Decolonizing Christianity

Religion and the End of Empire in France and Algeria

Darcie Fontaine

DECOLONIZING CHRISTIANITY

Decolonizing Christianity traces the dramatic transformation of Christianity from its position as the moral foundation of European imperialism to its role as a radical voice of political and social change in the era of decolonization. As Christians renegotiated their place in the emerging Third World, they confronted the consequences of racism and violence that Christianity had reinforced in European colonies. This book tells the story of Christians in Algeria who undertook a mission to "decolonize the Church" and ensure the future of Christianity in postcolonial Algeria. But it also recovers the personal aspects of decolonization, as many of these Christians were arrested and tortured by the French for their support of Algerian independence. The consequences of these actions were immense, as the theological and social engagement of Christians in Algeria then influenced the groundbreaking reforms developing within global Christianity in the 1960s.

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To my parents,
Bob and Beverly Fontaine,
and to Aaron Walker

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Abbreviations

ACA	Assemblée des Cardinaux et Archevêques (Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops)
AJAAS	Association de la jeunesse algérienne pour l'action sociale (Association of Algerian Youth for Social Action)
ALN	Armée de libération nationale (National Liberation Army)
CCIA	Commission of the Churches on International Affairs – WCC
CCSA	Christian Committee for Service in Algeria – WCC
Cimade	Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacuées (Inter-Movement Committee Among the Evacuees)
ERA	Eglise réformée d'Algérie (Algerian Reformed Church)
ERF	Eglise réformée de France (French Reformed Church)
FLN	Front de libération nationale (National Liberation Front)
FPF	Fédération protestante de France (French Protestant Federation)
GPRA	Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic)
JOC	Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne (Young Christian Workers)
MDF	Mission de France
OAS	Organisation armée secrète (Secret Armed Organization)
SAS	Sections administratives spécialisées (Specialized Administrative Sections)
SMA	Scouts musulmans d'Algérie (Muslim Scouts of Algeria)
WCC	World Council of Churches

Introduction

> *The Church in the colonies is a white man's Church, a foreigners' Church. It does not call the colonized to the ways of God, but to the ways of the white man, to the ways of the master, the ways of the oppressor. And as we know, in this story many are called but few are chosen.*
>
> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*[1]

As French officials prepared to negotiate the terms of Algerian independence with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) in 1961–1962, among the issues up for discussion were the rights of the European settler population of Algeria and the religious freedom of Christians and Jews in what would soon be a country governed primarily by Muslims. Despite the French government's diplomatic interest in the future of his flock, Monseigneur Léon-Etienne Duval, the archbishop of Algiers, informed the French that the Catholic Church in Algeria would hold its own negotiations with the GPRA on the future of Christianity in Algeria, as the church did not want its interests to be confused with those of the French government.[2] After more than one hundred thirty years of occupation and six years of armed struggle, in which the defense of "Christian civilization" in Algeria had been one of the chief ideological justifications for the notoriously violent French tactics against the Algerian population, the future of Christianity in postcolonial Algeria was in jeopardy.

In France and the wider world, the events unfolding in Algeria during the 1950s and early 1960s became catalysts for a reevaluation of the role of

[1] F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. R. Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 7.

[2] R. Malek, *L'Algérie à Évian: Histoire des négociations secrètes, 1954–1962* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995), 163. See also A. Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre* (Paris: Éditions Cana, 1979), 241.

Christianity and Christian institutions in the modern world. For Christians across the world, the Algerian conflict was just one ripple, albeit one of the most tragic, in the global wave of political uprisings and negotiations that signaled the end of the European empires. Yet the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) forced Christians in both France and Algeria to face the realities of what had been until then abstract discussions about the problems of colonialism or colonized peoples' right to self-determination. Institutions such as the Vatican and the Protestant World Council of Churches (WCC) were concerned, above all, with the future of Christian missions in a postcolonial world. They closely watched the Algerian War, realizing that it was a particularly important test of the possibilities for positive postcolonial relations between Christians and formerly colonized peoples.

The vast majority of the Christian population, however, would not stay in Algeria long enough to witness Algerian independence. Instead, most Christians living in Algeria chose the option of "repatriation" to France. Although the origins of the phrase "the suitcase or the coffin" remain contested, it was the vibrant metaphor that captured the imagination of the European settler population by late 1960, especially those who clung desperately to French Algeria and envisaged a fate sometimes dramatically worse than death if they remained.[3] In the late spring and summer of 1962, newsreels and the pages of French periodicals such as *Paris Match* depicted dramatic scenes of the European settler population of Algeria gathering at the ports of Algiers, Oran, and other coastal cities, with suitcases and children in tow, fleeing the ravaged and newly independent Algeria.[4] By the end of the summer, more than three-quarters of the approximately one million European settlers who lived in Algeria before the War of Independence had left Algeria for France.[5]

Despite – and perhaps because of – their departure in the early 1960s, the European settler population has long dominated the narrative of the European experience of Algeria, both before and after its independence. For the period between 1962 and the early 2000s, public and official memory of

[3] Stories about Algerian nationalists' brutality toward *colons*, including beheadings and mutilation of corpses, were commonplace among the *pied-noir* community throughout the twentieth century, and especially in OAS propaganda about the consequences of Algerian independence. On the phrase, "the suitcase or the coffin," see J.-J. Jordi, *De l'exode à l'exil: Rapatriés et pieds-noirs en France* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), and P. Daum, *Ni valise ni cercueil: Les pieds-noirs restés en Algérie après l'indépendance* (Arles: Actes Sud, 2012), 33–37.

[4] See, for example, the June 2, 1962, issue of *Paris Match*.

[5] D. Lefeuvre, "Les pieds-noirs," in *La Guerre d'Algérie*, ed. M. Harbi and B. Stora (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2004), 396–409.

France's colonial rule in Algeria has often been described as "amnesiac."[6] The official French narrative at the time of the cease-fire negotiations between the French government and the provisional Algerian authorities declared that the French were beneficently jumping on board the "Tide of History" in according the Algerians independence.[7] The reality, however, was that in the minds of the vast majority of the French and European settler population up until 1959, Algeria was irrevocably a part of France – not a colony – and therefore, could not be decolonized. In contrast to the general amnesia of the French population, former European settlers, often called *pieds-noirs*, have engaged in an active project of memorializing their experience in Algeria. This is primarily because the history of French colonialism, the Algerian War, and the dramatic exodus from Algeria's shores are foundations of their identity.[8] Indeed, the narrative of the *pied-noir* experience in Algeria has been given the label *nostalgérie*, referring to its tendency toward sentimental nostalgia and representations of French Algeria as a Paradise Lost.[9]

[6] M. Harbi and B. Stora, eds., *La guerre d'Algérie, 1954–2004, la fin de l'amnésie* (Paris: Laffont, 2004).

[7] On this narrative and its creation, see T. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), ch. 3.

[8] The terminology for the population of colonial Algeria is extremely complex and fraught with identity politics. Until the interwar period, the European population comprised French, Spanish, Italian, and Maltese settlers (mostly Catholic but with a notable Protestant and Jewish presence), who all had some variation of French citizenship and called themselves "Algerians," and then the "*Français d'Algérie*" (French of Algeria). The indigenous Arabs and Berbers were called "*indigènes*" or "*français musulmans*" (Muslim French). During the Algerian War, the indigenous Algerian Arabs and Berbers reclaimed "Algerian" to refer to the non-European populations of Algeria. In this book, I use the term "Algerian" to refer to the non-European Arab and Berber population, and the term "Muslim" solely in its religious or historical context. I refer to the European settler population alternately as "European settlers" or "*pieds-noirs*," and use "the French" to designate metropolitans or recent arrivals from France. The term "*pied-noir*" is of obscure and contested origin, but it is currently used to refer to settlers in Algeria of European descent who arrived after French colonization in 1830, possessed French citizenship, and were "repatriated" to France after the Algerian War. The term was used pejoratively during the colonial period, but "repatriated" settlers in France have since reclaimed it. On the complexities of these labels, see Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, ch. 1. Other important recent interventions on the *pieds-noirs* include M. Baussant, *Pieds-noirs: Mémoires d'exil* (Paris: Stock, 2002); V. Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007); É. Savarese, *Algérie, la guerre des mémoires* (Paris: Éditions Non Lieu, 2007).

[9] On the phenomenon of *nostalgérie* and *pied-noir* memory, see A. L. Smith, *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), and C. Eldridge, "Blurring the Boundaries between Perpetrators

An extreme version of this narrative appeared in 1968, six years after Algeria gained its independence from France, with the publication of the French researcher Jean Boisson-Pradier's book *L'Église et l'Algérie* (The church and Algeria). In this wrathful indictment of anticolonial Christians in Algeria, Boisson-Pradier documented what Jean Loiseau, who wrote the preface, called, "the erasure of the Church in Algeria."[10] According to Boisson-Pradier, during the Algerian "war," a group of French Catholics had "colluded" with Algerian nationalists and "contributed in large part to the granting of Algerian independence," in that "each act, each text that demonstrated sympathy and understanding for Algerian nationalism was taken by the FLN and exploited against France."[11] In doing so they had betrayed both France and Christianity, and consequently, "the granting of independence to Algeria meant that the million or so French living there were obliged to precipitately leave the territory." Thus "the Church brutally disappeared from Algeria, driven by the vacuum that enveloped it."[12] Boisson-Pradier recounted the alleged transgressions of these Christians, including biased journalism, and the speeches and actions of Mgr Duval, whom he accused of betraying Catholics by supporting the Algerian nationalists of the Front de libération nationale (FLN) instead of his own parishioners. Some of the most egregious acts, though, entailed the provision of material support to nationalist militants. One example was that of a social worker named Denise Walbert, who was put on trial in Algiers in July 1957 for using her apartment to print FLN propaganda and shelter wanted Algerian militants. To question the validity of her motives, Boisson-Pradier cited this statement from Walbert, allegedly from the time of her arrest: "It was my Christian convictions that made me decide, freely, to take part in all of these activities."[13]

On the surface, Walbert's statement is unremarkable. In the context of the history of Christianity in Algeria, however, the position that she espoused was nothing short of revolutionary. In the spring of 1957, in the midst of the events that are commonly known as the battle of Algiers, the

and Victims: Pied-noir Memories and the Harki Community," *Memory Studies* 3 (2010): 123–36.

[10] J. Boisson-Pradier, *L'Église et l'Algérie* (Paris: Études et recherches historiques, 1968), 7. *Note*: All translations from the French, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.

[11] Ibid., 289, 290.

[12] Ibid., 297.

[13] Ibid., 28. Boisson-Pradier incorrectly dates Walbert's arrest from "the first days of 1956." She was actually arrested in February of 1957. See Walbert's personal testimony: "Une Française en Afrique du Nord de 1929 à 1957," Centre des archives du monde du travail (hereafter, CAMT), Fonds de la Mission de France (MDF), 1999013 0154, Roubaix, France.

French military arrested Walbert and eleven other Christians and charged them in the military tribunal of Algiers with "undermining the security of the French state." The actions and motivations of these Christians, among them a Catholic priest, several Catholic social workers, and an assistant to the mayor of Algiers, were feverishly debated on both sides of the Mediterranean. In some cases these Christians were labeled as "liberals," but several of the more conservative newspapers, including *Le Figaro* and *L'Echo d'Alger*, emphasized their "progressivist" activities, a term that clearly referred to their supposed ties to communism. For conservatives, right-wing Catholics, and the French military, the most vocal critics of the Christians on trial, "progressivism" was a crime in and of itself. Indeed, Walbert's statement and the argument that support for the Algerian cause was the "Christian" position had the force of an incendiary to those who saw her actions and those of her colleagues as a political and moral betrayal.

Despite the polemics and hostility toward their moral positions and actions, the "progressivist" Christians were, for the most part, neither communists nor revolutionaries. Rather they were men and women – both Protestant and Catholic – who worked on the ground in Algeria, initiating a dialogue with Algerian Muslims and working with them to solve some of the grave social problems that were at the root of Algerian discontent. With the outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence in 1954, these so-called progressivist Christians realized that whatever moral authority they had left among the Muslims of Algeria depended on their distancing themselves from the colonial power and demonstrating solidarity with the Algerians. In groups such as the Association de la jeunesse algérienne pour l'action sociale (Association of Algerian Youth for Social Action, or AJAAS), which organized service projects for Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Scout movements, these Christians began to fully understand the Algerian arguments for independence. The Centres sociaux (Social Centers), where Algerian and French social workers and teachers provided basic literacy, social services, and medical care for the residents of Algerian shantytowns, also became sites for direct Christian-Muslim collaboration. Within these organizations, Christians gained firsthand exposure to the massive poverty, illiteracy, and frustration that were the most visible legacy of French colonialism for the majority of the Algerian population.

Through these interactions, the "progressivist" Christians came to believe that radical social action was the means through which they could prove to the Algerians that their engagement in the political project of

independence was serious. For some this even meant supporting the end of *Algérie française*, a position that was tantamount to treason in the eyes of many in both France and Algeria. Yet it was through this engagement in social projects at the grass roots that they also came to realize that the institutions and practices of Christianity in Algeria would also have to be decolonized.

Decolonizing Christianity

This book examines the central role that Christianity played in Algerian decolonization and the evolution of the relationship of religion and politics throughout the war of independence and its aftermath on multiple levels. First and foremost, this book tells the story of individuals who, like Denise Walbert, understood their political and social engagements in Algeria to be a vital extension of their Christian beliefs. I trace the origins of their beliefs and the motivations for their political and social actions by examining their religious, social, and political networks, and the ways in which they constructed their political and theological worldview. I reconstruct the individual histories and connections that developed between the Christians in France and Algeria who came to realize that Christianity would need to adapt to the realities of a postcolonial world. Their shifting beliefs about Christianity's role in the French empire grew out of a long-term theological and moral examination of the relationship between religion and politics, which emerged in France in the 1930s and 1940s. It was first tested during World War II as leftist Catholics and Protestants in France used Christian theology as a basis for their resistance to Nazism. In the aftermath of World War II, Catholics like the worker-priests of the Mission de France and Protestants such as the aid workers of Cimade transferred this engagement to the colonial context through their political solidarities with North African laborers and their social projects in Algeria.[14] Protestants and Catholics in Algeria then adapted theological ideas from the metropole to the Algerian

[14] The Mission de France was a French Catholic missionary movement that began in Lisieux in 1941 as part of the Catholic Church's project to attract more young men to the priesthood and combat the growing dechristianization of the working classes. Several of the priests who joined the Mission de France became known as worker-priests because they went into factories as laborers (rather than as chaplains or priests) to be among the working classes. Cimade was a French Protestant aid organization formed in the early days of World War II as a means to support wartime refugees. Both organizations are analyzed in great depth throughout this book.

context thereby forcing Christians globally to rethink concepts and practices such as the Christian missionary project, and the relationship between religion and politics.

I use the term "Christianity" in this book to describe the totality of Catholic and Protestant institutions and beliefs in both France and Algeria, with the clear understanding that Catholics vastly outnumbered Protestants in both places. Although I often analyze Catholics and Protestants separately, as individuals or movements, their networks overlapped in significant ways, particularly by the end of the Algerian War. The greater representation of Catholics and Catholicism within France and its empire (particularly in overseas missions) has dominated scholarship on Christianity in France, and to a certain extent dominates this book. However, Protestants were a vocal minority who played a significant role in both Christian resistance to Nazism during World War II and the decolonization of Algeria, and thus deserve significant representation in this story.

This project reframes the history of twentieth-century French Christianity in several ways. Analyzing both Catholics and Protestants allows us to see more distinctly both their similarities and their differences in regards to theology, religious practice, and engagement in the political sphere, while highlighting their interpersonal connections, which were considerable in Algeria. In addition, this book ties the period of World War II to that of the Algerian War and its aftermath. In contrast to the majority of histories of French Christianity that isolate one event from the other, I demonstrate that the theological innovations and political and social activism that emerged in French Catholicism and Protestantism during the 1930s and 1940s were among the most important inspirations for the engagement of French Christians in the Algerian War.[15] This book also illustrates how the local context of Algerian decolonization influenced the global currents of both Protestant and Catholic movements that were concerned about the future of Christianity in the decolonizing world.

[15] This is most typical of much of the French-language historiography of Christianity that tends toward long-term synthetic works organized around major political events such as the two world wars, the Algerian War, the May '68 uprisings; religious events such as Vatican II; or more focused studies of religious movements. Some examples include F. Bédarida and E. Fouilloux, eds., "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens," special issue, *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 9 (1988): 1–188; G. Cholvy and Y.-M. Hilaire, *Religion et société en France, 1914–1945* (Toulouse: Éditions Privat, 2002); E. Fouilloux, *Les chrétiens français entre crise et libération, 1937–1947* (Paris: Seuil, 1997); E. Fouilloux, *Les chrétiens français entre guerre d'Algérie et mai 1968* (Paris: Parole et silence/Desclée de Brouwer, 2008).

In exploring the decolonization of Christianity in France and Algeria, I follow the lead of scholars such as Frederick Cooper, Ann Stoler, and Gary Wilder who treat the metropole and the colony within the same analytical frame.[16] Wilder, in particular, invites us to consider France as an "imperial nation-state" and ultimately to decenter France in the spatial, intellectual, and methodological norms of the history of the modern French empire.[17] By analyzing networks and exchanges of people and ideas that moved back and forth across the Mediterranean, I demonstrate that it was not simply French theology or grassroots activism in Algeria that reshaped global Christianity in the era of decolonization but the combination of the two. However, this does not imply that Christians in Algeria simply put into practice modern theological innovations from Europe. Such a claim highly devalues and underplays the transformative role that Christians in Algeria and the context of Algerian decolonization played in the development of postcolonial Christianity in the 1960s.

Following Dipesh Chakrabarty, who works to "decenter" or "provincialize" Europe in global history, this book seeks to "provincialize" the history of Christianity.[18] In decentering the focus of postwar Christianity from metropolitan Europe, I am not suggesting that we reject or ignore the influence of French Christianity on Algeria. On the contrary, "provincializing" the history of Christianity allows us to see how Christians in the French empire understood metropolitan theologies, adapted them to their local context, and reshaped debates and practices that have long been analyzed as uniquely "French" or "European." It adds new depth and context to debates about the relationship between religion and politics, and the role of religion in the development of the French empire, as well as the relationship between Christianity and Islam, that have long been centered solely on the metropole. Provincializing Christianity also allows us to analyze how and why Christians in Algeria undertook the project of "decolonizing" Christianity – or transforming the institutions and practices of Christianity there – as they faced a situation in Algeria quite unique to French

[16] F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler, "Between Metropole and Colony," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1–37; G. Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

[17] G. Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).

[18] D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3–6.

Christianity. Indeed, as we look closer into the shifting power dynamics that the process of decolonization produced, we see that the decolonization of Christianity was a means through which Christianity was provincialized in its power structures and practices. This occurred most visibly in the theological innovations and personnel changes of these churches in the 1960s, as the emerging voices of the Third World within both Protestantism and Catholicism began to gain a foothold in their historically Eurocentric hierarchies.

Algeria is a particularly instructive case study within the crumbling European empires for examining how Christianity encountered the question of decolonization. Algeria was quite distinctive in a number of respects from the rest of the French empire. Because of Algeria's legal incorporation into metropolitan France and its status as France's major settler colony, Christianity in Algeria was organized around the European settlers. In contrast to French imperial territories such as French West Africa, Madagascar, or Indochina, Algeria had few Catholic or Protestant missionaries seeking to convert indigenous souls to Christianity or to uplift them to the standards of French civilization. In most European colonies, the objective of both Catholic and Protestant missionaries (and their leadership institutions) was the establishment of an indigenous church. As both Elizabeth Foster and Charles Keith have demonstrated, in France's nonsettler colonies like Senegal and Indochina, a "decolonization of the church" meant a transition to indigenous leadership at independence. This process did not occur without contestation, as it was the Vatican that had, from the end of World War I, been pushing to build up indigenous clergy and leadership throughout the European empires. It did so, in many instances, in the face of strong opposition from French missionaries, who claimed that their protégés were not yet prepared to hold positions of leadership.[19] Although the existence of indigenous churches in most European colonies secured some future for Christianity after decolonization, tensions between European missionaries and indigenous clergy lingered after independence, putting to question the validity of traditional missionary practices and the ideologies of Western Christianity.

[19] E. Foster, "A Mission in Transition: Race, Politics, and the Decolonization of the Catholic Church in Senegal," in *In God's Empire: French Missionaries and the Modern World*, ed. J. P. Daughton and O. White (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); C. Keith, *Catholic Vietnam: A Church from Empire to Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), ch. 3.

Algeria, with its violent war of decolonization that placed Christian rhetoric and practices center stage, brought these questions to the attention of Christians globally. The second objective of this book is to examine the ways in which "Christianity" was mobilized as an ideology – rather than as theology or a body of religious practices – to defend a variety of actions during the French colonial period and during the Algerian War. The goal here is to analyze the power that Christianity as an ideology held in relation to French colonialism, to show who wielded this power, how it was mobilized, and what its consequences were. By the late 1950s, the Algerian War of Independence had become a test case for how Christianity would respond to the potential crises of decolonization that were developing throughout Africa and Asia. As Christians attempted to renegotiate their place in the emerging Third World, they were forced to confront the consequences of centuries of racism and violence that Christian rhetoric and institutions had reinforced in European colonies. By the end of the Algerian War in 1962, many Christians globally had realized that unless they demonstrated solidarity with colonized peoples in their desire for independence, they would lose whatever moral authority they had left and would cease to be welcome in the new independent nation-states that emerged from the process of decolonization. Furthermore, they understood that it was necessary to decouple – or decolonize – Christian institutions and practices from both the real and perceived authority of the colonial state. Otherwise, in the eyes of formerly colonized peoples, Christianity would forever be associated with colonial power.

The final objective of this book is to analyze the consequences of Christian activism in Algeria, of Christian rhetoric around the Algerian War, and of the decolonization of Christianity both in Algeria and on the global stage. The moral and religious questions that shaped the Algerian War inspired theological discussions at the highest levels of Christian institutions such as the Vatican and the World Council of Churches. They also fostered historic innovations in global religious thought, including the ecumenical movement, Vatican II, and Liberation theology. Thus, in contrast to Jean Boisson-Pradier's assertion that Christian "collusion" with Algerian nationalists destroyed the church in Algeria, I demonstrate that it enabled the church's continued presence in Algeria after independence. Using Protestant and Catholic engagement in the decolonization of Algeria as a case study of the role of Christianity in the modern world after World War II, this book traces the transformation of Christianity from its position as the moral foundation of European imperialism to its role as a radical voice of political and social change in the era of decolonization.

A Social History of Theology

To fully analyze the decolonization of Christianity in Algeria and its consequences in Algeria, France, and the postcolonial world, I offer here a social history of theology. In other words, my intention is to examine how Christians understood and used theological principles in their everyday lives, how theology influenced their understanding and engagement with politics, and how the actions of Christians then influenced shifts in theological principles. In many ways, this methodology is derived directly from the perspectives and motivations of the actors that I study; several of the theologians I explore in this book, including Karl Barth and Marie-Dominique Chenu, argued that theology should not be a set of abstract concepts outside the grasp of most Christians, but rather should respond to the pressing moral problems that Christians faced in the modern world. Both Barth and Chenu, among others, encouraged Christians to be engaged in the world and to work toward social justice. Such theologians were direct influences on several of the movements and individuals who were engaged in decolonizing the church in Algeria. As a living body of knowledge, theology not only influences people but it also can be influenced by them. This book, then, additionally seeks to understand to what extent the actions of Christians in France and Algeria influenced shifts in Christian theology that occurred in major international forums, such as the Second Vatican Council, which began in 1962, just as the Algerian War was coming to its violent end.

When historians of the Algerian War discuss the engagement of Christians in the conflict, they tend to focus almost exclusively on Christian intellectuals in France.[20] This focus is largely the result of the phenomenon that Todd Shepard deconstructs in which French politicians and intellectuals reinterpreted their positions and actions during the Algerian War in light of Algeria's independence. In many cases, they painted themselves as ardent supporters of Algerian independence and of decolonization more generally

[20] Examples among the major histories of the Algerian War include A. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962* (New York: New York Review Books, 2006), and S. Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005). The exceptions are the few texts that focus on a specific group, like French Protestants, who were featured in G. Adams, *The Call of Conscience: French Protestant Responses to the Algerian War, 1954–1962* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1998), or the priests of the Mission de France, in S. Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie: L'action de la Mission de France* (Paris: Atelier, 2004), and Nozière's 1979 book *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, which is the only significant work to address the actions of both Protestants and Catholics in Algeria during the entirety of the war.

when that was not necessarily true. One result of this reinterpretation was the creation of a heroic myth that allowed many French intellectuals to claim that they had supported Algerian independence all along. The reality is that, until 1959, like the vast majority of French men and women on both sides of the Mediterranean, most of them had never even considered that Algeria could be anything other than French.[21] Because Christian intellectuals – particularly the New Left, including François Mauriac and those writing in journals like *Esprit* – were among the most outspoken critics of the French military's use of torture and repression tactics during the Algerian War, in the years following the war, they have been portrayed as among those heroic supporters of independence.[22] There has been, however, a notable failure to acknowledge the fact that many of those who spoke out against military atrocities like the use of torture or the condition of regroupment camps in Algeria did not often do so in pursuit of a belief in the justice and necessity of Algerian independence; even more rarely did they do so in defense of Christian morality. Rather, in many instances, they did so to save the honor of France.[23]

Although the public interventions of Christian intellectuals such as François Mauriac, Pierre-Henri Simon, or Henri-Irénée Marrou influenced public opinion in France on issues like torture, the historical focus on intellectuals has often obscured the engagement of Christians on the ground whose activism in both France and Algeria had a much more direct impact on the Algerian fight for independence and on the decolonization of Christianity. Some of these individual Christians openly declared their support for Algerian independence well before most intellectuals in France had considered it a serious option. In March 1958, for example, the Mission de France published a statement of support for Algerian independence in their monthly *Lettre aux communautés*. This statement was the result of years of reflection and activism by priests in both France and Algeria, several of whom had participated in FLN support networks in France, including

[21] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 63.

[22] Ibid., 66–68. Some examples of this portrayal of Christian intellectuals as supporters of independence include R. Bédarida, "La gauche chrétienne et la guerre d'Algérie," in "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens," ed. F. Bédarida and E. Fouilloux, special issue, *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 9 (1988): 89–104, and J. Le Sueur's portrayal of Christian intellectual responses to torture in *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria*, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), ch. 5.

[23] Even Henri-Irénée Marrou, the well-known Catholic historian of the Christian church fathers, including Saint Augustine, framed his critical 1956 article in *Le Monde*, "France, ma patrie" (April 5, 1956), within the values of French civilization.

the infamous Jeanson network.[24] Whether or not the so-called progressivist Christians on trial in Algiers in 1957 for sheltering FLN militants openly favored Algerian independence, the fact that many of them risked their lives and suffered torture for their decision to support their Algerian friends is one that merits historical consideration.

My point, however, is not to substitute one "false" heroic narrative with another "true" one. For one thing, the itineraries of the Christians I explore in this book are far too complex to be distilled into a simple explanation of their anticolonial resistance.[25] In many cases, for example, their objective was not the political independence of Algeria but the reform of the colonial system. This may have shifted over the course of the war, but it would be disingenuous to argue that even those who gave direct assistance to the FLN were all active supporters of Algerian independence. Even the show of solidarity for Algerians amid real dangers had diverse and individualized motives. Rather, my goal has been to explore how these Christians came to their moral positions, to understand what motivated their actions, and then to trace the consequences of these actions. The Christians who chose to shelter FLN militants or to work in the shantytowns or regroupment camps often took enormous physical risks that cannot be explained solely by their political or their religious beliefs; the explanation lies at the intersection of politics and religion. An exploration of their social activism in France and Algeria, as well as of their Christian beliefs and theological roots, sheds light on why many of them went to Algeria in the first place and why the behavior of this small group of Christians differed so dramatically from that of most Christians in France and Algeria. It also helps to explain why both French theology and the Algerian War play such key roles in transforming global Christianity in the 1950s and 1960s.

The relationship between religion and politics has long occupied scholars, but for the past several decades, this relationship has also been a crucial component of scholarly debates about the concept of the secular in modern Western civilization and its role in shaping both politics and religion. In postwar Europe, for example, the French philosopher Raymond Aron articulated a vision of communism as a "secular religion."[26] Meanwhile, Hannah Arendt argued, in what Samuel Moyn claims can be interpreted as

[24] Mission de France, *Lettre aux communautés*, March 1958.

[25] See F. Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking African Colonial History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1516–45, especially sections on "resistance" as an analytical tool.

[26] R. Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 265.

her critique of Carl Schmitt's doctrine of "political theology," that "modernity took its most politically defective forms when (among other things) it had failed to make its necessary break with the religious civilization that preceded it."[27] Although this is not a book about secularism, it does emerge amid a growing number of contemporary studies that focus on conflicts between religion and secularism and on the place of religion in modern politics in France, particularly as the practices and beliefs of France's Muslim population have come into conflict with the supposedly universal values of the republican secular nation-state.[28] As the anthropologist Talal Asad has demonstrated, political doctrines such as secularism have been constructed as much in tandem with modern religious structures and practices – Christianity, in particular – as against them.[29] Additionally, scholars such as Joan W. Scott, Naomi Davidson, and Mayanthi Fernando have further challenged the teleological assumption that French secularism, or *laïcité*, is incompatible with religion, and particularly Islam.[30] This book offers a parallel genealogy of these conflicts that disrupts the normalized narrative of a universally secular French nation-state in conflict with Christianity, and then Islam.

This book demonstrates the existence of a profound connection between religion and politics in France and its empire that remained deeply ingrained in French culture long past the supposed secularization of the French Third Republic in the late nineteenth century. The discourses and practices of French Algeria were rooted in a version of Christianity that by turns ignored and racialized Algerian Muslims and marginalized those Christians who sought to create conditions of dialogue with and social justice for the Muslim population. But Christianity in Algeria was not isolated from the metropole, or from the rest of the world. Indeed, the Algerian

[27] S. Moyn, "Hannah Arendt on the Secular," *New German Critique* 105 (2008): 71.

[28] See, for example, T. Asad, "Trying to Understand French Secularism," in *Political Theologies*, ed. H. de Vries and L. E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 494–526; J. Bowen, *Can Islam Be French?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); J. Surkis, "Hymenal Politics: Marriage, Secularism, and French Sovereignty," *Public Culture* 22 (2010): 531–56.

[29] T. Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); T. Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). See also G. Anidjar, "Secularism," *Critical Inquiry* 33 (2006): 52–77.

[30] J. W. Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); N. Davidson, *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); M. Fernando, *The Republic Unsettled: Muslim French and the Contradictions of the Secular* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014).

War forced Christians in France in particular to rethink their relationship to imperialism, to the overseas missionary project, to Islam, and to secular political power in ways that have largely been erased from the historical narrative. That these debates and practices then influenced the significant shifts that took place in global Catholicism and Protestantism in the 1960s and 1970s only underscores their importance.

Christianity in French Algeria

The radical nature of the "progressivist" Christian project can be appreciated only when contrasted with the complex history of Christianity in Algeria. For Jean Loiseau, who wrote the preface to Jean Boisson-Pradier's book *The Church and Algeria*, French Algeria was a "human mosaic [where] men of diverse confessions lived, side by side, sharing without complexes their sorrows and joys, the same work, the same struggles, the same hopes." For Loiseau, "this was the real Algeria," and "it was there [this human mosaic], the presence of the Church in Algeria."[31] Colonial Algeria was certainly a melting pot of different ethnic and religious groups, including Christian settlers from France, Spain, Italy, and Malta; a similarly diverse group of Jews (including indigenous Mozabite Jews living in the Saharan M'Zab); and Muslim Arabs and Berbers. Despite this diversity, Jean Loiseau's idealized "human mosaic" was hardly the reality.

From the French invasion in 1830 until Algerian independence in 1962, the French used the defense of Christianity in North Africa as one of the main justifications for the oppression of the indigenous Arab and Berber populations. In some cases, Christianity was used to justify the violence that characterized much of the colonial experience in Algeria.[32] The historian Patricia Lorcin notes that even the 1830 invasion was depicted in the language of the Crusades, as a "campaign to achieve a Christian victory over a belligerent Islam."[33] The French could argue, of course, that North Africa had been Christian under the Roman Empire. They drew in particular on the fact that one of the early church fathers – Saint Augustine of Hippo (now the modern city of Annaba in eastern Algeria) – was born in Algeria

[31] Boisson-Pradier, *L'Église et l'Algérie*, 10.

[32] See J. McDougall, "Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830–1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 117–31. McDougall notes that one of the original European stereotypes of Algeria included stories of the Barbary pirates who enslaved white Christians, lending justification to the French invasion in 1830.

[33] P. M. E. Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 19.

to justify their contention that they were merely "liberating" Algeria from the Muslim Arab invaders and restoring the rightful Christian claim to the territory.[34]

This vision was reinforced with the arrival in 1867 of Charles Lavigerie, who was appointed archbishop of Algiers. Lavigerie, who soon after his arrival in Algeria founded the Missionaries of Africa (nicknamed the White Fathers and White Sisters), came to "restore the Church in North Africa to its former Augustinian glory." His vision of Islam as a "regrettable" and "incorrigible" religion, led to his desire to convert the population of North Africa – and the Kabyle Berbers in particular – "back" to Christianity.[35] When he discovered that North African Muslims were exceptionally resistant to conversion, Lavigerie created the White Fathers, a missionary order that would work to convert "barbaric" Africans with methods that included learning the indigenous languages and living among indigenous peoples. They focused primarily on mission education and orphanages, because working with children allowed them to begin with a tabula rasa, without the "deleterious" influence of Islam or local customs.[36] Lorcin argues that these practices, particularly in Algeria, were an especially potent form of the French "civilizing mission." Lavigerie viewed the French as the means through which Christian civilization would be spread across the African continent, which he consistently portrayed as barbaric and culturally inferior.[37] Even though the French "civilizing mission" was portrayed as a secular endeavor, particularly after the institution of the Third Republic, several historians have recently demonstrated that Christian missionaries played a central role in enacting its policies on the ground.[38] In

[34] Ibid., 20–23.

[35] Ibid., 177–78. See also O. Saaïdia, "Le cas de l'Église catholique en Algérie avant la Première Guerre mondiale," in *Religions et colonisation XVIe–XXe siècle*, ed. D. Borne and B. Falaize (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier/Éditions ouvrières, 2009), 166–76.

[36] Saaïdia, "Le cas de l'Église catholique en Algérie avant la Première Guerre mondiale," 179; K. Dirèche-Slimani, *Chrétiens de Kabylie, 1873–1954* (Paris: Editions Bouchene, 2004).

[37] Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 179. The White Fathers and White Sisters have a complex history in Algeria. Despite their anti-Muslim origins, they became a missionary organization that was rooted in local communities, particularly in Kabylia and the M'Zab. They learned local languages, provided education and libraries, and in the case of the White Sisters, gathered and maintained local knowledge about Algerian women's arts and crafts, including elaborate embroidery patterns. They remain in Algeria to this day.

[38] On the role of the "civilizing mission" in French colonies, and the complex role French missionaries played in its implementation, see A. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); S. A. Curtis, *Civilizing Habits: Women Missionaries and the Revival of the French Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); J. P. Daughton, *An Empire*

Algeria, however, the notable failures of French attempts to convert Muslims to Christianity meant that there were actually few missionaries, mission schools, or hospitals; most Christian institutions were set up to serve the European population, not the Muslim population.

The failures of the "civilizing mission" in Algeria cannot be attributed solely to the lack of missionary support on the ground, however. Until 1944, French colonizers had great confidence that their "civilizing mission" would eventually uplift the colonized Algerian "Muslims" to the point that they could become "assimilated" French citizens. The reality, however, was that Algerian "Muslims" were governed under a different legal system (Koranic law); Algerian Arabs and Berbers were governed as subjects rather than as citizens, despite their having French nationality.[39] Whether this was due to racism or to anti-Muslim sentiment motivated by secularism within French Republican ideology is a subject of intense historical debate.[40] Yet the reality is that in Algeria, the government consistently failed to fund and support education or even basic social services for the Arab and Berber populations, leading to what the French ethnographer Germaine Tillion described in 1958 as the "pauperization" of the Algerian population. In 1954, she noted, the rate of illiteracy among Algerian male "Muslims" was 94 percent and among females it was 98 percent; additionally, only one in four Algerian children attended school.[41] Until 1949, for those students

Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880–1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); E. Foster, *Faith in Empire: Religion, Politics, and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880–1940* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); and Keith, *Catholic Vietnam*.

39 On the complexities of the legal status of Algerian "Muslims" and "Israelites," see Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, ch. 1. There was a potential exception to this law, but it required the abandonment of the Muslim personal statute, a situation that was not often pursued: Kamel Kateb notes that between 1866 and 1933, there were only 2,355 indigenous naturalizations. See K. Kateb, *Européens, "indigènes" et juifs en Algérie (1830–1962)* (Paris: Éditions de l'Institut national d'études démographiques, 2001), 194.

40 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 30–39. Shepard summarizes this debate very nicely, mainly drawing on the work of P. Weil, *Qu'est-ce qu'un Français?* (Paris: Grasset, 2002), and E. Saada, "Une nationalité par degré, Civilité et citoyenneté en situation coloniale," in *L'esclavage, la colonisation, et après*, ed. P. Weil and S. Dufoix (Paris: PUF, 2005), 193–227. Newer work, such as that of Naomi Davidson in *Only Muslim*, supports the argument that race and religion have been conflated in the case of French Muslims, particularly those French Muslims whose families immigrated from Algeria. In *The Republic Unsettled*, Mayanthi Fernando makes a more nuanced argument about the relationship between race and religion, although she traces the racialization that does occur back to colonial Algeria and the aftermath of decolonization.

41 G. Tillion, *Algeria: The Realities*, trans. R. Matthews (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), 58.

who did attend school, the government ran a two-tiered education system in which "indigenous schools" provided rudimentary vocational training, and European schools were available only to Algerian elites.[42]

Between 1830 and 1962, the Arab and Berber populations of Algeria experienced consistent racism and violence that were encoded in the very fabric of French Algeria. The historian Kamel Kateb has described in detail how the French occupation of Algeria led to profound upheavals in Algerian society. These included famines and epidemics that were related to French policies of population regroupment, which removed indigenous Algerians from land that the French military confiscated for the use of European settlers.[43] In 1881, the French government established the *Code de l'indigénat*, which, until 1944, instituted much harsher penalties for "natives" than for European settlers who committed thirty-three specific crimes.[44]

Before the discovery of oil in Algeria in 1956, it appeared that Algeria had few exploitable natural resources. Additionally, the French had invested little capital in industrial development before World War II. The vast majority of the Algerian population worked in the agricultural sector, despite their having many fewer acres of far less fertile land than the large European landowners had.[45] In the mid-1950s, the Algerian population experienced high levels of unemployment, leading many men to seek work in the metropole. Those who lived in rural areas (approximately eighty percent of the population) existed on subsistence agriculture, and those in the urban areas often lived in overcrowded shantytowns (*bidonvilles*), on the outskirts of the larger cities, with no electricity, sewage, or running water.[46] In the major cities, few Europeans ventured into either the casbahs or the shantytowns, although in the rural areas, it seems that there was

[42] J. Gosnell, *The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 1930–1954* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 47. Gosnell notes that "colonial schools served as training grounds for a Muslim labor force in French industries" (67).

