358/ki2013.pdf (accessed April 9, 2015), p. 192 (table 1.14).

Conflict and Minority-Group Insecurity

Even in the postcharter ASEAN, there continue to be a number of communities that suffer displacement and other acute insecurities as a result of conflicts. Although there are efforts by concerned governments to find political solutions to these conflicts—with progress in some cases, such as the March 2014 peace agreement between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)—the conflicts have already exacted a high toll on the lives of people in the affected communities in the region.

In addition to the open conflicts that persist in the region, the complex ethnic and religious makeup of some countries in the region has led to the discrimination against and marginalization of some groups by others. In some cases, states have been responsible for discrimination against minority groups, or complicit in the violence perpetrated against them.

For example, the Rohingya communities in Myanmar suffer persistent insecurity. As noncitizens, Rohingyas are deprived of many fundamental rights, including freedom of movement, education, marriage, and employment. They are also exposed to human rights violations such as arbitrary detention, forced labor, rape, torture, and forcible relocation. Until the plight of the Rohingyas is addressed, the issue will continue to be a blight on ASEAN's goal of realizing a political and security community that is just, tolerant, and democratic.

It is important to recognize the link between conflict and development. Conflict-affected areas are among the worst performers in terms of poverty and human development. Persistent conflict makes it difficult to narrow the development gap, since it destroys the stability needed for people to build their communities. Without stability, the cycle of poverty will continue. Although poverty has seldom been a primary cause for grievances in ASEAN member states, the insecurities created by poverty have in turn acted as multipliers to conflicts. Sustained conflict and instability disrupt livelihoods and opportunities for education. In addition, where deep inequalities exist within and between states, conflict is all but inevitable (especially in borderlands), restarting the vicious cycle (on borderlands; see also chapter 4 in this volume). Hence, the presence of intractable conflicts contributes to the widening of the development gap among ASEAN member states.

Insecurity of Economic Migrants

As ASEAN continues to deepen economic integration, there are also the multiple insecurities faced by people on the move, such as the thousands of migrant workers who are vulnerable and in need of protection from human rights abuses and violence. While ASEAN has made some strides through the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, this convention remains weak unless all countries that are host to migrant workers observe and protect the rights of these communities. Importantly, protection will remain a challenge as long as host countries are unable to actually provide this protection and instead hide behind the cloak of noninterference.

Impact of Natural Disasters

The region also faces complex human insecurities brought on by natural disasters, such as cyclones and earthquakes. As the world adjusts to the new normal of intense weather patterns, the ASEAN region's vulnerability to frequent severe cyclones becomes more acute. This means that more people in ASEAN will need more protection from natural disasters, which in turn demands more efforts by governments to build capacity and make communities more disaster-resilient.[26]

This is certainly not an exhaustive list of the issues ASEAN faces, but suffice it to say that, in a rapidly changing ASEAN, the list of human insecurities includes issues of both development and security.

With the growing emphasis on people-centered development, one could argue that the region-building project of establishing an ASEAN Community raises the human and comprehensive development agenda right at the heart of each member's national policies. Thus, the goal of a secure, prosperous, and caring ASEAN can be realized only if states and societies share common social agendas.

Conclusion

As ASEAN's 2015 target for full implementation of the ASEAN Community approaches, gaps in terms of both development and security remain demonstrably wide between and within member states. Ongoing internal conflicts in some member states make the vision of a caring, sharing, peaceful, democratic, and tolerant ASEAN Community a distant reality. The realization of an ASEAN economic community is hamstrung by numerous practical, developmental, political, and societal challenges taking place in the different societies of ASEAN's member states. The formation of a robust ASEAN Community requires the translation of this vision into a realizable goal within and across societies.

Once again, ASEAN faces multiple challenges, with issues of development and security at the forefront. The cyclical and reinforcing effects of widening income gaps at the national and regional levels are compounded by protracted ethnic conflicts that perpetuate the insecurities of communities, and result in a lack of development. Indeed, the tasks at hand are enormous. They include: narrowing the development gaps among member states; assisting member states undergoing democratic transition; helping build capacity in governance and rule of law; and providing appropriate help in patching societal fault lines. Since the creation of any community is dependent upon societal dynamics, ASEAN member states must address political grievances and the widening economic and development gaps as prerequisites to the formation of a peaceful, democratic, prosperous, and caring ASEAN Community.

Notes

1. Despite common usage of the term "centrality," its definition remains unclear. Several framings of centrality, such as "fulcrum of evolving regional architecture" and "driving force" of regionalism, indicate the notion that this term implies. See Malcolm Cook, "ASEAN's Triumph," Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre Policy Brief, June 2011, https://www.adelaide.edu.au/indo-pacific-governance/policy/Malcolm_Cook.pdf (accessed April 21, 2015), p. 3; K. Kesavapany, "Special Lecture on ASEAN Centrality in Regional Integration," Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 26, 2010, http://asc.iseas.edu.sg/images/stories/pdf/asco07-10.pdf (accessed April 20, 2015).
2. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) brings together the ten countries of Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam.
3. ASEAN, "Chairman's Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit," November 11, 2011, http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/19th%20summit/CS.pdf (accessed October 16, 2014).
4. ASEAN, "ASEAN Vision 2020," adopted December 15, 1997, http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-vision-2020 (accessed April 20, 2015).
5. ASEAN, "Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)," adopted October 7, 2003, http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii (accessed April 21, 2015); ASEAN, *Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009–2015*, 2009, http://www.asean.org/images/2012/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf (accessed April 21, 2015).
6. The blueprints for each of the ASEAN pillars outline the measures and action-oriented plans to implement and realize the vision of an ASEAN Community.
7. ASEAN, *Roadmap for an ASEAN Community*, pp. 5, 21, 67.
8. For more about the history of ASEAN and background about the political and security environment that had defined the regional dynamics, see, for example, J. A. C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesian-Malaysian Dispute, 1963–1966* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974); Arfinn Jogensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in Southeast Asia* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982); Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990). For more recent works on ASEAN, see also Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London:

Routledge, 2001); Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security beyond the ASEAN Way* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2005).

9. Michel Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 19.
10. The ASEAN Plus Three brings together the ten countries of ASEAN with China, Japan, and South Korea. The EAS includes the ten ASEAN states plus eight other countries: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. The ASEAN Regional Forum brings together 26 countries and the European Union (EU): the ten ASEAN states, ASEAN's ten dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the United States), plus Bangladesh, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste.
11. For details of ASEAN documents, see ASEAN, *Handbook on Selected ASEAN Political Documents: New Edition*, 2003, http://www.asean.org/archive/pdf/HBPDR.pdf (accessed April 1, 2014).
12. See ASEAN, *The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)*, adopted August 8, 1967, http://www.asean.org/component/zoo/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration (accessed April 21, 2015); ASEAN, *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia*, adopted February 24, 1976, http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3 (accessed April 21, 2015).
13. Tobias Nischalke, "Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post-Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community," *Pacific Review* 15, no. 1 (2002), 89–117. See also Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 1 (1998), 38–66.
14. Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement," p. 59.
15. See, for example, Jürgen Ruland, "ASEAN and the Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism," *Pacific Review* 13, no. 3 (2000), 421–51; Jeannie Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," Adelphi Paper no. 323 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999); John Garofano, "Flexibility or Irrelevance: Ways Forward for the ARF," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21, no. 1 (1999), 74–94. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security beyond the ASEAN Way.*
16. See, for example, Amartya Sen, "Human Security," in Japan Centre for International Exchange (JCIE) (ed.), *The Asian Crisis and Human Security* (Tokyo: JCIE and ISEAS, 1998).
17. See, for example, ASEAN, *A Bridge to Recovery: ASEAN's Response to Cyclone Nargis*, July 2009, http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/bridge-recovery-aseans-response-cyclone-nargis (accessed October 17, 2014).
18. Fabiola Desy, Unidjaja, "Indonesia Proposing ASEAN Security Community Concept," *Jakarta Post*, June 16, 2003, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2003/06/16/indonesia-proposing-asean-security-community-concept.html (accessed November 23, 2014).
19. ASEAN, *ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint*, 2009, http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf (accessed April 20, 2015).
20. Ibid., p. 14.
21. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Non-traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC)," in Ralf Emmers (ed.), *ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 27–42.

22. ASEAN, *Political-Security Community Blueprint*, pp. 1, 14.
23. ASEAN, *The ASEAN Charter*, adopted November 20, 2007, entered into force December 15, 2008, http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf (accessed June 29, 2015).
24. Esmer Golluoglu, "Aung San Suu Kyi Hails 'New Era' for Burma after Landslide Victory," *The Guardian*, April 2, 2012.
25. Mark McGillivray, "Narrowing the ASEAN Development Gap: Drivers and Policy Options," http://aadcp2.org/uploads/user/6/technicalReports/NDG/NDG_Presentation_Sustineo.pdf (accessed April 1, 2012), p. 7.
26. See ASEAN, *A Bridge to Recovery*.

Chapter 17

Lessons from Latin America: MERCOSUR

Laura Gómez-Mera

Introduction

The Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), or Southern Common Market, was once regarded as among the most successful examples of the new regionalism among developing countries. But the unsteady evolution of Latin America's common market since the 1990s offers several lessons for African countries. It sheds light on both the challenges and the opportunities that developing countries face in the construction and maintenance of regional groupings in a context of increased economic interdependence and asymmetric power distribution. Indeed, the case of MERCOSUR is particularly relevant to some African groupings, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), given the prevailing asymmetries of power among member states.

This chapter begins by providing a brief overview of MERCOSUR's troubled history. After a promising start in the early 1990s, MERCOSUR witnessed a progressive erosion of its economic and institutional relevance, leading many to predict its demise. Contrary to these pessimistic forecasts, however, the region's states intervened repeatedly to "relaunch" the bloc and ensure its survival.