[43] Kateb, *Européens*, 58–84. On the environmental and population devastation of French colonialism, see also D. K. Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), and B. Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

[44] See Weil, *Qu'est-ce qu'un Français?*, 223.

[45] Ibid., 219. Kateb notes that the average number of hectares for European *colons* was 190, whereas for the indigenous population it was 14. In 1954, 80 percent of the agricultural land was in the hands of only 25 percent of the population, and close to one-third of the land (35.4%) was held by only 4 percent of the population.

[46] Ibid., 276–78. In 1954, 30% (86,000) of the Muslim population of Algiers lived in the *bidonvilles* outside the city, 29% of that of Oran, 30% of Bône (Annaba), and 7% of

much more contact between the European and Algerian populations. The view that these contacts were "fraternal," however, appears almost solely in European narratives, as these relations were framed almost entirely in hierarchies of racial and class inequality.[47] At the outbreak of the war, colonial Algeria did not at all resemble a "human mosaic" where Christians and Muslims "lived, side by side, sharing . . . the same struggles, the same hopes." For the most part, the Christian population did little to protest or change the situation.

Throughout the Algerian War, most of the French clergy and the majority of the Christian population supported the cause of French Algeria. The reasons for this support, beyond the obvious defense of their property and way of life, were twofold. In the first place, for decades Christians in Algeria had been constantly reminded that their Christian duty included obedience to secular authorities, and through most of the war, the French government and military were fighting to keep Algeria French. But by early 1960, those Christians who believed that French President Charles de Gaulle and the metropolitan French population had betrayed the cause of French Algeria began to argue that the defense of French Algeria took priority over the duty of obedience to secular and religious authorities. Secondly, the legacy of figures like Cardinal Lavigerie was so powerful that there was a deeply entrenched belief that the French in Algeria were not only promoting their "civilizing mission" but were also defending the Christian legacy in North Africa. This legacy was under threat, they believed, from both Islam and global communism. Christians in Algeria fully bought into French fears that North Africa had become a key battleground in the Cold War.[48]

By the outbreak of the war, the handful of Christians who were attempting to draw attention to the injustices of the colonial system and encouraging their fellow Christians to do the same encountered scorn and often outright rejection from the majority of the Christian population. When Léon-Étienne Duval arrived in Constantine in 1947 to take up the post of

Constantine. This number exploded after the outbreak of the war, as the fighting led to a rural exodus.

47 *Pied-noir* memoirs, especially those that fall into the category of *nostalgérie*, often emphasize the "fraternal" relationships between the European and Algerian populations in colonial Algeria. On *pied-noir* "blindness," see A. L. Hubbell, "Looking Back: Deconstructing Postcolonial Blindness in Nostalgérie," *CELAAN* 3 (2004): 85–95.

48 On Algeria and the Cold War, see M. Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origin of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

bishop of Constantine and Hippo – not coincidentally the ancient canonical diocese of Saint Augustine – he gained a reputation as an avant-garde cleric. In a series of interviews conducted late in his life, Duval recalled that even before his arrival in Algeria he had come to believe that colonialism had run its course, and that his main preoccupation in Algeria should be to achieve legal equality for Algeria's three religious communities: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim.[49] The anticolonial intellectual André Mandouze, a Catholic who was known for his outspoken support for Algerian independence, was chased from his parish church in Hydra, in the hills above Algiers, by parishioners who shouted, "Since you love the Arabs, go to the mosque, and not the church!"[50] As the war progressed and the *pieds-noirs* organized into paramilitary settler militias called the OAS (Organisation armée secrète) to defend *Algérie française*, the attacks became violent. Churches were bombed and people like Pierre Popie, a liberal Catholic lawyer and cofounder of the AJAAS, became OAS assassination targets.[51]

In showing solidarity with the Algerian population, this small minority of Christians demonstrated what the Abbé Jean Scotto called "the positive face of Christianity." When the negotiations for Algerian independence began, a small committee of European Christians – including several notable "progressivists" – and Algerians, organized under the auspices of the GPRA, wrote a report on the church in Algeria that would form the basis of negotiations on the status of Christianity in Algeria after independence.[52] The document was then sent in the form of a letter to the Catholic bishops of Algeria. It asserted that although the Catholic Church would no longer have the privileged place it had held in French Algeria, it would, in independent Algeria, "feel free and respected."[53] One condition of this acceptance, however, was that the church transform itself so that it would be of service to the Algerian people. Although this condition was already in line with the vision of those who sought to decolonize the church, it proved much more

[49] L.-É. Duval and Marie-Christine Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval: "Évêque en Algérie"* (Paris: Centurion, 1984), 56.

[50] A. Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle*, vol. 1, *D'une résistance à l'autre* (Paris: Viviane Hamy, 1998), 250.

[51] Pierre Popie was the very first victim of the OAS on January 25, 1961, when he was stabbed to death in his office. The lawyer who took over his office, Pierre Garrigue, was also assassinated by the OAS on March 1, 1962, just hours before he was to leave Algeria for good. Both Popie and Garrigue were known for their relationships with "progressivist" Christians, and Popie was famous for having declared, "*L'Algérie française est morte!*"

[52] Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 237–38.

[53] "Memorandum du G.P.R.A. à N.N.S.S. les Évêques d'Algérie," Archives du Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 280, Algiers, Algeria.

difficult for many others to accept. The irony for those such as Jean Boisson-Pradier and the Christians who felt betrayed by Algerian independence is that even as they accused Christians like Mandouze or Mgr Duval of inciting the "fratricidal struggle and hatred" in Algeria between Christians and Muslims and of "erasing the Church in Algeria," it was people like Duval and the "progressivist Christians" who actually allowed for Christianity's continued existence in Algeria.

When Algeria became independent, the vast majority of the Christians there left, but those who chose to stay witnessed the transformation of the colonial Église de France into the Église d'Algérie: the Algerian dioceses were no longer under the control of the French episcopate, and, as a text from one of the Mission de France priests on the relationship between church and state after independence noted, "In sum, the Church wants to be Algerian in Algeria."[54] Mgr Duval supervised the handover of a significant number of Catholic churches that were transformed back into mosques, a symbolic and material indication that the Catholic Church was distancing itself from its colonial past.[55] This was an outcome that few would have foreseen just a few years previously. For the Christians who remained in Algeria, however, it meant the discovery of exactly what Christianity could be without the structures of colonialism to prop it up. The church was not "erased," as people like Boisson-Pradier claimed, but its role in society had been fundamentally transformed.

The fact that so many different people from such different backgrounds and experiences all ended up in Algeria working together toward the same goals – of decolonizing Christianity and attempting to transform the relationship between Christians and Muslims – indicates that something larger was at work than a coincidental convergence of events and individuals. In this book, I have taken as a starting point Denise Walbert's claim: "It was my Christian convictions that made me decide, freely, to take part in all of these activities." In the chapters that follow, I analyze what these Christian convictions were and how these activities came to pass, bringing together a diverse set of individuals who altered the course of French, Algerian, and global Christian history.

Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the history of Christianity in French Algeria, focusing particularly on the relationship between Christianity and

54 L. Augros, "Suggestions relatives aux rapports entre l'Eglise et l'Etat dans l'Algérie de demain," October 18, 1961, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 280.

55 Duval and Ray, *Cardinal Duval*, 154–55. During the colonial period, the French had transformed a number of mosques into churches, including the Ketchaoua Mosque in Algiers, which became the Cathédrale Saint-Philippe in 1832.

the colonial regime and the challenges to this relationship that emerged within the Christian community just after World War II. Chapter 2 focuses on the political and religious tensions that emerged in response to the 1957 trial of a group of Christians in Algiers who were accused of supporting Algerian nationalists against the French state. In this chapter, I analyze how "Christianity" became an ideological tool for defending political as well as moral positions in Algeria. Chapter 3 moves across the Mediterranean to Europe and analyzes the responses of Christian institutions and resistance movements to the moral questions that emerged from the Algerian War. In France, Christians agonized over the use of torture and the relationship between church and state, and the Vatican and the World Council of Churches debated the future of Christianity in the decolonizing world. Chapter 4 focuses on the role of Christianity in the collapse of French Algeria, ranging from Protestant humanitarianism in the newly discovered regroupment camps to the growing violence and the divisions that emerged with the return of Charles de Gaulle and the subsequent rise of the OAS. Chapter 5 examines the aftermath of decolonization, focusing particularly on how Christians in Algeria adapted to independence and how Algerian decolonization influenced debates at Vatican II and in the World Council of Churches occurring at the same moment.

CHAPTER 1

Christianity and French Algeria

In French Algeria, Christianity and the colonial regime were deeply intertwined from the start. French military and political leaders characterized the invasion of Algiers in 1830 as a modern crusade against the belligerent Ottomans and Barbary pirates, whose practice of enslaving "Christians" (i.e., white Europeans) became a cause célèbre in France during the early nineteenth century.[1] Although the conquest served multiple political and economic causes for the French, primarily by distracting attention from Charles X's weakening monarchy, the fight against pirates in the name of "Christian civilization" provided the whole affair with a pretext of moral legitimacy. As Gillian Weiss notes, antislavery activists in France argued that simply limiting trade with the Ottomans would not destroy the savage pirates and their allies in the Algerian interior; the only solution was the conversion of the Muslim "savages" to Christianity. Additionally, they argued, French influence would provide a civilizing example: "if Christian doctrine separated man from beast," then Frenchness, Weiss writes, "provided the ultimate model of humanity."[2] Furthermore, the French believed that a military victory in Algeria would come with an additional religious triumph through the liberation of the former Roman homeland of Saint Augustine from Muslim occupation.[3]

Just as the pretexts for the invasion were rooted in the language of religious crusades and moralistic Christian propaganda, the language and practices

[1] For a beautifully documented account of the role of Barbary pirates in and depictions of Mediterranean slavery in the lead up to the conquest of Algeria in 1830, see G. Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

[2] Ibid., 147.

[3] On the language of crusades and the importance of Saint Augustine to the French conquest, see Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*.

of the French conquest and the colonization of Algeria were also strikingly religious in tone. To celebrate the surrender of the Ottoman ruler Hussein Dey in early July 1830, the French expeditionary forces and their sixteen chaplains sang a Te Deum Mass in the casbah of Algiers,[4] and within hours of receiving the news of the surrender, the French king Charles X ordered that the Te Deum Mass be sung in all French churches as well on the following two Sundays.[5] However, the notion of a religious crusade went far deeper than propaganda and ceremony. Although the bishops of France publicly celebrated the conquest as a means to bring Christian virtue to the Muslim heathens of Algeria, and thus promoted it as a missionary enterprise, the military conquest of Algeria during the 1830s and 1840s was notoriously brutal in its successful attempt to wipe out indigenous resistance to French occupation.[6] Jennifer Sessions argues that the "total war" staged on Algerian battlefields by commanders such as General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud and represented in the elaborate battle paintings of Horace Vernet, which were displayed to vast crowds in Paris, enabled a patriotic Bonapartism among the French population that cemented the notions of conquest and crusade into the cultural discourse.[7] The next step in this consolidation of French and Christian power in Algeria was the implementation of settler colonialism.

By the late nineteenth century, "Christianity" had become a mark of European identity, and the French defined the "indigenous" Arab and Berber populations of Algeria by their attachment to Islam.[8] But for the most part, European settlers were not drawn to Algeria out of a desire to Christianize or civilize the natives, and few were engaged in any sort of missionary endeavor.[9] Although the "Christians" of Algeria can often be identified by their religious practices, a lack of archival sources, the ethnic and class diversity of the settler population, and the sparse initial settlement patterns make it nearly impossible to trace who among the settler population could be termed "practicing Christians." A more useful frame of analysis

4 D. Gonzalez, "L'Église d'Algérie: Enracinement, épreuves et conversions, de 1830 à nos jours," in *Histoire des chrétiens d'Afrique du Nord*, ed. H. Teissier (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991), 118.

5 J. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 43–44.

6 On the violence of the Algerian conquest, see Brower, *A Desert Named Peace*, and Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome*.

7 Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, ch. 3.

8 On the question of defining Arabs and Berbers as "Muslim," see Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, ch. 1.

9 Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, chs. 5–6. This is quite distinctive from French and Christian cultural practices in other parts of the French empire that would develop during France's major imperial expansion into Asia and sub-Saharan Africa beginning in the 1850s.

is to consider "Christianity" as a marker of identity formation alongside religious practice. For example, in the 1920s, Christianity's Roman heritage in North Africa formed the basis for what the novelist Louis Bertrand and various other European intellectuals and social scientists of the École d'Alger claimed was a specifically Algerian ethnicity: the "Latin-Mediterranean."[10] This supposedly "new race" that had arisen among the European settlers of Algeria, was, the historian Patricia Lorcin notes, "the pillar on which the myths of origin of the settler state were constructed."[11] By the mid-twentieth century, observers such as the *pied-noir* priest Jean Scotto noted that European "Christians" in Algeria had developed into a self-contained and patriotic community that had very little interaction with Muslims, and in general were not all that faithful, at least in terms of church attendance.[12] Yet most European settlers in Algeria still identified themselves as Christians, and Catholicism in particular became a cornerstone of European settler identity, as most settlers came from Catholic countries – not only France but also Spain, Italy, and Malta.[13]

Although the vast majority of the European settler community barely acknowledged the existence of the indigenous Algerian population, the gradual awakening that developed within a small segment of the European Christian community to the injustices of the colonial system can be traced back to the burgeoning of Social Christianity in Algeria in the mid- to late-1930s. Algerian sections of movements such as the Catholic Action and its corresponding youth groups under the umbrella of the French Catholic Youth Association (Association catholique de la jeunesse francaise, or ACJF), including the Young Christian Workers (Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne, or JOC), Young Christian Students (Jeunesse étudiante chrétienne, JEC), and Catholic Agricultural Youth (Jeunesse agricole catholique, JAC), developed in tandem with their metropolitan counterparts and engaged Catholic youth and clergy from the 1930s onward. Since the early days of French occupation, the Catholic Church played a key role in educating the European population of Algeria. In Algiers during the first half of the twentieth century, for example, prominent European Catholic families often sent their children to be

[10] P. A. Silverstein, "France's Mare Nostrum: Colonial and Post-colonial Constructions of the Mediterranean," *Journal of North African Studies* 7 (2002): 1–22.

[11] P. M. E. Lorcin, "Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria's Latin Past," *French Historical Studies* 25 (2002): 323.

[12] J. Scotto, *Curé pied-noir, évêque algérien. Souvenirs recueillis par Charles Ehlinger* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991), 10–11.

[13] Saaïdia, "Le cas de l'Église catholique en Algérie avant la Première Guerre mondiale," 174; see also Baussant, *Pieds-noirs*, 199–200.

educated by the Jesuits at the basilica of Notre-Dame d'Afrique. From there, they might take part in Catholic youth movements such as the ACJF, the Scouts, or a specifically Algerian organization called the Catholic Student Association of Algiers (Association catholique des étudiants d'Alger), also known as the "Asso." The trajectory was much the same for Protestants, although they had their own confessionally based youth movements and religious organizations.

It was through these youth organizations and church-related movements and networks that new ideas about the role of Christians in the modern world, the missionary movement to the "dechristianized," and social justice began to circulate throughout the Christian community in Algeria. Aided in part by a small number of radical clergy members who were sympathetic to these new ideas and to the cause of social justice, the generation that came of age during World War II was particularly intrigued by the possibility of challenging the status quo in Algeria. This was not simply an intellectual challenge, but one that occurred through actions ranging from social work in the shantytowns outside of Algiers to full political engagement in the Algerian independence movement.

By the outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954, there were small pockets of practicing Christians who pushed for a style of Christianity that emphasized social justice, dialogue, and direct engagement with Algerian Muslims. For some, this meant actively rejecting Christianity's ties to the colonial regime and showing solidarity with Algerians in their fight for independence. This political and theological position emerged through their dialogue with Algerians in youth movements and their experiences working with impoverished Algerians in the shantytowns. It also put them into direct conflict with a conservative, deeply entrenched vision of Christianity that provided a moral justification for both the French colonization of Algeria and the ongoing privileges enjoyed by European settler society.

Christianity in French Colonial Algeria

Algeria was unlike any other colony in the French empire. The early assumption that French colonizers would establish French law in Algeria after the conquest never fully materialized. From 1830 onward, the French determined that the Muslim and Jewish populations of Algeria should be governed under what they called "local law," or the body of laws, courts, and so forth that predated the French conquest.[14] This set an immediate

[14] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 23.

precedent for defining populations in Algeria according to perceived racial and religious affiliation. In an attempt to formalize its hold over the unruly colony, in 1848 the French Second Empire transformed the three northern provinces of Algeria into legal departments of France. Yet despite this territory's legal incorporation into the metropole, the indigenous "Muslims" of Algeria, as the French defined them, were excluded from French citizenship until the 1950s. Even though the French "civilizing mission" and project of assimilation put in place by 1865 offered the possibility that some "indigenous" men could achieve French citizenship through the renunciation of their "local civil status," very few Algerians took up this option. After 1865, Algerian "Muslims" had French nationality, but not citizenship – a key distinction, as it left them with few political rights.[15] Todd Shepard has argued that the French primarily used the term "Muslim" to delineate legal differences between the European and the Algerian Arab populations and that it did not exist as a racial distinction until the postcolonial period (as opposed to simply defining religious affiliations). However, the language itself played heavily into Christian discourses about Algeria throughout the French colonial period as well.

Religious affairs in Algeria were also unlike those in other areas of the French empire. While historians of the French empire have recently brought to scholarly attention the long neglected role that French missionaries played in the propagation and management of the French empire, the missionary story is only a small piece of the complex history of religious life in colonial Algeria.[16] The official position of the French regime toward Muslim religious practices at the time of the conquest in 1830 was one of neutrality – the fifth clause of the capitulation convention signed on July 5 by Louis de Bourmont, Charles X's minister of war, and Hussein Dey specified that "the exercise of the Mohammedan religion will remain free; there will be no attacks on the liberty of all classes of inhabitants, their religion, their property, their commerce, their industry."[17] In reality, French

[15] Ibid., 32–33. Shepard's discussion of the consequences of this difference highlights the necessity of pointing out the French emphasis on defining Algerian Arabs as "Muslims."

[16] The historian J. P. Daughton was at the forefront of the new scholarship on missionaries and Christianity in the French empire with his book *An Empire Divided*. See also Curtis, *Civilizing Habits*; Foster, *Faith in Empire*; Keith, *Catholic Vietnam*; and O. White and J. P. Daughton, eds., *In God's Empire: French Missionaries and the Modern World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[17] Cited in R. Achi, "Conquête des âmes et consolidation de l'ordre colonial: La fabrique d'un "islam algérien," in *Religions et colonisations: Afrique-Asie-Oceanie-Amériques, XVIe–XXe siècle*, ed. D. Borne and B. Falaize (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier/Éditions ouvrières, 2009), 143.

FIGURE 1.1. The Cathédrale Saint-Philippe, Algiers; Library of Congress, LOT 13420, no. 015.

colonial practices did not live up to these promises. The French drastically reduced the number of Muslim religious edifices, from one hundred seventy-six in 1830 to forty-seven in 1862, of which only twenty-one were used for worship.[18] An important number of these mosques were transformed

[18] Ibid., 144.

into Christian churches, including the Ketchaoua Mosque at the entrance to the casbah in central Algiers, which the French requisitioned in 1831. It became the Cathédrale Saint-Philippe in 1845 and the eventual seat of the bishops and archbishops of Algiers.[19]

While the Catholic Church saw Algeria as a space with enormous potential as a missionary territory, the growing presence of European settlers and the incorporation of the northern provinces into the metropole also necessitated a more permanent ecclesiastical presence. Some early conflicts between Rome and the French government over the application of the Concordat in Algeria and who could name priests to an Algerian post were tentatively resolved in 1838 with a papal bull announcing the creation of a Catholic diocese in Algiers.[20] It was dependent on the metropolitan authority of the Archdiocese of Aix-en-Provence, and under the authority of the Concordat (i.e., dependent on the budget of the French state).[21] The first appointed bishop, Antoine-Adolphe Dupuch, the former vicar-general of Bordeaux, arrived in Algiers with the relic of Saint Augustine, to be "returned" to North Africa.[22] He rapidly expanded Catholic influence in Algeria. He also "reclaimed" ancient Christian sites, such as the ruins of Hippo, where he commissioned a basilica to house Augustine's remains. The historian Sarah Curtis notes that "in a remarkably short time, the diocese of Algiers reproduced the infrastructure of a typical French diocese," complete with churches, Catholic schools, a seminary, an orphanage, and an influx of Catholic priests and nuns.[23] For Dupuch, the goal was not so much the conversion of Algerian Muslims to Christianity as the expansion of Catholic – and by extension French – influence in Algeria. Christianity had triumphantly returned to North Africa.

[19] "Note sur la cathédrale d'Alger," Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 472.

[20] The Concordat was an agreement that Napoleon Bonaparte signed with Pope Pius VII in 1801 that reconciled France and the Roman Catholic Church in the wake of the secularizing program of the French Revolution. The agreement, which remained in effect until the 1905 law that separated church and state in France, declared Catholicism as the religion of the "great majority of the French," but left the balance of power of church-state relations in the hands of the French, who had the authority to nominate bishops and pay clerical salaries.

[21] Saaïdia, "Le cas de l'Église catholique en Algérie avant la Première Guerre mondiale," 168.

[22] Curtis, *Civilizing Habits*, 114.

[23] Ibid., 116. Dupuch's methods and self-aggrandizing personality were not universally admired, however, and he came into conflict with more than one major figure. For the history of his conflict with Emilie de Vialar, the superior-general of the Sisters of Saint-Joseph de l'Apparition, see Curtis, *Civilizing Habits*, 131–73, and J. A. Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), ch. 7.

By the 1870s, the Catholic missionary story in French colonial Algeria came to be dominated by the presence and enduring influence of its most famous proponent – Cardinal Lavigerie.[24] Lavigerie was appointed archbishop of Algiers in 1867, a date worth noting, as he came to prominence at the dawn of the French Third Republic. The post of archbishop had only been created in 1865, and it included governance over three dioceses, as the dioceses of Oran, and Constantine and Hippo had been added to that of Algiers in 1857. Lavigerie's grand project in Algeria was to resurrect the ancient Église d'Afrique, the heritage of Saint Augustine, which, the legend recounted, was left in ruins by the Vandal and Arab invasions.[25] Lavigerie saw France, which had also been conquered by foreign invaders (a noteworthy coincidence in his eyes), as the best means of resuscitating the legacy of Roman Christianity in North Africa and transmitting its values further across the African continent.

Like many French colonizers of that period, Lavigerie had an extremely negative view of Arabs and the Muslim faith. In his biography of Lavigerie, François Renault writes that there is no evidence to suggest that Lavigerie had read the Koran, although he recognized the religious fervor of the Muslims surrounding him.[26] The Muslim Arabs were in his view an inferior civilization to that of European Christians and, it turned out, exceptionally resistant to conversion.[27] Lavigerie played an important role in the creation of the "Kabyle Myth," in which the French posited that the Kabyle Berbers had maintained vestiges of Christianity dating from the Roman occupation of North Africa. Thus the Kabyles, they believed, were more receptive to both Christianity and French values than were the Arabs.[28]

To carry out this mission of conversion, Lavigerie founded the Missionaries of Africa (better known as the White Fathers and White Sisters), who focused specifically on converting Kabyle Berbers "back" to Christianity. Lavigerie's message was controversial, in part because it fed Kabyle discontent and eroded relations between European settlers and the indigenous Algerian population. As the crusading head of the Catholic Church in

[24] On Vialar and the SSJ in Tunisia and their legacy in North Africa, see Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans*, ch. 7, and Curtis, *Civilizing Habits*, 131–73.

[25] F. Renault, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 140.

[26] Ibid., 142.

[27] Dirèche-Slimani, *Chrétiens de Kabylie*, 23–24. Dirèche notes that there were a few rare cases of conversion during the Dupuch era, but they were likely forced or financially coerced conversions and strongly mocked by the Muslim population. It also appears that the converts returned to Islam shortly after their evangelization.

[28] Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 62–63, 179.

Algeria, Lavigerie became a de facto spokesperson for the colonizing population, spreading the message of "civilization" through conversion until his death in 1892. Lavigerie's influence, however, lingered long after his death, particularly in the Catholic emphasis on Algeria's Augustinian heritage and belief in the cultural and religious inferiority of Arabs and Islam.

The other key element of Lavigerie's influence had less to do with missionaries and conversion practices than with church-state relations in the Third Republic. As the historian Oissila Saaïdia notes, despite growing hostility between French Republicans and the Catholic Church in the metropole after 1870, archival dossiers of the bishops in Algeria as well as an 1889 report from the general prosecutor on the bishops and clergy in Algeria show "cordial relations" between the civil authorities and the church in Algeria.[29] There were two primary reasons for the lack of conflict between church and state in Algeria, both due to the specificity of the colonial situation. First was the need for all European institutions to maintain an alliance to defend colonial interests in Algeria, and second were the conciliatory politics of Cardinal Lavigerie. Lavigerie was charged by Pope Leo XIII with contriving a signal to jumpstart the *Ralliement*, a reconciliation between the Catholic Church and the French Republic to disrupt the growing conflict between them. His moment came in November 1890 at a reception in Algiers for visiting French military dignitaries.[30] In what became known as the "Toast of Algiers," Lavigerie publicly announced the Catholic Church's loyalty to the French Republic, setting a tone for obedience to the French authorities that would remain the standard among Catholics in Algeria throughout the French colonial era.

Although the 1905 law that decreed the separation of church and state in France ushered in a process of secularization in France, the law was unevenly applied in the French empire, Algeria included.[31] The three "French" departments of Algeria – Algiers, Oran, and Constantine – were subject to this law, yet the general government in Algeria continued to pay allowances to French Christian clergy, along with those to Jewish and Muslim religious leaders, as long as they continued to serve the "national and public interest."[32] Because of Algeria's peculiar status as part of the

[29] Saaïdia, "Le cas de l'Église catholique en Algérie avant la Première Guerre mondiale," 170.

[30] Renault, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie*, 587–93.

[31] See Daughton, *An Empire Divided*, ch. 7.

[32] O. Saaïdia, "L'anticléricalisme article d'exportation? Le cas de l'Algérie avant la premiére guerre mondiale," *Vingtième siècle* 87 (2005): 107–12. I am focusing here primarily on the ways in which this law affected Christianity. On how the Law of 1905 and its uneven

metropole, Algerian dioceses were not integrated into the colonial framework. Instead most Catholic bishops came from France. When the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops of France (ACA) was created in 1919, the archbishop of Algiers became a key member of the organization.[33] In addition, the failure to convert Muslims meant that beyond the few missionaries who remained in Kabylia, by the turn of the twentieth century, the Catholic community in Algeria had turned its focus inward.

As was noted earlier, the vast majority of European settlers in Algeria were Catholic, whether in practice or culture. However, the influx of approximately ten thousand settlers after 1870, in large part from Alsace-Lorraine, which had been lost to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War, brought a growing number of Protestants into the mix. They remained, nonetheless, a tiny minority of the population in Algeria. Despite its status in 1950 as the third largest synod of the French Reformed Church (ERF) – the largest French Protestant denomination – the twenty-one Reformed congregations in Algeria comprised only six thousand members.[34] As with the Catholic Church, the Protestant community in Algeria focused primarily on its own internal concerns. The lack of government support for French Protestant missionaries meant that the earliest Protestant missions in Algeria tended to be foreign, notably British organizations, and the only significant French Protestant mission was the Mission Rolland, which began in 1908 in Tizi-Ouzou.[35]

By the early twentieth century, the Catholic and Protestant populations of Algeria were both well integrated into metropolitan ecclesiastical structures and set apart as colonial institutions. In order to protect its property and ensure its presence in the colonial setting, the Catholic Church, in particular, had entered into a close and mutually beneficial relationship with the French colonial powers.[36] Cultural and religious practices as well as political beliefs among the European Christian community differed according to their region, country of origin, and class. Nevertheless, the outward performance of religiosity was a significant element of Christianity in colonial Algeria. The diocese of Oran was the most active in Algeria, due

application in Algeria affected Muslims, see J. McDougall, "The Secular State's Islamic Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52 (2010): 553–80.

33 Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 27.

34 Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 14.

35 Ibid., 14–15.

36 Saaïdia, "Le cas de l'Église catholique en Algérie avant la Première Guerre mondiale," 169–72.

in large part to a fervently Catholic settler population of largely Spanish origin with a taste for "grandiose and emotional religious manifestations."[37] Despite growing anticlericalism after World War I, the ostentatious 1939 Eucharistic Congress was an event that marked the Catholic community in Algeria for future decades, and was, as Pierre Chaulet described it, "a public manifestation of an official and triumphant Catholicism."[38] According to a French government surveillance report on the "Muslim" reaction to the congress, the Association des Oulémas viewed the event as an "attack against Islam" and complained publicly about official support given to its organizers.[39]

Close relations between Christian institutions and the colonial regime persisted well into World War II. Just as in France, the majority of the French Christian population of Algeria rallied to the Vichy government and Pétain's National Revolution, finding in its conservative policies a restoration of Christian values that had come under threat from the growth of secular ideologies like communism in the interwar period.[40] Although Mgr Leynaud, the archbishop of Algiers from 1917 to 1954, was reputed to have an "ecumenical spirit" and be on good terms with other religious leaders, the bishops of Oran and Constantine were more conservative in their political and ecclesiastical positions. Yet it was Mgr Leynaud who reminded Christians in Algeria of their duty to obey the government with "discipline and confidence" and publicly paid tribute to Marshal Pétain in a pastoral letter in March 1942.[41] Although there were some priests who secretly supported General de Gaulle and the French Resistance, most remained openly supportive of the Vichy regime, at times even reaching the level of active engagement.[42]

On May 8, 1945, the armistice celebrations in the eastern Algerian town of Sétif and the surrounding area ended in bloodshed. After clashes with the

37 Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 103.

38 P. Chaulet and C. Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie: Deux voix, une mémoire* (Algiers: Éditions Barzakh, 2012), 42. In my 2009 interview with them, Pierre and Claudine Chaulet also brought up the Congrès as an example of attempts by the European Catholic community in Algeria to make their presence felt. Interview with Pierre and Claudine Chaulet, Algiers, February 23, 2009.

39 "Oulémas et Congrès Eucharistique," Archives nationales d'outre-mer (hereafter ANOM)/Fonds Territoriaux: Algérie, Fonds du Gouvernement Générale d'Algérie (GGA)/16h/114, Aix-en-Provence, France.

40 See the section on the Catholic Church and Vichy in J. Cantier, *L'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy* (Paris: Jacob, 2002), 264–71.

41 Ibid., 267.

42 Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 43–44; Cantier, *L'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy*, 269–70.

French gendarmerie, Algerian attacks on European settlers in the countryside led to a series of brutal reprisals on Algerian civilians, ending with 103 European and somewhere between 15,000 and 45,000 Algerian deaths.[43] The response of Mgr Thiénard, the bishop of Constantine, who was the ecclesiastical authority in that region, was to deplore the attacks on the Europeans, writing in a letter to his parishioners that "innocent victims paid with their blood and their lives just to be called French, priest, and Christian."[44] The historian André Nozière notes that while Mgr Thiénard condemned the "murder and disorder committed by fanatics who were led astray" he also glorified the work that France had done for the Muslims, a theme that Mgr Leynaud took up the following month at the festival of Saint Augustine in Hippo.[45] These were the only official statements from the Catholic Church on the events of Sétif.

French law evolved over the course of the twentieth century and gave a growing number of rights to the non-European population of Algeria. However, both the continued use of the term "Muslim" to distinguish Arabs and Berbers from the Jewish and Christian settler population and the Christian emphasis on the cultural distinctions specifically between Arab "Muslims" and European "Christians" only heightened the widening divide between the populations. These legal and cultural distinctions also legitimized the Christian community's emphasis on religious belief as a major factor in determining difference. Between the 1930s and the 1950s, however, a number of radical ideas and theologies arrived from the metropole, infusing Christian discourse in Algeria and infiltrating the static racism that held sway within the European settler community. These ideas appeared simultaneously with several influential figures who challenged the status quo and inspired revolutionary transformations within the European Christian community.

Catholics and Social Christianity

Within the European Catholic community in Algeria between the late 1930s and early 1950s, which is generally understood to be quite

[43] The conflicting and imprecise archival documentation on the massacres in Sétif and in the surrounding towns and villages has made it impossible to cite a precise number of deaths. However, historians generally accept these figures as the most reliable. See R. Branche, *La torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie, 1954–1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 35n. 1.

[44] Cited in Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 24.

[45] Ibid.

conservative, a small group followed closely the innovations within Social Catholicism in France and integrated them into the colonial context in Algeria. In particular, the emergence of new missionary theologies and movements, the growing role of the laity in mission and service projects, and the direct engagement with "dechristianized" populations reshaped Catholicism in Algeria.

Several individuals and families in Algeria are emblematic of this shift in Christian mentalities and practices in Algeria during this period. Alexandre Chaulet, a member of a prominent Catholic family in Algiers, had been a leader of the youth section of the Catholic Action (Action catholique) movement, the ACJF, in Algeria in the late 1930s. This movement was led by the Jesuits in the parish of St. Charles de l'Agha in central Algiers.[46] There he encountered a young *pied-noir* priest named Jean Scotto, newly ordained and working with youth and Social Catholic movements in St. Charles, his first post.[47] Chaulet went on to found the first section of the Christian labor union, the CFTC (Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens), in Algeria. He worked tirelessly, with his wife, Suzanne, to improve the social conditions of both Christian and Muslim workers in Algeria.[48] A second Catholic family, the Gallices, was also active in Social Catholicism in Algiers, including a metropolitan organization called Vie Nouvelle (New Life). Cyril Gallice, who ran a small paper company in Algiers, had been active with Alexandre Chaulet in Catholic youth movements in the 1930s, and by the early 1950s, the Gallice family was part of a group of Europeans in Algeria that have often been called the "liberals" (*libéraux*) of Algeria. The term "liberal" is generally used to describe leftist Christians in Algeria who were actively engaged in an analysis of the social and economic inequalities there, although most of those categorized as "liberals" were more often advocates for the reform of the colonial system than for Algerian independence.[49]

[46] Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 38–39.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Alexandre Chaulet also founded the Caisse d'allocations familiales in Algeria and fought to give Algerians access to social security benefits. See Chaulet and Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie*, 27–42; Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 39.

[49] In a 1988 interview with Patrick Eveno, Pierre Chaulet noted that the term "*libéraux*" was created during the Algerian War to talk about a wide range of Europeans in Algeria who were interested in social and political reforms and, in some cases, the independence of Algeria. This interview was published in N. Bancel, D. Denis, and Y. Fates, eds., *De l'Indochine à l'Algérie: La jeunesse en mouvement des deux côtés du miroir colonial, 1940–1962* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), 80. On the "*libéraux*," see also work by Lahcène Zeghdar, including "Les 'libéraux' européens d'Algérie face à la guerre de libération," in

The Chaulets and the Gallices and their children moved within circles in Algiers that included a number of progressive priests, including Jesuits such as the Abbé Desrousseaux and his cousin Jules Declercq. Both taught at the Catholic school at Notre-Dame d'Afrique and were also attached to Catholic youth movements as chaplains.[50] Another young Jesuit, Henri Sanson, whose family from Oran included a Muslim grandfather, was a philosophy professor at the secondary school at Notre-Dame d'Afrique, and the leader of Catholic Action movements in Algiers. In 1951, he founded the Secretariat social d'Alger, which gathered socially minded Catholics together to investigate and to publish studies about the current situation in Algeria. The sociological approach and published surveys were an attempt to engage the Catholic population of Algeria more directly in their responsibilities vis-à-vis the non-European population. Titles of some of the publications included, "The struggle of Algerians against hunger" (1955), "Underdevelopment in Algeria" (1959), and "The search for a community: Cohabitation in Algeria" (1956).[51]

Priests like the pères Desrousseaux, Declercq, and Sanson were viewed as radical within the Catholic clergy of Algeria in the 1930s and 1940s. Certainly, their adherence to the tenets of Social Catholicism or their leadership in Catholic Action movements signaled a political leaning to the left in a generally conservative atmosphere. Yet it was their engagement with the Muslim population of Algeria and their encouragement of European Catholics – and of the youth, in particular – to do the same that shocked most conservatives. At the same time, these projects also attracted those who sought to transform the relationship between the Christian and Muslim populations and the role of Christianity in Algeria. By the early twentieth century, with the exception of the few White Fathers and White Sisters and Protestant missions engaged in traditional missionary activities in Algeria, the Christian churches in Algeria had essentially turned their backs on the project of converting the Muslims and had disengaged from Muslims entirely. The results of the segregation of the religious communities were obvious to socially engaged Christians, who argued that the distance could only be bridged with a new form of engagement that rejected the traditional missionary tactics and goals.

Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale (1830–1962), ed. A. Bouchène et al. (Paris/Alger: Éditions La Découverte/Éditions Barzakh, 2012), 637–40.

[50] Chaulet and Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie*, ch. 1.

[51] M. Akbal, *Père Henri Sanson, s.j.: Itinéraire d'un chrétien d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010), 42–45, 65–67.

These theological innovations and missionary practices in Algeria emerged in tandem with such groups as the Mission de France (MDF) in the metropole. The Mission de France is an emblematic example of the influence of metropolitan theologies and movements on Algerian Catholicism. The Mission de France seminary opened in October 1941 in Lisieux, France, as the realization of a long-term project of the French Catholic Church to attract more young men to the priesthood and to combat a massive drop in church attendance, particularly among the working classes.[52] The Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the establishment of the French Communist Party in 1920 had made Catholics aware that they had growing competition in attracting the attention of the working classes to their message.[53] As a result, French Catholics realized that they needed to adapt their vision of the Christian missionary project to combat the growing internal "dechristianization" in France, rather than just focus on overseas conversion of non-Christians. The Mission de France was not the French Catholic Church's first internal missionary experiment, but it dramatically altered the theory and methods of missionary practice.