In recent years, MERCOSUR has witnessed a decline in commercial friction among its members and has continued to expand in membership and institutional structure. Yet the dynamics of cooperation within the bloc suggest that persistent problems have undermined the quality and stability of regional cooperation. In fact, for some, MERCOSUR is currently little more than a "fractious" and "unsteady" political alliance.[1] This chapter assesses the factors that have plagued MERCOSUR since the 1990s.

The chapter also discusses how MERCOSUR's troubled existence (and persistence) could illuminate the experience of Africa's regional integration efforts. I will focus on four aspects: (1) the centrality of systemic incentives—in particular, perceptions of external vulnerability—in explaining the emergence and endurance of the regional regime; (2) the absence of a responsible regional leader; (3) the gap between discourse and rhetorical support for regionalism and actual implementation; and (4) the challenges that the proliferation of overlapping agreements in the Americas create for regional cooperation in the Southern Cone.

Historical Overview of MERCOSUR

The origins of regional economic cooperation in the Southern Cone can be traced back to the process of Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement initiated in the late 1970s. The signing of a number of nuclear agreements in 1979 marked a shift away from historical mistrust and rivalry between the two countries.

Yet the institutionalization of security and economic links did not take off until the reestablishment of democracy in both countries in the mid-1980s. In 1986, Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín and his Brazilian counterpart, José Sarney, signed the Act for Brazilian-Argentine Integration, which established the Programa de Intercambio y Cooperación Económica (PICE, Exchange Programme and Economic Cooperation). The agreement consisted of a number of bilateral protocols aimed at promoting trade integration at the sectoral level. The Treaty of Integration and Cooperation and the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development followed in 1988 and 1989 respectively, envisaging the creation of a free trade area (FTA) between Argentina and Brazil by 1999. However, further progress in the process of integration soon came to be constrained by the domestic economic crises confronted by the two countries.[2]

The relaunch and reinvigoration of bilateral cooperation, after its stagnation in the late 1980s, was led by the administrations of Carlos Menem in Argentina and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil. The two new presidents introduced substantive methodological changes in the process of integration, broadening its scope and accelerating its pace. In 1990 they signed the Buenos Aires Act, which called for the establishment of a common market by the end of 1994. In March 1991, they invited smaller neighbors Uruguay and Paraguay to join them in the signing of the Treaty of Asunción (TOA), which formally gave birth to MERCOSUR.[3] The treaty abandoned the sectoral approach of the PICE in favor of a program of automatic across-the-board tariff reduction, and envisaged the creation of a customs union by January 1995. The systematic implementation of liberalization agreements resulted in unprecedented levels of trade interdependence within the bloc. In December 1994, MERCOSUR members finalized negotiations on a common external tariff (CET), turning the bloc into a customs union in January 1995.

Nevertheless, the momentum of the early 1990s was not sustained. The second half of the decade saw a progressive deterioration of members' commitment to the process of integration and a deceleration in intrabloc interdependence.[4] The devaluation of the Brazilian currency in January 1999 is usually viewed as a turning point in the history of MERCOSUR. The Brazilian currency crisis, which coincided with a deterioration in international and domestic economic conditions, gave way to a highly conflictual period in relations between the bloc's two largest countries, Argentina and Brazil.[5] The recurrence of commercial and diplomatic friction within the bloc led many to doubt its longer-term sustainability.[6]

Despite joint attempts to relaunch the project during the first half of 2000, the worsening of the economic and political crisis in Argentina prevented progress in the implementation of regional commitments. After a short impasse, a new instance of conflict arose in March 2001, as a consequence of the Argentine government's decision to take measures entailing a perforation of the CET. The 2001–2 Argentine crisis and debt default brought the process of economic integration to a standstill.[7] Intraregional trade levels decreased from \$32 billion in 2000 to \$20.4 billion in 2002.[8] By April 2002, Argentina had fallen from second to fourth place in the ranking of destinations for Brazilian export products, and Brazil was losing its position as the principal buyer of Argentine goods.[9]

The gradual improvement in national and regional economic conditions since 2003 allowed national leaders to refocus attention on the integration process. In 2003, Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his Argentine counterpart, Nestor Kirchner, signed a number of agreements signaling their commitment to reconstruct and re-relaunch MERCOSUR.[10] In addition, they announced plans for the establishment of a MERCOSUR Dispute Settlement Tribunal, an important step toward strengthening the institutionalization of the bloc.

A progressively favorable external environment has also contributed to the recovery in levels of commercial exchange. And yet, not only has trade friction continued in the past decade and a half (2000–15), but diplomatic tension and strategic dissonance among MERCOSUR partners seem to have deepened as well. The decreasing commercial relevance of the bloc for members, particularly for Brazil and Argentina, has further contributed to perceptions that the bloc has become primarily a political alliance and not one to promote trade. These criticisms were reinforced by the recent and controversial admission of Venezuela into the bloc as a full member, made possible by the suspension of Paraguay. Nevertheless, MERCOSUR, now more than two decades old, continues to feature prominently in the foreign policy agendas and discourse of governments in the region, particularly of Brazil and Argentina.[11]

Lessons for Africa

External Threats Are Not Sufficient to Ensure Stable and Thorough Regional Integration

One of the implications that can be drawn from an examination of the long-term history of MERCOSUR is that systemic incentives, or more specifically the constraints and opportunities of the broader international system, could facilitate the emergence and continuity of regional regimes. The creation and maintenance of MERCOSUR has been to a great extent a defensive strategic response by South American countries confronted by the highly asymmetric distribution of power in the international system. A shared sense of external vulnerability among countries in the region has facilitated their convergent interests in preserving MERCOSUR as a vehicle for increasing leverage in the international system.[12]

However, MERCOSUR's history clearly shows that systemic incentives alone are insufficient to ensure the stability and success of regional cooperation. As I have argued elsewhere, regionalism in the Southern Cone has been driven primarily by defensive incentives—that is, by South American countries' attempts to increase their leverage in a highly asymmetric hemispheric system.[13] In the early 1990s, MERCOSUR was conceived as a defensive response to external powers and perceived extraregional threats, or more specifically as an attempt to balance the power and influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Toward the end of the decade, member states' determination to uphold MERCOSUR and avoid its collapse despite its declining economic and institutional relevance also reflected defensive considerations.

Moreover, a series of external developments in the early 2000s, including progress in negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, served to further underline perceptions of joint vulnerability among South American countries and deepened incentives to preserve the regional partnerships.[14] In particular, members had a shared interest in maintaining regional unity so as to enhance their leverage in hemispheric, multilateral, and interregional negotiations with developed countries.

After 2003, the structure of the international and regional systems changed significantly, and so did the ways this change was interpreted by national foreign policy elites. On the one hand, the more assertive pursuit of global power preponderance by the United States, and the declining strategic relevance of the region, further underscored the defensive rationale of the regional partnership. Indeed, during this period, MERCOSUR partners attempted to collaborate more actively in extraregional fora in order to enhance their leverage and obtain more balanced outcomes. Under Brazil's more assertive leadership, the bloc was successful in resisting the US position on the FTAA, leading to a collapse of negotiations in 2005. South American countries disagreed with several aspects of the hemispheric integration project, especially its provisions on agriculture, intellectual property rights, and competition and investment policies. In addition, the left-wing governments of Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil opposed the initiative on ideological grounds. Around the same time, other asymmetric negotiations that South American countries were involved with, such as talks with the European Union (EU) and at the World Trade Organization (WTO), also reached an impasse.

On the other hand, as preferential negotiations with developed countries lost relevance, an important external source of incentives for intrabloc coordination and convergence eroded. The weakening of joint defensive incentives resulted in some degree of strategic dissonance within the bloc, as partners adopted divergent responses to the constraints and opportunities posed by the international system, and in particular to US preponderance. Divergence between Argentine and Brazilian positions in subsequent multilateral trade negotiations illustrate this point.

While the bloc retains its defensive rationale, the two largest members, Argentina and Brazil, have both looked beyond the region to diversify their commercial links. Brazil, in particular, has widened its strategic focus considerably, establishing partnerships with other large emerging economies.[15] Apart from its ongoing role coordinating the Group of 20 (G-20), Brazil signed a commercial agreement with India and South Africa in 2004, the so-called IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) initiative, and pursued closer relations with other countries of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) bloc, particularly China, Russia, and India. Under President da Silva, Brazil also actively tried to enhance its standing and salience in the international system. As Brazil's national interests shifted and acquired an increasingly global scope, MERCOSUR lost the former strategic and commercial relevance it once had in Brazilian foreign policy. In response, Argentina launched its own "multipolar" strategy of international insertion, aimed at increasing the access of Argentine products, such as soy beans, wheat, maize, and foodstuffs, to world markets.[16]

Attempts to offset extraregional powers and threats have spurred attempts at regional integration in both the developed and the developing world. However, as the case of MERCOSUR demonstrates, though systemic incentives may provide motivations for the signing of regional agreements and the creation of regional institutions, they are, by themselves, insufficient to ensure their implementation and adequate functioning. In the absence of careful attention to deepening economic and commercial interdependence at the regional level and promoting support by domestic actors and coalitions, external pressures by themselves will at best result in shallow or empty political agreements. As Diana Tussie put it: "Defensive regionalism as a contending project is not a grand strategy and remains far from crystallized; it is rather diverse and brittle, with overlapping and competing interests in a state of flux."[17]

In Asymmetric Agreements, Responsible Regional Leadership Is Essential

Another factor conditioning the nature of regional groupings is intraregional power asymmetries. Regional cooperation initiatives tend to differ in terms of the degree of asymmetries among member states as well as the extent to which pivotal powers serve as institutional focal points and regional paymasters.[18] From this perspective, the existence of a benign regional leader that is willing and able to perform these functions of political and economic focus significantly increases the chances of success for regional integration initiatives.

MERCOSUR is characterized by major power asymmetries among its members. Brazil represents almost three-fourths of the bloc's total output and population, which reached $3.48 trillion and 282 million people in 2013. Brazil's regional hegemony has had an ambiguous effect on its evolution and stability. The country's regional preponderance has worked, indirectly, to promote regional cooperation. Aware of Brazil's relative power advantage in South America, Brazilian foreign policy elites have historically sought to consolidate their country's power and influence within the region.[19] In the 1990s and early

2000s, Brazil's aspirations for a more pivotal role in South America and beyond converged with the maintenance and strengthening of MERCOSUR. Brazil viewed the bloc as a vehicle for achieving these strategic goals.

However, Brazil's preponderance has not translated into active, responsible leadership. While possessing the economic and political resources to bear the costs of promoting and maintaining regional cooperation, Brazil has lacked the political will to do so.[20] Several analysts have argued that Brazil has taken advantage of its relative strength to dictate the pace and scope of the process of integration.[21]

As part of its strategy to pursue regional hegemony and global salience more assertively, the da Silva administration introduced a series of mechanisms aimed at promoting a balanced distribution of gains within the bloc, which could be interpreted as indicating Brazil's readiness to bear the costs of exercising more constructive regional leadership. However, many of these initiatives have yet to be fully implemented.

Indeed, while agreeing to create compensation mechanisms in order to keep MERCOSUR going, the Brazilian foreign policy elite has only reluctantly agreed to allow regional institutions to become more autonomous, or to take more concrete steps toward revitalizing the bloc. Brazil remains far from the role of benign leader and continues to maintain quite a self-serving position toward MERCOSUR, seeking to benefit from the reputational and legitimacy effects of being recognized as a regional power, but refusing to face the costs of more active leadership in constructing and maintaining regional order. In this sense, Brazil's self-interested project of regional leadership has had an ambiguous impact on the MERCOSUR regime, contributing to its survival, but also to its ineffective and weak form.

The case of MERCOSUR sheds light on the adverse consequences that the presence of a reluctant or irresponsible regional leader in an asymmetric agreement can have on regional cohesion and integration. Brazil's preponderance and its unwillingness to act as a focal point or leader in the construction and maintenance of regional order have fostered resentment among weaker partners, as evidenced by their reluctance to support some of Brazil's global aspirations, such as its attempt to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and its bid for directorship of the WTO.[22]

In addition, Brazil has led weaker partners to engage in balancing strategies, typically including the search for closer ties with other powerful states, such as the United States and Venezuela. In the early 1990s, Argentina sought to offset its strong economic and strategic dependence on Brazil by bandwagoning with the United States. More recently, however, Argentina has attempted a similar balancing strategy with Venezuela, which has deepened Argentina's rivalry with Brazil.[23] Uruguay and Paraguay have also played "the US card" to balance against their larger MERCOSUR partners. In 2006, for example, Uruguay threatened to leave MERCOSUR and to sign a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States.[24]

These attempts at balancing by weaker partners increase friction and divergence within the bloc, but it is also believed that they have no major impact on

Brazil's overall project to become a salient player in the international system. Andrés Malamud, for example, argues that despite Brazil's failure to gain acceptance as a regional leader, increasingly it "is recognized as an emergent global power by the established world powers."[25] Balancing strategies could therefore further erode Brazil's interest in MERCOSUR and lead to even greater indifference, with potentially serious consequences for the bloc's future.

Implementation Deficits Lead in the Long Run to Eroded Legitimacy and Credibility

Another feature of MERCOSUR that is certainly not worth emulating is the wide gap that has always existed between discourse and political statements of support for integration, and actual implementation of these pledges. Examples abound. MERCOSUR's leaders are extremely fond of referring to the bloc as their "destiny," a "strategic alliance," and "the most transcendental political decision in our history."[26]

But, in practice, implementation of trade liberalization commitments and other trade disciplines has been uneven and subordinated to states' domestic political and economic priorities. Despite impressive progress toward the completion of the free trade area in the first few years following the signing of the TOA in 1991, member countries were allowed to present lists of products that they wished to exclude from the automatic trade liberalization program. This led to a number of "sensitive" sectors, including agricultural products, textiles, and footwear, receiving special treatment from the beginning.[27] In addition, when negotiating the CET several sectors were also subjected to special regimes and exemptions. While some of these exceptions have been removed, new ones have been added in recent years.[28] Thus, MERCOSUR remains at best an imperfect, hole-filled customs union.

Perhaps more consequential, MERCOSUR partners have exhibited a tendency to reverse and violate agreements at their convenience. With increasing frequency since the mid-1990s, national governments have defected from regional commitments by imposing restrictions on intraregional trade, or introducing unilateral changes in the CET. While some of these unilateral violations were largely inconsequential, several of the measures established toward the end of the decade triggered intense commercial and diplomatic crises, such as the dispute over restrictions on footwear products in 1999 and the dispute over the common external tariff in 2001.[29] However, these recurrent disputes were typically resolved swiftly through diplomatic channels, sometimes involving company chief executives, who rushed to reaffirm their determination to relaunching (and re-relaunching) the project. As a result, repeated violations have generally gone unpunished and have come to be viewed as a normal or acceptable part of the integration process.

In recent years, rather than addressing outstanding issues on the regional agenda, MERCOSUR leaders have launched a series of new and increasingly ambitious initiatives, such as the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) in 2000, the establishment of a regional parliament in 2000 and the creation of a permanent court of appeal and a Structural Convergence Fund.[30] In 2004, led by Brazil, MERCOSUR countries joined the South American Community of Nations (SACN), with the goal of integrating the whole subcontinent.[31] Moreover, after many years of negotiations, Brazil finally agreed in 2006 to the creation of a system of safeguards within the bloc. Although the Competitive Adaptation Mechanism (CAM) was allegedly aimed at increasing flexibility, it also gave members the potential to introduce restrictions within a context of formal legality. The persistent gap between stated goals and the actual steps taken to materialize them may not have immediate consequences for national leaders.

But in the long run, this overreliance on empty promises erodes the credibility and legitimacy of South American regionalism. While doubts about MERCOSUR's prospects are far from new, increasingly scholars have suggested that regionalism in Latin America more generally may have reached its peak. For example, scholars Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini argue that "Latin American regionalism is not evolving toward yet another paradigm but it is instead rolling onto itself, either spilling around without deepening or going back to standard cooperation arrangements."[32] Along similar lines, Nicola Phillips and Germán Prieto talk of the "demise" of regionalism and its transformation into a "rhetorical regionalism of sorts." Regionalism, in their view, may be serving "a set of political objectives but it can no longer be seen as playing a significant role in driving processes of structural political-economic change in the region."[33]

The Proliferation of Overlapping Agreements: Increased Complexity and Fragmentation

Latin America as a whole, and not just MERCOSUR, offers another important lesson to African countries regarding the consequences of the proliferation of overlapping agreements among countries in the region. Like Africa and other regions, Latin America in the past two decades has witnessed an unprecedented surge in the number and scope of regional integration agreements, resulting in a complex "spaghetti bowl" of trade and economic relations (see figure 17.1).

This expanding web of regional and bilateral agreements reflects the strong faith that Latin American leaders continue to have in institutions and cooperation in general. However, as a growing literature in international relations has cautioned, it is unclear how these parallel and overlapping regimes interact with one another and what the consequences of these interactions are for the stability and quality of interstate cooperation. On the one hand, growing international regime density and complexity may have positive feedback effects that enhance cooperation and the effectiveness of existing institutions. On the other, institutional overlap could encourage self-interested behavior and competition among actors and regimes, ultimately undermining the success of cooperative initiatives.[34]

The evidence from Latin America seems to suggest that the proliferation of overlapping and intersecting economic agreements has undermined the stability



Figure 17.1 Multiple memberships and overlapping agreements in Latin America

and success of cooperation in the region in at least three ways. First, by introducing legal fragmentation and rule ambiguity, regime complexity has exacerbated implementation and compliance problems in Latin American regional cooperation initiatives. While the spread of preferential agreements has resulted in significant trade liberalization among countries in the region, the surge in overlapping rules has increased transaction costs for both private actors and governments.[35] The fact that many of these agreements differ in their market disciplines, including trade liberalization schedules, investment rules, rules of origin (ROOs), and safeguard measures, further complicates the scenario for traders, investors, and private sector actors. Indeed, the administrative and technical costs of compliance and implementation grow dramatically with the signing of asymmetrical agreements that go beyond traditional trade issues, such as intellectual property, investment and competition policies, and labor and environmental standards.

Apart from increasing the technical costs of compliance, international regime complexity also influences the *politics* of implementation. The existence of overlapping rules and jurisdictions erodes the clarity of legal obligations and introduces rule ambiguity. States can take advantage of that fragmentation and ambiguity, selecting their preferred rule or interpretation and ignoring those that do not reflect or advance their national interests. In 1999, for example, Argentina tried to take advantage of the overlap between rules in MERCOSUR and the Asociación Latino Americana de Integración (ALADI, Latin American Integration Association) to impose safeguard measures on imports from Brazil. While MERCOSUR lacked safeguard mechanisms at the time, ALADI's Resolution 70 authorized the use of safeguard measures in trade between partners when the "quantity or conditions of imports of one or several products from the region causes or threatens to cause serious damage to national producers of similar products."[36]

In July 1999, in response to stringent domestic pressures following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, the Argentine government passed a resolution regulating the application of ALADI's Resolution 70 within MERCOSUR. According to Argentine officials, the act was legally and technically justified because it filled an institutional gap in MERCOSUR's legislation.[37] The legal fragmentation resulting from overlapping regimes, therefore, contributes to the implementation and compliance problems in Latin American agreements.

Second, the existence of several different institutions with authority over an issue area, such as trade or the environment, allows states to engage in cross-institutional political strategies, making choices in one venue that may have specific effects within others. International trade scholars have paid significant attention to the practice of "forum shopping," or selecting the venue where states believe they are more likely to obtain a more favorable outcome.[38] The overlap of trade agreements in the Americas provides multiple opportunities for this type of cross-institutional strategy, particularly in dispute settlement. All the subregional integration agreements established in the 1990s, as well as the bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) negotiated in the past decade, contain formal dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) with different provisions and varying levels of legalism.[39] There are significant overlaps of jurisdiction among these regional and bilateral DSMs, allowing governments to select strategically in order to protect their national interests.[40] In addition, as members of the WTO, they can resort to multilateral dispute settlement procedures to adjudicate regional disputes.