Until the creation of the Mission de France, Catholic working-class missionary projects were almost uniformly focused on lay Catholic missionary engagement. One of the first examples of this was the Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne, which essentially turned young Catholics of working-class origin into missionaries to their own class. These Catholic youths were recruited to teach the working classes that "their problems stemmed not from economic exploitation but from spiritual and moral distress."[54] The JOC was created by a Belgian priest in 1924, but it had moved into France by 1926. It used the model of the Action populaire, a Jesuit social organization founded in 1903 and based on the principles of the church's late nineteenth-century social doctrine.[55]

With the increasing engagement of Catholic laity, the 1930s proved to be a high point for Catholic renewal in twentieth-century France. However, this process was complicated by the Vatican's growing concern about the politicization of religion and its profound anticommunism, resulting in a tendency to reject ideas that it deemed too leftist or too openly political. One of the major Vatican initiatives within France in the early 1930s was

[52] "Lettre de son Eminence le Cardinal Suhard sur le Séminaire de la "Mission de France," dated October 1941 [handwritten date], CAMT/Fonds MDF/1996028 013.

[53] S. Whitney, *Mobilizing Youth: Communists and Catholics in Interwar France* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 82.

[54] Ibid., 81.

[55] Ibid., 80.

the reorganization of the main Catholic lay society, Catholic Action, and youth movements like the JOC into one large organization called the Specialized Catholic Action (L'Action catholique spécialisée).[56] This umbrella association now included not only the adult Catholic Action groups but also youth organizations like the JOC, the JEC, and the JAC, as well as various other Catholic lay organizations, most of which had corresponding (and separate) women's sections. Because a priest had direct charge of each branch, this move, which originated with Pope Pius XI, gave the church hierarchy more direct control over all of the Catholic Action and youth movements. In addition, the idea of specialization was supposed to spread Catholicism into every sector of society and to facilitate the mission process by allowing the members of certain groups and social categories to become missionaries within their own class and social groups: factory workers would be missionaries to other factory workers, university students to other university students, and so forth. It was not until World War II, however, that French Catholics began to seriously rethink the goals and structure of this internal mission.

Although it was only one of many new missionary organizations, the Mission de France played a central role as a "research laboratory" in the revolution in missionary theology and practice that was taking shape within the French Catholic Church.[57] This new mission model rejected the old formulation of "conquest" or even "reconquest" of Christian souls in favor of a model that was designed to convert the church to modern society, stripping it of "the coatings, the growths, the deformations that the mold of a culture have imposed upon it" to arrive at "the essential of the evangelical message."[58]

The Mission de France differed from the Catholic Action movements in a key way. Whereas the Catholic Action movements were designed for lay Catholics to be the "missionaries" to their own social groups, the Mission de France was designed as a training ground for priests who "desired to consecrate themselves to the apostolic work of the 'mission' by living communally."[59] The shift to training priests as missionaries came as the

[56] Cholvy and Hilaire, *Religion et société en France, 1914–1945*, 29.

[57] This conception of the Mission de France as a "research laboratory" and crossroads of the missionary movement belongs to T. Cavalin and N. Viet-Depaule, *Une histoire de la Mission de France: La riposte missionnaire, 1941–2002* (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 64.

[58] E. Poulat, *Naissance des prêtres-ouvriers* (Paris: Casterman, 1965), 47.

[59] "Lettre de son Eminence le Cardinal Suhard sur le Séminaire de la "Mission de France," dated October 1941 [handwritten date], CAMT/MDF/1996028 013.

French episcopate realized that the problem of dechristianization was much more widespread than it had thought and that it affected not just the urbanized working classes but the rural countryside, and places where there were no priests at all. Recruiting priests from other dioceses to go into those regions seemed like an impossible task, particularly when they had no training in missionary techniques. The Mission de France, along with other movements such as the Mission de Paris, went a step further and sent priests into factories as laborers, creating a novel form of Catholic missionary called the "worker-priest."[60]

The model for this new Catholic missionary, and the worker-priest in particular, was Jesus, who in his human incarnation had lived the Gospel and saved humanity from eternal damnation. Instead of spending their energy working to convert the proletariat, they perceived their mission as one of making a place for Christianity in the lives of the working classes; in sharing the workers' daily turmoil and hardships, they were testifying to the possibilities of Christian solidarity with the working classes and breaking down the wall between the proletariat and the bourgeois church. Consequently, the initial missionary project of the Mission de France, and other worker-priest movements in France and elsewhere, was to fully integrate itself into the lives of the working classes through sociological study, research groups, and finally full-time work in factories as ordinary laborers. In most cases, they would not reveal their identity as priests, but through their behaviors, actions, and solidarity would "incarnate" the values of Christianity and reveal to the dechristianized populations a less threatening, less bourgeois version of Catholicism.

Movements like the Mission de France were quite radical within French Catholicism and engendered strong criticism from conservatives within the Catholic hierarchy. However, the new missionary theologies and practices found resonance among a growing body of leftist Catholics within Algeria. In Algeria, those who adopted these theologies and practices also adapted them to the local context. Studying labor and the social conditions of workers, for instance, involved studying the social conditions of both European and Algerian workers. This meant that a missionary engagement with the "dechristianized" masses also included an engagement with the entire non-Christian population of Algeria, including the Muslims. The Christian engagement with the impoverished indigenous populations of Algeria occurred in tandem with the engagement of worker-priests and Protestant aid organizations in the political struggles and working

[60] On the history of the worker-priests, see Poulat, *Naissance des prêtres-ouvriers*.

conditions of Algerian laborers in the metropole. As such, it signaled a shift in the consciousness of leftist Christian political engagement on both sides of the Mediterranean.[61]

A significant influence in these discussions in both France and Algeria was the Catholic mystic and desert wanderer Charles de Foucauld. A former French army officer and an explorer of Morocco, Foucauld became a Trappist monk in 1890, and, in pursuit of his spiritual vision of poverty and penitence, built a hermitage in the Algerian Sahara at Tamanrasset. There he envisioned a new religious association that would combine a monastic life with an apostolate of extreme poverty and holiness, rather than of preaching.[62] Foucauld's ideal of a Catholic "missionary presence" among the Algerian Muslims inspired the congregations of the Little Brothers of Jesus, which were founded in Algeria in 1933 by Père René Voillaume, and later of the Little Sisters of Jesus. These congregations observed vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience to the church while living among the populations they served. They also inspired corresponding lay fraternities and groups like the Mission de France and others reconsidering the new "incarnated" missionary movement in the 1940s. Although the theological and social impact of Foucauld and these movements has been well documented in metropolitan France, less attention has been paid to their influence on Catholics in Algeria. As these ideas spread through seminaries and youth movements, they began to trickle down to the generation that would have its greatest impact on the post–World War II period. For instance, even though the congregation did not formally settle in Algeria until 1948, members of the Catholic community there, including pères Desrousseaux and Declercq and such notable figures as the Catholic scholar of Islam Louis Massignon, had long been attracted to Foucauld's call to engage directly with the Muslim population.[63] These were the teachers of those Catholics

[61] "Les Nord-Africans en France" Rapport pour la Commission Urbaine, February 1955, CAMT/MDF/1996028 0067/file Jan–Mars 1955.

[62] J.-J. Antier, *Charles de Foucauld*, trans. J. Shirek Smith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), 330.

[63] Louis Massignon (1883–1962) was a French Catholic scholar of Islam who was known in Algerian circles for his engagement in movements toward Christian-Muslim dialogue. He was a founding member of a mystical Christian prayer group called "Badaliya" and of the Little Brothers and Sisters of Jesus in 1933. Whereas scholars such as Edward Said have criticized his Orientalism, others have argued that his views on Islam and dialogue were influential in the Vatican II encyclical Nostra Aetate. See E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), ch. 2, and D. Massignon, ed., *Louis Massignon et le dialogue des cultures* (Paris: Cerf, 1996).

who were most directly engaged with the Algerian Muslim population by the late 1940s and early 1950s.[64]

One individual who was profoundly influenced by the teachings of Foucauld and his followers in Algeria was Jean Scotto. Under the guidance of the Abbé Declercq, who taught him philosophy during his seminary studies and took him into the douars of Algiers to care for the impoverished Muslim inhabitants, Scotto came into direct contact with the Foucauldian movement.[65] Scotto grew up in a modest family in the working-class village of Hussein-Dey on the outskirts of Algiers. After his studies at the Petit and Grand Séminaire at Notre-Dame d'Afrique in Algiers, he was ordained as a priest in 1936. He then served in some of the more working-class parishes around Algiers, including Hussein-Dey, where he was named curé in January 1949. A highly decorated World War II veteran, Scotto gained a reputation in Algiers for his sense of justice and his desire to make the Catholic Church more welcoming to the working classes.[66] Influenced by priests like Declercq, Jean Scotto was troubled early on by what he saw as the destructive relationship between the Christian and the Muslim populations in Algeria.[67] Several of his friends and contemporaries have described him as someone who was profoundly concerned with the "human problems" that were especially evident in places like Hussein-Dey, with their vast shantytowns and overcrowding, that had emerged during Algeria's dramatic postwar urbanization.[68] Scotto was also, unsurprisingly, one of the first Catholics in Algeria to exhibit interest in leftist Catholic movements from the metropole, including the Mission de France.

[64] J. Fournier, "Disciples en Algérie (avant 1939)," in "Charles de Foucauld – approches historiques," ed. P. Fournier, *Courrier de la fraternité séculière Charles de Foucauld* 131 (2007–2008): 219–65.

[65] Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 20.

[66] Concerning his military service during World War II, Scotto was mobilized in 1939 and became a prisoner in June 1940, according to the Prefecture in Algiers. He escaped in September 1940 and made his way back to Algeria. In October 1942, he reengaged for the duration of the war, serving in campaigns in France and Germany. In September 1945, he was named a military chaplain and was awarded the Légion d'Honneur, the Croix de Guerre, and the Médaille des évadés. ANOM/1k/963 (sous dérogation).

[67] From the biographical statement on Père Scotto based on interviews conducted by B. Garnier and J.-L. Planche, in *Parcours* 15, 1991, Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 182.

[68] Close colleagues including Pères Henri Bonnamour, Denis Gonzalez, and Henri Teissier as well as Pierre Chaulet all mentioned the same thing in my conversations with them in January and February 2009 in Algiers.

The first community of Mission de France priests in Algeria was organized in Hussein-Dey in 1949, specifically at the request of Jean Scotto.[69] After a few initial interactions with the Mission de France during his military service in France in the mid-1940s, Scotto, with the blessing of Mgr Leynaud, the archbishop of Algiers, convinced a few young priests to come to Algeria and to work with him in Hussein-Dey in order to engage more directly with the largely "dechristianized" working classes in the village.[70] For many of the Mission de France priests, their first encounter with North Africa had come in France as a result of either their military service or their interactions with North African workers there. One of the earliest arrivals in Algeria was Guy Malmenaide, who had expressed a desire to live a contemplative life among "a primitive population, like the indigènes of North Africa."[71] In Hussein-Dey, he worked alongside Algerians, and he was one of the first Catholic priests in Algeria to learn Arabic, which he studied with the White Fathers in Tunisia. Honoré Sarda, who had discovered his own "missionary aspirations" after his return from forced labor in the STO (Service du travail obligatoire) in Germany, had spent seven years of his youth in North Africa and wanted to return after his ordination. He arrived in Hussein-Dey in July 1951, around the same time as Henri Bonnamour, who came to replace Guy Malmenaide during his Arabic training in Tunisia but stayed on as the fourth priest.[72]

Jean Scotto and his team made several changes in the parish, many of which were quite radical for Algeria. In their report on their activities in 1952, the Mission de France team in Hussein-Dey described the commune as having approximately eighteen thousand European inhabitants, with twenty-five thousand "indigènes," twenty thousand of whom lived in the shantytown on the outskirts of Hussein-Dey. The town was quickly shifting away from its agricultural origins with the influx of industrial laborers.[73] To engage with the largely working-class population, Scotto and his priests

[69] After his time in Hussein-Dey, Père Scotto was the curé of Bab El-Oued, a working-class quarter of Algiers, and then of El Harrach (1961–1963) and Belcourt (1963–1970), before becoming the bishop of Constantine and Hippo in 1970. He retired from this post in 1983 for health reasons; he died suddenly and prematurely of a heart attack on September 8, 1993, in Aix-en-Provence. See H. Teissier, "Notice biographique du P. Scotto pour le service du chef du gouvernement," 1993, Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 182.

[70] Biographical statement on Père Scotto based on interviews conducted by B. Garnier and J.-L. Planche in *Parcours* 15, 1991, Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 182.

[71] "Etat de la Mission de France dans le secteur d'Hussein-Dey," CAMT/MDF/1997015 0172/1952.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

attempted to "convert" the church to the world of modern Algeria. With the motto "new wine in new vessels," they reversed the altar so that the priests faced the congregation and pronounced the Latin liturgy in French.[74] Scotto also removed many of the statues and stained-glass windows from the church, arguing that the goal was the "unification of the classes in simplicity." In addition, he asked Éric de Saussure, a member of the ecumenical Taizé order, to paint murals on the building's walls.[75]

By orienting the church toward the reality of Hussein-Dey, Père Scotto followed the model of the Mission de France and the movement of liturgical reform in France that had begun in the 1930s and 1940s. Conservative Christians viewed these reforms negatively, especially as it became clear that in Hussein-Dey, the opening of the church also meant engaging the entire parish in church activities and social work projects, in particular activities focused on the Algerian Muslims who lived in the shantytowns around the village.[76] By the early 1950s, Scotto and the MDF team had gained a reputation for having a radical political and theological orientation. The MDF, however, defined all of these reforms as being necessary to the instillation of a "missionary spirit" among Catholics in Algeria. In their 1952 report, the team wrote:

> Whatever anyone says, the Church in North Africa is not revived. It is not a question of a Church rising from the ruins, but a transplanted church for the exclusive use of a European population with Christian traditions. The world outside of Christianity is untouched by the structures of the Algerian Church. Worse than that, the more or less flagrant compromises with temporal values create an obstacle to the penetration of the gospel in the pagan and Muslim worlds.[77]

Although the Mission de France believed that "missionary work" was something greater than just conversion, the introduction of the gospel and a Christian influence on the largely "dechristianized" European population in Algeria remained a major motivator in the church reforms. In terms of their relationship with the Muslim population, however, it is unclear to what extent conversion to Christianity was a goal of the MDF teams in

74 H. Sarda, "Histoire de la MDF à Hussein-Dey," CAMT/MDF/1997015 0172. See also Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 80. Sarda notes that the priest read the text, mumbling, in Latin while someone else read the French translation aloud.

75 Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 72–74.

76 Ibid., 74–75.

77 "Etat de la Mission de France dans le secteur d'Hussein-Dey," CAMT/MDF/1997015 0172/1952.

Algeria. What is clear is that they believed that their role was to convince the Christian population that they had a responsibility to create a more just and fraternal relationship with the Muslims in Algeria and to build a bridge across the enormous divide separating the Christian and Muslim populations.[78] In doing so, the Mission de France sought to change the perception among Algerian Muslims that Christianity was fully aligned with French political power and colonialism.[79]

In October 1950, the Mission de France established a second team in the town of Souk-Ahras, in eastern Algeria near the Tunisian border, in response to a call by the then bishop of Constantine, Mgr Léon-Etienne Duval.[80] The team was made up of three young priests – Pierre Jarry, Gabrielle Moreau, and Jobic Kerlan.[81] In a 1951 report to Mgr Duval, the team in Souk-Ahras defined their work as a double task: they sought to help the European Catholic community to grow in their role as Christians, and to create and nourish personal contacts with non-Christians, whether workers of European origin or Algerian Muslims.[82] Their interaction with Algerian Muslims occurred in the events of daily life. In the report, the priests note that they used whatever means they could to connect with the community, whether in the markets or on the sports field. They also worked to establish a dialogue between communities through various associations, such as the Assocation des Oulémas, or the Muslim Scouts.

The radical approach to Catholic life of the new MDF team was a welcome addition for some parishioners in the region (a "slowly-growing core" of the Catholic community, the team described in a 1953 report to Mgr Duval). But in 1953, the priests also noted that the majority of the Catholic community lived completely separated from Algerians, or even

[78] "Nuit et brouillard en Algérie," interviews with Père Gabriel Moreau of the Mission de France, 140, Archives of the MDF, Perreux-sur-Marne, France. See also "Je prie chaque jour pour la paix en Algérie: Entretien avec l'evêque Jean Scotto (Candidat au prix Nobel de la Paix)," in *El Watan*, January 22–23, 1993, Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 182.

[79] Exposé from Père Scotto, Jean Urvoas, and Père Moreau on the situation in North Africa to the AG at Pontigny, Sept. 1956, CAMT/MDF/1996028 0193; Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 22–23, 79–80, 90.

[80] For a more detailed description of the Mission de France's experiences in Souk-Ahras, see Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 17–43; "Copie du rapport de l'équipe de Souk-ahras pour le Cardinal Liénart," CAMT/MDF/1997015 0175/1954.

[81] Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 20. She cites the testimony of Jean Scotto after the death of Jobic Kerlan, found when she consulted Kerlan's personal archives.

[82] "Rapport adressé par l'équipe sacerdotale de Souk-Ahras à Monseigneur Duval, Eveque de Constantine," April 26, 1951, CAMT/MDF/1997015 0175/1951.

from working-class Europeans.[83] The MDF's continued emphasis on pursuing relationships with the Muslim community was viewed with extreme suspicion by more than a few Europeans, leading to tense relationships between the MDF teams and the military and government establishment, especially after the outbreak of the war in November 1954.[84]

In its report to Cardinal Liénart (prelate of the MDF seminary in France) in March 1954, the team wrote that in 1953 they had signed a contract with the bishop that specified the explicitly "missionary" role that they were to play in the diocese. Although they wrote that they had not abandoned the work of spiritual leadership among the Christian community, they were more focused on cultivating relationships with non-Christians, among both the European working classes and the Muslim community.[85] In their attempt to "demonstrate the true face of Jesus Christ," the MDF priests opened the doors of the presbytery to whoever needed help or support, and by late 1954, when the priests observed the astounding increase in the military and police presence and repression in the region, more and more of those coming to the Mission de France for help were Algerians.[86]

In Hussein-Dey, Père Scotto and a community of like-minded Christians were also establishing direct contact with the Algerian Muslim population. In their 1952 report, the Hussein-Dey team wrote that Guy Malmenaide, the Arabic speaker of the team, had taken up residence in the shantytown of La Glacière (Bel-Air), where he, "without the pretension of proselytizing, tries to give an example of prayer and service, approaching as much as possible their lifestyle."[87] Part of his service there was to distribute food, clothing, and medicine to the shantytown residents, a project that slowly expanded in the following years into one of the first Centres sociaux (social centers) in Algeria. In addition to Guy Malmenaide, the parish of

[83] Letter from the MDF équipe in Souk-Ahras to Mgr Duval, June 1953, CAMT/MDF/1997015 0175/1953.

[84] "Objet: A/S des Prêtres de la Mission de France de Souk-Ahras," ANOM/GGA/10CAB/155. This is a surveillance report on the MDF team in Souk-Ahras, dated June 8, 1954, stating that several Catholic parishioners from Souk-Ahras were writing a collective letter to the Vatican protesting the liturgical reforms instituted by the MDF team, as well as the team's close relationships with communists, syndicalists, and "Muslim separatists."

[85] "Copie du rapport de l'équipe de Souk-Ahras pour le Cardinal Liénart," March 24, 1954, CAMT/MDF/1997015 0175/1954.

[86] J. Kerlan, "À propos de Badji Mohktar," in *Le retentissement de la révolution algérienne: Colloque international d'Alger (24–28 novembre 1984)*, ed. M. Touilli (Algiers: ENAL, 1985), 141–59.

[87] "Etat de la Mission de France dans le secteur d'Hussein-Dey," CAMT/MDF/1997015 0172/1952.

Hussein-Dey had acquired in 1951 two parish assistants, one of whom was a French Catholic named Marie-Renée Chéné. Chéné decided that her time would be better spent at the dispensary in the Bérardi shanytown, and from there she began to build a social center with the assistance and support of Père Scotto, who viewed the center as a realization of the idea of "service" that would demonstrate the "positive face" of Christianity to the Algerians.[88]

Marie-Renée Chéné, who had originally come to Algeria as a volunteer with the pacifist NGO, the International Civil Service, had gathered around her a group of young Christians and Muslims who were eager to volunteer in social projects like the social center in Bérardi and, later, to respond to the devastation in Orléansville after the massive earthquake in September 1954. In addition to the dispensary, the Bérardi center opened a school for young girls who had no other opportunities for education, and eventually a school for boys. In 1953, a second center opened in Bel-Air, the other large shantytown in Hussein-Dey, after two *pied-noir* social workers, Emma Serra and Simone Gallice (daughter of Cyril Gallice), suggested to Père Scotto that they could build a social center that would cater to the educational, social, and medical needs of the quarter. They modeled this center on one that they had visited outside of Lyon.[89] From this small center, the young social workers founded the Association of Social Workers of Hussein-Dey (Association des travailleurs sociaux d'Hussein-Dey), which counted on its board equal numbers of Christians and Muslims.[90] The social centers in Bel-Air and Bérardi became the nucleus of an immense volunteer effort by groups of young people who came to the area on the initiative of the International Civil Service as well as that of several youth movements in Algiers. These various groups were educating a growing number of Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish *pieds-noirs* and recent arrivals

[88] Honoré Sarda, "Histoire de la MDF à Hussein-Dey," CAMT/MDF/1997015 0172; Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 77–80. Nelly Forget notes that Marie-Renée Chéné refused all attempts at institutionalization, and when Germaine Tillion's project for the Centres sociaux got off the ground in 1955, Marie-Renée was asked to be the director of the center in Bérardi (also called Bou-Bcila), but refused. The Centres sociaux later took over that original center after her departure from Algeria. Some of the most important support for the early centers came from volunteers from the International Civil Service teams who helped construct the schools and ran the dispensary. This was why several French men and women who eventually worked in the Centres sociaux came to Algeria in the first place, including Nelly Forget. Conversation with Nelly Forget, Paris, France, November 2008, and subsequent correspondence.

[89] Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 78.

[90] Ibid., 79.

from France on the economic and social disparities between the French and Muslim populations in Algeria.[91]

These centers, which became the models for Germaine Tillion's government-run project that began in 1955, attracted the attention of a group of young people in Algeria who had formed an organization called the Association of Algerian Youth for Social Action (Association de la jeunesse algérienne pour l'action sociale, or AJAAS).[92] Anyone seeking an explanation for the radicalization of European Christian attitudes in favor of social justice and Algerian independence would be wise to look closely at the AJAAS. According to a 1953 report on the development of the AJAAS, the organization was created in the fall of 1952 after a series of contacts between Christian and Muslim Scout movements. One of these points of contact was the Algerian committee for the preparation of the World Assembly of Youth's (WAY) first international meeting in 1951. In the end, Algerian participation in the WAY assembly never materialized; the organization was condemned as communist by conservative elements and as too conservative by radical members. After the relative failure of previous attempts at dialogue between Christian and Muslim youth movements, a few Catholic and Muslim youth leaders, including Pierre Chaulet (son of Alexandre Chaulet), Pierre Roche, and Mahfoud Kaddache, decided to form an organization, the AJAAS, whose goal was to "coordinate the action of young Algerians in order to edify a human community in which all Algerians could meet with each other and express themselves, permitting them to be enriched by their mutual differences."[93] AJAAS projects included the improvement of hygiene in the shantytowns, the fight against illiteracy, and the creation of social secretariats to help impoverished Algerians with

[91] The French branch of the Swiss pacifist service organization called the International Civil Service was created in 1935. One of its founders was the French Protestant pastor and pacifist Henri Roser, and it drew on pacifist and Social Christian currents in France and abroad. Volunteers worked on *chantiers* (work sites) both in France and abroad. In 1948, a small section was founded in Algeria that had both European and Algerian members and tried "to bring our spirit of comprehension and mutual tolerance, in total racial equality" to Algeria. See E. Reclus, ed., *50 ans au service de la paix: Les memoires de la branche française* (Paris: Service Civil International, 1987), 57.

[92] On the Catholic Centres sociaux as prototypes for Germaine Tillion's project, see A. Dore-Audibert, *Des Françaises d'Algérie dans la guerre de libération: Des oubliées de l'histoire* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1995), 56–60.

[93] "Où va l'Association Catholique des Étudiants d'Alger?," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 268, file 22. AJAAS members included leaders of the Scouts musulmans d'Algérie (SMA), the French Catholic student association in Algeria (the "Asso"), and newly arrived French youth, such as volunteers from the International Civil Service.

administrative problems. By 1954, approximately three to four hundred students were participating in AJAAS conferences and social projects in and around Algiers.

In addition to the practical social work that the AJAAS members committed to do, the organization also worked to create a forum for discussion of social and political problems raised by the members. A series of weekend camps, held in the beach town of Sidi Ferruch, enabled AJAAS members to bring up topics like capitalism and Marxism, women and Islam, and the colonial system. Despite the insistence of some observers that the Catholics in the organization wanted to steer clear of political issues, members' statements reveal an open discussion of a diverse range of political and religious questions. This openness was central to the success of the organization, allowing it to move beyond the ingrained prejudices of the European population. The first step in achieving mutual respect and dialogue, according to the AJAAS, was acknowledgment of the existence of the other:

> It seems to us to be capital that each of these youth groups, which are completely divided from the start, which grow in parallel without any point of contact, sometimes as enemies, should come to understand, finally, that the other exists, that they have their own personality, and problems that the other never dreamed existed. For us, the future of the country rests in the mutual and reciprocal knowledge of the two youth groups.[94]

Only from there would European and Algerian students be able to move past their cultural and historical prejudices and be able to work together for the future of Algeria.

It is unsurprising that an organization like the AJAAS would emerge from collaboration between the various confessional Scout movements, given that some of the largest youth groups in Algeria during the colonial period were the various branches of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Scouts. There were strong ties among the Christian Scout movements in Algeria, which were offshoots of the metropolitan organizations, and the French movements.[95] As in France, Scout movements in Algeria were organized by confession generally, with multiple branches of Protestant and Catholic Scouts as well as an independent Jewish branch; all were divided by gender. Beginning in 1935, the Algerian Muslims had their own

[94] Ibid.

[95] A. Coutrot, "Les Scouts de France et la guerre d'Algérie," in "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens," ed. F. Bédarida and E. Fouilloux, special issue, *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 9 (1988): 122.

branches, starting with the Scouts musulmans d'Algérie (SMA), which the historian Gilbert Meynier argues was formed under the influence of the ulama and the Algerian nationalist party, the Parti du peuple algérien (PPA). He writes that after 1945 the SMA was "practically a sort of juvenile section of the PPA-MTLD, despite the efforts of Mahfoud Kaddache to keep its autonomy."[96]

Because of these political connections and the radical (for Algeria) projects that AJAAS members engaged in during the early 1950s, the AJAAS was mired in controversy. In particular, more conservative members of the European Christian community were concerned about the leftist and anti-colonial tendencies within the AJAAS. According to a January 1955 report for the archbishop of Algiers, the problem first began with the arrival in Algiers of the Catholic intellectual André Mandouze.[97] In January 1946, the former *résistant* and founder of Témoignage chrétien boarded a ferry to Algeria to take up a post as a professor of Latin at the University of Algiers. A little over a year later, his article denouncing the "myth of the three departments" of Algeria appeared in the Catholic periodical *Esprit*.[98] This article, which launched his activism on behalf of Algerian independence, broke down the myths with which the French attempted to convince themselves that Algeria was indeed part of France. For the next several years, in addition to transforming the pedagogical system of the Latin Department at the University of Algiers with field trips to Roman sites like Tipaza and close interactions with European and Algerian students, Mandouze continued to critique the French colonial system in Algeria. His controversial articles appeared in a diverse range of publications in France and

[96] G. Meynier, *Histoire intérieure du F.L.N., 1954–1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2002), 107. The PPA (Parti du peuple algérien) was an Algerian nationalist political party formed in 1937 out of the remnants of Messali Hadj's Étoile nord-africaine (ENA). The MTLD (Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques) was a more public wing of the PPA, formed in 1946. The PPA-MTLD produced an important number of Algerian militants who became leaders of the FLN after its formation in 1954. Later, the Boy-scouts algériens was formed from members who split from the SMA in 1948, because of their desire to remain apolitical.

[97] "Où va l'Association Catholique des Etudiants d'Alger?," Archives of the Archdiocese of Algiers, casier 268, file 22. The report's authors remain unknown, but according to a rebuttal from the R.P. Coignet (the chaplain at the time), it was likely from a group of five conservative students who were opposed to the "liberal" or "progressiste" politics of certain members. See L. Coignet's May 1955 report in the Archives of the Archevêché of Algiers, casier 268, folder 22. Even though the Asso was created as a Catholic organization, it also included Muslim, Protestant, and Jewish members.

[98] A. Mandouze, "Impossibilités algériennes ou le mythe des trois départements," *Esprit*, July 1947.

Algeria, including several important Christian journals like the Protestant student journal *Le Semeur*, *Témoignage chrétien*, *Esprit*, and *Consciences algériennes*, a journal he founded in 1950.

In addition to his early and public support for Algerian independence, Mandouze was known for his openly "progressivist" political views. As one of the original members of the Union of Progressivist Christians, a movement that promoted dialogue with the Soviet Union as a means to promote peace, Mandouze pushed to break through what he called the "double incomprehension" of the Marxist and Catholic "intransigence" through dialogue between East and West.[99] He participated in the early issues of the "progressivist" periodical *La Quinzaine*, writing on the necessity of Algerian independence. His journal *Consciences algériennes* took up many of the same themes, bringing together articles by communists, Algerian nationalists, and Christians under a simple mantra: "There is no possible Algerian conscience without the definitive liquidation of racism and colonialism, and without a definitive engagement in the direction of democracy."[100] But while Mandouze's journalistic polemics gained him notoriety in intellectual circles and the European settler community, his engagement with students in Algeria was among his most influential actions on behalf of Algerian independence.

The goals of the AJAAS were in many ways in line with the worldview of André Mandouze, although it is difficult to pinpoint Mandouze's influence on the European members of the association; some former members have indicated that it was quite a bit less than what has been previously depicted.[101] Nevertheless, at the request of the editorial team, Mandouze helped the AJAAS launch its own bulletin, *Consciences maghribines*, with the first issue appearing in March 1954.[102] *Consciences maghribines* was from the start openly concerned with social and political questions. The students

[99] Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle*, vol. 1, 210–13.

[100] Ibid., 214.

[101] Conversation with Pierre and Claudine Chaulet, February 2009, in Algiers. In his autobiography, Mandouze depicts himself as one of the founders of a circle of like-minded Europeans interested in developing "franco-musulman" relations, of which the AJAAS and Scout initiatives were one aspect. See Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle*, vol. 1, 208–209. Despite their genuine admiration for the political and anticolonial engagement of Mandouze, European activists for Algerian independence also seemed to have had some mistrust of Mandouze as a French outsider with a somewhat egotistical attitude about his role in Algerian politics.

[102] Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle*, vol. 1, 222–23. The editorial team of *Consciences maghribines* included Pierre Chaulet, Françoise Becht (a leader of the female Scout branch, the Guides de France), Mahfoud Kaddache (leader of the SMA), Pierre Roche, Jean Rime, Mohamed Salah Louanchi, Reda Bestandji, and several others.

themselves wrote the articles, with analyses of subjects that included the various nationalist parties in North Africa; "the French of North Africa," which described the colonialist mentality; and "public health in Algeria," on the Algerian medical structure and the challenges of disease and lack of medical care for the majority of Algerians.[103] Articles in *Consciences maghribines* were also reprinted, beginning in the fall of 1955, by the French Federation of the FLN, and, at the same time, *Consciences maghribines* reprinted several FLN documents.[104]

According to the unnamed authors of the January 1955 report on the "Asso," the AJAAS was being led by "well-known Muslim agitators who, for the most part, have recently been the object of judicial measures."[105] In October 1953, the R.P. Louis Coignet, the chaplain of the Asso, had already expressed particular wariness of what he called the "Manifesto" of *Consciences maghribines*, a document that was never published.[106] His most profound objection was to the politicization of the AJAAS, because it moved the Christian and Muslim members away from acting solely on their religious faith. What he meant by politicization was the passing from political discussion to political action, for he noted that each individual, whether Christian or not, had the right to take a political position. He admitted that the Christian community of Algeria did not have much in the way of political education and that their Muslim counterparts were extremely disappointed that the Catholics, and the representatives of the church in particular, refused to take political positions against the colonial system. However, he then fell back on the favored biblical passage of those Christians who maintained that the church should stay out of the political realm, that of "rends à César [ce qui est à César]."[107]

[103] Ibid., 223. From *Consciences maghribines*, no. 2 (May–June 1954), and no. 3 (Oct.–Nov. 1954).

[104] *Consciences maghribines*, no. 6–7 (Fall 1955), includes a statement by the Fédération de France du FLN, stating their intention to reprint the articles from *Consciences maghribines* for their readers and saluting the courage, intellectual probity, and devotion that they bring to the service of a just cause. *Consciences maghribines* reprinted a large number of FLN documents, including the proclamation of October 31, 1954, up through the tract on the first anniversary of the "Algerian revolution," from October 22, 1955.

[105] "Où va l'Association Catholique des Etudiants d'Alger?," Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 268, file 22, p. 5. They cite in particular the Muslim Scout leaders Omar Lagha [written Amar Lagha] and Salah Louanchi, both of whom were later arrested.

[106] L. Coignet, "A propos du 'manifeste' de *Consciences maghribines*," October 15, 1953, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché of Algiers, casier 268, folder 22.

[107] This verse, from Matthew 22:21, which translates in full as "give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and give to God what belongs to God," was often quoted during the Algerian conflict as biblical justification for keeping the church out of political affairs.

While the most vocal critics of the AJAAS highlighted the political radicalization of its members, this element of its impact was also clear to those within the organization. From the testimonies of several former AJAAS members, it is clear that it was their burgeoning awareness of the economic, social, and political conditions of the Algerians, made possible through both discussion and direct experience in the shantytowns and other social projects of the organization, that led many Christian members of the AJAAS to a political awakening. Frequently, it also led them to support Algerian independence.[108] These Christians, many of whom were radicalized by their experiences in the AJAAS, began to move away from positions that emphasized colonial reform or Christian-Muslim theological dialogue to an understanding that the root of the problem was political. As they did, they became more critical than ever of organizations and Christian institutions that refused to treat the Algerian problem as a political problem.

The AJAAS was clearly on the fringe of Christian youth movements in both Algeria and France, so it is unsurprising that its members became the target of critiques from all manner of sources, particularly from Catholics who argued that the church should stay outside of all political affairs. Yet despite their vilification, the members of the AJAAS did have support from Catholic clergy like Jean Scotto and from the leaders of youth movements in France. Many of these leaders, because of their physical and intellectual distance from Algeria, were more progressive in their critiques of the colonial system than were their Algerian counterparts. For example, the leaders of the older branch of the Catholic Scouts in France, La route, lent their support to various AJAAS projects.[109] One of the most controversial documents that several AJAAS members participated in writing was an open letter from the heads of the more progressive youth movements in Algeria to the governor-general. The carefully worded letter was published in the Algerian newspapers on November 30, 1954.[110] The letter protested in particular the use of "repression" and "*ratissage*" (sweeps) since the

[108] This comes from conversations with Evelyne Lavalette Safir, Pierre and Claudine Chaulet, and Nelly Forget, as well as the testimony of Denise Walbert, CAMT/MDF/1999013 0154/Janvier-Juin 1957.

[109] Interview with Paul Rendu, Bry-sur-Marne, France, April 30, 2009.

[110] The full text of the letter was published, for example, in the *Echo d'Alger* on November 30, 1954, and the letters of protest from several members of the Scouts de France and the Asso were published the following week, December 2, 1954. The original text with the handwritten signatures of the youth leaders exists in the archives of the Archevêché of Algiers, casier 185.

beginning of the Algerian uprising a month earlier. The students highlighted the projects of organizations like the AJAAS, which attempted to solve the Algerian problem through friendship and an understanding of the social and economic causes of the uprising rather than through military repression.

Although the AJAAS is generally categorized as a movement of the so-called liberals of Algeria, it is useful to compare it to another important Christian movement in Algeria that emerged out of the Christian Scout movements. Vie Nouvelle was an organization of young married Catholics and former Scouts that started in France under the leadership of André Cruiziat in 1947.[111] The Vie Nouvelle group in Algiers was composed of approximately forty people, led by André Gallice, the son of Cyril Gallice, and Paul Houdart, both former Scout leaders from well-established Catholic settler families. According to the historian Jean Lestavel, a former member of Vie Nouvelle, the group in Algiers became conscious of the social problems of Algerians in part because of their close relationships with social workers in the original Centres sociaux in Hussein-Dey, including Emma Serra and André's sister, Simone Gallice.[112] With the help of André Cruiziat, André Gallice and his wife, Annette, whose first encounter with the Vie Nouvelle occurred in 1950 during their honeymoon in France, organized a series of meetings in Algeria in April 1951 in the parish of Hussein-Dey.[113] The Gallices describe Vie Nouvelle as a movement that trained young adults and young married couples for greater life responsibilities, whether those of marriage and children or in the political and social spheres.[114] One of the things that attracted the Gallices to the movement was the sense that political engagement was a Christian responsibility, especially in Algeria, where the more progressive wing of the "liberal" milieu was becoming increasingly aware that the solution to the Algerian problem was going to have to be political as well as social.[115]

[111] J. Lestavel, "Le Mouvement 'La Vie Nouvelle' et la guerre d'Algérie," in "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens, ed. F. Bédarida and E. Fouilloux, special issue, *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 9 (1988): 155.

[112] J. Lestavel, *La Vie nouvelle: Histoire d'un mouvement inclassable* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1994), 149–50.

[113] Lestavel, "Le Mouvement 'La Vie Nouvelle' et la guerre d'Algérie," 156.

[114] Interview with André and Annette Gallice in Lyon, France, May 5, 2009.

[115] This does not mean that the *libéraux* were proposing Algerian independence, which was a very infrequent proposal within any of the European communities in Algeria in the early 1950s, with the exception of people like André Mandouze. Generally speaking, until the political scene shifted in the late 1950s, most *libéraux* were calling for reform of the political system, particularly of the Algerian Assembly's two-college system.

It was Vie Nouvelle that led André Gallice to politics, for it was at a meeting of the Vie Nouvelle in Algiers where he first encountered the "liberal" mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier. Chevallier had been a member of the Algerian Assembly before becoming mayor of Algiers in 1953. He was also a Catholic with close ties to the Catholic leadership in Algeria, including the newly installed archbishop of Algiers, Mgr Duval.[116] Thanks to the persistence of Père Scotto and his team in Hussein-Dey, one of the problems that Chevallier became acquainted with as a councilman was that of housing in Algiers, particularly in the slums and shantytowns on the edges of the city.[117] After the Vie Nouvelle meeting that he attended, Jacques Chevallier challenged André Gallice to work for him as an advisor. Gallice, taken aback by the request and feeling that he lacked the experience for the post, eventually agreed to take the job, but only if he could share the tasks with his friend and cofounder of the Algiers section of Vie Nouvelle, Paul Houdart. Gallice and Houdart started working for Chevallier in 1953, focusing particularly on the housing question, and interacting both professionally and personally (as a project of the Vie Nouvelle) with future Algerian nationalist leaders, including Benyoussef Ben Khedda and Salah Louanchi.[118] Gallice and Houdart were also known for their outspokenness on the issue of torture. For example, at a meeting of the Municipal Council in Algiers on January 12, 1955, Paul Houdart protested the use of torture on Algerians; he was greeted with a "glacial silence."[119]

Although Vie Nouvelle is in many ways representative of the "liberal" category of Christians in Algeria, the friendships and connections its members forged with AJAAS members and leaders of the Algerian community engaged them in the Algerian conflict much more than they could have anticipated. People like André Gallice and Pierre Chaulet demonstrate, for example, the diversity of opinions that emerged from a group of socially minded European Catholics with similar backgrounds. Yet for conservative European Christians, both Gallice and Chaulet and the organizations to which they belonged represented a threat to the status quo in Algeria and, in particular, to the privileges that the European settlers held dear. For those who believed wholeheartedly in the defense of *Algérie française* – the vast majority of the settler population – there could never be such a thing as "postcolonial Algeria." In demonstrating solidarity with

[116] P. Éveno and J. Planchais, eds., *La Guerre d'Algérie: Dossiers et témoignages* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte/Le Monde, 1989), 51.

[117] Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 76.

[118] Lestavel, "Le Mouvement 'La Vie Nouvelle' et la guerre d'Algérie," 163.

[119] Paul Houdart's comments were copied from the minutes of the meeting that were published in the Algerian press in *Consciences maghribines*, no. 4 (Jan.–Feb. 1955).

oppressed Algerians in their struggle for social justice and even Algerian independence, the so-called liberal or progressivist Christians had chosen to support the Algerian "terrorists" over the European settlers, a treasonous betrayal.

Christian Institutions and the Politics of Morality

In November 1954, armed conflict erupted in the Algerian countryside, marking the beginning of the war of independence. For those European Christians who had been attempting to promote dialogue between Europeans and Algerians, the outbreak of conflict pushed them toward more radical action. For some, the war and the French policies of pacification merely confirmed the legitimacy of the Algerian nationalists' calls for independence. The police and military tactics, including the use of torture and summary executions, pushed even those who favored reform of the colonial system into concrete actions on behalf of Algerian nationalists – especially when the targets of French "pacification" were longtime friends they had met through groups like the AJAAS. The vast majority of the European Christian population of Algeria, however, was unprepared to deal with the moral and political challenges the war presented. Unsurprisingly, they turned to the leadership of religious institutions for guidance. Yet there was little to be found from the leadership of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in either France or Algeria. The growing divisions within the European population and the reluctance of religious leaders to engage in the "political sphere" forced even the most radical Christian leaders to temper their words and issue cautious statements with vague hopes of "peace and justice." In general, Christian institutions and their leaders maintained conservative and careful positions, particularly on the political ramifications of the conflict. The radical actions and positions of Christians on both the right and the left were those of individuals, including clergy, who often acted in reaction to the perceived lack of moral guidance from religious leaders and institutions.

The Protestants in Algeria, especially those of the Reformed Church, which comprised the majority, generally tended to be more conservative than their metropolitan counterparts. Protestants in Algeria seem to have maintained a relatively cautious and conservative attitude toward the Algerian conflict, siding early on with the integrationist plan proposed by the prominent Protestant Jacques Soustelle, who early in his tenure as governor-general seemed to be working toward a peaceful end to the conflict.[120] It

[120] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 25–37.

is clear that, to some extent, the Algerian Protestant community resented the more leftist viewpoints of metropolitan Protestants, feeling them to be both particularly uninformed on the situation in Algeria and unduly intrusive. One Algerian Reformed Church elder famously retorted "Shut up and pray!" to his French compatriots after receiving a sternly worded letter condemning the violence in Algeria. This discord was reinforced in 1956 when André Chatoney, the head of the Algerian synod at the national ERF meeting in Royan, France, while acknowledging the "brutality" of the delivery, argued that the sentiment still had value.[121]

Yet, with the arrival of more "liberal" French Protestants in Algeria, starting in the mid-1950s, the tone began to shift in certain Protestant communities. This occurred, for example, in the fall of 1955, when a pastor named Max-Alain Chevallier, a former head of the French Protestant student association, the Fédération française des associations chrétiens d'étudiants, better known as the Fédé, arrived to run the Reformed Church parish of Hussein-Dey. As "liberals" from France, Chevallier and his wife, Marjolaine, fit right into the Christian community in Hussein-Dey, pushing their parishioners (somewhat unsuccessfully, it appears) to be more open to the Algerian community, and working with a small group of ecumenical orders of French and Swiss origin. Like the the Mission de France priests, the Deaconnesses of Reuilly, the Soeurs de Grandchamp, and the Frères de Taizé also lived among the impoverished Algerians in the shantytowns and distant suburbs of Algiers around Hussein-Dey.[122] The arrival of Elisabeth Schmidt, the first female pastor of the ERF, who took up the parish in Blida in 1958, similarly challenged the status quo of colonial life. She was invited to Blida to help combat the growing "paganism" (both Christian and Muslim, the invitation letter specified) in Algeria, but her work there was far less missionary in nature. Instead, she attempted to promote a spirit of openness toward the Algerian community in her parish, which was quite conservative, as were many others in rural Algeria.[123]

As with the Catholics, a small group of Protestants in Algeria were becoming conscious of the enormous economic and political disparities

[121] "Procès-verbal du synode national de Royan, 1956," Centre historique des archives nationales (hereafter CHAN)/Fonds de l'Église réformée de France (ERF)/107AS/93.

[122] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 53–54.

[123] Invitation letter from an unknown Algerian pastor asking Elisabeth Schmidt to become pastor of the parish of Blida, Algeria (no date), Bibliothèque de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme (hereafter BSHP)/Fonds Elisabeth Schmidt/014y/2/"Lettres au moment de son départ de Sète"; E. Schmidt, *J'étais pasteur en Algérie: En ces temps de malheur, 1958–1962* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1976).

between the European and Algerian communities. They included François Hauchecorne, the head of the National Library of Algeria, and Maurice Causse, a teacher who arrived in Algeria in 1953 after a stint in Madagascar where he had supported the indigenous movement for autonomy.[124] According to the historian Geoffrey Adams, both Causse and Hauchecorne, who was himself a scholar of Islam, became involved in the Algerian Muslim community through their attempts to create a new form of dialogue between Christians and Muslims, one that was based on mutual respect and the belief that each faith had spiritual integrity as its source.[125] It was from this group that Tania Metzel, a French prison chaplain who had been sent to Algeria to examine how the Protestant community could best engage with the growing numbers of Algerian prisoners, found an enthusiastic welcome on her arrival in Algeria in February 1957.[126]

During her three tours of the prisons and detention camps in Algeria, Tania Metzel became a spiritual and material counselor for Algerian prisoners and, in some cases, for European prisoners who had been arrested for various crimes, including support for the nationalist movement.[127] Although she encountered some resistance from male Muslim prisoners who found it awkward to talk to a European woman, she quickly became a trusted intermediary between the Algerian prisoners and their families.[128] In her later visits to internment camps and prisons, she began to document the use of torture that she discovered, although she found a relatively unwilling audience in the French prison and camp administrators in Algeria. She also attempted to engage the Protestant community in Algeria through a radio address in June 1957, in which she essentially called on Christians to ask God for forgiveness for their neglect of the Muslim community around them. According to Elisabeth Schmidt, this message was not well received by the Algerian Protestant community.[129]

In the Protestant community, those who interacted with the Algerians did so outside of the structures of the church. For example, in addition to

[124] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 87.
[125] Ibid., 86–89.
[126] Ibid., 90. Unfortunately, with the exception of a few documents and Geoffrey Adams's interviews with her, there is little archival documentation on Tania Metzel and her work in Algeria. It seemed that the ERF leadership in France was not eager for her to stay in Algeria, as her presence was also invaluable in France. See Cimade archives/2.3 (Jacques Beaumont).
[127] Nelly Forget, who was imprisoned for several months in the spring and summer of 1957, received a visit from Tania Metzel in Barberousse prison.
[128] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 134.
[129] Schmidt, *J'étais pasteur en Algérie*, 91–92.

the independent work of Tania Metzel in the prisons, and the presence of some Protestants in movements like the AJAAS, several of the European Christians who lived in Hussein-Dey at the time have noted the importance of two small ecumenical communities – the Frères de Taizé and the Soeurs de Grandchamp – who had moved into the poor neighborhoods around Hussein-Dey in the early 1950s.[130] Both groups often worked in tandem with the Centres sociaux in Hussein-Dey. Later, during the so-called battle of Algiers, they became the intermediaries between Algerian prisoners and their families, even attempting to find information on those Algerians who had simply "disappeared."

Like the leading Protestants in France, including Marc Boegner, who was the head of the French Protestant Federation, W. A. Visser 't Hooft, the head of the World Council of Churches, was also extremely concerned about the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Algeria and its impact on both the Algerian War and global Christianity. The WCC was preoccupied with the moral issues surrounding Christians and colonialism, particularly as the organization sought to reconcile the WCC doctrine of human equality before God with the reality of Christian missions. After Visser 't Hooft's 1956 tour of Protestant churches in Algeria, he wrote an open letter to the pastors of the Reformed Churches in Algeria in which he outlined what he saw as the major barriers between the European and Algerian populations. Visser 't Hooft's principal suggestion was to establish human contacts on a footing of equality, offering to the pastors the example and practical assistance of Cimade, the French Protestant aid organization. Cimade had famously run Jewish rescue operations out of occupied France during World War II and, in the postwar period, through its politically engaged humanitarianism, had become the "armed wing of French Protestantism."[131]

Like the Mission de France, Cimade became involved in Algeria because of the problems of North African workers in France. In the summer of 1956, with the financial support of the WCC, Cimade had set up a team in the

[130] The first Taizé brothers, including Éric de Saussure, who painted the murals in Père Scotto's new church in Hussein-Dey, arrived in Algeria in 1953 – this was the first overseas settlement of Taizé. Soeur Renée Schmutz of Grandchamp (1927–2014) arrived in Algeria on November 2, 1954, unknowingly stepping right into the middle of the Algerian conflict. The *baraque* (shanty) of the Soeurs de Grandchamp was in the middle of the Hussein-Dey *bidonvilles*. She remained in Algiers until her death. Interview with Renée Schmutz, Algiers, January, 2009.

[131] M. Barot, "La Cimade et le rôle des organisations internationales de jeunesse," in "Les protestants français pendant la seconde guerre mondiale," ed. A. Encrevé and J. Poujol, *Bulletin de la SHPF* 3 (July–Sept. 1994): 218–19.

outskirts Marseille, in the middle of a North African quarter, where they opened a center for North African workers that offered literacy courses for adults and activities for the children in the neighborhood.[132] From this engagement came the impulse to establish a presence in Algeria.[133] In September 1956, Jacques Beaumont became the new secretary-general of Cimade. In his acceptance letter to the FPF president Marc Boegner, Beaumont asserted that Cimade, while maintaining its historical role in responding to the urgent needs of refugees and migrants in France, needed to find a way to address the grave problems caused by French policies in France's overseas territories, especially in North Africa.[134] Whether through aid to North African workers in France or through direct engagement on the ground in North Africa, Beaumont saw Cimade's role in both spiritual and, to some extent, political terms: as a concrete form of Christian witness to the oppressed that demanded constant negotiation with contemporary political forces.[135]

In both its metropolitan and overseas projects, Cimade undertook to work with a diverse group of secular and religious organizations, many of which already had experience on the ground.[136] It is not surprising that the organization of the first Cimade team in Algeria greatly benefited from the assistance of the Frères de Taizé and the Soeurs de Grandchamp, and from the expertise of the personnel of the Centres sociaux (both the Catholic and the government centers) in the Algiers region.[137] In the summer of 1957, Cimade's leadership in Paris sent Isabelle Peloux, one of the team leaders in its prison ministry, to North Africa to scout out possible locations for Cimade and activities it could undertake. After talking with Protestant pastors and parishioners, as well as with city officials, and visiting one of the Centres sociaux, Peloux decided that the poor, and primarily Muslim, quarter of Clos Salembier in Algiers would be the best place for the first Cimade team. The team members, often called *équipières*, lived in a small house in the quarter, which they opened to the neighborhood children,

[132] "La Cimade à Marseille 1956–1962," from the private archives of Charles Harper.

[133] "Conversations avec Jacques," transcript of Geoffrey Adams's interviews with Jacques Beaumont, October 1994, Cimade archives.

[134] Letter from Jacques Beaumont to Marc Boegner, April 14, 1956, Cimade archives/Personnel boxes/2.3/Jacques Beaumont. Also cited in Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 74–75.

[135] "Conversations avec Jacques," transcript of Geoffrey Adams's interviews with Jacques Beaumont, October 1994, Cimade archives.

[136] Letter from Jacques Beaumont to Marc Boegner, April 14, 1956, Cimade archives/Personnel boxes/2.3/Jacques Beaumont.

[137] "Report on the Camp de Villemarie," Cimade archives/3D 10/11(DZ02); Correspondence between Isabelle Peloux and Jacques Beaumont, Cimade archives/3D 10/12(DZ02–2).

and worked with those residents who needed access to medical care and social services.

Over the next few years, the Cimade teams in Algeria spread from Algiers to Médéa (where they were supported by a former *équipière*, Pastor Elisabeth Schmidt) and into some of the regroupment camps. Cimade, as an ecumenical organization, worked with groups like the American Friends Service Committee and the American Mennonite "Pax Boys," and with Catholic organizations like Secours catholique, in addition to secular agencies like the Red Cross, the Algerian branch of which was run by a Protestant named Mademoiselle Lung.[138] A small number of Protestant parishes assisted in Cimade activities, including the distribution of donated food and clothing to regroupment camps, but for the most part, the Cimade teams were made up of young Protestants who had been recruited through youth movements across Europe.

The Protestants of Algeria were a small and somewhat insular community whose actions and moral positions had a pointed but relatively insignificant impact on the larger European population of Algeria. By contrast, the Catholic Church, as an institution, was a major force within Algerian society. It likely would have remained one of the most powerful procolonial forces if not for the change in its leadership that occurred just before the outbreak of the Algerian War. In March 1954, Mgr Léon-Étienne Duval was named archbishop of Algiers. Duval was a native of Annecy, a town located in the Haute-Savoie region of France on the Swiss border. He had been indelibly marked by the events of World War II, notably the engagement of the region's Christian community in the conflict, which included their active resistance against the Nazis and the Vichy regime and their creation and support of clandestine networks that smuggled Jews out of France.

Upon his nomination to Algeria as bishop of Constantine and Hippo in 1947, Duval arrived to find a diocese still traumatized by the events of Sétif and Guelma in May 1945, and a Christian population that was almost completely closed off from its Muslim neighbors. Although few sources remain to document Duval's years in the Constantinois, in a series of interviews he gave later in his life, Mgr Duval stated that even before

[138] Many of the resources of the Cimade teams, including the food and clothing distributed to the regroupment camps, came from the World Council of Churches and, in particular, from the Church World Service in the United States, which shipped American surplus items to Algeria. The Cimade archives hold detailed correspondence on the daily operations of the distributions in regroupment camps and in the Cimade centers across Algeria. See especially the files from Philippe Jordan in carton 3D 10/11 (DZ02).

FIGURE 1.2. Mgr. Léon-Étienne Duval, official photo as bishop of Constantine and Hippo. Reprinted with permission of the Archdiocese of Algiers.

his arrival in Algeria, he had "arrived at the conclusion that the Second World War had shaken people in such a profound manner that it would mark the end of colonial empires." He went on to note that "the Christian presence in North Africa seemed to me to be legitimate only if Christians were willing to be faithful to the demands of justice, to live in friendly relations with non-Christians, and to be of service to all the inhabitants of the country."[139] This was not, apparently, the situation he found on his arrival in the diocese of Constantine and Hippo in 1947, a region described most frequently to me as "conservative."

Certainly, there were radical influences among the Catholic clergy in Algeria, notably the aforementioned Jesuits and individuals like the Abbé

[139] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 56.

Jean Scotto, but Mgr Duval was an exceptional figure among the Catholic leadership in Algeria, and he became the symbol of the Catholic Church during the Algerian War. His mythic status derived from his public statements against the use of torture and other forms of what he called "injustice"; his vocal and tangible support of peace and reconciliation among the Algerian population, especially across religious lines; and his eventual words and actions at Algerian independence. Yet he is an extremely complex figure. Well before his nomination as archbishop of Algiers, Duval supported the work of the Mission de France in Souk-Ahras, and he maintained this support even after the expulsion of the team in 1956 and in the face of the consistent vilification to which the MDF priests were subjected from multiple quarters. Yet like many Christian leaders of the time, Duval believed – at least early in the Algerian War – that it was possible to separate morality and politics and to maintain a distance between the church and the political problems associated with the Algerian conflict.

When Mgr Duval took the helm of the Catholic Church in Algeria in March 1954, he gained responsibility for one of the most influential institutions in the country. The historian André Nozière gives the number of Catholics of European origin in Algeria at this time as around eight hundred thousand, with a few hundred Algerian Catholics, mostly Kabyles.[140] However, growing political and theological divisions within both the clergy and the population at large made for a tense atmosphere throughout the four dioceses of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Laghouat. On one side were priests like Jean Scotto and the Mission de France, along with the growing number of lay movements like the AJAAS, engaged in social projects with Algerian collaborators. These Catholics, who were often accused of "progressivism" owing to their theological links to Social Catholicism and personal ties to Algerian nationalists, laid the groundwork for some of the strongest challenges to the colonial system that emerged from the European sphere. But this group was a very small minority. The vast majority of the European Catholics and the Catholic clergy of Algeria were known to be intensely conservative, both politically and theologically. The European Catholic population of Algeria had long been indoctrinated with the belief that it was their "Christian" duty to support the colonial regime, and patriotism was part and parcel of "French" Catholic identity in Algeria. The outbreak of the Algerian War in November 1954 only made this duty even more clear to them.

[140] Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 26, citing statistics from *Cahiers d'action religieuse et sociale* 271 (February 1, 1959): 3.

FIGURE 1.3. Installation ceremony of Mgr. Léon-Étienne Duval as archbishop of Algiers, Cathédrale Saint-Philippe, Algiers, March 1954; archives of the Archdiocese of Algiers, AAA/374. Photo reprinted with permission of the Archdiocese of Algiers.

As the head of the Catholic Church in Algeria, Mgr Duval saw that he had two primary tasks in 1954: to maintain the unity of the Catholic community in the midst of a tense moral and political conflict and to create the conditions for a reconciliation of the Christian and Muslim communities of Algeria. The outbreak of the war added a third duty, which was to ensure the presence of the Catholic Church in Algeria. Yet, following the policy of much of the Catholic hierarchy in Europe, Mgr Duval argued that he did not want either himself or the church mixed up in "political questions." To address the problem of the divided Catholic population, he exhorted the clergy to stay united around him and prohibited them from

adding anything to his directives.[141] In the famous 1955 "Collective letter of the Algerian bishops," written in part by Père Lebret of the French Social Catholic association Economie et Humanisme, the voice of the episcopate stated, "It is the affair of the responsible powers to steer Algeria through the incertitude of the moment, toward its better destiny."[142] Just a few months later, in a circular to the clergy titled "Church and Politics," Mgr Duval wrote, "It is not the role of the Church to propose technical solutions to temporal problems: political, social, economic. Temporal power has its own domain, independent of spiritual power, which cannot intervene except in the instance where moral questions are at play. The Church defends justice for all and in all domains."[143] Despite ecclesiastical attempts to leave the "temporal problems" to the state, the moral conflicts that emerged during the Algerian War challenged the possibilities of separation between the two, if such a thing were even possible.

Indeed, the war put Duval into an increasingly difficult position. As head of the Catholic Church, he led an institution whose historic role in Algeria as champion of the colonial regime was at odds with both the ideal of its removal from political affairs and his own visions of his role as archbishop. Maintaining the unity of the Catholic Church remained one of Duval's central preoccupations, despite its impossibilities. But the growing antagonism and violence among Christians and between the European and Algerian populations from 1955 onward forced "moral concerns" to occupy a more prominent position in Duval's engagements. As early as the 1955 "Collective letter of the Algerian bishops," Duval took a fairly

[141] "Rapport très confidential présenté à Monsieur le Ministre résidant à Alger sur l'action de l'Eglise catholique dans le diocèse d'Alger, 4 avril 1957," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283.

[142] "Lettre collective de l'épiscopat algérien," September 15, 1955, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 262, fichier 31. Louis-Joseph Lebret was a Dominican priest who founded the association Economie et Humanisme in Marseille in 1941. According to the historian Denis Pelletier, its major project was one of research that would "work toward a confrontation between the social doctrine of the Church and the human sciences, so as to lay the groundwork for a 'human economy' that was compatible with Christian ethics." The movement, which included worker-priests, was characterized as "progressivist" and widely criticized for its leftist orientation in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but Lebret in particular was extremely influential in Vatican II and the growing movement of Third Worldism within leftist Catholicism in the 1960s and 1970s. For the best history of the movement, see D. Pelletier, *Economie et Humanisme: De l'utopie communautaire au combat pour le tiers-monde, 1941–1966* (Paris: Cerf, 1996).

[143] "Eglise et politique," Circ. 5, November 3, 1955, cited in D. Gonzalez, *Cardinal Léon-Étienne Duval: La voix d'un juste (1903–1996)* (Algiers: ENAG Éditions, 2008), 24.

radical position on the question of "justice," with the publication of this long sentence:

> Assuring the free expression of legitimate aspirations, respecting the profound values of civilizations and cultures, favoring relationships not only of mutual tolerance, but of understanding and friendly cooperation between human groups, searching for common forms in which [people] can express agreement in favor of civic or political progress, we think these general indications cannot be ignored without compromising the future of Algeria.[144]

It is possible to look at this statement and see an overt openness to the possibilities of Algerian independence, based on the phrase "assuring the free expression of legitimate aspirations," despite Duval's insistence to the political authorities, his clergy, and his parishioners that the church should refrain from all involvement in "political" affairs. Yet it was not until much later in the war that Duval made any further public pronouncements on the political future of Algeria.

This is not to say that Mgr Duval was not concerned with important moral questions facing Christians in Algeria, particularly the use of torture and other morally questionable practices that affected Christian soldiers as well as those individuals on whom such techniques were being used. He was remarkably well informed about military and police atrocities, having received several letters from soldiers describing them. A former French Scout leader, for example, recounted the exactions the military ordered against Algerian villages if gunshots were heard in the surrounding areas; these included the deliberate destruction of agricultural and grazing fields and the burning of buildings, as well as the torture and summary executions of villagers.[145] Mgr Duval also received letters from several Algerians who believed that they had been unjustly put under house arrest and asking for his assistance.[146] In addition, he met with at least one defense attorney for Algerian detainees – Maître Bouzida – who told Duval that ninety percent of his clients had been tortured; the methods included immersing detainees

[144] "Lettre collective de l'épiscopat algérien," September 15, 1955, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 262, fichier 31. Although all of the bishops signed the letter, including Mgr Lacaste, the conservative bishop of Oran, it was clearly under Duval's guidance and leadership.

[145] Letters from the "chef de la bataillon Chambrueil" to Mgr Duval, dated August 17, 1956, and September 9, 1956, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 282.

[146] Assorted letters to Cardinal Duval, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 282.

in bathtubs for water torture and forcing detainees to drink urine. According to his notes, Mgr Duval also learned that the large majority of European lawyers in Algeria refused to defend Algerian detainees.[147]

Mgr Duval lodged several official protests about these practices with French government officials and military leaders, including in a letter dated August 22, 1956, to an unnamed general in which he took the officer to task for "thefts committed by soldiers in the course of control operations in the mechtas, the victims of which are often families already suffering from enormous poverty; odious treatment inflicted on suspects; summary executions of prisoners; the use of torture during interrogations (bathtubs, electric current, etc)."[148] He had a number of meetings and a long correspondence with the resident minister Robert Lacoste and his successor, Paul Delouvrier, on matters ranging from protests against the use of torture to the relationship between religion and patriotism.[149] In October 1956, he met with the French prime minister, Guy Mollet, in Paris. There Mgr Duval brought up the "errors committed by certain police and army units," which included cases of torture; the dangers of counterterrorism; and the methods that he believed would "respect the dignity of the autochthones."[150]

As early as 1955, Mgr Duval used his moral authority as archbishop in his public statements as well to critique both the military's tactics and the settlers' violence against Algerians. In January 1955, Mgr Duval issued a statement in which he quoted large sections of Pope Pius XII's discourses on "natural rights," and specifically on the moral limits of police and legal action against citizens. Duval later admitted that he quoted the pope "because it was the means to give my text more credibility in the eyes of Christians."[151] He cited passages that were particularly relevant to Algeria, including a statement from October 1953 in which the pope had declared that "judicial instruction must exclude physical and mental torture . . . first off because they damage a natural right, even if the accused is truly guilty, and because too often they give erroneous results."[152]

[147] Mgr Duval's handwritten notes from meeting with Maître Bouzida, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 282.

[148] Letter to an unnamed general from Mgr Duval, August 22, 1956, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 308.

[149] Mgr Duval's notes on an April 17, 1956, meeting with Robert Lacoste; letters to Paul Delouvrier, August 10, 1959, and February 2, 1960; Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 261.

[150] Mgr Duval's notes on his meeting with Guy Mollet, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 261.

[151] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 129.

[152] L.-É. Duval, *Au nom de la vérité (Algérie, 1954–1962)* (Paris: Cana, 1982), 26–27.

As a member of the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops since his nomination as archbishop of Algiers in 1954, Mgr Duval was in frequent communication with Catholic leaders in France. In a 1982 interview with the journalist Marie-Christine Ray, Duval stated that he had participated in the March 1957 ACA declaration, one of the only texts from the group to condemn, albeit vaguely, the use of torture, terrorism, and counterterrorism by Europeans in Algeria.[153] It is quite evident that even for Mgr Duval, who, along with Catholic leaders in France, adamantly declared that the Catholic Church should remain outside of politics in Algeria, the line between "politics" and "morality" became increasingly blurry as the war progressed. As was clear to a growing number of Christians in both France and Algeria, this distinction was full of contradictions and thus impossible. By late 1956, the increasing violence and issues such as the summary executions of Algerian prisoners, the use of torture, and, eventually, the arrests and trials of Christians accused of aiding the enemy forced Christians on both sides of the Mediterranean not only to confront their moral positions on the various elements of the conflict but also to reexamine and defend their political positions.

As the political tensions intensified during the war, the rhetoric around "Christianity" became an ideological tool for defending political as well as moral positions in Algeria. Both those who sought to alter the social and political systems in Algeria and those who sought to defend *Algérie française* found justification for their cause in a defense of "Christian values" and used examples they mined in the varied interpretations of the relationship between Christian institutions and individuals in Algeria and the French colonial project there. Although the realities of these relationships had a certain inherent value to the future of Christianity in Algeria, it was often the perception of these relationships that had a more important role in shaping political affairs. This was particularly true during the 1957 trial of the "progressivist Christians."

[153] These quotations are from the petition dated March 1957 and sent by several Catholic priests and public figures to Cardinal Gerlier asking for a clear moral statement from the ACA condemning French military tactics in Algeria, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 153.

CHAPTER 2

Christianity on Trial: The Battle to Define Christian Morality

On July 17, 1957, in the midst of the series of events commonly known as the battle of Algiers, a headline in *L'Echo d'Alger* announced the trial of the "progressivist Christians" in the military tribunal of Algiers. There were thirty-five defendants, all charged with "undermining the security of the French state." Mostly ignoring the twenty-three Algerian defendants, the press in both France and Algeria focused their attention on the twelve "progressivist Christians," who included a Catholic priest, an assistant to the mayor of Algiers, and several social workers.[1] According to the military prosecutor, their crimes ranged from printing and distributing tracts for Algerian nationalist movements to sheltering Algerian "terrorists" from the French military, which was attempting to dismantle the FLN network in Algiers.[2] The trial caused a storm of reactions: supporters claimed that they were merely fulfilling their duty to demonstrate "Christian charity" to the oppressed Algerian population; detractors argued that the accused were aiding and abetting those, from the "terrorists" of the FLN to global communists, who sought to destroy Christianity in North Africa.

This was not the first trial during the Algerian War in which Europeans were accused of aiding and abetting Algerian nationalists. However, the moral and religious questions at stake during this particular trial had long-term repercussions in Algeria and beyond. This was a high-stakes game, and those who were caught in the middle were subjected to torture at the hands of the French *paras*. Political and military leaders like General Massu and to some extent even Robert Lacoste, the resident minister during

[1] M. Elbe, "Lundi s'ouvre le singulier procès des 'progressistes,'" *L'Echo d'Alger*, July 17, 1957.

[2] Report from the Ministre de la Justice to the Secretaire d'Etat à l'Intérieur chargé des Affaires Algériennes, April 15, 1957, ANOM/FM/81f/917 (sous dérogation).

the battle of Algiers, defined their actions in opposition to the Christians that they accused of being "progressivists"; they argued that those who questioned the military's tactics were supporters of the FLN "terrorists" and even traitors to the French nation. Although it ultimately backfired, the July 1957 trial was one means by which the French military attempted to legitimize its moral authority and use the justice system to denounce a vision of Christianity at odds with that of French political and military leaders in Algeria.

The trial's visibility during the tense atmosphere of the battle of Algiers to some extent explains the intense reaction on both sides over the accusations. Yet the charges of "progressivism" cannot be fully understood unless they are examined in the political context of the Cold War and of the rhetoric within the European community in Algeria, which was attempting to frame the Algerian War as a conflict over the future of "Christian civilization" in Algeria.[3] The interlacing of the radical missionary movement to the working classes and the Catholic dialogue with communism in the late 1940s and early 1950s began in France, and it resulted in the movement that has been pejoratively called "Christian progressivism" (*progressisme chrétien*).[4]

The so-called crisis of progressivism within the Catholic Church lasted from 1950 to 1957. During this time, the Vatican called into question many of the ideas and projects of the new missionary movement, eventually condemning and shutting down nearly all of the missionary projects to the working classes, including the worker-priest component of the Mission de France.[5] From the late 1940s until the early 1960s among Catholics and the

[3] For an overview of this position, see the introduction in Bédarida and Fouilloux, eds., "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens."

[4] On "progressivism," see Y. Tranvouez, *Catholiques et communistes: La crise du progressisme chrétien, 1950–1955* (Paris: Cerf, 2000). Christian progressivism was not a movement with any sort of organized body, but rather it was made up of Catholics who were connected through personal ties, through adherence to organizations like the Mouvement de la Paix or the Union of Progressivist Christians, through journals like *La Quinzaine*, *Esprit*, or *Jeunesse de l'Eglise*, or simply through religious institutions like the Mission de France or religious orders. Those who condemned progressivists accused them of being fellow travelers of communism, which was in most instances patently untrue. However, so-called progressivists did reject the outright anticommunism of the Catholic Church. Moreover, they openly critiqued the social doctrine of the church, which they viewed, in light of the experiences of the missionary movement in previous years, as stuck in the mentality of the liberal, bourgeois church. In the Cold War atmosphere of the postwar Catholic Church, this was enough for the Catholic hierarchy to attempt to completely marginalize them from the church, a situation that lasted until the reforms of Vatican II.

[5] See F. Leprieur, *Quand Rome condamne: Dominicains et prêtres-ouvriers* (Paris: Plon/Cerf, 1989).

populations of France and Algeria "progressivism" was a widely understood code word that contained an embedded critique of the allegedly radical leftist theological and political tendencies of those who were accused of it. "Progressivism" was thus seen as a danger to both the political well-being of French Algeria and the moral structures of Catholicism. The Christian "progressivists" in Algeria were often linked with those called the "liberals" of the European community in Algeria, and at times more conservative rhetoric conflated the two positions. Although there was some overlap between the "liberals" and their more radical counterparts who advocated for Algerian independence, especially as the war progressed, it was widely acknowledged that "liberals" were an acceptable group whereas "progressivists" were not.

Within the context of Algeria and the War of Independence, however, the larger issue was who got to define what actions and values were "Christian." Historians note that the spring of 1957 was a crucial moment in the Algerian War, particularly for larger moral questions revolving around the use of torture and the military's attempts to solidify its power in what its leaders increasingly believed was a "revolutionary war."[6] The events surrounding the trial of the "progressivist Christians" exposed the extent to which the French used the rhetoric of "Christian values" and the defense of "Christian Algeria" as justifications for the use of violence in Algeria. They also highlighted the hypocrisy of the supposedly benevolent French "civilizing mission," a cornerstone of Christian support for the colonial project in Algeria. The trial occurred in tandem with growing resistance, particularly within the leftist Christian community in France, against the French military's tactics in Algeria. Beginning in 1956, Christian soldiers who recounted their experiences in Algeria became key sources of information for the French public on French military violence in the war. In early 1957, the French Catholic newspaper *Témoignage chrétien* published the *Dossier Jean Muller*, the journal of a Catholic Scout leader killed in an ambush with his reserve unit, which recounted in great detail the military practices of torture in Algeria.[7] This text and others mobilized Christian intellectuals like François Mauriac and Pierre-Henri

[6] See S. Thénault, *Une drôle de justice: Les magistrats dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Découverte, 2001), and Branche, *La torture et l'armée*.

[7] A. Coutrot, "Les Scouts de France et la guerre d'Algérie," in "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens," ed. F. Bédarida and E. Fouilloux, special issue, *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 9 (1988): 121–38; see also, Comité de résistance spirituelle, *Des rappelés témoignent* (Clichy: Seine, 1957).

Simon, who wrote articles and pamphlets denouncing French military tactics.[8]

Debate on both sides of the Mediterranean grew heated over the extent to which Christians, and the Catholic and Protestant churches as institutions, should become involved in political affairs. Leaders of the Catholic Church, in particular, were walking on eggshells in Algeria. For Catholic clergy like Mgr Duval and Jean Scotto, who saw their role as finding a way to bridge the growing chasm that existed between the European and the Algerian communities in Algeria, taking a public political stance on the war carried an enormous risk. Openly supporting the goals and tactics of the French in Algeria would betray their sense of justice. However, speaking out in favor of the Algerians, whether or not they openly supported the FLN, could potentially alienate the European Catholic community who supported the cause of French Algeria. In addition, the charges that the Christians on trial were part of a communist plot against the French nation brought to the forefront the tensions around the "progressivist crisis" that had raged within the French Catholic community for more than a decade.

Despite the fact that the majority of the defendants were Algerian, the media coverage surrounding the trial focused almost exclusively on the Europeans, labeling them alternately as "liberals" or "progressivists," depending on the political orientation and audience of the journal.[9] Soon after the arrests of the European defendants, several of the settler-owned newspapers and some conservative French journals such as *Le Figaro* wrote that the Christians on trial were active members of the progressivist community in Algeria. This charge depended completely on a definition of progressivism that placed Social Catholic movements like the Catholic Action on par with those French Christians who had sought to create a dialogue with Marxism after World War II. For Mgr Duval, the charge of progressivism was in many ways more grave than the charge of damaging the security of the French state; he spent much of his time and ink updating

[8] See F. Mauriac "La Question," *L'Express*, January 15, 1955; P.-H. Simon, *Contre la torture* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957).

[9] Conservative papers in Algeria, including the *colon*-owned *L'Echo d'Alger*, *La Dépêche quotidienne d'Algérie*, and in France *Le Figaro*, tended to refer to the Christians on trial as "*progressistes*," whereas papers with a more leftist orientation, like *Témoignage chrétien* or *L'Express*, or with a religious focus, like *La Croix* or *Réforme*, tended to refer to them as "*libéraux*" (liberals). For other more mainstream papers like *Le Monde* or *France Soir*, it depended on the journalist.

the Vatican on the trial and the charges, reassuring the Catholic hierarchy that the accused Christians were not progressivists.[10]

As the battle of Algiers was intensifying in the spring of 1957, the role that propaganda and public perception played in the growing divide between those who supported any and all means of maintaining French (and therefore Christian) power in Algeria and those who supported the Algerians was immense. Mgr Duval responded by prohibiting members of his clergy from making public statements about the Algerian conflict, while privately assuring Catholic ecclesiastical authorities in France and the Vatican that propaganda had blown the affair of the "progressivist Christians" completely out of proportion. However, his carefully worded public statements were ambiguous and often denounced violence and hate within the Christian community without openly supporting the Christians on trial or their positions. In the end, anticolonial Christians praised his support for their position, while conservative *pieds-noirs* brutally denounced his foray into political affairs. As Mgr Duval and many others discovered, taking a "moral" position in a highly political war was fraught with complication.

The Politics of Solidarity

By late 1955, the French police and military were suspicious of any signs of friendship between Algerians and Europeans. However, European Christians continued to help their Algerian friends and neighbors, whom they felt they could not abandon in a time of great need. For many, it was specifically this show of solidarity in the most difficult of circumstances that demonstrated Jean Scotto's "true face of Christianity" – one that was compassionate, concerned with social and political justice, and took a moral position against the use of torture and the various other repressive "pacification" techniques in use. After the war began, suspected Algerian nationalists were arrested in droves. The threat of arrest, torture, and incarceration in French internment camps drove Algerians into hiding, including many who had no direct affiliation with nationalist movements. These "outlaws" often sought help from their European friends, a few of whom were still – at that point – above suspicion.[11] Salah Louanchi found shelter, for example, in the presbytery of Hussein-Dey, where Jean Scotto allowed several

[10] Mgr Duval wrote at least five reports to the Vatican between August 1955 and July 1960 detailing events in Algeria and the reaction of Catholics; see Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283.

[11] C. Jeanson and F. Jeanson, *L'Algérie hors la loi* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1955).

Algerian militants to stay on the condition that they left their arms at the door.[12] In 1956, Benyoussef Ben Khedda stayed for several months with André Gallice, a "crime" that led to the latter's arrest.[13] Evelyne Lavalette, a former Girl Scout and AJAAS member, sheltered a number of Algerian militants, including Larbi Ben M'hidi and Krim Belkacem.[14]

For some Europeans, such as Evelyne Lavalette and Denise Walbert, the next step was taking part in more directly political activities, acting as a liaison between militants, or helping to prepare, print, and distribute leaflets. In testimony after her arrest in 1957, Walbert, who was accused of distributing tracts for the FLN, argued that to understand the context of her engagements with her Algerian nationalist friends, one first had to understand the rumors that circulated widely: that the police were searching for Algerian militants and that, once caught, they would be subjected to torture, a known reality in Algeria even as early as 1955.[15] Lavalette worked with Père Jules Declercq, whose apartment near the casbah of Algiers housed the roneo machine on which the first issues of the FLN periodical *El Moudjahid* were printed, helping with the printing and distribution of *El Moudjahid* and other nationalist tracts.[16] Lavalette and several other European women were later arrested in Oran after transporting FLN tracts there from Algiers.[17] Jacques and Eliane Gautron, a Catholic teacher and a social assistant in the Centres sociaux, provided their apartment for meetings of Algerian nationalists as well as for the famous meeting in September 1955 between the French journalist Robert Barrat and the Algerian militants Ramdane Abane and Amar Ouamrane.[18]

By many accounts, the actions of these European Christians were overtly political. Both Evelyne Lavalette and Pierre Chaulet, who as a medical

[12] Louanchi, a leader in the Scouts musulmans d'Algérie, joined the FLN in 1955, becoming head of the French Federation in 1956. He later married Anne-Marie Chaulet, sister of Pierre Chaulet, and, through his European contacts, connected Francis Jeanson to the FLN.