Several examples from the Western Hemisphere illustrate the ways in which governments in the Americas have taken advantage of conflicts of law and jurisdictions as well as contradictory interpretations resulting from overlapping DSMs. After losing a MERCOSUR-level dispute against Argentina over restrictions on poultry in 1999, Brazil initiated WTO proceedings to challenge the same measure. The WTO panel ignored Argentina's claims that the regional ruling could not be disregarded, and ruled in Brazil's favor.[41] The Argentina-Brazil dispute over poultry also illustrates another type of cross-institutional strategy: cross-forum escalation and retaliation.

Another example of a dispute that escalated from the regional to the multilateral level is the Argentina-Chile conflict over price bands. Argentina first brought a case against Chile's price band system to the DSM of the MERCOSUR-Chile Agreement.[42] Although the group of experts ruled in Argentina's favor, Chile failed to comply with its recommendations. In response, Argentina initiated a dispute against Chile at the WTO. Soon thereafter, Chile brought to the WTO a case against Argentina regarding safeguards on preserved peaches. In Argentina, this initiative was widely interpreted as revenge.

Third, regime proliferation and, in particular, nonexclusive and overlapping membership have increased economic and political competition among states and groupings in the region, in some cases eroding intraregional unity and cohesion. The adverse consequences that the negotiation of bilateral agreements with the United States had on the more traditional regional blocs in Latin America illustrate this dynamic. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the Andean Community of Nations (ACN). The decision by Colombia and Peru to negotiate free trade agreements with the United States led to a crisis within the regime, which resulted in Venezuela's exit from the bloc and its subsequent application to join MERCOSUR. The departure of Venezuela from the ACN, in turn, has been viewed as further contributing to fragmentation among remaining members of the bloc.[43] Analysts have also pointed to how a free trade agreement with the United States has contributed to undermining regional cohesion among members of the Central American Common Market.

Venezuela's entry into MERCOSUR, in turn, introduced further turmoil and fragmentation into the ever-fractious South American trade bloc. Venezuela first requested to join MERCOSUR in 2006, obtaining a quick approval by the four members' governments. However, domestic ratification of this approval was much slower, especially in Brazil and Paraguay. After lengthy negotiations, the Brazilian senate finally accepted Venezuela's admission to the bloc in 2009. By contrast, the Paraguayan congress continued to block the final step. But, in June 2012, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo was abruptly impeached and replaced by Vice President Federico Franco, leading MERCOSUR members to suspend Paraguay for a year, claiming a violation of the bloc's democratic clause. In a controversial and much-criticized move, MERCOSUR leaders then proceeded to accept Venezuela as a full and formal member.[44] Despite officially agreeing to the decision (allegedly for political reasons), the Uruguayan government promptly expressed its discontent. According to Uruguayan vice president Danilo Astori, it constituted a major "institutional blow" that left MERCOSUR "weak" and almost "useless."[45]

The erosion of regional unity undermines the ability of countries in the region to present a coherent front in external negotiations and thus limits their opportunities to participate in the design of broader regimes of global governance. Difficulties for regional coordination and collaboration became evident in the context of the recent international financial crisis starting in 2008. Latin American countries engaged in extensive consultations and joint analyses to gauge the potential impact of the crisis on the region. Indeed, in 2008 and 2009, 28 summits were held in the different regional organizations, including MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market, the Caribbean Community, the Boliviarian Alliance for the Peoples of America, the Union of South American Nations, and the Pacific Alliance.[46] A consensus emerging from these meetings was that regional cohesion and collaboration were fundamental in confronting these negative external conditions. In particular, Latin American leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening ties among the different integration initiatives.[47] However, in practice, this region-wide collaboration in forging a joint response to the crisis has not materialized. As Francisco Rojas Aravena, puts it, "The tension and polarisation of political positions in many countries in the region have accentuated tendencies to fragmentation. In this context, the construction of regional consensus has become harder and slower and requires greater political and diplomatic efforts."[48]

Conclusion

Trade liberalization has been equally problematic for the 15-member SADC bloc, which could learn from MERCOSUR, while SADC is trying to move to a customs union. Like MERCOSUR, SADC has been setting its tariffs under difficult conditions, mainly due to imbalance of powers. It took the region over a decade to establish its FTA, over the period 1996–2008, and only 13 out of 15 member states are signatories to the SADC free trade agreement (see chapter 11 in this volume). South Africa plays a similar dominant but ambiguous role in SADC. South Africa accounts for 70 percent of the bloc's total gross domestic product (GDP) and has dominated regional trade. For example, due to its strong position, South Africa has overpowered SADC's smaller and more vulnerable regional economies, such as the BLNS states (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland) within SACU. Furthermore, there has been an initiative for trade between SACU and MERCOSUR. This agreement would offer marginal preferences on tariffs applied on selected products. It was expected that the agreement would be ratified by all member states by 2013, but this has not happened, as the agreement is still pending ratification by all signatory parties.[49]

In sum, the experience of MERCOSUR offers a number of important lessons for regional economic organizations in Africa. The South American bloc has a lot in common with some of Africa's main regional initiatives, such as SADC and SACU. These organizations have faced many of the same challenges that have made integration a difficult process in South America.

Notes

1. See, for example, Joanna Klonsky, "Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc," *New York Times*, March 1, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/slot2_20070301.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 (accessed April 21, 2015).
2. On the origins of cooperation between Argentina and Brazil, see Andrew Hurrell, "An Emerging Security Community in South America?" in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 228–64.
3. *Treaty for the Constitution of a Common Market Between the Republic of Argentina, the Federate Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay* (commonly known as the Treaty of Asunción), adopted March 26, 1991, entered into force November 29, 1991, http://www2.uol.com.br/actasoft/actamercosul/ingles/tratado_de_assuncao.htm (accessed November 25, 2014).
4. Roberto Bouzas, "MERCOSUR Diez Años Después: Proceso de Aprendizaje o Déjà Vu?," *Desarrollo Económico* 41, no. 1 (2001), 179–200.
5. In 2013, Argentina's gross domestic product (GDP) reached $612 billion and its population size was 41 million. Brazil's GDP for the same year was $2,246 billion, and its population was 200 million.
6. Mario Carranza, "Can MERCOSUR Survive? Domestic and International Constraints on MERCOSUR," *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 2 (2003), 67–103.
7. In December 2001, after several years of economic recession and financial turmoil, Argentina defaulted on more than $100 billion in debt, the world's biggest-ever sovereign debt default. For a discussion of the 2001 debt crisis in historical perspective, see Klaus Friedrich Veigel, *Dictatorship, Democracy, and Globalization: Argentina and the Cost of Paralysis, 1973–2001* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), pp. 182–201. For a brief overview of the 2001 debt crisis, see J. F. Hornbeck, *The Financial Crisis in Argentina*, Congressional Research Service Report RS21072, June 5, 2003, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21072_20030605.pdf (accessed December 2, 2014).
8. Centro de Economía Internacional (CEI), *Cuadros Estadísticos MERCOSUR* (Buenos Aires: CEI, 2002).
9. Juan José Taccone and Uziel Nogueira, *Report MERCOSUR 2001–2002*, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) MERCOSUR Report no. 8, 2003, http://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/2953/MERCOSUR%20Report%20N%C2%B0%208.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed November 25, 2014).
10. "Mercosul é Prioridade, Reafirman Lula e Kirchner," *O Estado de São Paulo*, June 12, 2003.
11. Following Venezuela's admission to MERCOSUR, Brazilian and Argentine leaders emphasized the "historic" implications of this move, which would make MERCOSUR the "fifth largest economy in the world" and a "new pole of power." Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, quoted in "MERCOSUR Ampliado: Fracaso o la Quinta Potencia del Mundo?" *Perfil*, August 8, 2012; Argentine president Cristina Kirchner, quoted in "With Venezuela MERCOSUR Has

Become a New Pole of World Power," August 6, 2012, http://en.mercopress.com/2012/07/31/with-venezuela-mercosur-has-become-a-new-pole-of-world-power (accessed October 19, 2014).

12. Laura Gómez-Mera, *Power and Regionalism in Latin America: The Politics of MERCOSUR* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013).
13. Laura Gómez-Mera, "Explaining MERCOSUR's Survival: Strategic Sources of Argentine–Brazilian Convergence," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37, no. 1 (2005), 109–40; "How 'New' Is the New Regionalism in the Americas? The Case of MERCOSUR," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, no. 3 (2008), 279–308.
14. Since the early 1990s, the United States has sought to promote hemispheric integration through a preferential trade agreement with Latin American countries. At the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, heads of state of 34 countries agreed to begin negotiations for the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would expand the preexisting North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and become one of the most far-reaching trade agreements in history. Large South American countries, like Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, came to see the FTAA initiative, which was officially launched in 1998, as an attempt by the United States to extend its influence in the region.
15. Pedro Da Motta Veiga, "Por Que Erramos Tanto na América do Sul?," *Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior* 90 (2007), 2–3; Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice, and Responsibilities," *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2006), 21–40.
16. Martin Redrado, "Un Nuevo Modelo de Inserción Internacional," *Prensa Económica* 29 (2003), 58–60. See also "La Argentina se va a Sentar en Todas las Mesas Posibles," *Clarín*, September 21, 2003.
17. Diana Tussie, "Latin America: Contrasting Motivations for Regional Projects," *Review of International Studies* 35, supplement S1 (2009), 188.
18. Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 65.
19. Lafer Celso, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future," *Daedalus* 129, no. 2 (2000), 207–38.
20. Sean Burges, "Building a Global Southern Coalition: The Competing Approaches of Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chavez," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007), 1343–58.
21. Bouzas, "MERCOSUR Diez Años Después."
22. Oliver Stuenkel, "Responding to Global Development Challenges: Views from Brazil and India," German Development Institute Discussion Paper 11/2010, 2010, http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_11.2010.pdf (accessed November 24, 2014).
23. "Mercosur and Venezuela: An Ominous Step," *The Economist*, December 8, 2005.
24. Magdalena Herrera, "Mercosur en Crisis: Irse o Quedarse," *El País*, March 26, 2006.
25. Andrés Malamud, "A Leader without Followers: The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Latin American Politics and Society* 53, no. 3 (2011), http://apps.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/malamud/laps_53_3_Malamud.pdf (accessed November 20, 2014), p. 19.
26. Tussie, "Latin America," p. 175.

27. Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen, *Bridging Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas* (Washington, DC: IDB, 2009).
28. See "MERCOSUR Habilito Nueva Lista de Excepciones," *La Nación*, July 1, 2012.
29. Gómez-Mera, *Power and Regionalism in Latin America.*
30. See Clarissa Franzoi Dri, "Parliamentary Institutionalization in Mercosur: Does Regionalism Defy Globalization in South America?," paper presented to the International Political Science Association world congress, Santiago, Chile, July 12–16, 2009, http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_168.pdf (accessed July 3, 2015).
31. Tussie, "Latin America," pp. 184–5.
32. Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini, "Has Regionalism Peaked? The Latin American Quagmire and Its Lessons," *International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 47, no. 1 (2012), 118.
33. Nicola Phillips and Germán C. Prieto, "The Demise of the New Regionalism: Reframing the Study of Contemporary Regional Integration in Latin America," in Alex Warleigh-Lack, Nick Robinson, and Ben Rosamond (eds.), *New Regionalism and the European Union: Dialogues, Comparisons, and New Research Directions* (London: Routledge-ECPR, 2011), p. 120.
34. Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier, "The Politics of International Regime Complexity," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009), 13–24.
35. Estevadeordal and Suominen, *Bridging Regional Trade Agreements.*
36. Asociación Latino Americana de Integración (ALADI), *Resolution 70/87: Régimen Regional de Salvaguardia*, April 27, 1987.
37. Felix Peña, "Ni Tempo de Funerales ni Tudo Bem," *Archivos del Presente* 5, no. 17 (1999), 35–48. See also "Itamarati Teme Pelo Mercosul," *Jornal do Brasil*, July 26, 1999; "Mercosur: Se Logró Supercar la Peor Crisis," *La Nación*, July 30, 1999.
38. See, for example, Marc Busch, "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade," *International Organization* 61, no. 4 (2007), 735–61; Saadia M. Pekkanen, Mireya Solís, and Saori N. Katada, "Trading Gains for Control: International Trade Forums and Japanese Economic Diplomacy," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 4 (2007), 945–70.
39. James McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000), 137–80. See also Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), *South Africa, Africa, and International Investment Agreements*, Cape Town, July 2014, http://www.ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/V48-IIAs%20Report%20Web.pdf (accessed November 24, 2014).
40. "Overlaps of jurisdiction" refers to situations where the same dispute could be brought to two distinct dispute settlement mechanisms. See Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, "Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the WTO and RTAs," in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds.), *Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 465–524.
41. Jennifer Hillman, "Conflicts between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO: What Should the WTO Do?," *Cornell International Law Journal* 12, no. 36 (2009), 198.
42. See, for example, Diana Tussie and Valentina Delich, "Dispute Settlement between Developing Countries: Argentina and Chilean Price Bands," Managing

the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study 1, 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case1_e.htm (accessed October 19, 2014).

43. Phillips and Prieto, "The Demise of the New Regionalism."
44. See Jonathan Wheatly, "Chavez: Into MERCOSUR by a Side Door," *Financial Times*, July 3, 2012.
45. See "Astori Describes MERCOSUR Latest Decisions as 'Aggression and Major Institutional Blows,'" July 3, 2012, http://en.mercopress.com/2012/07/03/astori-describes-mercosur-latest-decisions-as-aggression-and-major-institutional-blows (accessed November 25, 2014).
46. Francisco Rojas Aravena, "The Financial Crisis: Formulating a Latin American Political Response," Fifth Report of General Secretary of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), 2009.
47. Ibid.
48. Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Siete Efectos Políticos de la Crisis Internacional en América Latina," *Nueva Sociedad* 224 (2009), 141.
49. Southern African Customs Union (SACU), *Implementing a Common Agenda Towards Regional Integration*, 2012 Annual Report, http://www.sacu.int/publications/reports/annual/2012/annualreport2012.pdf (accessed September 23, 2014), p. 26.

Conclusion

Daniel H. Levine

As the contributions to this volume show, regional integration in Africa is still in process—perhaps, as Scott Taylor suggests, it is a learning process. If we follow Samuel K. B. Asante, Piers Ludlow, and other contributors in giving up the ideal of an African Union (AU) that someday looks just like the European Union (EU), it is difficult to predict from here what form regional integration in Africa will take. It is worth taking stock, however, of what we can learn from regional integration so far, and looking ahead to how the process can be turned more to the benefit of all of Africa's one billion people.

What Can We Learn from Regional Integration in Africa?

If the original impulse toward regional integration in Africa came in significant part from the pan-African commitments and context of independence leaders, as discussed by Asante and Kasaija Phillip Apuuli (as well as in the introduction to this volume), we can trace the development of newer forms of thinking about regionalism in and about Africa to the resistance to the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) being championed by the Bretton Woods institutions during the 1980s (as discussed by Adekeye Adebajo and Asante, as well as Laura Gómez-Mera in the similar Latin American context). SAPs for African states typically called for the lifting of market restrictions, which meant free access to markets and relaxed tariffs and taxes; encouragement of inward investment and external trade; and liberalized labor markets. If the simple classical economic models accepted by both internationally backed and conservative "Monrovia group" forms of regional integration were correct, SAPs *should have worked*. Yet the failure of SAPs in Africa is well-attested.[1]

The failure of the SAPs was predicted by many African analysts. For example, Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) from 1975 to 1991, covering the apex of SAPs in the 1980s (see both Adebajo and Asante in this volume), pressed a different narrative: Africa's woes were not the result of insufficient liberalization, but of an economy focused on small-scale agriculture, export commodities vulnerable to falling world prices (see Adebajo and Gómez-Mera on Raúl Prebisch's analysis of the role that neocolonial relationships play in these dynamics), and global economic shocks (like the 1973 oil crisis). If these were important sources of anemic

African growth in the 1980s, liberalization was always as likely to be harmful as helpful, as it would make African economies even more vulnerable to external shocks and intensify intra-African competition in export markets. Liberalization also exposed small farmers with very little surplus to bring to market in the first place to greater competition from imported agricultural products.

Economic models that abstract from African political-economic conditions can also misunderstand the dynamics of African economies. For example, the approach of the Bretton Woods institutions to agriculture was often criticized for a focus on privatization and commodification of land,[2] and a bias toward promotion of cash crops for export.[3] Treating the prevalence of small, informal, consumption-oriented farming in Africa as a technical problem to be solved by inducing investment in more efficient and competitive farming and land-use practices may mistake the place of such farming in the livelihoods of the rural population. As a primary source of income, small farming is risky and not very lucrative. However, many small farmers may be using access to land as a supplement to their formal wages, in lieu of the social safety nets that wage-earners in wealthier states enjoy.[4] Policies of land taxation and dispossession were, in fact, integral to convincing people to leave farming for wage employment and thereby to the creation of industrial work forces in some parts of Africa.[5] Similarly, informal economies, as discussed by Daniel Bach in this volume, are not just signs of "state weakness" or "state failure" that can be remedied through capacity-building; they are responses to policy choices, such as protectionist economic schemes that provide opportunities for arbitrage, trade liberalization that improves access to higher-end goods and services (but only for those with extra cash), and labor market liberalization that can increase the precariousness of workers' positions (where informal activities can serve as a buffer similar to subsistence agriculture).[6]

Simple political models of regional integration also fail to capture adequately the dynamics of Africa's five regions. Early on in scholarly attention to region-building, realist models came under assault from functionalist approaches. Realism—which treats states as unified, power-seeking, rational actors—could neither show a normative path to any form of regional integration where states would give up some of their autonomy for greater coordination, nor easily explain the kinds of regional integration that had actually taken place. Functionalist and later neofunctionalist accounts did better—as Gilbert Khadiagala and John Ravenhill have discussed in this volume—in terms of both diagnosis and prescription. Functionalists focused on the ways in which cooperation on narrow, often technical aspects of governance and economics could start based on shared (and relatively apolitical) need. In a nutshell, if realists tell us that states will come into conflict over borders, functionalists remind us that they will nonetheless cooperate to make sure the mail gets delivered across those borders. Once cooperation is achieved in narrow areas, functionalists argue, interdependence will grow, leading to the creation of ever stronger international and supranational institutions.

The functionalist approach, however, does not adequately capture the African situation either. Even cooperation in as important a functional entity as the

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), for example, did not eliminate conflict between Algeria and Libya, as Azzedine Layachi has noted in this volume. Nor would it be correct to see the persistence of conflicts simply as a vindication of realism. Said Adejumobi describes how Nigeria realized that its own power required the construction of a strong regional system in West Africa. Not one to which ECOWAS member states only paid lip service, but one that had the power to promulgate and enforce its governance norms. In addition, when Taylor discusses in his chapter how Zimbabwean recalcitrance gutted the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal in May 2011, we should note a kind of informal regionalism at play. Harare could not have acted with such impunity if it were not backed, at least passively, by South Africa, whose willingness to stand by Zimbabwe was based in significant part not on the pure calculations of power politics, but on a sense of transnational solidarity and relationships that went back to the fight against white minority rule in Southern Africa.[7]

Furthermore, in a number of the discussions in this volume, one can see "spillover" effects from one area of cooperation to another—but not necessarily in the direction of increasing supranational institutionalization, as the functionalists and neo-functionalists envisaged. Bach has described how cooperation by "borderlanders" was the source of coordinated but subversive resistance to greater formal integration in West Africa. The collaboration between Rwanda and Uganda to address their joint security concerns in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which later involved the looting of the Congo's natural resources, has spilled over into enduring transnational linkages between militant groups in the DRC and neighboring countries, to the detriment of regional institutions, as René Lemarchand has shown in his chapter.