[13] See A.-M. Louanchi, *Salah Louanchi: Parcours d'un militant algérien* (Algiers: Éditions Dahlab, 1999), 63; and B. Ben Khedda, *Alger, capitale de la résistance, 1956–1957* (Algiers: Houma, 2002), 104.

[14] Interview with Evelyne Safir Lavalette, Médéa, Algeria, January 31, 2009. See also E. Safir Lavalette, *Juste Algérienne: Comme une tissure* (Algiers: Éditions Barzakh, 2013).

[15] D. Walbert, "Une Française en Afrique du Nord de 1929 à 1957," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0154; Branche, *La torture et l'armée*, 57–60.

[16] Interview with Evelyne Safir Lavalette, Médéa, Algeria, January 31, 2009.

[17] Lavalette was arrested in Oran on November 13, 1956, sentenced to three years in prison, and involuntarily placed in a psychiatric ward. She was freed before the end of her sentence in 1959 under the amnesty given to those with prison sentences of less than three years.

[18] R. Barrat, *Un journaliste au cœur de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 2001).

student treated wounded maquis and then joined the FLN in 1955, declared that they proudly took part in the nationalist movement. For others, even those who well before the outbreak of the war in 1954 had begun treating the Algerian problem as a political one, actions such as hiding friends or typewriters were not necessarily political statements in support of Algerian independence. But as the war intensified and moved into the cities, even those Christians who had planted themselves firmly in the camp of the reformers, in the sense that their goals were the rapprochement of the Christian-Muslim community in Algeria and the reform of the colonial system, began to realize that they could not avoid being caught up in the politics of the war. This was particularly the case for the Catholic priests who had worked on the ground in Algeria to promote dialogue and Christian solidarity with the Algerian Muslims.

In the summer of 1955, a *pied-noir* curé named Alfred Bérenguer, from the town of Montagnac near Oran, decided to publish his thoughts on the Algerian War and the nationalist movement. In his text, *Regards chrétiens sur l'Algérie* (Christian views on Algeria), Père Bérenguer outlined several points of reflection for the Christian community in Algeria. He argued that the Algerian problem was as much a political as a social and economic problem, and that the Christian community needed to find a new relationship with the Algerian Muslims that was not a colonial or a missionary relationship.[19] The text, which was printed and distributed by his Catholic Action group to various friends and Catholic leaders in France and Algeria, received, according to Bérenguer, "lots of positive and negative reactions in Algeria."[20] It also led to his expulsion from the department of Oran in May 1956.[21] He went from there to Algiers, to Bab-el-Oued more specifically, to the parish of Jean Scotto. There he met two priests from the Mission de France – Pierre Mamet and Jobic Kerlan – who had recently arrived in Algiers with a similar story.

After the outbreak of the Algerian War and the formation of maquis of the National Liberation Army (ALN) in the Constantinois, the MDF priests in Souk-Ahras were placed under surveillance by a Monsieur Schmitt, of the Police des renseignements généraux (PRG), because there were "lots of Muslims coming to the presbytery, and more and more often the Muslims that he [M. Schmitt] interrogated took an attitude of silence in front of

[19] A. Bérenguer, "Regards chrétiens sur l'Algérie," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, carton 308. See also A. Bérenguer and G. Dermenjian, *En toute liberté: Entretiens avec Geneviève Dermenjian* (Paris: Centurion, 1994).

[20] Bérenguer and Dermenjian, *En toute liberté*, 142.

[21] Ibid., 146–47.

him."[22] Another police official reproached Mgr Duval, then archbishop of Algiers, for allowing the MDF team to take a visiting cardinal to see one of the poor villages in the area. According to a 1955 MDF report, the official reportedly said, "It was the priests of the Mission de France who took him [Cardinal Tisserant]. Why did you accept that? They are going to show him the misery of those people and explain it in their own manner; we could have given the Cardinal the real reasons."[23] Even more suspicious for the local government was the fact that the team had agreed to participate in a "*comité de soutien*" (support committee) for the families of Algerian prisoners, and that it created information files on examples of police repression that it would send to journalists and writers in France as well as to church leaders and politicians.[24]

The historian Sybille Chapeu, who worked extensively in the personal archives of Jobic Kerlan, one of the Souk-Ahras team, has shown that both Kerlan and Pierre Mamet had direct contacts with the Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD) and later with the FLN. This caused unease among several other members of the MDF team, including Pierre Jarry, who returned to France in 1955.[25] Additionally, Kerlan had a fairly close relationship with Badji Mokhtar, a former member of the Muslim Scouts (SMA) and one of the Algerian nationalist leaders in the region. Mokhtar had been the victim of torture by the French army, and his experiences and belief in Algerian independence were a defining influence on the political evolution of Jobic Kerlan.[26] When Mokhtar was killed during a military operation in late November 1954, Kerlan gathered a small group of Christians from the parish in Souk-Ahras, and they began to visit Muslim families in the area. They also formed a discussion group in which they could explore the social and political problems in Algeria with their Muslim friends, a fact that did not go unnoticed by the local officials who were conducting surveillance on the MDF.

The tensions between the MDF and the local authorities exploded in April 1956 when the prefect of Constantine, Monsieur Dupuch, ordered – for the second time – the expulsion of the MDF from Souk-Ahras. In an internal document chronicling the buildup of tensions before the expulsion order, the MDF noted that even during the period when Mgr Duval

[22] "Rapport chronologique et explicatif concernant l'Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0159/"Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras."
[23] Ibid. Also cited in Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 30.
[24] J. Kerlan, "L'Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," 1985, Archives of the MDF.
[25] Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 31.
[26] Ibid., 27

was still the bishop of Constantine (he became archbishop of Algiers in March 1954), he had received letters from prominent Catholics, including local administrators and *gros colons* in the region, demanding the replacement of the Mission de France priests because of their "teachings."[27] In the spring of 1955, General Allard informed Mgr Pinier, the new bishop of Constantine, that he had decided to expel the MDF team unless the Catholic Church replaced them itself. Word got quickly to Algiers where Jean Scotto intervened through Vincent Monteil, a noted French Arabist and convert to Islam who was working at that time in the cabinet of Jacques Soustelle, and the order was revoked.

In January 1956, the MDF team in Souk-Ahras issued a statement concerning the responsibility of Christians within the growing culture of hatred and violence in Algeria.[28] After pointing out that the Christian faith had for its essential doctrine that Christians "should not kill, should not unjustly take the belongings of others, and that they should respect their neighbors, his property, his family, his honor, and his liberty," the team then stated that "for the Christian conscience, all of these attacks of the last fifteen months are crimes."[29] They went on to say that the Christian faith should not be limited to these principles, but should lead to attitudes that refuse "to condemn this or that category of person under the pretext that they belong to a certain class, nation, race or civilization . . . there are neither inferior nor superior races. There are only men, all sinners and all loved by God as his children."[30] This statement was distributed to all of the Catholic parishioners in the area and likely was one of the major catalysts for the expulsion order of April 1956, which, despite the best efforts of the clergy and sympathetic politicians in Algeria, forced the team to leave Souk-Ahras.

In a 1985 article that he wrote on the expulsion order of 1956, Jobic Kerlan described the order as completely unexpected. The three priests – Kerlan, Pierre Mamet, and Louis Augros – were summoned before the police commissioner on April 16, 1956, at which point they were presented with the expulsion order, which was to take effect immediately.[31] They

[27] "Rapport chronologique et explicatif concernant l'Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0159/"Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras."

[28] This statement was a reprinted version of a sermon given by Père Augros a few weeks prior.

[29] "Un compte-rendu de l'Apostolat en Afrique du Nord donne le texte de ce sermon du R.P. Augros," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0153/Guerre d'Algérie, janvier-mai.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Kerlan, "L'Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," Archives of the MDF. Louis Augros was traveling and could not attend.

were given no warning, and no concrete reason for the order. Kerlan left the next morning for Constantine to meet with Mgr Pinier and then took a flight to Algiers where Jean Scotto had already enlisted the help of Jacques Chevallier, the liberal mayor of that city. In the end, it was the journalist Jean Daniel of *L'Express* who arranged a meeting between Kerlan and Robert Lacoste, the resident minister, who, "very embarrassed, could not justify any of the reasons for the expulsion."[32] Although Mgr Pinier and other Catholic leaders could not get any confirmation of the official reasons for the expulsion, an anonymous paper circulating through Algeria and France detailed the purported crimes of the MDF. This paper, titled "The truth of the affair of the priests of Souk-Ahras," accused the priests of taking an attitude "that was of an exclusively political order" and of frequenting the milieu of Algerian nationalists, and it claimed that they had even been warmly received by Colonel Nasser in Cairo on a trip they took to Egypt in the summer of 1954. The paper further accused them of exercising a "double action, favorable to rebel bands that operate among civilian populations, whose activities include many assassinations of women and children."[33] Accordingly, the military, which apparently feared that the activities of the MDF were endangering the security of the European population, decided to proceed with the team's expulsion.

In their public response to the expulsion of the Souk-Ahras team, the leadership of the Mission de France was unequivocal in its support for the work of the team. As a statement, signed by both Jean Vinatier, superior of the MDF, and Cardinal Liénart, archbishop of Lille, affirmed

> Every priest has the right and duty to help and assist the sick and the wounded, whoever they are; it is against the inalienable rights of humanity to prevent them from doing so. Every priest has the right and duty to give food to the hungry, clothes to the destitute and to exercise charity in all its forms; no state power can stop that which is the sign of the universal brotherhood of God.[34]

Clearly this statement was a direct response to the accusations that the MDF had provided food and medical care to Algerian nationalists. In reality, it is entirely possible that they did so, but not necessarily out of a political

[32] "Rapport chronologique et explicatif concernant l'Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0159/"Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras."

[33] "La vérité sur l'affaire des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0159/"Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras."

[34] "Protestation de la Mission de France contre l'expulsion des trois prêtres de Souk-Ahras," Archives of the MDF.

motivation. The "open door" policy of the MDF team had essentially been in effect since their arrival in Souk-Ahras. As their reports and statements make clear, one of their most effective means of creating bonds between the Muslim community and the Christians was through the distribution of food and medical care to those who were in need, a category that was primarily made up of Muslim Algerians.

Jobic Kerlan and Pierre Mamet left shortly after the expulsion order, going to Algiers to join the MDF teams in the capital; Louis Augros stayed in Souk-Ahras. Père Augros had decided, with the full support of his bishop, to leave Souk-Ahras only if forced to. In the end he was forced, as the military arrived the morning of May 10 to escort him to the train station and make sure that he was securely on the train to Algiers.[35] After the expulsion of their priests, local Muslims and several hundred Catholic parishioners from Souk-Ahras wrote to Mgr Pinier with letters of support for the work of the priests. In their letter, "a group of Muslims from Souk-Ahras" (who did not sign individually out of fear of "problems with the authorities") wrote, "This measure [of expulsion] has thrown our community into confusion, especially because the ties that unite these priests with the population are woven together by sincere friendship, indeed fraternity. Thanks to them, we have discovered the true face of Christianity and of France."[36] The anonymous tract denouncing the MDF team described these letters and this petition as "faked," and the work of women and Muslim communists and extremists. An opposing petition, signed by twelve hundred "practicing Catholics" who denounced the "treasonous" acts of the MDF, the tract argued, better depicted true public feeling.[37]

In their various personal letters, collective statements, and internal discussions, the priests of the Mission de France demonstrated early in the Algerian conflict an awareness that the injustice of the colonial system and the racism that was quickly hardening into violent hatred could not continue. Their sympathies clearly lay with the Algerians, and even if they did not openly support the means (i.e., guerilla warfare), they supported the ends of the independence movement.[38] For Christians like

[35] "Rapport chronologique et explicatif concernant l'Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0159/"Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras."

[36] "Témoignages de paroissiens de Souk-Ahras," Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 308.

[37] "La vérité sur l'affaire des prêtres de Souk-Ahras," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0159/"Expulsion des prêtres de Souk-Ahras."

[38] See the letter from Claude Renaud to "Vieux Francis," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0153/Guerre d'Algérie – Janvier à mai.

the priests of the Mission de France and Alfred Bérenguer, their intellectual support for Algerian nationalism and their relationships with Algerian Muslims were sufficient cause for the government and the conservative European community to condemn them as collaborators with the FLN, as progressivists or communists, and in some cases as traitors to the French nation.[39]

Another clear example of the general condemnation against European Catholics who were in any way connected to Algerian nationalism is evident in the case of Jean-Claude Barthez, who had taken over Jean Scotto's parish in Hussein-Dey and become his vicaire-général in Bab-el-Oued. In 1956, the military questioned Barthez during the trial of the Jewish communist Doctor Daniel Timsit. According to Barthez, Timsit came to visit him out of the blue one day saying that he regretted his involvement in the fabrication of a bomb for the Algerian Communist Party (PCA), for which he was later arrested. Timsit sought a different way of engaging in the Algerian War, namely, by joining the FLN. Barthez, who was surprised that Timsit would believe that he had direct access to the FLN, accordingly transmitted Timsit's request to Pierre Chaulet, who by that time had become fully engaged in the FLN. After Timsit's arrest, the prosecuting judge wanted also to charge Barthez with conspiracy in the plot but in the end called him only as a witness.[40] Although Barthez was never implicated in any actions that supported either the PCA or the FLN, the mere fact that he had some association with many of those Europeans and Algerians who were becoming the object of military and police interest was enough to make him a suspect.

The Christians who worked in the Centres sociaux found themselves in a comparable situation. Even those for whom social action was the key means through which they engaged with the Algerian population discovered that the conflict meant that work that in other contexts would be termed "charity" had become politicized and polemical. Todd Shepard has noted that the Centres sociaux were a central component of the French integrationist project of the early years of the Algerian War, which attempted to combat Algerian unrest through social reform modeled on UNESCO projects to end racial discrimination.[41] The ethnologist Germaine Tillion,

[39] In his book *En toute liberté*, Bérenguer denies ever having adhered to the FLN, despite the stories that persist that his mission to Latin America was an FLN project rather than a Croissant rouge project, 60.

[40] Interview with Jean-Claude Barthez, Lyon, France, April 2009.

[41] T. Shepard, "Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO: A Transnational History of Anti-racism and Decolonization," *Journal of Global History* 6 (2011): 290–95.

who helped found the government Centres sociaux while working in the cabinet of her fellow ethnologist Governor-General Jacques Soustelle, had initially rejected the UNESCO model for the Algerian centers, turning instead to the Catholic-run centers in Hussein-Dey for inspiration. What ultimately emerged was an amalgam of the two: the UNESCO model of basic education, social science methods, and emphasis on racial equality intertwined with the earnest on-the-ground practices of social workers and youth activists, who sought to develop the basic skills of the illiterate Algerian population and reestablish more positive contacts between the European and Algerian populations.[42] For instance, much of the instruction was in Arabic (which entailed the recruitment of Arabic-speaking teachers and monitors), and a sociological survey was done in each locale where a center was being considered in order to determine from the local population what they needed, as opposed to having a curriculum imposed from the top down. Finally, unlike the work of the military-organized SAS or the SAU, there was no overt propaganda aspect to the Centres sociaux.[43]

From the beginning the centers recruited heavily from former Scout and youth movements – both Christian and Muslim – in Algeria, and each team was made up of both European (whether from France, as was the case with several former volunteers from the International Civil Service, or *pieds-noirs*) and Algerian social workers, instructors, and inspectors. Before their incorporation into the Ministry of Education, many of these recruits had worked as volunteers in social projects, including those of the AJAAS, which were concerned with similar issues of basic education, hygiene, and other social problems.[44] Even though the official centers differed from the original Bérardi and Bel-Air centers in that they were governmental and completely secular, they continued to attract European Christians who wanted to participate in the construction of a new relationship between the European and Algerian communities in Algeria, specifically through direct interaction with the Muslim community. For the Algerian recruits, the Centres sociaux offered the stability of a salaried job and a *fiche de*

[42] Ibid., 294 n. 68. See also N. Forget, "Le Service des Centres Sociaux en Algérie," *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps* 26 (1992): 37–47.

[43] See, for example, Le Sueur, *Uncivil War*, ch. 3. My interpretation of the trial of the "chrétiens progressistes" and the role of the members of the Centres sociaux in that trial differs significantly from that of Le Sueur. Documents concerning the foundations and pedagogical policies of the Centres sociaux exist in Nelly Forget's private collection.

[44] Forget, "Le Service des Centres Sociaux en Algérie," 37–47. The precursors and volunteer efforts before 1955 are also outlined in the pamphlet "Le Service des Centres Sociaux," one of the first official brochures on the Centres sociaux. From the private archives of Nelly Forget.

travail, or work papers, which allowed them much more freedom of movement in Algiers. It also offered them the possibility of working toward the construction of a more equal and just Algeria in which everyone had access to at least basic education and health care.

Tillion made some efforts to protect the Centres sociaux from the political battles of the Algerian War. Namely, she ensured that they focused only on social programs and attached the programs to the Ministry of Education in France, as opposed to the office of the governor-general in Algiers. However, the centers and their employees found that it was impossible for them to avoid getting mixed up in politics. Even before the battle of Algiers began in 1957, social assistants were recruited and used by the army in their raids on Muslim quarters in Algiers. One famous instance of this is recounted in a letter of protest that Marie-Renée Chéné wrote concerning the actions of the police, who, on the night of May 26, 1956, rounded up all eighty of the social assistants who were employed by the governor-general and tried to force them to participate in a raid in the casbah of Algiers. They were required to search the Algerian women while the soldiers searched the men and went through the houses looking for FLN militants. Chéné and several other assistants with her refused to participate, even though many of the others went through with the order. Those who refused, for the reason that their role as social assistants to the Algerian population would be thoroughly compromised by the action, were forced to stay in the military truck for eighteen hours and were subjected to threats and mockery from the police officers, who questioned not only their choices but their patriotism as well.[45]

As the war continued, both the European and Algerian staff of the Centres sociaux increasingly became the targets of suspicion from government, police, and military officials, who believed them to be in contact with FLN militants. In some instances, it was true. Whether or not they were involved directly in the FLN or other nationalist movements, many of these young men and women were close friends with those who were, including leaders of the AJAAS like Benyoussef Ben Khedda, or Salah Louanchi, who ran the French branch of the FLN in 1956 and who later married Anne-Marie Chaulet, a Catholic Scout leader and the sister of Pierre Chaulet.[46] As for

[45] Marie-Renée Chéné's letter is in the archives of the Mission de France at the CAMT/MDF/1999013 0153. Nelly Forget noted that the social assistants of the Centres sociaux were excluded from this raid, and because of the vocal protest on the part of the Association nationale des assistants sociaux (ANAS), the forced participation of social workers never happened again on a national level.

[46] They were married in 1959 in France in Fresnes, where Louanchi was imprisoned.

the charge that the Centres sociaux staff was made up of nationalists, that also was likely true. As both an Algerian former member of the Centres sociaux and Soeur Renée Schmutz of Grandchamp noted of the Algerian staff, "Of course they were nationalists! They were working toward the future of Algeria!"[47]

The Trials of the "Progressivist" Christians

In the autumn of 1956, the FLN responded to the execution of several Algerian prisoners by initiating a campaign of random terrorism against European civilians in Algiers, although it specifically excluded women, children, and the elderly. In retaliation for the deaths of fifty-nine Europeans, a *pied-noir* counterterrorist group blew up a house in the casbah on the rue de Thèbes, killing nearly seventy Algerians, including women and children. The FLN's Algiers operational executive Yacef Saadi concocted a plan in which three attractive Algerian women placed bombs in highly populated civilian targets in the center of Algiers, including the Air France office and the Milk Bar cafe, a scene famously recreated in Gillo Pontecorvo's 1966 film *The Battle of Algiers*. In January 1957, in the wake of the bombings, the FLN launched an eight-day general strike against French businesses in Algiers, and the French government handed over full police powers to General Massu, the commander of the Tenth Parachute Division, whose task was to dismantle the FLN network based in the casbah. As the historians Raphaëlle Branche and Sylvie Thénault have carefully documented, the parachutists' main concern was efficiency, not legality.[48]

General Massu, like many French officers in Algeria, was shaped by his experience fighting in Indochina, and he tended to view the Algerian conflict through the lens of the Cold War. For the French military, Algeria was a "revolutionary war," and the fight against the FLN was just as much a battle in the war against communism as it was repression of an anticolonial rebellion. Branche notes that whether or not the imagined links between the FLN and global communism were real, French military leaders believed them to be so, supposing that the FLN "rebels" were incapable of organizing by themselves "such a subversion of the colonial order."[49] General Massu saw himself as a good Catholic, following in the footsteps of Père Charles

[47] From an interview with Soeur Renée Schmutz and her friend "Zohra" in Algiers, January 2009.

[48] Branche, *La torture et l'armée*, 110–19; Thénault, *Une drôle de justice*, 38–83.

[49] Branche, *La torture et l'armée*, 107. On the connections between the French military's experiences in Indochina and in Algeria, see also F. Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of*

de Foucauld.[50] He understood that his job was to maintain French Algeria in the face of threats from the FLN and communism. As he wrote in his memoir fifteen years later, "At the dawn of the Battle of Algiers, the army estimated that it could demonstrate pacification in the tradition of the great ancients, the Foucaulds, the Gallienis, the Lyauteys, adapting its action to the revolutionary war that had been imposed on it and pursuing the objective that it defined with the term Eurafrica."[51] Buried in that quote are many coded phrases, including "pacification," a term that covered all manner of violent excesses, but Massu's worldview is clear: the army was not the aggressor; the soldiers were merely "keeping the peace" in the manner of the great nineteenth-century colonizers.

But not everyone shared Massu's vision. Throughout the spring of 1957, the French military faced growing criticism in France for its tactics during the battle of Algiers, and especially for its use of torture to gain information from captured rebels. Massu was much more disturbed, however, by criticisms that were coming from certain Christians within Algeria. In his book *La Vraie bataille d'Alger* (The real battle of Algiers), General Massu noted that, in his opinion, the most serious opposition to his tactics came from the "attitude of Mgr Duval, and certain priests, notably abbé Jean Scotto."[52] In 1957, Mgr Duval had been the archbishop of Algiers for over three years and was publicly known for his opposition to the use of torture.[53]

French military leaders took a particularly aggressive stance toward Europeans who lent support to Algerian nationalists, as evidenced by the treatment of the Christians they arrested in the spring of 1957. In late March, newspapers on both sides of the Mediterranean reported that French paratroopers were hunting a young French communist named Raymonde Peschard, believed to have been the "blonde woman" who had placed the infamous bomb in the Milk Bar in Algiers in September 1956. She had reportedly found shelter in two Catholic convents in Algiers thanks to the assistance of a priest named Jean-Claude Barthez and several Catholic social workers. *L'Echo d'Alger* reported that the French army's Tenth Parachute Division had routed out these Christians after their names had been found on a captured rebel.[54]

Colonial Violence, trans. D. Geyer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), ch. 4.

50 J. Massu, *La Vraie bataille d'Alger* (Paris: Plon, 1971), 51.

51 Ibid., 56.

52 Ibid., 216.

53 See Duval, *Au nom de la vérité*, 26–27.

54 See stories on the arrests in *Journal d'Alger*, March 22, 1957; *L'Echo d'Alger*, March 22, 1957, March 26, 1957; and *Le Figaro*, March 25, 1957.

In February 1957, as the battle of Algiers gained momentum, the French police and military carried out a series of raids in which they arrested thirty-five people, including the twelve "progressivist Christians." An April 5, 1957, article in *Le Monde* outlined the accusations against the defendants, which were expanded in a report from the trial prosecutor to the secretary of the interior dated that same day.[55] The prosecutor's report makes clear that several of the defendants, both European and Algerian, had some connection with the Centres sociaux. The others, accused of being part of a support network for the FLN, all had some connection with Christian movements like Cimade, the Scouts, or the Catholic community in Hussein-Dey. The report portrays them as a subversive group of criminals, hiding communists and FLN leaders, and serving as liaison agents for Algerian nationalists.

The *Le Monde* article paid special attention to the charges against Jean-Claude Barthez, who was

> notably accused of having sheltered Amara Rachid, a Muslim student since killed in the maquis; of having ties to the Doctor Timsit, a militant communist who was recently condemned to twenty years of forced labor for fabrication of explosives; of having helped in the creation of tracts and of *Moudjahid* (organ of the FLN), and finally of having sheltered in two convents Raymonde Peschard, author of two bomb attacks.[56]

The prosecution report further accused Barthez of hiding a roneo machine in the presbytery of Hussein-Dey and of encouraging several of the other European defendants to support the FLN.[57] *Le Monde* also noted that, like Barthez, Denise Pepiot [Walbert] had been caught with a roneo machine that was used to print copies of *El Moudjahid* and that she had participated in hiding Raymonde Peschard.[58]

After their arrests in late February and early March 1957, several of the defendants were taken to the notorious Villa Sésini in Algiers and interrogated by French paratroopers. In complaints filed with the French attorney general several months later, four of the Catholic women, who were social workers in the Centres sociaux, described their experiences in prison in great detail.[59] Denise Walbert recounted being hooded and

[55] "Vingt-huit personnes inculpées," *Le Monde*, April 5, 1957; "Lettre et rapport du Ministre de la Justice à Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Intérieur, Chargé des Affaires Algériennes," ANOM/FM/81f/917 (sous dérogation).

[56] "Vingt-huit personnes inculpées," *Le Monde*, April 5, 1957.

[57] "Lettre et rapport de la Ministre de la Justice à Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Intérieur, Chargé des Affaires Algériennes," ANOM/FM/81f/917 (sous dérogation).

[58] "Vingt-huit personnes inculpées," *Le Monde*, April 5, 1957.

[59] Several of these reports are located in the archives of the Mission de France, CAMT/MDF/1999013 0154; "Lettre au procureur général Jean Reliquet au garde des

questioned, and she stated that when the soldiers refused to accept her version of the events in question, she was stripped and tortured with water and electricity for several days. Her colleagues Eliane Gautron and Nelly Forget reported the same treatment.[60] It was not until several months later – at the opening of their trial in July – that their friends and colleagues and the public became aware of the dramatic events that occurred during their imprisonment. Eliane Gautron, a social worker on trial, told the judge, "I knew that the Muslims I sheltered were at risk of being tortured. I know what I am talking about. I was [tortured] myself. I want to make clear that if the three men who tortured me were one day worried, and rang at my door, I would shelter them in the same way." Françoise Giroud quoted Gautron in the July 26 edition of the French periodical *L'Express*, noting that Gautron was the only European defendant to bring up the issue of torture during the trial even though "everyone knows and repeats here that most of the accused suffered severe abuse."[61]

The military's case against the defendants centered on physical evidence like the roneos and copies of FLN documents such as *El Moudjahid* found at various locations, including the presbytery of Hussein-Dey, as well as on testimony from previously arrested Algerian militants and communists, and on admissions from the defendants themselves. Yet the fact that several of these admissions were extracted under torture or, as occurred in André Gallice's case, were falsified by the army had little bearing on their admissibility as evidence in the trial. Nelly Forget and several of the other European defendants noted that their interrogators specifically pushed them to accuse their Algerian friends of masterminding the whole plan, and the prosecution attempted to depict the young European women in particular as "dupes" of the FLN.[62] It was partly for this reason that the defendants in the trial agreed early on not to say anything in court that would implicate the other defendants, whether Christian or Muslim.

Sceaux," April 16, 1957, in S. Reliquet, "L'Exercice de la magistrature en Algérie d'octobre 1956 à octobre 1958, le cas du parquet général d'Alger," mémoire de DEA, IEP de Paris, 1989.

60 Nelly Forget's archives are in the ANOM/114 APOM (sous dérogation), consulted and cited with permission from Mlle Forget. One defendant described how she was subjected to a simulated strangling, a water torture technique in which a tube was placed in her mouth and her nose was held as water was forced into her body, and then forced out through pressure on her abdomen. She then had electrodes placed on various parts of her body, including her tongue, and was left without food or water for three days.

61 F. Giroud, "La lettre de 'l'Express,'" *L'Express*, July 26, 1957, 8.

62 The subheadline for Serge Bromberger's July 23, 1957, story in *Le Figaro* on the trial read "plusieurs des inculpés ont été les dupes du F.L.N. [several of the accused were dupes of the FLN]."

The fact that the French military arrested and tortured French citizens based on flimsy evidence picked up off a captured Algerian rebel is in itself shocking. What is perhaps even more shocking is that the French military allowed the July 1957 trial to go forward even though they knew that the crimes that the vast majority of the "progressivist Christians" were supposedly guilty of had not actually been committed. Several of the European defendants were on trial for playing key roles in hiding Raymonde Peschard, the communist militant accused of both the September 1956 Milk Bar bombing and the November 1956 bombing of a public bus in Diar-es-Saada. But it turned out that Peschard, who was not tried with the thirty-five defendants in July 1957, having escaped Algiers for a maquis unit in the countryside, where she was later killed, was a red herring.[63] Throughout the spring of 1957, European newspapers in Algeria repeated the charges that she had placed both bombs, claiming that she had been an "abusive" resident at both of the Catholic convents in which she hid for several weeks.[64] According to *L'Echo d'Alger*, Peschard was identified as the "blonde woman" bomber based on testimony from an arrested communist named Georges Marcelli and from a key eyewitness in the Milk Bar bombing. However, the prosecutor later reported that when asked to identify Peschard in a photograph, Marcelli was unable to do so.[65]

Indeed, as the military made headway in dismantling Yacef Saadi's network, officials realized that Raymonde Peschard had not been the "blonde woman" who had placed either of the bombs in question. With the arrests in April 1957 of Djamila Bouhired and the FLN bomb maker Abderrahmane Taleb, the French military determined that Bouhired had placed the Milk Bar bomb, a crime for which she was convicted in June 1957 in the military tribunal of Algiers.[66] On June 12, 1957, the investigating magistrate dismissed the case against Peschard. All of this occurred more than a month before the trial of the "progressivist Christians," but this information

[63] "Le corps de Raymonde Peschard a dû être 'arraché aux rebelles'" (unknown newspaper), November 30, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283.

[64] See *Journal d'Alger*, March 22, 1957; *L'Echo d'Alger*, March 22, 1957, March 26, 1957; *Dépêche quotidienne d'Algerie*, March 22, 1957.

[65] Report from the Procureur général d'Alger au Ministre de la Justice (Garde des Sceaux), June 14, 1957, ANOM/FM/81f/917 (sous dérogation). According to the March 26, 1957, issue of *L'Echo d'Alger*, a victim of the Diar-es-Saada attack, who supposedly identified Peschard in a photo, confirmed Marcelli's testimony.

[66] Although Bouhired was convicted of the crime, it was actually Zohra Drif who placed the bomb in the Milk Bar. She was captured in 1957 with Yacef Saadi and convicted of terrorism in 1958.

apparently never made it to the judge in that trial. It was not until the second day of the "progressivists'" trial (July 24) that the military released the information, following the judge's request that the government commissioner investigate what had happened to Peschard.[67] Several newspapers noted the highly charged nature of this information. Serge Bromberger of *Le Figaro*, hardly an ally of the Christians on trial, noted that if Raymonde Peschard was not the woman who was "responsible for the explosion of a bomb that wrought horrifying human devastation among an anonymous crowd," and was simply a wanted communist militant, then the case against the Christians accused of sheltering her would be "infinitely less serious."[68]

So why did the French military allow this trial to go forward, when the case against a number of the European defendants, in particular, was no longer viable and when the potential outcry after the exposure of its torture tactics being used on European Christians was so great? The explanation most evident to people like Mgr Duval and Jean Scotto was that this was, in fact, a show trial meant to put the so-called progressivist Christians in their place and keep them from impeding the military's mission in Algeria. As the accusations and propaganda swelled to a fever pitch in Algeria during the spring and summer of 1957, Mgr Duval came to the realization that the crux of the whole problem for these Christians was not so much the reality of their positions and actions as it was the public's perception of them. In his reports to the Vatican in 1957, Mgr Duval consistently criticized the conservative press in both Algeria and France for peddling the theory that the Christian defendants were progressivists, a charge that, he wrote, was an example of "absurd slander," and "excessive and passionate propaganda."[69]

For the French government and certain military leaders like General Massu, the Christians on trial in July 1957 represented a shocking betrayal of the French cause; Robert Lacoste, then the resident minister, ranted to a *Le Monde* journalist that Nelly Forget's sheltering of Raymonde Peschard "disgusted" him.[70] In a letter dated March 10, 1957, Massu stated that "after the warning shot given to certain European circles who have given

[67] B. Poirot-Delpech, "Des peines modérées sont requises contre la plupart des inculpés," *Le Monde*, July 24, 1957.

[68] S. Bromberger, "Premier audience du procès des 'progressistes,'" *Le Figaro*, July 23, 1957.

[69] Letter from Mgr Duval to an unnamed archbishop (in file with Vatican correspondence), July 5, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283, file 5.

[70] The notes from the interview between Robert Lacoste and Bertrand Poirot-Delpech are cited in Branche, *La torture et l'armée*, 219.

charity an abusive and antinational interpretation, [we have] slowed the proceedings against them, in a manner that would not annihilate the old and valuable efforts, of unselfish men and women, in their social programs."[71] This "warning shot" refers, however obliquely, to the arrest of the "progressivists," whose explanation of "Christian charity" Massu clearly found in direct violation of their national duty.

A Defense of Christian Charity

It was in this heated political climate that Jean Scotto began organizing the collective defense of the Christians on trial. Although each defendant had his or her own lawyer, there was also an attempt to create a unified defense, specifically for the European Christians, that would reject the accusations that they were progressivists and were collectively plotting against the French nation. Even though all of the defendants could agree with the rejection of these accusations, not all of them were in agreement about how the defense should construct the explanation of their actions. Scotto, who had taken on responsibility for organizing the defense of Jean-Claude Barthez and for developing the larger strategy of the Christian defense team, stated in his memoir, "We had the choice between two attitudes: plead guilty and defend a political cause or plead not guilty and protest that we were acting in the name of Christ. I chose the second position."[72]

Although Jean Scotto saw a distinct difference between actions that supported a political cause and actions that were undertaken in the name of Christian charity, some of the defendants saw things differently. For some, like André Gallice, who left Algeria after the trial, and for other members of Vie Nouvelle, the connections between their Christian faith and their political responsibilities were central to their moral positions on the Algerian War. For them, as for defendants like Pierre Coudre or Pierre Chaulet (who for reasons of ill health did not participate in the July 1957 trial), the defense of "Christian charity" was merely a strategy focused on defending the reputation of the Catholic Church.[73] In the end, for the Christian defendants on trial, the goals and implications of the defense

[71] This text is quoted in Boisson-Pradier, *L'Église et l'Algérie*, 33.

[72] Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 142.

[73] This perspective came through in my conversations with Pierre and Claudine Chaulet in Algiers, Algeria, in February 2009; with Jean-Claude Barthez in Lyon, France, in April 2009; and with André and Annette Gallice in Lyon, France, in April 2009. They all claimed that they had not necessarily been in favor of a trial defense that avoided political questions.

strategy were just as complex as their own motivations were for engaging in the Algerian conflict to begin with.

In a report for the Mission de France in August 1957, Jean-Claude Barthez described the discussions and formation of the defense strategy for the trial, noting that there was a desire, among the Christian defendants especially, to create a unified defense that would allow them to demonstrate that their motives and attitudes were shared and that collectively all of the defendants on trial, both Christian and Muslim, represented the true Franco-Algerian community.[74] In Barthez's view, the collective decision to follow a defense strategy that avoided any "political" questions was made in order to maintain some continuity with the "internal logic of our testimony." In this he seems to imply that there was no consensus even among the Christian defendants on how best to situate their actions within the tense political atmosphere of the battle of Algiers.[75]

Several documents in the private archives of Nelly Forget, one of Barthez's fellow defendants, support Barthez's account of the discussions surrounding the defense strategy. Forget's letters to her lawyer from Barberousse prison, where she was held between her departure from the Villa Sésini and the start of the trial, reveal her desire that the orientation of her defense should focus on her "fidelity to [her] faith and [her] professional duty."[76] Furthermore, she emphasized that she refused to respond to the desires of certain police officials who wanted her to turn against her Algerian friends (Chafika Meslem, in particular) and declare that she had merely been used as a cover for their nationalist activities. She wrote that perhaps the lawyer saw this position as "pure sentimentality" but added that if there was one thing she held true, and what she worked toward in Algeria, it was friendship.[77]

In keeping with the strategy to focus specifically on the question of the European defendants' Christian faith and duty to their Algerian friends, the defense attorneys amassed as many character witnesses as possible to testify not only to their clients' Christian faith but also their moral character and their dedication to helping people in need, the Algerian people being simply one example. Yet even the selection of character witnesses was not without its political dramas. In the case of Nelly Forget, the strategy was to gather witnesses from each "slice of her life," including figures such as Germaine

74 J.-C. Barthez, "Le procès des 'libéraux' d'Alger," CAMT/MDF/1996028 014/juil-sept. 1957.
75 Ibid.
76 Letter from Nelly Forget to Maître Mercier from Barberousse prison, April 3, 1957, ANOM/114APOM (sous dérogation), consulted with permission from Mlle Forget.
77 Ibid.

Tillion, whose credentials as a former *résistante* and member of Jacques Soustelle's cabinet would impress the tribunal. In addition to Tillion, there were letters of support from the French pacifist Camille Drevet, who was at the time the honorary secretary of the French branch of the International Civil Service, and from Charles Aguesse, director of the Centres sociaux in Algeria. In their numerous letters, each character witness testified to Forget's loyalty, generosity, and devotion to helping those in need. Several also emphasized that she had worked as a volunteer in the SCI in France, Germany, and England even before her arrival in Algeria, demonstrating her long-standing commitment to the organization's humanitarian goals.[78]

This aspect of the defense was especially important because even though the defendants had denied the charges of attacking the security of the French state, none of them denied that they had given assistance to their Algerian friends, or, in the case of Raymonde Peschard, that they had participated in hiding her from the French authorities.[79] The defense attorneys further argued that the accusations against the defendants in normal circumstances would only be tried at the level of the correctional court, as opposed to a military tribunal, and that it was diverse pressures from the press and others that had led to the accusation of a plot against national security.[80] The task, then, was to explain why the actions of the defendants were not evidence of a plot against the French nation but were instead a striking example of Christian charity, performed under the most difficult, morally challenging circumstances. Each of the defendants was questioned individually by the prosecuting magistrate, after which time the defense attorneys made their statements. They argued that the actions of the defendants were not evidence of a plot against the security of the French state; rather, they were a "*complot de bonnes volontés*," a conspiracy of goodwill.

Surprisingly, given the political climate in Algiers at the time, the judge seemed to agree with the defense's argument that the Christians on trial were acting in the name of Christian charity; with the exception of Pierre Coudre, whose activities were found to be overtly political in nature, each of

[78] These letters are in Nelly Forget's private archives in the ANOM/114APOM (sous dérogation), consulted with permission from Mlle Forget.

[79] In the copy of her deposition before the *juge d'instruction* in the Algiers military tribunal on April 4, 1957, in Algiers, Nelly Forget laid out in detail her connection with Raymonde Peschard and the reasons she agreed to help her. See ANOM/114APOM (sous dérogation), consulted and cited with permission from Mlle Forget.

[80] Barthez, "Le procès des 'libéraux' d'Alger," CAMT/MDF/1996028 014/juil-sept. 1957.

the European defendants was acquitted, received a suspended sentence, or had his or her case dismissed for lack of evidence.[81] Yet this generous attitude did not extend, for the most part, toward their Algerian codefendants. When questioned directly by the prosecuting magistrate about their support of the terrorist tactics of the nationalists, most of the Algerian defendants declared their refusal to participate in terrorist actions, even if they supported, more or less actively, the political goals of the FLN. Yet they were judged much more harshly than the Europeans were for similar crimes.[82] Additionally, the judge maintained that the conduct of the French military was beyond reproach. When Eliane Gautron brought up the injustices that Algerians faced, including the fact that they were at great risk of being tortured or killed, the judge replied, "People are always talking about torture. They forget that the rebellion preceded the repression. Without it I wouldn't be here."[83]

Essentially, the verdict came down to a question of what constituted political activity, and what did not. The court found that the same actions, depending on whether a European or an Algerian performed them, could constitute political activity in one case and not in the other. Yet it was not only the court that set up this distinction. In his trial report, Jean-Claude Barthez stated, for example, that the activities of the European defendants were "clearly different from those of the Muslim defendants," by which he inferred that the actions of all the Muslim defendants were tied to a larger political cause. The Algerians could, he wrote, "choose between the affirmation of their ideas and condemnation, or to 'slip by soft' and receive a moderate verdict."[84] Barthez's interpretation of the verdict illustrates that the Algerians who had not publicly declared their support for the independence movement in the court, and who were tied more closely to the European defendants, received lighter sentences than those who spoke openly about their support of the movement. This in many ways reinforced a distinction between the Christians and the Muslims that was at the center of the defense strategy.

[81] Numerous periodicals announced the verdict, including *Le Monde*, July 25, 1957, which reported the sentences for the Europeans as follows: Denise Walbert – 5 years prison (suspended); Pierre Coudre – 2 years prison; Jacques and Eliane Gautron – 2 years prison (suspended); abbé Barthez – 5 months prison (suspended); André Gallice – 3 months prison (suspended); Georges and Louisette Hélie, Jean Touilleux, Maurice Causse, and Nelly Forget – acquitted. Pierre Chaulet did not participate in the trial.

[82] Barthez, "Le procès des 'libéraux' d'Alger," CAMT/MDF/1996028 014/juil-sept. 1957.

[83] B. Poirot-Delpech, "Des peines moderées sont requises contre la plupart des inculpés," *Le Monde*, July 24,1957.

[84] Barthez, "Le procès des 'libéraux' d'Alger," CAMT/MDF/1996028 014/juil-sept. 1957.

It is the question of torture that best illustrates this aspect of the defense strategy, and also sheds some light on the issues at stake for various parties, including the French military and the French Catholic Church. The use of torture by the French military and police was without doubt one of the most controversial aspects of French tactics during the Algerian War, and this trial might have been a place where both the morality and the legality of torture could have been publicly debated. The moral questions surrounding the use of torture would have been especially explosive at this moment because the defense team could produce evidence that torture was practiced not only on suspected Algerian "terrorists" but also on Europeans. Few in France would acknowledge this fact until the publication of Henri Alleg's book *La Question* in early 1958.[85] The trial could also have provided a common platform from which both the European and Algerian defendants could have made the moral defense that their actions were a direct response to the repressive actions of the French military and police; this would have been particularly true for those who sheltered accused militants like Raymonde Peschard. In fact, several of the Algerian defendants actually did bring up the matter of torture when they were questioned about their motives and actions.[86] Yet the defense team, in some instances at the request of the defendants, made a concerted effort to downplay the question of torture. They refused to make it a central issue in their arguments, generally avoiding any line of questioning that would lead to a debate about the morality of French conduct during the war.[87]

The most obvious reason for their avoidance of the issue of torture was the desire of the Christian defendants, especially, to sidestep the more political questions that the trial could potentially have raised. Putting the question of torture at the forefront would likely have landed them in the middle of a debate about the legitimacy of Algerian nationalism and the French response to it, not to mention the morality of French military and police tactics. This would have set up the defendants in opposition to the French government and military tactics, "aggravating the sentences without advancing the problem," according to Jean-Claude Barthez.[88] Barthez

[85] For more information on the public reaction to Alleg's book, see James Le Sueur's introduction to the recent English translation: H. Alleg, *The Question*, trans. J. Calder (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006).

[86] Barthez, "Le procès des 'libéraux' d'Alger," CAMT/MDF/1996028 014/juil-sept. 1957; Eliane Gautron, in particular, stated in court that she had been tortured. See the *Echo d'Alger*, July 23, 1957.

[87] Barthez, "Le procès des 'libéraux' d'Alger," CAMT/MDF/1996028 014/juil-sept. 1957. Barthez notes that it was the request of several of the defendants that the defense lawyers avoid focusing on the fact that their clients had been tortured during their interrogations.

[88] Ibid.

further argued that even though each of the defendants who had been tortured had filed an official complaint with the court regarding their experiences at the hands of their interrogators, everyone knew that the use of torture, like the acts of terrorism, could not disappear without political change, although what that change should be, he did not specify.[89] The issue of the sentences is an important one, although in some ways it obscures some of the underlying reasons why the position of Catholic Church, and to an extent the Centres sociaux, would have been further damaged by an openly political trial.

There are several possible reasons why those such as Jean Scotto and Nelly Forget wanted to avoid an overtly political trial. Because the defendants did not deny their actions, the only way that they could hope to achieve lighter sentences was to define them not within the political situation in Algeria, but as part of a larger trajectory of humanitarian ideals and actions, of which these actions were just one "imprudent" example. But beyond just the question of self-preservation, choosing to make the trial a platform for the political and moral questions of the Algerian War, although it would have allowed some of the defendants to publicly decry the use of torture and the repression of the French military against the Algerian population, would also have played into the hands of the military and the conservative press, both of which clearly hoped that the trial would make an example of the European and Algerian defendants alike. There was quite a lot at stake, for example, for the Centres sociaux, which were already suspected of being a breeding ground for future "terrorists." If their staff members were to publicly declare their support of the Algerian cause, the Centres sociaux would likely lose all credibility with both the government and the *pied-noir* population. Finally, a political trial also would have forced Christians in Algeria, and in particular the Catholic Church, to publicly take sides in the debate about the morality of the conduct of the Algerian War, a situation that would likely have damaged any successes that people like Scotto and Mgr Duval had achieved in awakening European Christians to their own moral responsibilities to the Algerian community.

The Political Stakes of Progressivism

A few days after the verdict was delivered in the trial of the "progressivist Christians," Mgr Duval issued a public declaration on the outcome of the trial. He began by stating, "Up until this point, I have kept silent in order to avoid the impression, by a declaration that many would find inopportune,

[89] Ibid.

that I did not sufficiently respect the independence of the justice system." In his statement, Mgr Duval appeared to be concerned more than anything about the misrepresentation of these Christians as progressivists and the slander that had been directed at them, and at other Christians like himself, from those who functioned in an atmosphere of "hate and lies."[90] "Accusing someone of progressivism without proof," he continued, "makes one guilty of seriously reprehensible slander before God, for which one can only obtain forgiveness through a sincere desire to repair the wrongs unjustly caused against his neighbor's reputation."[91] Mgr Duval received a large number of letters in response to this declaration. Some of the letters, like those from Alexandre Chaulet and Cyril Gallice, fathers of the Catholic defendants Pierre Chaulet and André Gallice, expressed their strong support for his declaration and their gratitude for his support of the Christians on trial and their actions.[92] Many others, however, took issue with Duval's negation of the charge of progressivism, arguing, for example, that "even if these Christians are not progressivists, they are playing the game of communism anyway."[93] For Mgr Duval, who was well aware of the influence of propaganda and public perception during the Algerian War, the charge that these Christians were somehow connected with communism and the perception that they had taken a political stand on the Algerian question was much more dangerous to his vision of the Christian mission in Algeria than was the charge of undermining the security of the French state.

The arrest and trial of "progressivist Christians" in 1957 posed what was quite possibly the greatest challenge to Mgr Duval's authority and to his vision of Christian unity in Algeria until the emergence of the OAS in early 1961. By the summer of 1957, Mgr Duval had become the target of criticism from all sides, including from the French government and military. Certain members of the more radical fringe of those Christians engaged in the Algerian War on the Algerian side critiqued his failure to issue any clear statements of support for Algerian independence or more forceful condemnations of French repression in Algeria.[94] On the other end

[90] "Déclaration de Monseigneur l'Archevêque d'Alger," July 30, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 282, file 2.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Letter from Cyril Gallice to Mgr Duval, August 1, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283, file 5; letter from Alexandre Chaulet to Mgr Duval, August 1, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283, file 5.

[93] Letter from Auguste Sendra to Mgr Duval, August 1, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283, file 5.

[94] Conversation with Pierre and Claudine Chaulet, Algiers, Algeria, February 2009.

of the political spectrum, the most extreme supporters of French Algeria, known as the *ultras*, and those Christians who believed that he had betrayed their cause, labeled him "Mohamed Duval" for his perceived support of the Algerian nationalist movement.[95]

These challenges were directly related to the charge of progressivism. The accusations launched without foundation at the Christians on trial were full of allusions to their progressivism and their direct connections with communism, the least of which being the role several had played in sheltering Raymonde Peschard from the French military. The Mission de France's key role in the Catholic progressivist crisis in France in the early 1950s only added fuel to the rumors and to insinuations about the link between social Catholics and communists. Almost immediately after the arrests occurred in early 1957, Mgr Duval was on the defensive. Officials from the Vatican and from the French embassy to the Vatican expressed great concern over the accusations, particularly those against Jean-Claude Barthez. Mgr Duval was forced to write detailed reports on Barthez's conduct and history in an attempt to deny the charge of progressivism, one that had particular resonance within the Catholic hierarchy. The level of Mgr Duval's direct involvement in the trial is unclear, but he was at the forefront of the public relations battle that was growing tenser with threats to his moral authority and his ecclesiastical position in Algeria.[96] Mgr Duval also became aware in the spring of 1957 that he was the target of a plot, contrived by a conservative Catholic movement in France that had close connections to both Pope Pius XII and Robert Lacoste, to remove him from his position of archbishop of Algiers.

In his reports to the Vatican in 1957, Mgr Duval consistently pointed out that it was the conservative press in both Algeria and France that was peddling the theory that the Christian defendants were progressivists.[97] In his defense of Barthez, Duval recounted in detail Barthez's relationship

[95] "Rapport très confidentiel sur les incidences religieuses des événements d'Algérie du 1 août 1955 au 25 mars 1956," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 284. Duval explains this position in his March 26, 1955, report to the Vatican on the situation in Algeria. He writes, "Even if the majority of Catholics [in Algeria] demonstrate an affectionately submissive spirit toward Church leaders, a certain number of them have manifested, especially recently, contrary feelings. Under multiple influences . . . these Catholics accuse the Church of abandoning them and of taking the side of the Muslims."

[96] See Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 144. In his memoir, Scotto recounted that he had related every aspect of the trial to Mgr Duval, although he made no mention of Duval's opinion on the defense strategy or even on the outcome of the trial.

[97] Letter from Mgr Duval to an unnamed archbishop (most likely in the Vatican, as the letter was in a file with Vatican correspondence), July 5, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 283, file 5.

with the communist Daniel Timsit. Timsit first visited Barthez to express his regret at having participated in the fabrication of bombs and also to ask Barthez to write an article for the FLN revue, which Barthez categorically refused to do. Duval also wrote that Barthez himself admitted that he had been careless, but that his goal had been merely to "help his visitor escape from the vicious cycle that he was in."[98] Duval also noted that the charge of sheltering the communist militant Raymonde Peschard had been blown completely out of proportion by the press, which accused her of the Milk Bar bombing with no proof whatsoever, a claim recently declared to be false by various unnamed "high political officials" and "a magistrate with a great awareness and important functions in the court system." He added that Peschard would have been willing to turn herself in and prove her innocence, but for her fear that she would be "seriously mistreated in an effort to get her to reveal her whereabouts," and pointed out that "a rumor, based on her announced arrest in the press and almost immediately denied, but reluctantly, goes to prove that these fears were well-founded."[99] In a report section titled "Judgment of the Facts," Mgr Duval wrote categorically that Jean-Claude Barthez and his colleagues were in no way – not even indirectly – complicit in terrorist acts, and that the Abbé Barthez had always denied any connection with the FLN or the PCA. He stated, "The Abbé did not act by political passion but by compassion for his neighbor in specific cases."[100]

Mgr Duval was certainly no supporter of communism, identifying it simply as another form of the dangerous materialism that he felt was causing great harm to both Christianity and French civilization.[101] However, he never exhibited any real signs in his actions or public declarations of being a militant anticommunist in either his political or his religious views. Rather, his views on social justice and Christian charity suggest that he actually had more in common with organizations like the Mission de France (despite what he saw as their lack of discipline and respect for ecclesiastical authority) than with their conservative critics, and his strong support for the work of the movements of the Catholic Action puts him firmly in the realm of Social Catholicism.[102] There are also certain more subtle indications that suggest that his sympathies for the positions and actions of the so-called

[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 47.
[102] Ibid., 64–66.

liberal or progressivist Christians were actually stronger than what he portrayed publicly. For example, Jean Scotto recounts in his memoir that Mgr Duval knew about Raymonde Peschard and had even given permission for her to hide in the convents of the Soeurs Blanches and the Clarisses at Notre-Dame d'Afrique.[103] There is no written evidence in Mgr Duval's files to support this claim, and certainly if this fact had been publicly known, it would have greatly harmed Mgr Duval's moral authority and likely cost him his position as archbishop of Algiers.

In some of his earlier reports on Algeria to the Vatican, Mgr Duval did write that the Algerian Communist Party was actively involved in the "terrorist" organization of the FLN.[104] Yet he also admitted that one of the basic causes of the rebellion was the misery in which most of the Algerian Muslim population lived, acknowledging indirectly the power that a movement that appeared to meet their demands for equality and social justice would have among the Algerian population, and especially the Muslims.[105] Comments like these, however, have to be examined in relation to the larger body of his writing and actions. In this light, the moments when Mgr Duval expressed views on the danger of the communist influence in North Africa in his correspondence with the Vatican seem less like evidence of a strong anticommunist project and much more like a calculated attempt to garner Vatican support both for clergy like Jean-Claude Barthez and Jean Scotto, who were attempting to reshape Christianity in Algeria with tactics that conservative Christians viewed as radical, and for his own projects in North Africa. By 1957, having the public support of the Vatican was essential for Duval, both to maintain his moral authority in the Catholic community in Algeria and also because he was becomingly increasingly aware that a conspiracy was brewing to discredit him and his position. This conspiracy seemed to be connected not only to far-right movements within French Catholicism, but also to the Vatican, the French government, and even the French military.

The full extent of the danger that this conspiracy posed was likely not fully evident to Mgr Duval until July and August 1957. In the midst of the furor surrounding the trial of the "progressivist Christians," Mgr Duval sent Père Lanfry, a Père Blanc, to Rome to fulfill several missions before Duval's scheduled arrival in mid-August, including meeting with French Catholic

[103] Scotto, *Curé pied-noir*, 148.

[104] Mgr Duval's report to the Vatican on events from November 1, 1954, to July 31, 1955. These reports were written at the request of the Apostolic Nuncio in Paris. See Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 284.

[105] Ibid.

leaders and Vatican officials on the situation in Algeria, and in particular the trial. It is probable that Lanfry was sent to feel out the atmosphere and the attitudes toward Mgr Duval in the Vatican as well as to directly counteract the propaganda against these Christians that characterized much of the French Catholic press. At the French embassy to the Vatican, Père Lanfry emphasized Mgr Duval's loyalty in the service of public order, and he also recounted the "excesses" of General Massu and Robert Lacoste. In addition, Lanfry reiterated to both French and Vatican officials that the Christians on trial were not progressivists, even if they were active in movements like the Catholic Action or Vie Nouvelle. He "characterized the manner of Mgr Duval in these circumstances, the insidious attacks of which he was the object in the press and by the government. Certain [people] have sworn to make him leave Algeria. [Duval] himself told me that he was ready to respond to any invitation from the Vatican to withdraw."[106] This advance publicity campaign with the Vatican was a smart move, because suggesting the possibility that Duval was concerned above all with the Catholic Church in Algeria and was the victim of unjustified attacks on all sides seemed to counteract the testimony of the parties who wanted to have him removed.

One of Père Lanfry's first meetings in Rome was with Mgr Veuillot, a French bishop who worked in the Vatican Secretary of State's office, to whom he recounted these problems as well as the evidence of the plot against Mgr Duval. The facts revolved around the suspicious activity of a man named Monsieur Félix, who, while in Algiers, identified himself as the chief of the Parisian office of the resident minister of Algeria, at that time Robert Lacoste. M. Félix seemed to be collecting evidence against Mgr Duval. Lanfry described M. Félix as "an intelligent, cultivated, well-spoken Jew who claims to be in relation with high ecclesiastical authorities in Paris and Rome," and specifically with the Cardinal Tisserant.[107] Over the course of several weeks, Père Lanfry met with a number of Vatican officials, including M. Brouillet, the plenipotentiary minister for the French ambassador to the Vatican, who told him off the record that this M. Félix was someone from within Lacoste's inner circle and was probably using a false name.[108] M. Félix had apparently called M. Brouillet asking to

[106] Confidential letter and report from Père Lanfry to Mgr Duval, dated August 13, 1957, 1, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 261.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid., 3. The evidence M. Brouillet had for this was that he had seen M. Félix dining with Lacoste in a Parisian brasserie. He also stated on this occasion that Lacoste had loudly said. "Brouillet, I've been looking for you everywhere! You have to help me understand all these

meet with him urgently. But because Brouillet was going out of town, the meeting did not happen until several days later when Félix arrived with Mgr [Georges] Roche, the leader of a Catholic organization based in Poitiers called the "Cénacle," and an unnamed Algerian priest. These three men then gave Brouillet several documents, including a photocopy of the report on the interrogation of Jean-Claude Barthez, and papers that they claimed implicated Père Scotto in FLN activities.[109] M. Brouillet responded to these men that the documents implicated no one. He advised M. Félix to make his complaints through normal procedures of intervention, using the nunciature in Paris or the embassy to the Vatican, and not to employ such backroom methods.

In a section of his report labeled "very secret," Père Lanfry wrote that M. Brouillet had noted that although he respected the apostolic activities of the Cénacle, he also found them to be very enterprising, very wealthy, and very well connected. He added that through Mgr Roche, the "*Cénacle* had an audience with the Holy Father himself."[110] M. Brouillet further described the movement as a group of Poitevin priests who had left their diocese after a disagreement with the bishop of Poitiers, and who appeared to be royalist and integrist.[111] Père Lanfry also had an interaction with Chanoine Papin, the bursar of the Cénacle, who had been highly critical of Mgr Duval's July 30 statement to the press and of an article in *La Croix* that had treated the moral questions of the events in Algeria without saying a word about the "collusion between French communists and the rebels."[112] After several other meetings, including ones with Mgr Samore, the Vatican secretary of state, and Mgr Dell'Acqua, the French ambassador to the Vatican, Père Lanfry also learned that M. Félix had likely met several times with Mgr Samore.[113]

Along with these challenges and the propaganda attacks on him and on the Christian defendants in the trial, Mgr Duval had the added burden of dealing with the French military, which was becoming increasingly antagonistic toward him and his views on the morality of its "pacification" tactics. In General Massu's February 1957 letter to the Vatican,

affairs of curés." Brouillet responded that he preferred to conduct business elsewhere, later meeting with Lacoste in his office, saying that he "seemed very attentive and upright, as always, but terribly ignorant of religious affairs."

[109] Ibid., 3–4.
[110] Ibid., 4.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid., 2–3.
[113] Ibid., 5.

he had asked the pope to investigate Mgr Duval's attitude and the problems on the ground in order to assure the union of Catholics.[114] Massu received a reply from the Vatican on March 14 expressing the pope's wish that all the "holy forces" would "work together for the reestablishment of peace."[115]

General Massu was clearly concerned enough about morale within the French army, especially of those soldiers who felt attacks of conscience after participating in actions involving torture, disappearances, or civilian repression, that he counseled any "disoriented or worried souls" to consult the pamphlet "Reflections of a priest on urban terrorism." This document, a theological justification for the army's "police action" in Algeria, was written by Père Delarue, who was the chaplain of the Tenth Parachute Division.[116] In his introduction to the document, written in March 1957, Massu stated that "the angry outbursts of a certain metropolitan press must not move us: it only confirms the soundness of our views and the efficiency of our blows."[117] In his response to Père Delarue's text, so highly recommended by General Massu, Mgr Duval described it as "seriously reprehensible."[118] Duval criticized not only the misquotation and misrepresentation of statements made by the pope but also the fact that a priest would viciously attack other priests, particularly the Mission de France, without any proof or regard for the consequences. This text, he warned, would give laypeople the idea that the clergy was divided, already a serious problem. And, he asked, what would happen to the relationship between Christians and Muslims once the text fell into Muslim hands, as it was bound to do?[119]

Mgr Badré, the director of the French Catholic military chaplaincy, wrote to Mgr Duval in July 1957 telling him that the text had not been approved on any level by the chaplaincy, neither in its subject nor in its

[114] Massu, *La Vraie bataille d'Alger*, 216–17.

[115] Ibid., 217.

[116] "Réflexions d'un Prêtre sur le terrorisme urbain," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0154/Janvier-Juin 1957. On Massu's relationship with Catholicism, see R. Maran, *Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 96–98, and Massu, *La Vraie bataille d'Alger*, 51.

[117] "Note de Service," CAMT/MDF/1999013 0154/Janvier-Juin 1957. The press he is referring to undoubtedly includes many Christian publications like *Témoignage chrétien* and *L'Express*, both of which published searing indictments of the morality of the army's actions in Algeria.

[118] Mgr Duval's response is in his files relating to the military chaplains. See Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 282, file 3.

[119] Ibid.

form, and therefore it had no official character. Mgr Badré, who was trying to avoid a scandal after the appearance of and commentary on the text in *Témoignage chrétien* and *Le Monde* at the end of June, specified that the R.P. Delarue had been acting on the "perfectly commendable desire" to "see clear and enlighten the consciences of those with whom he was charged."[120] Mgr Badré also wrote that he had asked General Massu to remove the text from circulation, and so "everything has been reduced to a local incident without important repercussions."[121] In his view, the problem was with the journalists who exposed the text, not with the content of the text itself. As he saw it, the real concern was that "certain moral problems touching on revolutionary war were fairly well posed" but "the question was too complex to be treated in the public place."[122] Despite the superficial conciliatory tone of this letter, it is clear that Mgr Badré saw public interventions like those of Mgr Duval on questions of military tactics and torture as both unwelcome and harmful to the task of the military chaplains.

Massu's antagonism toward both Mgr Duval's moral judgment of French military tactics and the actions of the Christians that the general labeled as progressivists was not, however, limited to support for texts like those of Père Delarue. Massu himself was intent on demonstrating not only that his soldiers were innocent of charges that they had crossed the boundaries of Christian morality but also that they had a great concern for Christian charity. This was in contrast, of course, to the supposedly "Christian" actions of the so-called progressivists on trial in 1957 to whom Massu had given his famous "warning shot."[123]

For military leaders, whose morality was already being called into question, this explanation was likely much easier to accept than was the explanation that the "progressivist Christians" were displaying "true Christian charity." For someone like Massu, who saw his actions as those of a patriotic soldier doing his national and Christian duty to dismantle the Algerian terrorist cells that were threatening both the French nation and the Christian civilizing mission in Algeria, the claim that the Christians who had helped the so-called terrorists defended their actions as an example of "true Christian charity" must have been infuriating. This reaction explains to a certain extent why the military actively asserted that these Christians

[120] Letter from Mgr Badré to Mgr Duval, July 8, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 282, file 3.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid.
[123] This text is quoted in Boisson-Pradier, *L'Eglise et l'Algérie*, 33.

were progressivists, meaning that these individuals not only were colluding with communists and "terrorists" but also, by taking a political position, which being a progressivist clearly implied, were acting against the welfare of the French nation. From there it was not a difficult leap of logic to claim that these Christians were, in some cases, traitors to the French nation.

Mgr Duval had foreseen early on the consequences if Christians, and in particular the clergy, were perceived to have taken a political stance on the question of Algerian independence. The accusation of progressivism was so harmful to his influence with the Christian population of Algeria because it to some extent nullified the teachings of people like himself and Jean Scotto, who were trying desperately to convince the Christian population to search for peaceful and just solutions to the Algerian problem. As hard as Duval tried to be expansive in his statements on Christian charity and fraternal love, many Catholics had already decided to ignore his teachings and to condemn his perspective. They claimed that he was too political and that the church should not be involved in political or temporal matters. Regardless of whether the Christians on trial, and even Mgr Duval, were truly progressivists in the sense that they engaged in a political and moral collaboration with communism (which, of course, they did not), what mattered most was the appearance of their having taken a political position that could be interpreted as acting against the welfare of the French nation.

Throughout the Algerian War, and especially after statements such as the collective letter from the bishops of North Africa in 1955 or his own declaration on July 30, 1957, following the verdict in the "progressivist Christians'" trial, Mgr Duval received piles of letters from European Christians who condemned his involvement in "political questions" that were "not the concern of the Church."[124] In August 1957, several of the letters explicitly criticized his support for the Christians on trial and affirmed the belief that these Christians had committed treason, simply through adhering to ideas that could be considered progressivist.[125] One gentleman wrote that "what the faithful reproach them for is being 'progressivists,' and so half communists, and one cannot be both communist and French at the

[124] An anonymous letter to Mgr Duval dated April 28, 1961, in which the author wrote, "My congratulations to you, sir, for supporting a policy of abandonment, since the church should not get involved in things like that." See Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.

[125] These letters are collected in various locations in the archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger. The letters are in casiers 308, 309, and 283.

same time."[126] Later letters threatened that unless Duval openly supported the cause of *Algérie française*, European Catholics would "empty the churches," a threat later made real by OAS bombings of churches in parishes led by people like Jean Scotto.[127] Throughout the war, these letters continued to accuse "Mohamed Duval" and other Christians who appeared to oppose their writers' political perspective of doing the work of communists and terrorists, of abusing their position as leaders of Christianity by getting involved in political matters, and even of committing treason by refusing their Christian duty to support their *patrie*.

If the documents in the archives of successive governors-general are any indication, after the trial the furor over the perceived connections between Social Catholics and communists had not died down in the government either. In the archives of Paul Delouvrier's cabinet, for example, there is a report titled "Qu'est-ce que le progressisme?" (What is progressivism?), written by an unnamed author, that defined progressivists in France and Algeria between 1947 and 1956 as the "fellow travelers" (*compagnons de route*) of communism.[128] The author wrote that the movement was born out of the Christian, and especially the Catholic, community in France, and that its leaders and members were mostly Catholic militants; in other words, they were leftist Catholics involved in movements such as the Catholic Action and the JOC. The texts and authors that the report labeled as progressivist comprised a broad swath of French Christian journals, including *Témoignage chrétien*, *Esprit*, and *Libération*. It also named other prominent personalities, including the editor of *Esprit* Emmanuel Mounier, the R.P. Montuclard (a former Dominican worker-priest and sociologist), and, of course, André Mandouze.[129]

In general, the report portrays the progressivist Christians as direct political collaborators with communism – and to some extent with the Soviet Union – who had sided against France in Indochina and even in Algeria, as proven by the example of André Mandouze and his outspoken critiques

[126] Letter to Mgr Duval from "Gager," March 10, 1957, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.

[127] An anonymous letter to Mgr Duval from "a group of Catholics who cannot sign after the repression of the police regime that you support," no date, Archives of Mgr Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309. There are also many other anonymous letters that threaten bombings and assassinations.

[128] "Qu'est-ce que le progressisme?," ANOM/14 CAB/200 (sous dérogation). There are no names or dates on the report, but based on the events and publications cited, it appears to have been written in either late 1958 or early 1959.

[129] Ibid., 7–9. Mandouze in particular is highlighted in the report because of the political nature of his leftist Catholicism.

of French colonialism in Algeria. Openly anticommunist, the author of the report expressed regret that the events in Hungary in 1956 did little to force progressivist Christians to rethink their ties to communism. He argued that even though journals like *Témoignage chrétien* denounced Soviet repression, they immediately turned the focus back to Algeria, concentrating on the "torture" inflicted on arrested Algerians and their French collaborators by French troops. Throughout the report's sixty some pages, the author never wavered in the conviction that progressivist Christians had direct ties to the Communist Party and that they were working specifically to undermine the French mission in Algeria. The author wrote,

> But could one, in the course of the years during which France has been engaged in Algeria, establish a precise frontier where progressivism ends? The doctrinal action has passed to the background . . . But the desire of the Communist Party? To weaken the action of France in Algeria. It is now almost the totality of the Catholic press that can serve its ends.[130]

For the Christians, the author noted, the protest against the conduct of the Algerian War remained primarily in the realm of morality. But because they had not precisely laid out what was licit and what was not, the general impression was simply hostility toward the war. The author's conclusion was that "the progressivist movement has merged into the grand movement that undermines French morale in the Algerian affair."[131] Whether or not Delouvrier openly supported this position, a circumstance that seems unlikely given his political interest in easing tensions in Algeria after the arrival of Charles de Gaulle, the fact that such a report was circulating among high government officials suggests it had traction somewhere.

The charge that Christians, and French Catholics in particular, were openly supporting the goals of the Soviet Union and attempting to actively undermine the French state in Algeria demonstrates the extent to which the perceived political positions of French Christians who protested against French government and military tactics had led to an overwhelming paranoia around their lack of loyalty to the French cause. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, including the insistence by many Christians that their protests against the conduct of the war were primarily an attempt to protect the honor of France and the French military, many military and government officials seemed truly convinced that the Christians were out

[130] Ibid., 59–60
[131] Ibid., 52.

to destroy French Algeria and consequently undermine the French nation. This attempt to place in opposition to everyone else those Christians who were against French tactics during the Algerian War and to define them as disloyal to the nation was what disturbed Mgr Duval and many like-minded Christians. These individuals were particularly dismayed that the military, the government, and much of the *pied-noir* community had understood their moral stance as treason. The truth, of course, is that those who complained so angrily about the church having taken a political position likely would have been perfectly delighted if the church had taken *their* political position.

Ultimately, it mattered little that Mgr Duval never made any public statements supporting the cause of Algerian independence in 1957; the *ultras* believed that Duval was clearly against them, and many Algerians believed that he was firmly on their side. Despite the attempt by Jean Scotto and the defense attorneys for the Christians on trial in 1957 to avoid an overtly political trial, and despite the the court ruling exonerating most of the defendants, the trial had a significant impact on the future of Christian-Muslim relations in Algeria. The negative press surrounding the arrest and trial of the thirty-five Christians and Muslims had, among other things, severely damaged the reputation of the Centres sociaux in the eyes of the supporters of French Algeria, and centers and their staff became targets of the counterrevolutionary violence of the OAS. Furthermore, most of the defendants in the trial and a significant number of Europeans who had pursued the goal of Franco-Algerian rapprochement left Algeria soon after, whether by force or by choice. Their departure left precious few Europeans to continue their work, even as tensions rose to an extraordinary pitch by the late 1950s. As the events surrounding the arrest and trial of the "progressivist Christians" demonstrate, Christian rhetoric was a key component in the Algerian War of Independence. In the end, the battle over who got to define what actions and discourses were truly "Christian" had dramatic long-term consequences in Algeria and beyond.

CHAPTER 3

The Metropolitans Respond: The Conflicts of Politics and Conscience

In France and the wider world, the events unfolding in Algeria during the 1950s became catalysts for a reevaluation of the role of Christianity and Christian institutions in the modern world. Just as they did in Algeria, the political and moral conflicts that emerged during the Algerian War brought the preexisting divisions within Christianity into more distinct relief. Despite a general belief that the French were willfully ignorant about issues relating to the French colonial project, the question of decolonization was discussed in Christian circles in France throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s. But the Algerian War of Independence forced French Christians to face the realities of what had been up until then abstract discussions about the problems of colonialism or colonized peoples' right to self-determination. Within French intellectual and political communities, Algerian decolonization as an idea and as a fact was being defined as events unfurled. Todd Shepard has demonstrated that although the dominant post–Algerian War narrative attempted to portray the decolonization of the French empire, and of Algeria in particular, as a series of events that occurred within a Hegelian vision of "the tide of history," the reality was much different. The decolonization of Algeria was never a given for the French government, nor for most of the French population. Rather, between 1959 and 1962, it "emerged as a structural cause that French people could and did refer to in order to avoid explaining why they now overwhelmingly accepted Algerian independence."[1]

In terms of the Christian response to Algerian decolonization, Shepard's analysis mostly holds true; with the exception of the priests of the Mission de France and a handful of other Christian intellectuals and laypeople, very few French Christians openly supported Algerian independence

[1] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 55.

before 1959. It is important to note, however, that there were different issues at stake for Christians in the process of decolonization than for French politicians or for dilettante revolutionaries, for example. Consequently, it is necessary to examine French Christian responses to the Algerian War in the larger context of global decolonization and not just within the debates about the Algerian War. In addition, shifting the analysis of Christian responses to the Algerian War away from discussions about national identity, whether French or Algerian, allows us to understand the ways in which the Algerian War of Independence was a critical testing ground for some of the most pressing moral and theological questions that defined global Christianity after World War II.

The Algerian War became the center of debates about decolonization within French Christianity for a number of reasons. First of all, it was a war of decolonization that was fought close to home, and to a certain extent, even at home. The war in Indochina (1948–1954), which was France's first major war over decolonization, had occurred on the other side of the world from France and for the most part hardly affected the daily lives of French citizens. Events in Madagascar, Morocco, and Tunisia in the late 1940s and 1950s brought some French attention to the military repression of nationalist movements, but it was the Algerian War that brought the moral and political questions surrounding decolonization to life for the French population. As Christians in both France and Algeria began to take sides in the conflict, church leaders struggled to maintain church unity and moral authority without completely alienating their politically divided parishioners.

On a larger scale, many of the moral questions that emerged from the Algerian War, including those of the legacy of colonial violence and the relationship between Christians and the colonial system, contributed to the discussions on the role of Christians in a postcolonial world that occurred at the highest levels of both Protestant and Catholic ecclesiastical bodies. In the case of Protestants, the World Council of Churches (WCC) attempted to address these questions in their international meetings in Evanston, Illinois, in 1954, and in New Delhi in 1961. For Catholics, these questions came to the fore during the Second Vatican Council, which opened in 1962, just as the Algerian conflict was coming to its explosive close. Both the WCC and the Vatican were concerned, above all, with the future of Christianity and Christian missions in a postcolonial world. Unlike the majority of other European imperial spaces, Algeria had no strong body of indigenous churches to secure the presence of Christianity in the event of Algerian independence. Consequently, both the Vatican

and the WCC kept a close eye on Algeria, realizing that it was a particularly important test of the possibilities for positive postcolonial relations between Christians and formerly colonized peoples. In the end, both institutions attempted to convince French Christians that the Algerian War was in fact an international concern, and one that went beyond the defense of French honor.

Although historians of the Algerian War have suggested a number of different methods for categorizing French responses to the Algerian conflict, French Christians tend to fit rather awkwardly into most of these categories. In some instances they are almost completely ignored, despite the central role that Christian intellectuals played in the debates on the Algerian War that took place within the French intellectual sphere.[2] Historians, and intellectual historians in particular, have often focused on the fact that many of those who protested against the Algerian War did so in defense of political ideologies, including republicanism, left-wing or revolutionary values, and even Third Worldism.[3] Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who introduced these three categories into the debate in the late 1970s, notes that Christians fit into all three, although few espoused the revolutionary theories of people such as Jean-Paul Sartre or Henri Curiel.[4]

Christians did not fit easily into these categories in large part because different issues were at stake for Christians in the process of decolonization and in the Algerian War specifically. Christians in both France and Algeria were certainly not divorced from the major concerns of French citizens and the French government, including the future of the French settler population in Algeria and the larger questions of identity that emerged during the war. But they were also part of global currents of thought and action that historically had been in conflict with French "republican values," as well as with revolutionary ideologies, including Marxism.[5] Although some

[2] This is especially the case for the literature published in English. See, for example, T. Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), and Le Sueur, *Uncivil War*. French collections on intellectuals and the Algerian War are more likely to take Christian positions into consideration. See J.-P. Rioux and J.-F. Sirinelli, eds., *La guerre d'Algérie et les intellectuals français* (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1991).

[3] P. Vidal-Naquet, "Une fidélité têtue: La résistance française à la guerre d'Algérie," *Vingtième siècle* 10 (1986): 3–18; Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 66–67.

[4] Vidal-Naquet, "Une fidélité têtue," 13.

[5] See, for example, O. L. Arnal, *Priests in Working-Class Blue: The History of the Worker-Priests (1943–1954)* (New York: Paulist Press, 1986); G. Cholvy and Y.-M. Hilaire, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine*, vol. 2, *1880–1930* (Toulouse: Éditions Privat, 1986).

Christians in France and Algeria were indeed motivated by loyalty to the nation, an analysis of the global and transnational currents with which French Christians engaged, as well as of the stakes and motivations of various individuals and institutions, indicates that Christians in France and around the world had a wide range of responses to the conflict.[6]

This chapter demonstrates why decentering the history of Christianity from postwar Europe is a productive analytical model. The events taking place in Algeria during the War of Independence and the engagement of Christians in those events were central to the crisis within French Christianity during the war. The resistance of so-called progressivist Christians to the status quo spurred a broadening awareness in the metropole of Christianity's "colonial" problem; it also ignited debates about the relationship between church and state and ultimately a Christian movement of *insoumission*, or resistance to the state, of which the Christian members of the Jeanson network are the most well-known examples. Additionally, the politicization of religious ideologies in Algeria moved Christian leaders in the Vatican and the World Council of Churches to reconsider how Christianity engaged with the postcolonial world.