Neoclassical economic models, as championed, for example, by Dawn Nagar in her chapter, can provide significant insight into regional processes. The need to take factors into account that go beyond neoclassical economic models and state-centric political models, however, has led to the development of theories of "new regionalism" since the 1990s, as discussed in this volume by Bach, Khadiagala, Timothy Shaw, Ravenhill, and Taylor. The contributors to this volume have shown how attention to factors beyond states and formal market mechanisms can provide a much richer and more useful account of the successes and failures of regionalism in Africa. For example, by distinguishing (as Asante and Ravenhill do in their chapters) intentional, state-led "region-building" or "regional integration" from bottom-up, undirected, and informal processes of "regionalization," we open space to ask questions about how increased integration at the nonstate level may diverge from, or even undermine, integration at the state level (or vice versa). Recognizing that "region-ness" is a contested and mutable conceptual construct, as Khadiagala and Taylor do, rather than a feature that inherently attaches to geographical areas, allows us to conceptualize regional integration in ways that do not assume that contiguous groupings of states are necessarily good candidates for economic or political integration, and to discuss nonterritorial integrations based on other "regional" identities. In this book, Louise Fawcett has drawn our attention to regions defined in terms of religion and ethnicity, for example, while Shaw has pointed to "corporate" regions such as mobile phone plan coverage areas. The analyses of integration in Africa in this volume are strengthened by an ability to define regions in multiple ways and across various dimensions of cultural affinities, political regimes, security arrangements, and trade flows.

These new conceptual frameworks, though primarily developed to grapple with the difficulties of regional integration in the global South, are relevant to understanding region-building better in the industrialized North as well. For example, imperfect state ability to implement policies is certainly not unique to parts of Africa. In Greece, tax evasion has long been rampant, and contributed significantly to the country's economic woes and, thereby, to the crisis in the eurozone since 2009.[8] Similar to the way that SAPs played out in Africa, austerity-based responses to the Greek crisis have fallen especially heavily on the poor, while failing to raise as much revenue as planned.[9]

Similarly, Europe is facing its own, sometimes violent struggles with "regionness." At the macroscale, debates over Turkey's accession bid to the EU were often cast in terms of whether Turkey was really "European."[10] More recently, the issue of whether Ukraine would bind itself more closely to the EU was the proximate cause of the crisis that began there in 2013.[11] At the microscale, Europe has seen both policy conflict and violence over the question of who and what is "European," as witnessed in the 2004 French *banlieue* riots[12] and ban on headscarves in the same year,[13] the 2009 Swiss ban on the construction of minarets,[14] and the 2011 mass killings in Norway directed at the country's Labour party for its support of multiculturalism and acceptance of Islam.[15] The fact that these concerns and trends cut across the boundary between the EU and non-EU countries that consider themselves "European" indicates the inadequacy of looking at regional trends solely in terms of formal state-based structures. In all of these cases, Europe could learn from Africa's successes—and failures—at managing economic crisis, intercommunal marginalization, and conflict.

The Way Forward?

One lesson of the foregoing is that, if African leaders (especially of smaller states) do not seize the question of how a "region" is to be defined themselves, it may be defined for them by others. Building on this volume's insights into the lessons of regional integration in Africa, this concluding chapter tries to suggest three ways in which African governments and other actors might assert more effective agency in regional integration efforts: improving the fundamental conditions needed for regional integration; increasing regional institutional capacity; and promoting democratic developmentalism.[16]

Improving the Fundamental Conditions Needed for Regional Integration

The regional political and economic regimes whose construction has been attempted in Africa have often run ahead of the underlying conditions needed for their success. If African states and citizens are to benefit from greater regional integration, investment needs to be made in infrastructure that will facilitate intra-African trade. As Afeikhena Jerome and David Nabena argue in this volume, reducing tariffs at the borders will have limited impact if the roads that cross those borders are impassable.

At least as important is the pursuit of complementarity and industrial development in African countries.[17] Jacob Viner, one of the early theorists of regional economic integration, argued that the economic importance of customs unions in countries in Africa and the rest of the developing world would be small, due to their lack of major industries and the fact that they exported similar primary goods (and his arguments would also apply to other, more intense forms of regional integration).[18] Viner was writing in 1950, but much the same could be noted of Africa in 2015. African states are still largely dependent on the export of primary goods that other African states are not prepared to use as industrial inputs. Unless some way is found to provide African states more reasons to trade with each other, no amount of liberalization will induce them to do so. Without the basic infrastructure and human capital to support industry, trade-diverting protections against the global market will not make African industries spontaneously appear. African states need to find ways to build industrial and agricultural infrastructure if they want to take full advantage of the potential benefits of regional integration.

Infrastructure development is a huge project, and requires coordination between states. It should not be left up to individual states. Regional, continental, and multilateral institutions like the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) New Development Bank (NDB) also need to be involved.[19]

Increasing Regional Institutional Capacity

Another practical condition that can trump even the most impeccable theoretical plans for integration in Africa is a lack of institutional capacity. In a number of regions, such as Northern, Central, and Southern Africa (as discussed in this volume by Layachi, Lemarchand, and Taylor, respectively), there is neither sufficient buy-in on the part of member states nor sufficient capacity on the part of regional institutions to ensure that regional norms are followed. Even where regional integration is fairly advanced, institutional incapacity can limit the ability for all regional aims to be realized, as Khadiagala discusses in this volume in the case of East Africa.

Regional organizations should consider mechanisms for adding enforcement mechanisms to their regional agreements, such as fines for noncompliance with trade rules, as Dawn Nagar has suggested.[20] At the same time, the domestic side of the compliance issue needs to be addressed, as Asante has noted in his chapter's discussion of sovereignty. African states committed to regional regimes and economic plans need to create ministries with the authority and resources to implement their responsibilities. Any lack of political will to implement regional initiatives needs to be addressed at both regional and state levels. Consensus between states needs to be found on norms that governments will be ready to implement, rather than on what will sound good to domestic or international audiences. Once basic normative consensus has been achieved, regional organizations need to have the freedom to act without being obstructed by member states. This may require moving away from consensus models of regional decision-making, and is likely to be hard work.[21] The long, hard road to fairly successful governance norms in West Africa that Said Adejumobi describes in his chapter should be considered an example of the kind of process required to build regional normative consensus. In the meantime, it may make sense for regional organizations and the African Union to make fewer and narrower decisions, and focus on seeing those implemented and monitored.

Promoting Democratic Developmentalism

With the failure of SAPs and the success of East Asian economies such as Japan and South Korea by the 1980s and China by the 2000s, renewed attention has been paid to approaches to economic development that give a stronger role to the state. Many Asian countries, notably Japan, took a path to economic development after the end of World War II in 1945 that did not fully align with either the laissez-faire capitalism that animated Western-promoted neoliberal policies or the planned economies that dominated the Soviet sphere of influence. Chalmers Johnson described Japan as a "developmental state" in his 1982 book on its economic rise—a state whose distinguishing feature was the "setting of . . . substantive social and economic goals."[22]

The aim of a developmental state is to guide and nurture domestic industries so that they can be more competitive in international commerce. Developmental states do not consider state intervention in the market anathema—they may create industrial plans, or run parastatal firms.[23] This may mean some protectionist measures, but such states do not seek economic autarchy. Though the concept of the developmental state gained analytic currency in discussions of Asian economies, Thandika Mkandawire has pointed out that they have an even longer history in Africa—many postindependence states were developmental in outlook, and undertook developmental strategies that failed as much because of external shocks as any state defect or incapacity.[24]

Related to—but distinct from—the developmental state is "developmental regionalism." In a 1971 article, John Sloan defined developmental regionalism as "joint policies of economic cooperation, coordination, and integration among underdeveloped countries designed to accelerate the rate of development of both the member-states and the geographical region."[25] "Open" or "neoliberal" regionalism is based on the classical economic view that liberalizing trade within a region will induce other changes in the market that make the economy more efficient and stronger, through the "invisible hand" of increased competition. Developmental regionalism recognizes that full advantage cannot be taken of the possibilities for economic integration without careful planning.[26] Like developmental state strategies, developmental regionalism is not aimed at "delinkage" from the global economy. For example, the 1980 Lagos Plan of

Action (LPA) was developed by African economists as part of an alternative strategy to the SAPs of the Bretton Woods institutions. The LPA emphasized "self-reliance," but was also clear that it did not aim to "totally cut [Africa] off from outside contributions."[27]

The economic benefits of developmental approaches, at both state and regional levels, are potentially great. Asante has previously argued for the importance of understanding the value of regionalism in terms of not just its "static" effects, but also its "dynamic" effects, if we are concerned about it for developmental reasons. A static assessment looks at the ways in which a policy can increase the efficiency of production and consumption, given current conditions; a dynamic assessment examines the ways in which policy can transform the relations of production and consumption.[28] But a dynamic approach requires long-term planning that private sector actors are often ill-suited for without support from governments that can absorb short-term losses and engage in better coordination. Liberalization will tend to increase efficiency. In Africa it may, for example, encourage mining companies to import low-cost labor from poorer countries if limits on labor mobility are lifted. This would, no doubt, benefit both mineral consumers and would-be laborers from those poorer countries, in the short run. But market actors may not be able to take on the short-run costs associated with building manufacturing plants that could make use of the minerals that are mined—and it will be even more difficult for them to undertake broad-scale coordinated planning efforts (that involve not only industrial planning but also policy coordination), such as investing in education and research institutions that could reconfigure a mineral-dependent country as a biotechnology hub. Such dynamic changes could modify structural features of the economy that would make poor laborers even better off in the long run.

Given the complexities of regional integration in Africa explored in this volume, one of the key advantages of developmental states and developmental regionalism is their pragmatism. One of the reasons this book has focused on political economy is our conviction that no simple formula—certainly not liberalization, but not even "regionalism"—will automatically lead to peace and prosperity in Africa. As Adebajo notes in his chapter, Adedeji recognized that politics also is often more important than economics in Africa. The point of developmental approaches is not to introduce a new formula to replace others, but rather to recognize the role of organization and planning in responding to a situation that resists analysis in terms of simple formulas. Developmental approaches to national and regional economies reintroduce "African agency," as Shaw puts it, to a discourse often dominated by technocratic analyses.

There are two kinds of objection that a recommendation to purse developmentalism needs to address. First, developmental strategies require a tremendous amount of resources. Yet Khadiagala, Lemarchand, Ravenhill, and Taylor have pointed out the drastic lack of capacity in many African regional institutions. Second, one of the reasons for many analysts' (and donors') interest in taking decision-making out of the hands of politicians and putting it in the care of technocrats or the private sector is concern about the venality and corruption of the state.

A plan that assumed that one institution would be the central organ for all economic planning, coordination, and enforcement in a region would indeed require resources far in excess of anything reasonable. But planning could also be broad-based, distributed, and collaborative.[29] Economic planners could, for example, learn from the work of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), as Khadiagala describes. The EACJ does not have a supreme power of judicial review within its region, but it has been able to change the legal landscape through collaboration with civil society organizations in member states. Outside Africa, as Ravenhill has noted, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) does not have much in the way of regional institutional capacity—its planning is done by personnel in member states. If regional economic planning were a function of networks of collaboration between state authorities, private firms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions, and the like, regional organizations would not have to ask: How can we secure sufficient resources to control all of this? Rather, they could ask how they might more effectively foster the kinds of collaboration from which cooperation would emerge.

Involving a broad base of actors could also improve accountability. It would be a mistake to dismiss the problem posed by corrupt state leadership—several contributions (notably Adejumobi's, Lemarchand's, and Taylor's) address this issue head-on. But it is also possible to overstate the problem. As Mkandawire has noted, Africa has no monopoly on corruption, and many economically successful Asian developmental states have also seen spectacular cases of graft.[30] Mkandawire does not give specific examples in his paper, but may have had Indonesia or Thailand in mind.

More important, "new regionalism" holds out more interesting possibilities for accountable developmentalism in Africa by adding an explicit focus on democracy. If state illegitimacy is a barrier to successful developmentalism, then the answer may not be to sideline the state, but rather to address its democratic deficits. Democratic deficits can be addressed through formal means, like improving the fairness and competitiveness of elections, but this need not be the only route to progress. One of the lessons of new regionalism is that the powerbases and stakeholders in regional integration are diverse—the state-citizen relationship is not the only important one. Consultative mechanisms that allow NGOs, trade unions, religious groups, firms, and other actors to have input into the decisions taken by governments and regional institutions would be critical to ensuring accountability and making sure that developmental economic planning is aimed at securing equitable benefits for all citizens. Development in the global "periphery" may well require alliances between firms and labor, for example, that will let them collaborate on creating a self-reliant economic base.[31]

A form of "democratization" can be extended to the interstate level as well. Mere liberalization can tend to favor existing powerful economies, replicating global relationships of dependency on a regional scale. If region-building in Africa is to do more than enhance the power of regional hegemons, such as South Africa and Nigeria, African leaders need to pursue policies that will distribute the benefits of integration more equitably, even in ways that may not be market-efficient—the revenue redistribution system in the Southern African

Customs Union (SACU) to which Dawn Nagar has drawn our attention may be one. Doing so requires that all states in a region be treated as stakeholders and given a voice in regional planning. A developmental perspective opens the door to this kind of approach by allowing political restraints on market discipline, but it does not solve the problem entirely. Regional integration needs to be seen as a project of political solidarity in which the interests of all states are seen as common interests, as with the "community" orientation that Mely Caballero-Anthony describes in her chapter on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The only way it makes sense to regard dependence on other African countries as inherently superior to dependence on wealthy Western donors is if there is a political vision driving regional integration.[32] If every state simply sought its own maximum economic benefit, it might make as much sense for Africa to fragment as to integrate. As Fawcett has argued in her chapter, there are many kinds of community that could be formed that have nothing to do with the physical contiguity of Africa. Developmental *African* regionalism requires reclaiming the pan-African roots of the regional project in Africa.

Without a pan-African vision—as expounded by founding intellectuals such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere—the various non-state forces of regionalization in Africa are more likely to drive the continent to division along other lines of affinity. The continuing pull of pan-Africanism rests on the transnational relationships that Africans share—the cross-cutting ethnic identities, political solidarities, religious concerns, and histories of triumph and oppression. Actors who seek regional integration within Africa while favoring one government over another within a region, or one social group over another within a country, not only engage in a kind of bad faith—appealing to a common regional identity and at the same denigrating it—but also are in danger of undermining the sense of "region-ness" that makes the regional project possible.

Finally, as Adebajo has noted in his chapter, regional integration is a project that requires both hard work and political vision. We hope that this volume will help African policymakers to articulate a clear vision of regional and continental unity for the future. There is much work to be done, but with support to building the underlying basis for economic integration, commitment to strengthening regional institutions, and a careful, broad-based, and inclusive developmental approach to regionalism, a bright future for region-building in Africa is possible.

Notes

1. See, for example, Thandika Mkandawire and Charles C. Soludo, *Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment* (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa [CODESRIA], 1998); Sayre P. Schatz, "Structural Adjustment in Africa: A Failing Grade So Far," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 4 (1994), 679–92.
2. See, for example, Mkandawire and Soludo, *Our Continent*, pp. 17, 114.
3. See, for example, Franz Heidhues and Gideon Obare, "Lessons from Structural Adjustment Programmes and Their Effects in Africa," *Quarterly Journal of*

International Agriculture 50, no. 1 (2011), 59. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) did not explicitly critique the agricultural policies of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), but placed a much greater emphasis on food security and self-sufficiency than on using agriculture to achieve poverty reduction or income growth (both of which might be more efficiently achieved through export cash crops), and this focus was likely an implicit criticism of SAPs. Organisation of African Unity (OAU), *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000*, adopted April 1980, http://www.merit.unu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Lagos-Plan-of-Action.pdf (accessed April 28, 2015), Chapter 1. By comparison, see, for example, the focus on poverty reduction and income growth and consequent favorable assessment of privatization and cash crops in Luc Christiaensen, Lionel Demery, and Stefano Paternostro, "Growth, Distribution, and Poverty in Africa: Messages from the 1990s," World Bank, June 2002, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/94251/Sene_0303/Se_0303/christianensen_demery_growth.pdf (accessed April 28, 2015), pp. 28–30.

4. See, for example, Gillian Hart, "The Agrarian Question and Industrial Dispersal in South Africa: Agro-Industrial Linkages through Asian Lenses," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 23, nos. 2–3 (1996), 258–9; M. N. Baipethi and Peter T. Jacobs, "The Contribution of Subsistence Farming to Food Security in South Africa," *Agrekon* 48, no. 4 (2009), 469–70.
5. It is key to Hart's argument ("The Agrarian Question," 259–68) that dispossession in South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal meant that people in the province could not fall back on subsistence agriculture, exposing them to labor exploitation and explaining dispersal of industry to semirural areas.
6. See Marc Wuyts, "Informal Economy, Wage Goods, and Accumulation under Structural Adjustment: Theoretical Reflections Based on the Tanzanian Experience," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25, no. 3 (2001), 417–38.
7. See, for example, Mark Gevisser, *A Legacy of Liberation: Thabo Mbeki and the Future of the South African Dream* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Chapter 34; Christopher Landsberg, *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004), p. 174.
8. See, for example, Brad Plumer, "How Greek Tax Evasion Helped Sink the Global Economy," *Washington Post Wonkblog*, July 9, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/09/how-greek-tax-evasion-sunk-the-global-economy (accessed January 28, 2015).
9. Francesco Pappadà and Yanos Zylberberg, "Tax Evasion and Austerity-Plan Failure," *Vox*, Center for Economic and Policy Research, February 3, 2014, http://www.voxeu.org/article/tax-evasion-and-austerity-plan-failure (accessed January 28, 2015).
10. See, for example, Demitris Keridis, "Turkey and the Identity of Europe: Contemporary Identity Politics on the European Frontier," in Constantine Arvanitopoulos (ed.), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy* (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009), pp. 147–58.
11. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014), 77–89.
12. See Jocelyne Cesari, "Ethnicity, Islam, and *les Banlieues*: Confusing the Issues," Social Science Research Council (SSRC), November 30, 2005, http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Cesari (accessed January 28, 2015).