Christian Unity and the Intransigence of Christian Institutions

In a memo that circulated through the Ministry of Algerian Affairs in late 1955, the French government demonstrated a deep concern about positions that the French Catholic and French Reformed churches were adopting against French repression and military solutions in North Africa.[7] Specifically, the author was concerned about the public positions that resulted from study groups and meetings held by organizations such as the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops (ACA), which could potentially influence French voters away from their support of French pacification policies in Algeria. The writer of this memo noted, "With such directives, the clergy is particularly at ease to explain its doctrine concerning Franco-Muslim relationships, and we know that this doctrine has often taken a stance of a true defense in favor of the independence of Muslim communities."[8] This concern is particularly noteworthy because throughout the Algerian conflict,

[6] See T. Shepard, "Making French and European Coincide: Decolonization and the Politics of Comparative and Transnational Histories," *Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space* 2 (2007): 339–60.

[7] "Les Eglises devant les problèmes d'Afrique du Nord," December 16, 1955, ANOM/Ministère des Affaires Algériennes/81f/828.

[8] Ibid.

statements from the ACA, as well as from the French Protestant Federation (FPF), tended to be quite vague on the topic of Algerian independence.[9]

During the war, both Protestant and Catholic leadership bodies like the FPF and the ACA, respectively, issued declarations calling for peace and justice, but they refrained from suggesting political or "technical" solutions to the Algerian problem, as this was "outside their competence."[10] These groups believed that their "competence" lay, rather, in dealing with the moral questions and problems that the conduct of the Algerian War forced French Christians to confront on a daily basis. And for the better part of the Algerian War, it was to Christians that they directed their statements and recommendations. Although the French government was concerned that French Christian leaders were pushing their flocks to protest French policies in Algeria, contemporary observers and historians of the French response to the Algerian War have often pointed out the absence of statements or actions on the political questions of the war from French Catholic and Protestant leaders.[11] The main reason for this absence is twofold: a lack of unified opinion within these bodies on the role of the church in political affairs, and the fear that a pronounced stance favoring one side or the other would further divide the French Protestant and Catholic communities and prevent any meaningful moral unity on the issues brought to the fore by the Algerian conflict.

The ACA, which comprised archbishops and cardinals from the nineteen ecclesiastical provinces of France (including Algeria), did not have a canonic statute. But as Jean-Marie Mayeur has argued, it had acquired by the mid-1950s "a growing moral authority in the Church of France."[12] Its first public declaration on the Algerian War in October 1955 was published widely in the Catholic press. The declaration quoted long passages from the Algerian bishops' collective letter of September 1955 and further

[9] The FPF did not represent all Protestant positions, as several churches and denominations either chose not to participate in or were not given membership in the federation. But it generally united the major French Protestant churches – the French Reformed and Lutheran churches – under the leadership of Pastor Marc Boegner.

[10] "Lettre collective de l'épiscopat algérien," September 15, 1955, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 262, file 31.

[11] For example, see Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*; P. Houart, *L'Attitude de l'Eglise dans la guerre d'Algérie, 1954–1960* (Brussels: Le Livre Africain, 1960); J.-M. Mayeur, "Les évêques et la guerre d'Algérie," in "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens," ed. F. Bédarida and E. Fouilloux, special issue, *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 9 (1988): 39–46; P. Bolle, "Le protestantisme français et la guerre d'Algérie," in "La guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens," ed. F. Bédarida and E. Fouilloux, special issue, *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 9 (1988): 47–60.

[12] Mayeur, "Les évêques et la guerre d'Algérie," 39.

stated that the ACA desired to safeguard both the love of *patrie* and the rights of all humanity. It concluded, "Individuals do not have the right to resist the legitimate authorities unless they directly order them to commit a crime or a notorious injustice."[13] This declaration contained no overt suggestion that Christians should consider Algerian independence, and it removed from the citation of the bishops' declaration the contested line that suggested that "the free expression of legitimate aspirations should be assured."[14] Yet it is clear that this declaration as well as that of the Algerian bishops was what French officials were reacting to in the 1955 memo warning that Christians could undermine the French effort in Algeria. The next declaration from the ACA did not come until March 1957, in the midst of the battle of Algiers. In its 1957 statement, the ACA included this enigmatic phrase: "It is never permitted, in the service of a cause, even a good cause, to use means that are intrinsically bad."[15] We can infer that the "good cause" was the support of French Algeria. However, as an editorial in the Catholic periodical *Informations catholiques internationales* noted at the time, the words "torture" and "reprisals" did not appear in the declaration, and so the potential political impact of the declaration was greatly diminished.[16]

Throughout the war, the ACA continued to affirm that it was maintaining a respectful distance from political positions, and it consistently reminded French Catholics of their duty to obey governmental authorities. As the crisis over conscientious objection and civil disobedience reached its peak in the early 1960s, the ACA condemned both positions but expressed its concern for the "anguish of the young" who had to face these questions.[17] It is undeniable that the public declarations of an organization such as the ACA, which brought together Catholic clergy united by their office rather than their political or moral opinions, were the result of compromises within the group. Within this body, Mgr Duval, as the representative of the Algerian Catholic Church, was, not surprisingly, one of the more outspoken individuals. He consistently denounced the use of torture and violence, even if

[13] *Informations catholiques internationales*, November 1, 1955, 6.

[14] Mayeur, "Les évêques et la guerre d'Algérie," 40. See Chapter 1 for further discussion of the Declaration of the Algerian Bishops.

[15] *Informations catholiques internationales*, April 1, 1957, 6.

[16] Ibid. For a fascinating examination of internal French Catholic theological debates about colonialism and decolonization in the 1950s and Algeria's central role in this discussion, see E. Foster, "'Theologies of Colonization': The Catholic Church and the Future of the French Empire in the 1950s," *Journal of Modern History* 87 (2015): 281–315.

[17] Mayeur, "Les évêques et la guerre d'Algérie," 41.

his open support for Algerian independence did not become clear until the late 1950s.[18] Cardinal Liénart, the prelate of the Mission de France, which took an early and controversial stance in support of Algerian independence, continued to defend the Mission from conservative attacks throughout the war, although he never went so far as to publicly express his personal support for this clearly political stance.[19] Mgr Chappoulie, the bishop of Angers, was also known for his critiques of colonialism and his public condemnations of torture and of the military and police repression of Algerian civilians.[20] But the Catholic clergy also included its share of supporters of French Algeria and the policies of the French government. Cardinal Saliège, the archbishop of Toulouse, for instance, signed the "call for the salvation and renewal of French Algeria" and before he passed away in 1956 publicly supported in the *Semaine religieuse* of Toulouse the policies of the French prime minister Guy Mollet.[21] What is evident from an examination of public statements by French Catholic groups like the ACA is that the compromises needed to maintain the unity of those bodies significantly watered down any statements they made on the morality or immorality of French actions in Algeria. In the end, it was up to individual clergy members, orders, and organizations like the JOC or other Catholic Action movements to act according to their consciences, even if their actions were contrary to the recommendations of the ACA.

Despite a more diffuse ecclesiastical structure than that of French Catholics, French Protestants faced similar ideological struggles over their institutional responses to the Algerian conflict. In 1909, the French Protestant Federation was formed, bringing together the two main bodies of the French Reformed Church – the liberal Reformed Church and the orthodox Evangelical Reformed Church – along with the Lutherans and certain dissident Protestant denominations.[22] Although the federation was not much more than a "meeting place" for French Protestants, it was an attempt to unify them and undo the dramatic theological and political divisions that had emerged within French Protestantism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[23] As the unifying body of French Protestantism, the

[18] On Duval's evolution, see his interviews in Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 157–60.
[19] See Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, ch. 3.
[20] Mayeur, "Les évêques et la guerre d'Algérie," 44.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Cholvy and Hilaire, *Religion et société en France, 1914–1945*, 183.
[23] Ibid; see also A. Dumas, "Les grands courants théologiques du protestantisme français," in "Les protestants français pendant la seconde guerre mondiale," ed. A. Encrevé and J. Poujoul, special issue, *Bulletin de la SHPF* 3 (July-Sept. 1994): 16–18. The second half of

FPF issued declarations and acted on behalf of all of the French Protestant churches that were its members. This meant that in the tense climate of the Algerian War the divisions that characterized French Christians and French society as a whole were a potentially great threat to the unity that the FPF had attempted to establish, particularly since the 1930s, and the emergence of the ecumenical movement.[24] This imperative for unity was such an overriding concern that it often overshadowed the desire of many French Protestants that the FPF issue public statements on pressing moral and political issues like the rights and duties of conscientious objectors or the legitimacy of colonized peoples' aspirations to independence. The minutes of meetings of the governing council of the FPF show that questions like these were discussed in great depth at their quarterly meetings throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. The nuances of these discussions, though, never emerged publicly. What did emerge were frequent statements condemning the use of torture and other military tactics that French Protestants deemed immoral and calls for peace and reconciliation in Algeria and in other places, like Madagascar and Indochina, where conflicts over colonialism directly affected French Christians.[25]

The historian Geoffrey Adams writes that within French Protestantism in the late 1940s and 1950s, there were two main camps: the "progressives," whom he describes as "liberal in theological as well as in social and political matters," and the "*intégristes*," who were "devoted to the traditional Calvinist creed and tending either towards political neutrality or towards right-wing opinions."[26] This categorization, which resembles a similar division within French Catholicism, is perhaps oversimplified, but it does illustrate the extent to which divisions within French Protestantism, and in the FPF more specifically, were not simply political differences. For example, the views on issues like decolonization and the Algerian War of those who fell into the "progressive" camp were rooted in the

the nineteenth century was a period of great internal conflict within French Protestantism as the "liberal" branch fought against the more "orthodox" Protestants who emphasized traditional church dogma and remained apart from the modern world. Always a vocal minority within a France that was overwhelmingly Catholic, French Protestants (who numbered approximately 650,000 at the end of the nineteenth century – or slightly less than two percent of the population) saw the rise of French Republicanism as a generally positive development. Although a small contingent opposed the 1905 law of separation of church and state, most saw it as a means to level the religious playing field.

[24] On the Protestant struggle for unity, see Cholvy and Hilaire, *Religion et société en France, 1914–1945*, 183–89.

[25] Bolle, "Le protestantisme français et la guerre d'Algérie," 55–59.

[26] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 2.

theological tradition of Karl Barth and the idea that Christians should maintain a critical distance from governmental policies that conflicted with Christian morality. Many of these "progressives" had been instrumental in the French Protestant resistance to Nazism during World War II. In particular, Barth's call for a "spiritual resistance" against Nazi Germany and the French Vichy regime, modeled on the German Confessing Church, had ignited a French Protestant resistance movement during World War II that notably had used clandestine networks to rescue several thousand Jewish children and adults from deportation.

The "progressive" wing held vast power within French Protestantism, in large part because of its activities during World War II.[27] Cimade, the French Protestant aid organization run by young French women who were leaders in Protestant youth movements, emerged in 1939 as a means by which Protestants could engage directly in the political and social crises caused by the onset of the war. Working first in refugee and internment camps in southern France, Cimade created after 1942 numerous escape networks for French and foreign Jews from the unoccupied zone of France.[28] Cimade's entire mission was rooted in Barthian theology, and the organization was directly connected to the burgeoning World Council of Churches in Geneva.[29] Through their access to internment camps in southern France and ties to global Protestantism, team members embodied the most direct form of Protestant resistance to Nazism and also its most radical theological currents, which stressed the necessity to act in solidarity with the oppressed and to obey God when the actions of the state ran contrary to "the demands of truth and justice."[30] In the immediate postwar period, as mainstream and conservative French Catholicism lost credibility in France

[27] L. Yagil, *Chrétiens et juifs sous Vichy, 1940–1944: Sauvetage et désobéissance civile* (Paris: Cerf, 2005), 16.

[28] On Cimade's resistance activities, see Jeanne Merle d'Aubigné and Violette Mouchon, eds., *Les clandestins de Dieu: C.I.M.A.D.E., 1939–1945* (Paris: Fayard, 1968).

[29] On the history of Cimade, see Barot, "La Cimade et le rôle des organisations internationales de jeunesse," 218–19. See also A. Guillemoles and A. Domon, "Aux origines de la Cimade," special issue, *Cimade information* (1990): 4–5.

[30] This is a quote from the "Thèses de Pomeyrol," a statement drafted in September 1941 by fourteen prominent Protestant pastors, theologians, and youth leaders in the unoccupied zone of France, who met at a retreat center in central France called Pomeyrol. The Thèses were a theological declaration that addressed the relationship between church and state, "the limits of obedience to the state," and the group's refusal to accept "any statute that rejects Jews from human communities." This group, which included the WCC leader Willem Visser 't Hooft, Madeleine Barot (the head of Cimade), and the Alsatian theologian Suzanne de Dietrich, came together under the initiative of Visser 't Hooft and Barot. The full text of the Thèses is reprinted in P. Bolle and J. Godel, eds., *Spiritualité, théologie*

because of its strong support for the Vichy regime, French Protestants gained moral authority for their well-known resistance activities. Protestant leaders such as the FPF president Marc Boegner and the Cimade secretary-general Madeleine Barot were key figures in the establishment of the World Council of Churches after the war, cementing ties between French Protestantism and the expanding global ecumenical movement.[31] This same "progressive" tradition, however, stressed the importance of both maintaining church unity and challenging political authority. In certain respects, the collision of these two imperatives took place within the FPF's debates on the Protestant response to decolonization and the Algerian War.

Within the council of the FPF, those members who had close ties to the World Council of Churches were more open to discussing the larger issue of colonialism. They included Pastors Marc Boegner, Charles Westphal, and Pierre Maury, whose son Jacques at that time headed the Protestant youth movement known as the Fédé and would later go on to lead both the FPF and Cimade.[32] There were also those who argued that the "colonial problem" was in essence a political problem and that the church should not pledge allegiance to any political party or political solution.[33] The imperative for the FPF, as the umbrella organization of French Protestantism, was clearly to promote the unity of the church. Doing so generally meant silencing the group's more radical voices, even as members like Pierre Maury argued that they should maintain the unity of the church on moral questions, "but not in silence."[34] Charles Westphal agreed, further elaborating that the raison d'être of the FPF was both to "deal with the general interests of French Protestantism and to interpret the conscience of the

et résistance: Yves de Montcheuil, théologien au maquis du Vercors; Colloque de Biviers (Grenoble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 1987), 172–74.

31 Madeleine Barot became head of the WCC's Commission on the Role of Women in the Church (later the department of "Cooperation Between Men and Women in Church and Society") and Marc Boegner was president of the administrative commission to oversee the plans for the 1948 Amsterdam Conference that would officially establish the World Council of Churches. For more on Madeline Barot, see A. Jacques, *Madeleine Barot*, trans. P. Nottingham and B. Nottingham (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1991).

32 Procès-verbaux of the meetings of the Conseil de la Fédération Protestante de France, Archives of the French Protestant Federation (FPF), Paris, France. See particularly the meeting on November 4, 1948, for a discussion on the situation in Madagascar led by Pierre Maury to state that the Protestants needed to think more long term about the "colonial problem" and examine what the church of Jesus Christ should be doing for these peoples. Marc Boegner then suggested that he [Boegner] visit the president of the French Republic to let him know that the FPF was very concerned about the colonial problem.

33 Procès-verbal of the January 23, 1951, meeting of the FPF, Archives of the FPF.

34 Procès-verbal of the March 13, 1951, meeting of the Council of the FPF, Archives of the FPF.

churches."[35] One particular example clearly illustrates this conflict. In the October 1956 meeting of the FPF council, Pastor Marc Boegner mentioned that he had received several letters asking him to issue a statement protesting the "excesses committed by the authorities in their repression" in Algeria. During the discussion that followed, the more conservative members of the council insisted on the need to collect facts and testimony before making any public statement.[36] This task of collecting facts was delegated to a committee that was organizing a study day on North African problems scheduled to be held in January 1957; consequently, the result was continued silence on the issue.

The FPF's goal of maintaining French Protestant unity and the disagreements within its leadership council prevented the FPF from issuing statements forcefully condemning repression in Algeria. The ERF, as a member of that umbrella organization and the largest Protestant denomination in France, faced a different set of problems. The French historian Pierre Bolle has charted the various declarations that both the ERF and the FPF made and the actions that they took in response to the Algerian War, and his schema shows that the ERF was much more outspoken and prolific in its condemnation of French tactics in Algeria.[37] Yet the problem for the ERF was that its third largest synod was that of Algeria. Leaders of the ERF struggled to respond appropriately to the concerns of Protestants in Algeria while condemning the general atmosphere there, which clearly was largely the result of settler colonialism. In June 1955, the national synod meeting that was held in Strasbourg released a statement in which they assured the Protestants of North Africa that they were "entirely in communion with them."[38] By the 1956 national synod in Royan, however, the tensions between metropolitans and Protestants in Algeria were becoming more apparent, and it also became clear that the Algerian synod was itself just as divided as those in France on how best to respond to events in Algeria. Although delegates to the synod discussed a motion to publicly support a movement for a civil truce that had been launched by the *pied-noir* writer and intellectual Albert Camus, the idea that a dialogue should be established with Algerian nationalists was viewed as far too dangerous, and the motion was rejected.[39] In the late 1950s, even as the metropolitan

[35] Ibid.
[36] Procès-verbal of the October 9, 1956, meeting of the Council of the FPF, Archives of the FPF.
[37] Bolle, "Le protestantisme français et la guerre d'Algérie," 55–59.
[38] CHAN/ERF/107AS/92/dossier 1.
[39] CHAN/ERF/107AS/93/dossier 1.

synods of the ERF moved toward a position that supported Algerian self-determination, the Algerian synod remained divided and openly resentful of the advice of the metropolitans; in their minds, the metropolitans plainly did not understand the situation.[40]

Despite certain distinctions in theology and structure, the overall reactions to the Algerian conflict from the ecclesiastical organizations of both the Catholic and the Protestant churches in France were strikingly similar. The governing bodies of both French Catholicism and French Protestantism sought unity above all else, even at the risk of sacrificing moral clarity for their flocks, a situation that led to great confusion and frustration among the Christians of France. However, the reasons for focusing on unity were not necessarily the same for both institutions. The Catholic Church encompassed great diversity of opinion on how best to meet the challenges that emerged from the Algerian conflict and was still caught up in the divisions wrought by the progressivist crisis. Protestants, in contrast, were tied to a historical imperative for unity that emerged from their theological divisions and from the growth of the ecumenical movement, and they were slow to adapt to the postwar climate. This situation frustrated French Christian youth above all. Such institutional intransigence and refusal to issue clear moral directives was especially marked and resented when it came to matters like civil disobedience or the use of torture that affected Christians called up for military service.

The Morality of War

While Christian institutions attempted (and ultimately failed) to maintain their unity by avoiding political engagement, laypeople within both the Catholic and Protestant communities found themselves facing urgent moral challenges that arose with the constantly shifting political and military landscapes in Algeria and France. Although few were directly involved in the political arena, the socialist deputy André Philip, one of France's most prominent Protestant politicians, was a notable exception. Philip was at the center of the crisis within French socialism over the decision by Prime Minister Guy Mollet to give Resident Minister Robert Lacoste, and consequently the French military, special powers in Algeria in 1956.[41] Although

[40] Bolle, "Le protestantisme français et la guerre d'Algérie," 49–53. See also the *Plan d'étude sur l'Église et le Problème Algérien à l'usage de l'Eglise Réformée de France* from 1960, which suggests that self-determination might be the best plan in Algeria.

[41] On French Protestant socialists and the crisis in the SFIO (the main French socialist party) over Algeria, see Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, ch. 3.

Philip had voted to grant Lacoste special powers, he came to realize that the actions of Lacoste and Mollet represented a betrayal of French socialism and a crime against the people of both France and Algeria.[42] In his 1957 book *Le socialisme trahi* (Socialism betrayed), Philip declared that the French tactics in Algeria were harming rather than helping the French cause. The only possible solution in Algeria, he argued, was to take seriously the Algerian desire for independence and assist it in such a way that Algeria would maintain a "close solidarity" with France.[43] Although Philip's position on Algerian independence was much more advanced than that of most French Protestants in 1957, wariness over government "pacification" techniques and the seeming impossibility that European settlers in Algeria would ever cede to necessary reforms in Algeria were apparent in Protestant periodicals like *Réforme*.[44]

For French Christian laymen and laywomen, two issues set off waves of debate within their communities. The first was the use of torture in Algeria. Christian intellectuals and journalists, in particular, denounced the effects of the use of torture on the honor of the French nation and the morale of the French army. This position was apparent in the publications of prominent intellectuals such as Henri-Irénée Marrou and François Mauriac. Marrou's article "France, ma patrie," which appeared in *Le Monde* in April 1956, compared the techniques of the French military in Algeria to those used by the Gestapo during World War II and argued that France's "*grandeur*" was in peril and the *patrie* in danger unless the French people spoke up.[45] In his "Bloc-notes," which appeared in several French periodicals, including the centrist magazine *L'Express*, the Nobel Prize winner and French Catholic novelist François Mauriac began denouncing the use of torture in North Africa in early 1955. But like Marrou and even the Catholic intellectual Pierre-Henri Simon, Mauriac framed his moral opposition to the use of torture mainly in the language of French patriotism.[46] The French historian Etienne Fouilloux, among others, examined the question

[42] Ibid., 64–65. See also A. Philip, *Le socialisme trahi* (Paris: Plon, 1957).

[43] Philip, *Le socialisme trahi*, 190–91.

[44] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 59–60. See, for example, the articles by Marcel Niedergang and Jean Bosc in *Réforme* in the spring of 1957.

[45] H.-I. Marrou, "France ma patrie," *Le Monde*, April 5, 1956.

[46] F. Mauriac, "La Question," *L'Express*, January 15, 1955; Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 65. Todd Shepard has shown that most of those who critiqued French military tactics in Algeria, particularly the use of torture, did so for "patriotic" reasons (i.e., defending the honor of the French nation) rather than out of a commitment to Algerian independence. Yet in part because of how they were depicted by the OAS (Secret Armed Organization) and the defenders of French Algeria, who lumped them with supporters of

of whether the engagement of Mauriac and other Catholic intellectuals was primarily of a religious or a political nature. He concluded that it was both.[47] But in analyzing whether Mauriac's protests against torture were motivated more by a concern for Algeria than for France, which the Algerian War was compromising, Fouilloux acknowledged that it was more likely a result of Mauriac's French patriotism. And Mauriac was evidently not alone in this. Mauriac's protests, like those of many of his colleagues, for example, waned after de Gaulle returned to power in 1958.[48]

Undeniably, many of those who argued that French conduct in the Algerian War, especially the treatment of Algerian civilians, was at odds with Christian morality did not question the colonial system itself. And because many of these Christian intellectuals and journalists protested the use of torture for what seem to have been largely patriotic reasons, it is difficult to see which aspects of their moral opposition were motivated by their Christian faith. The average French Christian encountered the issue of torture primarily through the direct testimony of French soldiers in Algeria and their friends and families. Christian soldiers who recounted their experiences in Algeria and the moral dilemmas that using torture or committing other atrocities caused them were a significant source of information on French military tactics in Algeria beginning in 1956.[49]

In early 1957, the Catholic newspaper *Témoignage chrétien* published the journal of a recently deceased Catholic Scout leader named Jean Muller, a reservist who had died in an ambush in Algeria in October 1956.[50] Muller's journal recounts the agonizing moral choices that he faced as a Christian soldier who had to follow orders that went against his conscience. The publication of this text mobilized French Christian youth movements, whose members recognized that they were the ones who would encounter these same choices if they were called on to fight in Algeria. The Scouts de France, which was one of the largest youth organizations in France during the 1950s, experienced its own crisis over the publication of this text. The leadership of La route, the senior branch of the Scouts, of which Jean Muller had been a part, resigned after the Scouts' official publication refused to print Muller's journal. The editors had deemed it too politically

Algerian independence in the category of those who had betrayed French Algeria, these positions merged into one.

47 Fouilloux, *Les chrétiens français entre guerre d'Algérie et mai 1968*, 83.

48 Ibid., 52–59, 82.

49 Comité de résistance spirituelle, *Des rappelés témoignent . . .* ; Coutrot, "Les Scouts de France et la guerre d'Algérie," 121–38.

50 Coutrot, "Les Scouts de France et la guerre d'Algérie," 126–32.

charged; they argued that the Scouts should not be supporting a specific political position on the Algerian War.[51]

The question of how a Christian soldier should respond to orders that went against his conscience was a topic on which both Catholic and Protestant youth movements sought guidance from their respective leadership bodies. The problem, though, was that the Christian leaders themselves did not necessarily know how to respond or that their declarations contradicted those of other authorities. For example, even though Pope Pius XII had issued a statement in October 1953 declaring that "No higher authority is empowered to order an immoral act; there is no right, no obligation, no permission to perform an act that is inherently immoral, even if it is ordered, and even if the refusal to act causes the worst personal damage," the ACA continued to insist that French Christians had a duty to obey the civil and military authorities.[52]

Insoumission, or civil disobedience, became the second major issue during the Algerian War that ignited fierce debate among Christians in France. Even more than the moral response to the use of torture and treatment of Algerian civilians, the issue of civil disobedience highlighted the growing divisions both among Christians and between lay bodies and Christian leaders. It implicated two distinct groups within French Christianity – the military chaplaincy and Christian student movements – that developed, in some ways, opposing responses to the question of how Christian soldiers should respond to orders that went against their consciences. Both groups desired clear guidelines from Christian leaders on how to determine the appropriate circumstances for obedience to or disobedience against political and military authorities. Considering the historical circumstances of the Nazi occupation and Vichy regime from which French Christians had emerged just a decade earlier, it would seem that this question should have been at the forefront of the Christian leaders' agendas. Yet an examination of their responses to this issue illustrates just how conservative the Christian institutions in France remained regarding the proper relationship between church and state in the postwar era.

Based on public declarations from the ACA and the FPF, it is clear that the official position of the French Christian churches was that resistance, including civil disobedience, to government and military authorities was

[51] Ibid. Interview with Paul Rendu (one of the La route leaders who resigned) at his home in Bry-sur-Marne, France, April 30, 2009.

[52] Mayeur, "Les Evêques et la guerre d'Algérie," 41–42.

authorized in only the most extreme circumstances. For most Christian leaders, the Algerian War did not qualify as such a circumstance. Civil disobedience was particularly tricky for Christian soldiers, many of whom had been drafted to fight in Algeria and were faced with having to decide whether to follow orders to commit acts such as torture or violence against civilians that they did not feel prepared – morally – to do. Yet for many French Christians it was exactly this issue that motivated their engagement in the Algerian War and, in some cases, the radicalization of their positions on Algerian independence.

The military chaplaincy, a highly conservative institution, predictably reacted in the negative to those who sought their counsel on the decision to disobey orders.[53] Some chaplains even sought to convince soldiers that, in the context of the battle of Algiers and the fight against terrorism, actions like torture not only were moral but also were necessary to defend Christian Algeria from the Muslims and communists.[54] Thus soldiers often turned to others for help, including their friends in youth movements in France and church leaders like Mgr Duval, who received numerous letters from Christian soldiers detailing their experiences and the offenses that they had observed.[55]

In 1958, the national congress of the Protestant Fédé released a text unanimously supported by the entire congress. It called for the FPF to express its solidarity with Christian soldiers who refused to obey certain orders from their superiors that went against their consciences and to "concretely indicate a certain number of points that [soldiers] should in no case pass in their eventual participation in military action."[56] The FPF delayed in responding to the Fédé. Even by the 1960 Assembly of French Protestantism in Montbéliard, which produced several concrete recommendations on Algeria, including that of instituting direct negotiations with Algerian nationalists, the FPF's position was that civil disobedience "would only be justified if the state were basically perverted." It is clear that the FPF thought that a sufficient level of "perversion" (e.g., the toppling of

[53] Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 129–41.

[54] General Jacques Massu cites part of the R.P. Delarue's report on the theological legitimacy of torture in *La Vraie bataille d'Alger*, 159–62. The report also exists in its entirety along with a letter of introduction from General Massu in the archives of the Mission de France, CAMT/MDF/1999013 0154/Janvier-Juin 1957.

[55] See Chapter 2. A series of letters from the "chef de la bataillon Chambrueil" to Mgr Duval, dated August 17, 1956, and September 9, 1956, are in the archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 282.

[56] "Textes voté par le Congrès. Sur l'Algérie," *Le Semeur* 3 (1958): 27.

a legitimate government) had not yet been reached. However, the declaration did state as well that the church would provide "moral, material and judicial support" to those who refused to commit acts of moral or physical torture and to conscientious objectors.[57]

The question of civil disobedience had also motivated the formation in 1957 of the Comité de résistance spirituelle (Committee of Spiritual Resistance), a diverse group of influential Christians that included prominent Protestants such as André Philip and Paul Ricœur as well as Catholics like François Mauriac, Jean-Marie Domenach, and Louis Massignon; several priests of the Mission de France and former leaders of the Scouts de France were also members.[58] Although the committee's original goal was to inform the public of the grave injustices that were being committed in Algeria, it also served as a launching point for many Christians who became more active in the struggle for Algerian independence. These included the Jeanson network, whose 1960 trial became a public forum for debate about the question of civil disobedience. One important text that emerged from the controversy surrounding the Jeanson trial was the *Manifeste des 121* in September 1960. This text, which dealt with the right to practice civil disobedience, was signed by Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, Marguerite Duras, and many other prominent French intellectuals. The *Manifeste* declared that, as the Algerian conflict was a war of national independence and not a foreign war, its signatories "respect and judge justified the refusal to take up arms against the Algerian people" and "respect and judge justified the conduct of Frenchmen who believe it is their duty to bring aid and protection to Algerians oppressed in the name of the French people."[59] Although very few Christians were among the document's signatories, those who were, including Robert Barrat and the Protestant pastor Roger Parmentier, challenged the belief that it was a Christian duty to obey the civil authorities.

In the end, the majority of French Christians, whether or not they supported the right of civil disobedience or protested against military atrocities, rallied to the defense of the French Republic when it appeared to be under fire, first from the attempted military putsch of May 1958, and later from

[57] "Déclaration commune sur l'Algérie," in "Actes de la Xème Assemblée générale du Protestantisme Français," *Foi et Vie* (January/February 1961): 134–35.

[58] The list of members of the Comité appears at the end of the introduction to *Des rappelés témoignent*, which was published under the Comité's aegis.

[59] *Manifeste des 121*. Cited in R. Parmentier, *Durant la guerre d'Algérie, Protestants français devant l'Appel des 121* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008), 131–34.

the OAS "fascists."[60] When the French president Charles de Gaulle eventually suggested that the solution to the conflict was self-determination, many understood that to be the solution that in the end would save the honor of France. For some French Christians, the use of torture and the practice of civil disobedience were the catalysts for their direct engagement in the Algerian conflict. But for most, these were simply moral issues to be resolved within Christian organizations, or were issues that above all affected the honor of France. For most, the Algerians were either terrorists or victims without a legitimate cause. Even the eventual support of most French Christians for Algerian independence was not because of some epiphany about the legitimacy of Algerian nationalist aspirations; rather, it was the final step in the process of restoring honor and Christian morality to France.

The Morality of Resistance

Historians and observers have pointed out the ways in which those who opposed the French government during the Algerian War framed their actions in the language of resistance, and specifically the French resistance to Nazism during World War II.[61] It was no different for the Christians among them; for many of these Christians, there were direct links between World War II resistance activity and the Algerian War. This was true, for example, of André Mandouze, who subtitled volume 1 of his 1998 memoir "From one resistance to the other," and of Cimade, whose very existence was tied to the Protestant resistance during World War II.[62] For others, the connection was more theoretical. And yet, as the historian Martin Evans and the testimonies collected by Jacques Charby have demonstrated, many of those engaged in resistance activities during the Algerian War had grown up during World War II and were marked by that prior resistance, even if they had not played an active role in it.[63] By tying their actions to the World War II resistance, many of the Christians who participated in the Algerian

[60] On the depiction of the OAS as "fascists," see Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 83–90.

[61] See M. Evans, *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954–1962)* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1997), 40–41.

[62] See Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle*, vol. 1.

[63] Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, ch. 3; J. Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir: Les réseaux de soutien au FLN pendant la guerre d'Algérie; Les acteurs parlent* (Paris: Découverte, 2004). In Charby's book, nearly all of the actors interviewed discuss the role of World War II and the French Resistance in the roots of their engagement.

conflict drew not only on a myth that gave political and moral legitimacy to their own position but also on previous Christian examinations of the duties of resistance, notably from theologians like Karl Barth. In addition, within this World War II resistance context the comparisons between the actions of the French military and those of the Nazis, which were a common theme in early denunciations of torture and French army atrocities in Algeria, gained historical force.

One of the best examples of this use of the concept of resistance is the Committee of Spiritual Resistance. The Catholic journalist Robert Barrat first organized the committee in the spring of 1957 to publish the text *Des rappelés témoignent* (The draftees testify). This work is one example of an early reaction of those Christians who, feeling shocked and betrayed by revelations about the use of torture and the conduct of the French government and military in Algeria, sought to publicly expose more fully the facts of this conduct. Publications like the *Dossier Jean Muller*, which *Témoignage chrétien* published at around the same time, and the periodical *Témoignage et documents*, which documented specific cases of torture in Algeria, including that of the Catholic social worker Denise Walbert, fall into the same category.[64]

In the introduction to the testimonies published in *Des rappelés témoignent*, the Committee of Spiritual Resistance explained why they had published the dossier, stating, "If we have imposed on ourselves this task, it is essentially because we have come to agree that in the presence of such horrors, we no longer have the right to keep silent."[65] For the Christians involved, their moral duty was above all to speak out against what they saw as the grave injustices being committed. In part, this was a project of educating the "average Frenchman or woman," who continued to think that a French person would never be capable of committing torture, that such crimes did indeed exist. They were not at all trying, they insisted, to "search for a scandal to exploit against our country" but wished, instead, to point out that "the active participation in such collective crimes profoundly contributes to the demoralization of our soldiers and our officers."[66] They were not taking a stand against the army but were trying to address the causes of the moral dilemmas and mental anguish that French soldiers faced in Algeria.

The committee also asserted in this document that speaking out was their responsibility as French citizens. They compared their situation to

[64] See *Témoignages et documents sur la guerre en Algérie*, January 1958, 2.
[65] Comité de résistance spirituelle, *Des rappelés témoignent*, introduction.
[66] Ibid.

that of German citizens, many of them Christian, who, "in the presence of Nazi crimes, no longer had the right to stay silent: their duty was to protest! Many had the courage to do it, and most of them paid with their lives."[67] Keeping silent, they argued, made French men and women complicit in the crimes that were being committed in Algeria. In this text, the members of the committee made no distinction between their duty as Christians and their duty as French citizens to protest against the conduct of the Algerian War. At this stage, however, the committee's concept of resistance was less about actively resisting the government (even though, as the text was soon outlawed, the committee's continuing to print it was, in fact, breaking the law) and more about resisting the mentality of willful ignorance that committee members believed existed among the French population.

For some members of the committee engagement in the Algerian War was limited to intellectual activism and disseminating information. One example is François Mauriac, the Catholic novelist who spoke out against the use of torture and colonial repression in his "Bloc-notes." Mauriac also led committees in support of André Mandouze after his arrest and in the investigation into the *Affaire Audin*, but he never fully approved of those whose involvement led them to directly act with the Algerian nationalists.[68] For others, like Robert Barrat or several priests of the Mission de France, the next logical step after their information campaigns failed to produce any substantive change was to engage in a more active form of resistance. Among the principal questions they faced were those centered on at what point they were morally obligated as Christians to resist the French government, and what form that resistance should take. The answers were certainly not the same for everyone, but there are several common threads within the examples of those who did resist more actively.

One of the first steps for those engaged in resistance movements against French government or military policies, including the so-called *porteurs*

[67] Ibid.

[68] On Mauriac's moderate position on the FLN, see Le Sueur, *Uncivil War*, 210–11. The "Audin Affair" was the mystery surrounding the disappearance of the French communist and anticolonialist mathematician Maurice Audin after his arrest by French paratroopers at his home in Algiers on July 11, 1957. Like the Christians on trial for Raymonde Peschard's disappearance, Audin was taken to the Villa Sésini and tortured. However, after his arrest, his friends and family never heard from him again. His death at the hands of the French army was confirmed only through the posthumous testimony of the French general Paul Aussaresses, who claimed that he had given the direct order to kill Audin. The use of torture against French citizens became a cause célèbre in France, largely because of the Audin Affair and the publication of Audin's colleague Henri Alleg's book, *The Question*, in 1958.

de valises (suitcase carriers) for the FLN, was a shift in thinking. Instead of focusing on French honor, they asked Algerians what they thought would be best for them and for the Algerian people as a whole.[69] There is a distinct difference, for example, between works such as *Des rappelés témoignent* or Pierre-Henri Simon's *Contre la torture*, which defend their critiques of French conduct in Algeria in patriotic terms, and *L'Algérie hors la loi*, Francis and Colette Jeanson's polemical evaluation of the failures of colonialism. For Christians in Algeria who were actively engaged in movements like the AJAAS, this shift had taken place well before the beginning of the Algerian War. To a certain extent, these Christians influenced a similar shift in the thinking of their French counterparts. An interesting example of these connections is the meeting of the Catholic journalist Robert Barrat with Algerian nationalist leaders at the apartment of the "progressivist" Catholics Jacques and Eliane Gautron in Algiers in 1955. Another involves the ties that Salah Louanchi, the leader of the French federation of the FLN from 1956 until his arrest in the spring of 1957, formed with the leftist Catholic community in France through his fiancé, Anne-Marie Chaulet, who worked for the Catholic progressivist journal *Le Bulletin* (the successor to *La Quinzaine*) after her arrival in France.[70]

As in Algeria, many of the Christians who decided to break French laws that they felt were immoral did so after talking and interacting with Algerians. This included both nationalists in Algeria and North African workers in France, as happened with several priests of the Mission de France. Once these ties and friendships were built, the next step – sheltering friends who were wanted by the police – was a concrete enactment of loyalty to friends and solidarity with the Algerians' plight. For some, such as the Protestant pastor Etienne Mathiot, who was arrested in December 1957 and

[69] I use "*porteurs de valises*" here because this term runs through much of the historiography; however, I believe that the term does not accurately portray the range of motivations and activities of those engaged in resistance movements against the French government during the Algerian War. See H. Hamon and P. Rotman, *Les porteurs de valises: La résistance française à la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), and Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*. Some major histories of the *porteurs de valises*, including Hamon and Rotman's book, only briefly mention the role that Christian activists for the Algerian cause in Algeria, including the Chaulet family, played in influencing the political positions of the *porteurs de valises*. Yet, as cited in Charby's book, many later testified that their introduction to FLN members in France came through the Chaulet family (Anne-Marie Chaulet was engaged to the FLN leader Salah Louanchi). For a more thorough analysis on the engagement of the *porteurs de valises* with the French Federation of the FLN, see D. Djerbal, *L'Organisation spéciale de la Fédération de France du FLN: Histoire de la lutte armée en France, 1956–1962* (Algiers: Chihab Éditions, 2012).