13. For a discussion of the ban and its implications for democracy, citizenship, and the French secular national identity, see Selya Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 50–61.
14. Laila Lalami, "The Swiss Minaret Ban: What Are Voters Really Trying to Outlaw?," *The Nation*, December 21, 2009, http://www.thenation.com/article/swiss-minaret-ban-what-are-voters-really-trying-outlaw# (accessed January 28, 2015).
15. See, for example, Helen Pidd, "Anders Behring Breivik Spent Years Training and Plotting for Massacre," *The Guardian* (London), August 24, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/24/anders-behring-breivik-profile-oslo (accessed January 28, 2015).
16. This section draws heavily on the recommendations made by participants in the seminar from which the contributions to this volume are drawn, summarized in Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), *Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa*, Cape Town, South Africa, October 2014, http://ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/vol49_region_building_29sep2014.pdf (accessed January 30, 2015), pp. 40–1.
17. A focus on industrialization need not represent "capital fundamentalism" about development. Capital accumulation is one aspect of industrialization, but for the specific purpose of regional economic integration, industrialization also holds out the hope for diversification and hence complementarity. Industrialization, properly managed, can also be a vehicle for adoption of technology.
18. Jacob Viner, *The Customs Union Issue*, ed. Paul Oslington (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 163.
19. CCR, *Region-Building*, pp. 13, 18, 21–2, 40.
20. Ibid., pp. 23, 40.
21. Ibid., pp. 13, 40.
22. Chalmers A. Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 19.
23. Though, as Johnson (ibid., pp. 17–18) notes, ideological opposition to state intervention in the market in the West masks the fact that Western states do intervene heavily in their markets.
24. Thandika Mkandawire, "Thinking about Developmental States in Africa," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25, no. 3 (2001), 291, 295–6.
25. John W. Sloan, "The Strategy of Developmental Regionalism: Benefits, Distribution, Obstacles, and Capabilities," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 10, no. 2 (1971), 142. Sloan seems to have coined the term; for additional discussion of developmental regionalism in the African context (aside from discussion in this volume), see, for example, Sheila Bunwaree, "NEPAD and Its Discontents," in John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, and Tim Murithi (eds.), *The African Union and Its Institutions* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008), pp. 227–40; David J. Francis, "Linking Peace, Security, and Developmental Regionalism: Regional Economic and Security Integration in Africa," *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 2, no. 3 (2006), 7–20; Zoleka Ndayi, "In Quest of Regional Integration in Africa: Can the AU/NEPAD Reconcile Economic Plurilateralism with Developmental Regionalism?," *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies* 6, no. 1 (2011), 78–93.
26. Even under neoliberal conceptions of regionalism, industries and firms do not spring up spontaneously, like mushrooms. *Firms* must be able to plan ahead and

consider rationally how to take advantage of new opportunities opened up by regional liberalization. Appealing to "competition" does not remove this—the most competitive firms will just be the ones that plan best. An unspoken assumption of neoliberal approaches seems to be that firms can successfully engage in this sort of planning, but governments cannot.

27. OAU, *Lagos Plan of Action*, p. 7.
28. S. K. B. Asante, "The Experience of EEC: Relevant or Impediment to ECOWAS Regional Self-Reliance Objective?," *Africa Spectrum* 17, no. 3 (1982), 311.
29. Sloan ("The Strategy of Developmental Regionalism," p. 159) makes a similar point.
30. Mkandawire, "Thinking about Developmental States," p. 299.
31. Ibid., p. 297.
32. Sloan, "The Strategy of Developmental Regionalism," p. 149.

Contributors

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo has been executive director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, since 2003. He obtained his doctorate from Oxford University in England, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar. He served on United Nations (UN) missions in South Africa, Western Sahara, and Iraq. Dr. Adebajo is the author of: *Building Peace in West Africa*; *Liberia's Civil War*; *The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War*; and *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts.* He is coeditor or editor of eight books on managing global conflicts, the United Nations, the European Union, West African security, South Africa's and Nigeria's foreign policies in Africa, and Nobel peace laureates of African descent. Dr Adebajo is a visiting professor at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa.

Dr. Said Adejumobi is director of the Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Lusaka, Zambia. Prior to this, he was chief of the Public Administration Section and Coordinator of the Africa Governance Report (AGR) for UNECA in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He is a former governance adviser for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission in Abuja, Nigeria; and was an associate professor of political science at Lagos State University in Nigeria. Dr Adejumobi has published extensively in the areas of governance, democracy, and development in Africa.

Professor Kasaija Phillip Apuuli is an associate professor of political science at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda. He previously served as the Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution advisor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and assistant IGAD Facilitator for the Somalia Peace and Reconciliation Process. He was the programme manager of the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Professor Apuuli holds a DPhil in international criminal law from the University of Sussex, England. He is the author of several articles in refereed journals.

Professor Samuel K. B. Asante is the executive director of the Centre for Regional Integration in Africa (CRIA), in Accra, Ghana. He has been an active member of Ghana's National Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Governing Council since its inception in 2003. Professor Asante is a fellow of the Ghana

Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has been working in the field of regional integration for more than three decades. He served as former principal regional adviser and coordinator of the UN Multidisciplinary Regional Advisory Group at the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and has published prolifically, especially on regional integration, governance, and African development.

Professor Daniel C. Bach is the director of research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) at the Emile Durkheim Centre for Comparative Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bordeaux, France; and is also a professor at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Sciences Po, Bordeaux. He holds a DPhil from Oxford University and taught at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife-Ife in Nigeria. A former director of the Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire at Bordeaux, he has published on Nigerian federalism, the foreign policies of Nigeria and South Africa, regional organizations and regionalization processes in Africa, as well as on relations between France, the European Union, China, India, and Africa. His *Regionalism in Africa: Genealogies, Institutions, and Transstate Networks* will be published by Routledge in 2016.

Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony is an associate professor and head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. She also served as director of external relations at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat. She currently serves in the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and Security, and is a member of the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Agenda Council on Conflict Prevention. She has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals on a broad range of security issues Asia-Pacific.

Professor Louise Fawcett is an associate professor of politics, Wilfrid Knapp Fellow, and tutor in politics at St. Catherine's College at Oxford University. She is the author of *Iran and the Cold War*; and has coedited four books on regionalism, the Third World after the Cold War, the international relations of the Middle East, and the international relations of the developing world.

Professor Laura Gómez-Mera is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami, United States. She holds a DPhil in international relations from Oxford University, and has held research fellowships at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at Notre Dame University, and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC.

Dr. Afeikhena Jerome is the national coordinator of the State Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM) at the Nigeria Governors' Forum (NGF) in Abuja, Nigeria. Prior to this, he worked with the United Nations as the Coordinator for Economic Governance and Management at the African Peer Review Mechanism Secretariat in Midrand, South Africa, where he coordinated and served as principal writer of the APRM Country Review Reports of Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Dr. Jerome has taught at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria; the National Institute for Economic Policy, Johannesburg, South

Africa; the University of Botswana, Gaborone; and at the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) in Nairobi, Kenya. He has over 60 publications on African development.

Professor Gilbert M. Khadiagala is professor of international relations and head of the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg, South Africa. Trained as a political scientist in Kenya, Canada, and the United States, he specializes in African international relations, conflict management and resolution, African regional and sub-regional institutions, and comparative political institutions. He has published on politics and security in Southern Africa, the Great Lakes Region, Eastern Africa, and the Horn of Africa. In addition, he has written widely on mediation of African conflicts, Kenyan politics, and governance and leadership in Africa. He is currently conducting research on state formation in South Sudan.

Professor Azzedine Layachi is professor of government and politics at the Da Silva Academic Centre at St. John's University in New York, United States. His research interests include economic development, political change, political Islam, Middle East politics, African politics, and politics of ethnicity. Professor Layachi is the author of several books, journal articles, and book chapters. His books include *The United States and North Africa*; *State, Society and Liberalization in Morocco*; and *Global Studies: The Middle East*. Professor Layachi holds a PhD in international affairs from New York University in the United States.

Professor René Lemarchand is emeritus professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, United States. He has written extensively on the Great Lakes Region in Central Africa. His most recent publications include *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (2009) and an edited volume on *Forgotten Genocides* (2011). His book on *Rwanda and Burundi* (1970) won the Herskovits Award from the African Studies Association (ASA) of the United States as the best book of that year.

Dr. Daniel H. Levine is attendance mediation coordinator at Community Mediation in Baltimore, United States. He is also a research fellow with the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) in the United States, and was a consultant to CCR. He was previously an assistant professor in the Maryland School of Public Policy; a Fulbright scholar in the Department of Philosophy and Classics at the University of Ghana; and a program officer at the US Institute of Peace in Washington DC. Dr. Levine is the author of *The Morality of Peacekeeping*.

Professor N. Piers Ludlow is associate professor at the Department of International History at the London School of Economics; and is a specialist on the history of Western Europe since World War II, in particular on the development of the integration process. He has written extensively on the early development of the European Commission (EC)/European Union (EU), on Britain's problematic relations with an integrating Europe, and on the interlinkages between the integration process and the Cold War. His main monographs include: *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*; and *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s.*

Mr. David Nabena is an economist with the Nigeria Governors' Forum in Abuja, Nigeria. Among other roles, he coordinates NGF research with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the British Department for International Development (DFID). His research interests are in the fields of energy and infrastructure, economic development, and public financial management. Mr. Nabena holds an MSc in financial engineering from Manchester Business School in England.

Ms. Dawn Nagar is a researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town. She has worked on regional integration and on peace and security issues on the continent. She holds a master's degree in philosophy from the University of Nelson Mandela; and a master's degree in international relations from the University of Cape Town (UCT). She is the coeditor of *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects.*

Professor John Ravenhill is director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and professor of political science at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada. He was previously head of the School of Politics and International Relations at the Australian National University (ANU). After obtaining his doctorate at the University of California, Berkeley, he taught at the Universities of Virginia, Sydney, and Edinburgh. He recently coedited (with Andrew MacIntyre and T. J. Pempel) the book *Crisis as Catalyst: Asia's Dynamic Political Economy.*

Professor Timothy M. Shaw is graduate programme director of the Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance at McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts in the United States. Prior to this, he was professor and director at the Institute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies; associate research fellow at the United Nations University Comparative Regional Integration Studies in Bruges; and distinguished research associate with the North-South Institute in Ottawa, Canada. Professor Shaw previously directed the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London. His most recent coedited works include: *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* and *Comparative Regionalism for Development in the 21st Century: Insights from the Global South.*

Professor Scott Taylor is associate professor and director of the African Studies Programme in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. Prior to this, he was Gwendolen Carter Lecturer in African Politics at Smith College. Professor Taylor's research and teaching interests lie in the areas of African politics and political economy, with a particular emphasis on business-state relations, private sector development, governance, and political and economic reform. He is the author of: *Politics in Southern Africa* (with Gretchen Bauer); *Business and the State in Southern Africa*; and *Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa.* He received his doctorate in political science from Emory University, Atlanta, United States.

Index

Page numbers in *italics* refer to figures, tables, and illustrations.