[70] Hamon and Rotman, *Les porteurs de valises*, 54.

charged with sheltering the FLN leader Si Ali, the acts of resistance stopped there. During his 1958 trial, Mathiot, like the Christians on trial in Algiers in July 1957, argued that his activities were not in defense of a political cause or in support of the FLN. Because Algerians like Si Ali would likely suffer grave abuse at the hands of French authorities, Mathiot's activities were testimony to his belief in nonviolence and "any gesture of love that brings with it the potential for change."[71]

For those, like the Christian members of the Jeanson network, who took the further step to engage in actions on behalf of the FLN, the understanding that change in Algeria would have to be political, and to some extent revolutionary, was a common current of thought. In 1955, Francis and Colette Jeanson had published one of the most controversial documents from the early years of the Algerian War, the book *L'Algérie hors la loi* (Algeria outside the law). The Jeansons were not practicing Christians who were informed by a sense of Christian morality. But they had strong intellectual and ideological similarities with Christians like André Mandouze and the Mission de France priest Robert Davezies, which led them to a close collaboration with the Christians who worked with their FLN support network.[72]

Francis Jeanson, a French intellectual and protégé of Jean-Paul Sartre, who was perhaps best known for contributing to the public falling out between Sartre and Albert Camus, and Francis's then wife, Colette, had first encountered Algeria on their honeymoon in 1948–1949.[73] During this trip, the Jeansons had come into contact with the Algerian population and the growing nationalist movement. Francis Jeanson wrote articles criticizing the French treatment of Algerians in the early 1950s, but it was not until 1955 that Francis and Colette became actively engaged in the Algerian conflict. Colette Jeanson made three trips to Algeria in 1955 to research the conflict and to meet with Algerian nationalists. After initial difficulties in trying to meet nationalist leaders, she called André Mandouze, who put her in touch with Pierre Chaulet, who took her to visit one of the shantytowns

[71] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 112–14. Mathiot had not, in fact, even committed this crime but had taken the blame for his brother-in-law, Jacques Lochard, who had helped Si Ali get over the border into Switzerland.

[72] The most prominent Christian in the Jeanson network was Robert Davezies, a priest in the Mission de France, although Jeanson also worked with people like Mandouze, Christiane Philip (daughter of the Protestant André Philip), Robert Barrat, and the Chaulets.

[73] For more on Francis Jeanson, see M.-P. Ulloa's excellent biography, *Francis Jeanson: A Dissident Intellectual from the French Resistance to the Algerian War*, trans. J. Todd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

on the outskirts of Algiers.[74] Chaulet also took her to visit Mgr Duval, whom she believed was more sympathetic to the Algerian cause than he let on, and Salah Louanchi, who was hiding with Père Scotto in the presbytery of Bab-el-Oued. These interactions, as well as her interviews with Algerian nationalists like Benyoussef Ben Khedda, gave Colette the material she and Francis needed to produce their book on the origins of the nationalist movement.

The Jeansons' analysis of the injustices of the colonial system in Algeria and their searing critique of the projects of liberals like Jacques Chevallier, the mayor of Algiers, which they labeled "neocolonialism," had more in common with the views of the "progressivists" like Pierre Chaulet and André Mandouze than with with the views of those who advocated social programs like the Centres sociaux as a means to reform or reconcile the Christian and Muslim communities in Algeria.[75] These ties went deeper than just intellectual sympathy, however, as it was Robert Barrat who first introduced Francis Jeanson to the Egyptian "professional revolutionary" Henri Curiel, who would play such a key role in the Jeanson network.[76] Curiel also had connections to the influential French Protestant Socialist André Philip.[77]

Although the actions of the Jeanson network and other FLN support groups troubled French Christian leaders, especially with the revelations that some of these groups were transporting arms and money for the FLN, it was the engagement of several Mission de France priests with the FLN that most outraged conservative Catholics in France. The Mission de France had been involved in the Algerian conflict from the beginning. The expulsion of the MDF priests from Souk-Ahras in 1956 and the arrest and trial of Jean-Claude Barthez in 1957 were precursors of their more direct political engagement in the conflict. The publication of the March 1958 issue of the MDF's monthly bulletin, *Lettre aux communautés*, in which the MDF openly stated its support for Algerian independence, caused a huge scandal in France.[78] In addition to advocating for independence, the text discussed

74 From Colette (Jeanson) Tzanck's testimony in Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 69.

75 C. Jeanson and F. Jeanson, *L'Algérie hors la loi*. See in particular ch. 3, titled "Néocolonialisme," 102–108.

76 Hamon and Rotman, *Les porteurs de valises*, 90.

77 Francis and Colette Jeanson divorced in the late 1950s, and Francis then married Christiane Philip, daughter of the Protestant Socialist politician André Philip. Christiane Jeanson said in an interview with Jacques Charby that it was at her father's house that she first encountered the revolutionary Henri Curiel, who led her to begin working with the Jeanson network. See Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 220–21.

78 This position is especially clear on page 47 of the *Lettre aux communautés*, March 1958. On the ensuing scandal, see Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 134–40.

the relationship between the church and politics. In the introduction to the issue, Jean Vinatier, the prelate of the MDF, affirmed that the MDF's primary pastoral task during the conflict was to "enlighten the consciences of those who wonder and to awaken those who, alas, are indifferent to a drama that engages, for better or worse, all French men and women," a position not much different from that of Mgr Duval in Algeria.[79] The MDF also highlighted the religious aspect of their reflection. They were not searching for "technical solutions" or adhering to any particular political ideology, the MDF affirmed, but rather wanted to use the reflections of the team to help those who were facing the moral challenges created by the Algerian War.[80]

Yet, as the Jesuit theologian Gustave Martelet noted, even a truly spiritual pastoral action that sought to "educate consciences on the problems posed by the Algerian War" would have political repercussions.[81] "This work," Martelet stated, "necessarily involves an attitude of the Church because it is precisely the role of the Church to relate to the problems of the world: economic, social, political, familial, cultural, not by virtue of a technical competence, but in the name of ethical and Christian values that these problems and their solutions engage."[82] Martelet cautioned against using the authority of the church to justify a political position as had been done throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for right-wing causes. He also warned against the harm that would come if religious leaders abstained from making ethical judgments, which was a way of supporting the status quo.[83] How, then, should one interpret the role of the church in political affairs and the duties of Christians to the *patrie* during the Algerian War? Martelet answers that

> when one talks of the *patrie*, one speaks both of the men that compose it and the spiritual patrimony that unifies them on common ground . . . loving one's homeland does not consist of necessarily ratifying all of its gestures; loving one's homeland means knowing how to judge it in relation to its patrimony, and fidelity to it is not guaranteed at all costs.[84]

He continued, "The Church always has the right to judge the State, not politically, but spiritually, since even if the Church does not have

79 *Lettre aux communautés*, March 1958, 4.
80 Ibid., 5–6.
81 Ibid., 18.
82 Ibid., 19.
83 Ibid., 20.
84 Ibid., 22.

a political competence, it has an ethical competence that includes politics."[85]

The reflections of Père Martelet and the Mission de France were important because they define the relationship between the church and state as one that is connected but not driven by the same goals. The church, in this formulation, is rather like a Supreme Court, in that it judges the actions of the state within the ethical laws of Christian doctrine and should be independent enough from the state to protest against those actions that it finds unethical or immoral. The church's protest against the conduct of the Algerian War was therefore neither treasonous nor even disloyal but was a necessary moral counterbalance to a state whose goals were entirely political. This formulation of the relationship between church and state is similar to the one proposed by Karl Barth. In "Christian Community and Civil Community," Barth argues that for the "civil community," or the state, "no appeal can be made to the Word or Spirit of God in the running of its affairs. The civil community as such is spiritually blind and ignorant."[86] Barth also maintains that "the existence of the Christian community is political" in that the Bible asserts that all Christians are to "pray for all men and especially for 'kings,' that is, for those who bear special responsibility in the political sphere (which embraces all men)."[87] Furthermore, "the object of the promise and hope in which the Christian community has its eternal goal consists, according to the unmistakable assertion of the New Testament, not in an eternal church but in the *polis* built by God and coming down from heaven to earth."[88] Both Barth, whose text was incredibly influential within French Protestantism, and the Mission de France argued that the role of the church was to provide a moral compass for the state and to protest against those actions that were immoral by the standards of Christian ethics.[89] But how, then, to extrapolate guidelines for action in a situation like the Algerian War?

The engagement of several Mission de France priests in FLN support networks, including the Jeanson network, illustrates this shift from intellectual discourse to political action. Jean Urvoas was one of the first to take this step.

[85] Ibid., 22.

[86] K. Barth, "Christian Community and Civil Community," in *Community, State, and Church: Three Essays* (Gloucester, MA: Peters Smith, 1968), 151.

[87] Ibid., 153–54. Barth is quoting from 1 Timothy 2:1–7.

[88] Ibid., 154. Here Barth is referencing Revelations 21:2, 24.

[89] In my conversation with him in Paris, France, on June 17, 2009, Pastor Jacques Maury said that this essay was a key text for Protestants who were discussing the role of Christians in the political sphere during the Algerian War.

As a former member of the Urban Commission, and the founder of the MDF's subcommission on the Algerian problems, Urvoas had worked directly with North African laborers in France and, consequently, had been an early supporter of the FLN cause. He was also a founding member of the Committee of Spiritual Resistance. In 1956, Urvoas was frustrated by what he saw as the failure of the leadership of the MDF, as well as of Cardinal Liénart, to take a more forceful stand on the Algerian conflict. He specifically criticized the cardinal's stopping the publication of an MDF text on North Africa that was due out in *L'Express* on June 1, 1956.[90] On a larger scale, Sybille Chapeu has argued that many MDF priests were frustrated by the "immobility" of the Catholic hierarchy, which they believed was fundamentally conservative and, contrary to church doctrine, also fallible.[91] By distancing themselves intellectually from the church hierarchy and the stasis of the conservative establishment, MDF priests like Jean Urvoas, Robert Davezies, and Bernard Boudouresques attempted to reorder their priorities and act according to their personal sense of justice and their belief in the legitimacy of the Algerian cause, rather than solely as representatives of the church. Urvoas resigned from the Urban Commission in November 1956 because of the commission's inability to move forward on condemning French atrocities in Algeria and the fundamental inequalities at the root of the conflict.[92]

In September 1956, a group of people that included MDF priests, other Catholics, and Protestants who supported the Algerian cause began meeting in the apartment of the MDF priest Bernard Boudouresques. "Boudou," as he is affectionately called by his colleagues, also belonged to the Committee of Spiritual Resistance, and his room on the rue Saint Jacques in Paris served as a gathering place for people who were linked to the Jeanson network and as a shelter for Algerians who were being sought by the police.[93] Boudouresques was arrested in October 1958 after an Algerian who had stayed in his room denounced him under torture.[94] Boudouresques testified that he never collected money for, carried arms for, or was a member of

[90] Letter from Cardinal Liénart to Jean Urvoas responding to Urvoas's frustrations, July 12, 1956, CAMT/MDF/1999013 0160/Projet de déclaration, prêtres.

[91] Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 118.

[92] Letter from Jean Urvoas to the Commission Urbaine, n.d., CAMT/MDF/1996028 0068/1957.

[93] See Bernard Boudouresque's interview in Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 174–75. See also Chapeu's account of Boudouresques's engagement, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 142–47.

[94] Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 175.

the FLN; his actions arose from his desire to demonstrate his solidarity with the Algerian cause and his respect for his fellow human beings.[95] Like his counterpart in Algeria, Jean-Claude Barthez, Boudouresques was not actively engaged in the FLN. Nonetheless, he became a symbol to those critical of groups like the Mission de France and of the involvement of priests in politics.

Robert Davezies was by far the most visible and controversial of the MDF priests who took part in active resistance against the French government. He was a member of the Jeanson network from its early days and published three controversial books during the Algerian War.[96] Like Bernard Boudouresques and Jean Urvoas, Davezies was also active in the Committee of Spiritual Resistance. He joined an FLN support network after being solicited by Jean Urvoas at a conference on Algeria sponsored by the Mouvement de la Paix in June 1957.[97] Beginning with tasks like printing tracts and helping shelter Algerians, Davezies and Urvoas linked up with the Jeansons in October 1957 to form what would become the Jeanson network. Davezies emphasized that they were not members of the FLN but rather worked as a support network for the Algerian nationalists, who were extremely limited in their movements and in their ability to collect funds and eventually arms for their struggle.[98] At around the same time as Boudouresque's arrest in Paris, a warrant was issued for Davezies. He fled to Germany, where he worked in exile even through the trial of the Jeanson network. On returning to France in January 1961, he was immediately arrested.[99]

It was not only Catholics who were engaged in FLN support networks in France. Cimade's experience in clandestine work and the openness of its leadership and staff to the Algerian cause made them ideal collaborators for the FLN. Cimade's engagement with the French Federation of the FLN began during the period when Salah Louanchi was at its head. According to Maître Oussedik, a former member of the federation, Louanchi had a policy against attacks in France; he maintained that the FLN struggle was not against the French people, but against an ideological position.[100] The

[95] Ibid., 177.

[96] Robert Davezies publications during the Algerian War were *Le front* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1959); *Le temps de la justice* (Lausanne: La Cité, 1961); and *L'amnistie des républicains* (Paris: François Maspéro, 1962).

[97] See Davezies's interview in Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 148–56.

[98] Ibid., 151–52.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Transcript of the testimony of Maître Oussedik at the November 27, 1998, meeting of the Groupe des Anciens Equipiers de la Cimade, Cimade archives/3D 10/11 (DZ02).

FLN approached Cimade in 1957 because of that organization's firm stance against torture and repression in Algeria. Cimade's varied undertakings met the demands of the federation, including providing shelter for militants and helping Algerian prisoners in France navigate French bureaucratic structures.[101] Working in some of the most notorious prisons in France, the chaplain Tania Metzel and team members like Jacqueline Peyron had contact with imprisoned Algerian militants and even with FLN leaders.[102] Additionally, after 1959, Cimade was one of the main organizations working in regroupment and prison camps in Algeria, and was able to do much of the research on the ground to find out who had disappeared, been tortured, or been assassinated.[103]

So how did church leaders respond to these forms of active resistance in support of the FLN in which the Mission de France and Cimade engaged? In the case of Cimade, very few people knew what was happening. Cimade was by its nature engaged in humanitarian activities in locations like the poor immigrant neighborhoods of Marseille or the prisons that housed Algerian militants, and its actions during the Algerian War were simply a continuation of its prewar activities and clandestine origins. There was likely some agreement between Jacques Beaumont, Cimade's secretary-general, and its president Marc Boegner, but, according to Jacques Maury, a member of the Cimade board at that time, few board members had any idea of what was going on.[104] Cimade's reputation as the militant arm of French Protestantism and its legendary activities in the French resistance during World War II likely shielded it from criticism by conservative Protestants who may have been concerned about its political views and conduct.[105]

In the French Catholic community, conversely, the arrests of Bernard Boudouresques and Jean Urvoas, as well as the trial proceedings against the Jeanson network that heavily implicated Robert Davezies, hardly went unnoticed. After Boudouresques's arrest, the Mission de France as

[101] Ibid.

[102] From the transcript of Geoffrey Adams's interview with Jacques Beaumont, Cimade archives, given to me by Mireille Desrez.

[103] Ibid.

[104] In Jacques Maury's response to Maître Oussedik's testimony, at the November 27, 1998, meeting of the Groupe des Anciens Equipiers de la Cimade, Cimade archives/3D 10/11 (DZ02). This is confirmed by an examination of the minutes of the meetings of the Cimade board during the Algerian War, where there was no mention of Cimade's activities for the FLN. See Cimade archives/Procès-verbaux des réunions du Conseil de la Cimade.

[105] In a conversation with the Reformed Church pastor Michel Leplay in Paris on June 26, 2009, I asked him if any French Protestants had spoken out against Cimade's actions during the Algerian War. His response was, "They wouldn't have dared!"

a whole was under suspicion, and beginning in October 1958, the French intelligence and security services (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, or DST) searched the seminary, the prelature, the secretariat, and nearly half of the seventy communities that comprised the MDF.[106] Sybille Chapeu notes that Cardinal Liénart was in Rome at the time, attending the conclave that followed the death of Pope Pius XII on October 9. It was during his absence that the French interior minister decided to instigate this national search of the MDF, which he suspected was supporting the FLN. In the end, not a single compromising document was found. However, the public reputation of the MDF was badly damaged.[107] Just as it had in Algeria in 1957, the revelation that MDF priests had been assisting the FLN caused a new wave of accusations of progressivism that came from both the conservative press and Catholics more generally.[108] The leaders of the Mission de France did not hesitate to defend their political and moral positions, but the episcopal council, which met in November 1958, was forced to reassert the MDF's "priestly vocation to be at the service of everyone and the denunciation of all forms of violence, whether on the side of terrorists or counter-terrorists."[109] The MDF also benefited from the backing of some important Catholic figures, including Mgr Duval, who reaffirmed his support for the Mission and its priests.[110]

As in Algeria in 1957, most of the arrests (first of Boudouresques, but then of others, including Jobic Kerlan in Algiers in 1960) led to public trials during which defense attorneys, witnesses, and the accused themselves defended their actions as an example of their Christian mission, which included solidarity with the oppressed.[111] But by 1959, the political and religious climate of France had shifted considerably with the return of Charles de Gaulle in 1958 and the election of a new pope the same year. The trial that caused the most controversy was, unsurprisingly, that of the Jeanson network. The trial began in the fall of 1960. But even then, French Christians were facing some of the most controversial questions of the Algerian War, including those surrounding *insoumission* and the growth of

[106] Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 159.
[107] Ibid., 160–61.
[108] Ibid., 163.
[109] Ibid., 164.
[110] Ibid.
[111] The exception is Bernard Boudouresques, who was released in February 1959 after four months in prison, during which time the justice minister had decided not to bring him to trial. See Cavalin and Viet-Depaule, *Une histoire de la Mission de France*, 276.

the OAS in Algeria. Larger Christian bodies remained divided over how to respond to these questions, but the conservative powers that held sway over such organizations as the FPF during much of the Algerian War were giving way to new influences.

The International Christian Perspective: Rethinking the Christian Mission

Despite Algeria's legal status as part of France and the great efforts that European settlers and the French government made to establish French civilization in North Africa, the Vatican and external Protestant mission organizations saw Algeria as a "*pays de mission*" (mission field). The contradictions inherent in Algeria's unusual legal status as both a colony and yet not a colony were more than apparent to interested outside observers like the Vatican and the World Council of Churches. Already by the interwar period, the glaring failure of French Christians to convert North African Muslims to Christianity had become a growing concern in Rome.[112] Few priests or Protestant pastors in Algeria spoke Arabic or Kabyle, and the task of evangelizing the Muslim population was almost entirely reserved for the White Fathers and White Sisters, and the Protestant Mission Rolland. The failure of Christian missionaries in Algeria was compounded by the existence of a settler population that seemed to be completely unwilling to engage with the Muslim population and yet represented the Christian presence in North Africa. Although the Algerian War was not the first major violent conflict over decolonization, Christians who had a stake in the outcome of decolonization watched it with interest and a certain degree of trepidation. When the Algerian War broke out in 1954, the Vatican and the WCC saw a continuation of French Algeria, albeit with significant reforms, as the best hope to maintain the Christian presence.[113] By the end of the war, however, these institutions had come to realize that the greatest threat to the presence of Christianity in independent Algeria came from the supporters of French Algeria and the militant settler *ultras*, with their hard-line stance. The actions of the *ultras* in particular threatened to further alienate the Christian and Muslim communities.

[112] O. Saaïdia, "L'évangélisation des musulmans, mission impossible?," in *Résistances à l'évangélisation: Interprétations historiques et enjeux théologiques*, ed. Jean Pirotte (Paris: Karthala, 2004), 269.

[113] Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 157. Nozière cites a letter from the French ambassador to the Vatican in which he wrote that Pope Pius XII had told the ambassador how much he hoped that France would stay in Algeria.

Although there is a fairly large gap in the history of the Vatican's response to the Algerian War, mainly because of a lack of access to Vatican archives, we do have numerous public declarations and private archives from which we can begin to outline the Vatican's position on decolonization generally and in Algeria specifically. For the Catholic Church, which saw its missionary endeavor as merely a step toward the end goal of the establishment of indigenous clergy and churches in "young countries," the decolonization of mission lands posed a problem only insofar as the churches in those lands had not yet achieved a state of maturity that allowed them to function independently.[114] Although there was a well-known 1926 encyclical on the Catholic mission, it was not until Pope Pius XII's 1954 Christmas address that the Vatican publicly tackled the problem of decolonization and the potential independence of mission lands.[115] In this address, Pius XII took a position in favor of "a process of evolution to political autonomy for peoples considered until now as colonial."[116] One year later, Pius XII added that "a fair and progressive political liberty should not be refused to these peoples and that one does not put obstacles in their way."[117] Christine Alix has observed that the Vatican's public positions on decolonization were both very general and limited in number, and that only three discussions on decolonization took place at the Vatican between 1948 and 1954. By 1957, however, decolonization had become one of the Vatican's main preoccupations, leading to the encyclical *Fidei Donum*, which examined "the present condition of the Catholic missions, especially in Africa."[118]

In *Fidei Donum*, Pius XII exhorted his followers to turn their attention to Africa, "the Africa that is at long last reaching out toward the higher civilization of our times and aspiring to civic maturity; the Africa that is involved in such grave upheavals as perhaps have never before been recorded in her ancient annals."[119] While celebrating the mission work that had achieved a marked increase in the number of practicing Catholics, African priests, and ecclesiastical provinces, he added that there was still much work to be done. With the rapid social, cultural, and political changes that were taking

[114] C. Alix, "Le Vatican et la décolonisation," in *Les églises chrétiennes et la décolonisation*, ed. M. Merle (Paris, Armand Colin: 1967), 25–28.
[115] Ibid., 30. Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 154. The mission encyclical on missionaries is *Rerum ecclesiae* from 1926.
[116] Nozière, *Algérie: Les Chrétiens dans la guerre*, 154. He cited Alix in Merle, *Les églises chrétiennes et la décolonization*.
[117] Ibid., 154, Alix, "Le Vatican et la décolonisation," 30.
[118] Pius XII, encyclical letter *Fidei Donum*, April 21, 1957.
[119] Ibid.

place in Africa, he noted, the Catholic Church needed missionaries more than ever to make sure that Africans did not stray into "materialistic atheism" or an "excessive love of country." Although the description of Africans as "more easily unsettled and confused by the introduction of theoretical and applied scientific methods, with the result that they tend to be unduly inclined to a materialistic outlook on life" demonstrates the extent to which the Vatican had little confidence in Africans' political and spiritual maturity, it seems clear that the Vatican no longer saw European colonial powers as necessary to defend and promote the Christian mission.[120] Nevertheless, in his message of June 13, 1957, Pius XII added that "it seems necessary that Europe maintains in Africa the opportunity to exercise its educative and formative influence."[121]

Pius XII died in October 1958, and his successor, John XXIII (formerly Mgr Roncalli, papal nuncio to France from 1944 to 1953), followed a similar line in his desire to maintain European influence in decolonizing areas and his awareness of the need for more missionaries. At the same time, though, he also expressed in his address to the faithful of Africa his "great satisfaction to see progressively realized the accessions to sovereignty."[122] His concerns about the role of the church in the modern world and social justice were undoubtedly influenced by the process of decolonization. Indeed, an important feature of his papacy was his attempt to broaden the focus of the Catholic Church and bring in voices from outside Western Europe, including African, Asian, and Latin American clergy. His major theological project was the Second Vatican Council, which he did not live to see in full force, but which led to *Ad Gentes*, a new decree on the missionary activity of the church, passed by the assembly in 1965.[123]

Given the context of the Vatican positions on decolonization, it is easy to see why Algeria presented a particularly complex and worrying situation for the Vatican. The historian André Nozière has argued that Pius XII's position on Algeria was one of "moderation and prudence." Although the pope expressed to Mgr Duval his concern over the "grave problems that the relations between European and non-European peoples pose," his statements about Algeria tended to exclude terms like "political autonomy" and "liberty" that he used when discussing decolonization in a universal context.[124] His messages, like those of the leadership within the French

[120] Ibid.
[121] Alix, "Le Vatican et la décolonisation," 36.
[122] Nozière, *Algérie: Les Chrétiens dans la guerre*, 155.
[123] On Algeria and Vatican II, see Chapter 5.
[124] Nozière, *Algérie: Les Chrétiens dans la guerre*, 156.

Catholic episcopate, also tended to focus on "fraternal cooperation," "the return of peace," and "reconciliation" in this land, which he identified as an important "meeting ground" of Christians, Muslims, and Jews.[125] If, as some have suggested, Pius XII saw French Algeria as the best possibility for the continuation of the Christian presence in North Africa, one of his major concerns likely was the fate of the Christian population there.[126] Whereas many of the other colonies heading for independence already had a significant indigenous Christian population to protect the interests of the Catholic Church and its missionary effort even after independence, the minute missionary presence in Algeria could not guarantee a viable Christian presence after the possible independence of Algeria. Furthermore, Pius XII's concern throughout the 1950s about the growing influences of communism, coupled with conservative Christian propaganda about the dangers of communist infiltration in Algeria, would likely have presented yet another reason to support the French presence there.[127]

Some of the more fascinating and new recommendations in *Ad Gentes* reveal the extent to which the Catholic leadership understood the need to adapt the missionary project to a contemporary and postcolonial world. Instead of working with colonial governments to spread the Christian gospel, missionary activity had to "transcend every peculiarity of race or nation and therefore [not] be considered foreign anywhere or to anybody."[128] In addition to an exhortation for missionaries to learn the local languages, the tasks of mission work were broadened to include Christian charity that "truly extends to all, without distinction of race, creed, or social condition: it looks for neither gain nor gratitude."[129] It further instructed missionaries to "labor and collaborate with others in rightly regulating the affairs of social and economic life" and to "take part in the strivings of those peoples who, waging war on famine, ignorance, and disease, are struggling to better their way of life and to secure peace in the world."[130] Although it stopped well short of advocating that Christian missionaries engage in radical or openly political activities, this decree suggested a level of

[125] Ibid. He is citing Pius XII's January 11, 1957, radio address from Radio-Vatican.
[126] Ibid., 157.
[127] Nozière makes some interesting points about Pius XII's advisors, including Cardinal Tisserant, who openly supported the French cause in Algeria. However, because there is scant archival evidence for Pius XII's views, one can do little more than speculate based on his past viewpoints and statements.
[128] Paul VI, conciliar letter *Ad Gentes*, November 18, 1965, 8.
[129] Ibid., 12.
[130] Ibid.

solidarity with the poor and oppressed that was much more reminiscent of the mission conception of the Mission de France and the Little Brothers and Sisters of Jesus than of the self-contained world of European Christians in Algeria.

John XXIII seemed to recognize the limitations of Christianity under French Algeria, especially as the Algerian War progressed and threatened to turn into a French civil war. One major difference between him and his predecessor was that he had direct experience with Algeria. During his official visit to North Africa as papal nuncio in 1950, he had spent a significant amount of time with Mgr Duval, then bishop of Constantine, who took him on a tour of the region that included meetings with Jewish and Muslim religious leaders.[131] Mgr Duval later recounted that the future pope spoke to him in detail about his vision of Christianity in Algeria, which was a mission of "universal opening, in the respect of the liberty of persons and peoples, a mission of love in humility and a spirit of service."[132] In June 1961, the *Journal de Genève* reported that the Vatican had publicly expressed its support for the policies of Charles de Gaulle in the face of divisions that threatened to tear both France and the Christian community apart.[133] The pope's support for an end to the war that maintained the unity of France and of the Christian community, and which assured the possibility of a Christian presence in Algeria, was unsurprising. However, he did express support for Algerian independence in a telegram to Mgr Duval in April 1961, just after the failed Generals' Putsch, writing: "Your Excellency without difficulty understands the extent of our apostolic preoccupations in this critical hour for France, which is so dear, and that we see the menace of this fratricidal struggle, for the Algerian population that we had the pleasure to visit in 1950 and to whom we wish with all our heart the realization of their legitimate aspirations in justice and liberty."[134]

In many ways the preoccupations of the World Council of Churches on the question of decolonization were not all that different from those of the Vatican. Even if the mission of the WCC – to create Christian unity – resembled that of the FPF or even the ACA in France, there was a major difference of scale, which ultimately meant that the WCC approached issues of decolonization and the Algerian War differently from church leaders in France and Algeria. For the WCC, Christian unity meant *worldwide*

[131] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 66.
[132] Ibid., 67–68.
[133] "Le Vatican soutient la politique du général de Gaulle en Algérie," *Journal de Genève* (June 7, 1961), in the Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.
[134] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 70.

cooperation and dialogue among Protestant churches, including the "young" churches in decolonizing countries in Africa, Asia, and South America. This unity was based on a dialogue about theological questions among Protestant churches, and to some extent with Roman Catholicism. The WCC was also concerned with larger moral issues like social justice, racism, and decolonization that fell within the realm of international politics.[135] Darril Hudson, who has written on the WCC and world affairs, argues that "the effect of the ecumenical movement's first action in international affairs was that it attached significance not to church unity itself but to unified Christian action to relieve suffering in the world for the love of Christ."[136] Unlike the FPF and the ERF, the WCC did not shy away from openly discussing and attempting to influence "political" issues, and there was even a specific arm of the organization devoted to studying international affairs. This body was called the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the CCIA often focused on the issues surrounding decolonization.[137]

Because the ecumenical movement was in fact a result of the ecumenical action of missionaries, beginning with the World Missionary Conference in 1910, the question of Christian missions was a central consideration of the WCC and at the center of the CCIA's work as well. Between 1947 and 1961, when the International Missionary Council (IMC) was formally incorporated into the WCC, the CCIA was an organ both of the IMC and the WCC. Its task was to facilitate the missionary effort around the world by helping to solve governmental and international problems that affected Christians worldwide, as well as to serve as a liaison between these two organizations and the United Nations.[138] A major challenge for the CCIA in its early period was to reconcile the WCC's doctrine of human equality before God with the reality of Christian missions. Most missions were composed almost entirely of Europeans, many of whom still believed that "non white races were not yet equal to the whites in their administrative capabilities" and required the further "tutelage" of white Christians before they could achieve a level of advancement that would allow them to govern

[135] One interesting example is the long history of the WCC's battle against apartheid in South Africa, which was the result of both a theological and a moral stance on equality among people.

[136] D. Hudson, *The World Council of Churches in International Affairs* (Leighton Buzzard, UK: Faith Press, 1977), 24.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Ibid., ch. 1.

themselves.[139] The first step, therefore, was to eliminate racism within Christian churches. The WCC pursued this goal in various ways, including through its efforts to end apartheid in South Africa and segregation in the United States.[140]

The second step was to dissociate the Christian mission from imperialism. The fact that colonized peoples saw an inherent connection between European colonial powers and Christian missionaries was a problem that theologians and church leaders like W. A. Visser 't Hooft were thinking about even before the organization of the World Council of Churches.[141] In 1939, Visser 't Hooft wrote an article in the French Protestant youth journal *Le Semeur* in which he quoted Gandhi's statement that Christianity in India was "inseparably tied to British domination." The task of Christian missionaries, Visser 't Hooft argued, was to move beyond the colonial context and focus on the creation of "young, independent churches."[142] Unsurprisingly, this language was quite similar to that of the Vatican. Like the Catholics, the Protestants realized that they had to take concrete steps to demonstrate to colonized peoples that Christians were not simply a relic of the colonial order.

Before the 1954 Assembly of the World Council of Churches, the CCIA prepared a draft resolution on the "advancement of dependent peoples," for discussion among the representatives of the member churches. In this resolution, CCIA leaders affirmed their hope to further "the acceptance by all nations of the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of dependent peoples including their advancement toward self-government and the development of their free political institutions."[143] Although a subcommittee subsequently advised against presenting the resolution to the full assembly because it was "inadequate, in view of the complexity of the question," it is clear that there was a strong movement within the CCIA in particular to openly support decolonization movements.[144]

[139] Ibid., 59.

[140] W. A. Visser 't Hooft, ed., *The Evanston Report: The Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches, 1954* (London: SCM Press, 1955), 42–47.

[141] French theologian Roger Mehl also highlighted this connection in his book *Décolonisation et missions protestantes* (Paris: Société des missions évangéliques de Paris, 1964), 41–69.

[142] An extract of this article appears in M. Merle, ed., *Les églises chrétiennes et la décolonisation* (Paris: Armand Colin: 1967), 125.

[143] "Draft Resolution on the Advancement of Dependent Peoples," World Council of Churches (WCC) archives/Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA)/428.04/file 1, Geneva, Switzerland.

[144] Ibid.

During the assembly, several representatives of Christian churches in areas that had been or were still under colonial rule asserted the need for the WCC to support the aspirations of the peoples of Africa, Asia and other "dependent" regions for a more free and equal relationship with Western Christians.[145]

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the CCIA in particular continued to discuss the proper role of Christians in the process of decolonization. But for them, just as for Catholics, the case of Algeria was not easy to reconcile. A major issue was that French Protestants had played such key roles in the creation of the WCC and throughout the 1950s still filled important positions within the organization. This meant that dealing with the divisions among "our French friends," as Visser 't Hooft put it, was a difficult challenge. Yet the WCC was a guiding institution for French Protestants and particularly for people like Marc Boegner, who called on the WCC to intervene when French Protestants refused to tackle some of the larger moral and political questions of the Algerian conflict. At the request of Boegner and Madeleine Barot, Visser 't Hooft decided to wade into the churning sea of emotions and reactions that characterized French Protestant responses to the Algerian conflict.

According to the historian Geoffrey Adams, Visser 't Hooft initially sent a colleague from Geneva, André-Dominique Micheli, to Algeria to observe the situation on the ground. Micheli's report, which displayed his disbelief at the indifference of the Protestant community in Algeria to the conditions in which the Muslims lived, convinced Visser 't Hooft that something had to be done. In October 1956, Visser 't Hooft spent twelve days in North Africa preaching and visiting the Protestant communities in Algeria and Tunisia. In his confidential report to the World Council of Churches, Visser 't Hooft provided a starkly realistic analysis of the situation in North Africa. Although he recognized a certain open-mindedness among the Protestants he encountered (he admitted that they were of the elite class), Visser 't Hooft also outlined a number of major problems in the colonial situation. Algerian nationalism, he commented, did not seem likely to disappear anytime soon, despite the myth that "pacification" would return everything to the status quo.[146] And whereas he decried the violent methods

[145] Visser 't Hooft, *The Evanston Report*; see in particular statements by the Rev. Peter Dagadu, general-secretary of the Christian Council of the Gold Coast, 37, and Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, director of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, 41–42.

[146] These problems, which Visser 't Hooft also described a bit differently in his letter to the pastors of North Africa, were the demographic situation, the "*déracinement*" of Algerian Muslims because of an educational system that focused exclusively on French culture,

of the "nationalist terrorists," he also condemned the "terrorist" tactics of the French military and the use of torture.[147] The solution, in his mind, was the establishment of a more positive relationship between North African Christians and Muslims based specifically on human contact *outside of* the missionary context.

In his December 1956 letter to the Reformed Church pastors in Algeria, Visser 't Hooft brought up the question of comparisons between Algeria and other countries. He found the closest parallel to be that of South Africa, although he noted that the French had "fortunately" not applied a policy of apartheid.[148] He also noted the various arguments he had heard from those who defended the French presence in Algeria as a front against the installation of communism or as a means to increase European security. But, he argued, wasn't the internationalization of the Algerian problem inevitable, and shouldn't the French, consequently, share the responsibility for the solution with other nations? Although he wisely refrained from offering a solution to the Algerian problem, knowing full well how negatively European Christians in Algeria reacted to outside suggestions, Visser 't Hooft was well aware of the international consequences of the Algerian conflict. He recognized, moreover, the potential consequences of the growing hatred between the European and the Algerian Muslim communities.

In a January 1957 memo to Visser 't Hooft, Howard Schomer forwarded an analysis by the French pastor André Trocmé, who was considering the question of sending what eventually ended up being the Cimade teams into Algeria. Pastor Trocmé thought that increasing the human contacts between French Christians and Algerian Muslims was important not just for peace in Algeria but also for avoiding an international catastrophe. He acknowledged that there was growing hatred within the Arab and Muslim communities toward the West and Christianity but argued that French Christians in Algeria could supply proof that this hatred was unjustified. This proof, he wrote, does not exist in the eyes of the Arabs, because they saw the church as completely aligned with Western powers and their "defensive tactics."[149] Although Trocmé (and Visser 't Hooft)

the lack of contacts between Europeans and Muslims on a basis of equality and confidence, the Christian refusal to consider the validity of Islam, the lack of political reforms, terrorism, the failure to consider Algeria within its context in the decolonizing world, and pessimism.

147 "Notes on a Visit to Algeria and Tunisia," Cimade archives/3D 10/11 (DZ02)/Wisser 't Hooft – Dec. 1956.

148 "Aux pasteurs des Eglises réformées en Algérie," WCC archives/WCC General Secretariat/42.3.002/file 3.

149 Letter from Howard Schomer to Willem Visser 't Hooft, dated January 2, 1957, WCC archives/General Secretariat/42.3.002/file 3.

believed that the workers should be French, he argued that the WCC should control the Cimade teams as the French tended to "confuse the task of the testimony of Jesus Christ with that of the political Franco-Muslim rapprochement."[150]

Despite the moderate tone of his December 1956 letter to the pastors of the French Reformed Church in Algeria, Visser 't Hooft indicated in his report on Algeria to the WCC that he saw little hope for the French cause in North Africa.[151] Although Visser 't Hooft believed that the status quo could not be maintained, he also did not think that France would turn Algeria over to the FLN, and saw little advantage in that path either. It could lead to a situation, for example, where France would be cut off from its other African colonies, which were "not yet ripe for independence." Algerians, he warned, would be in a very difficult position if French capital and resources were to be suddenly removed. Although the French continued to resist internationalization of the Algerian conflict, the WCC, while resolving not to take sides in the internal debate within the French churches, continued to gently emphasize to French Protestants that Algeria *was* an international concern.[152] The CCIA took up the question of Algeria several times throughout the war. It did so originally at the request of French Protestants and continued to closely monitor the actions of Cimade teams in Algeria, which distributed large amounts of food and clothing provided by the World Council of Churches and the Church World Service. At the end of the war, the WCC cooperated closely with Cimade in the creation of the Christian Committee for Service in Algeria (CCSA), which worked directly with the Algerian government in reforestation and development projects.[153]

The 1961 Assembly of the World Council of Churches, held in New Delhi, India, crystallized many of the WCC's policies on decolonization and the future of the Christian mission. It did so in much the same way as the Second Vatican Council expanded the Catholic Church's commitment to social justice and a new mission relationship. A report from the Section on Witness at the 1961 meeting stated, in language that is reminiscent of the Vatican II decree *Ad Gentes*, that

[150] Ibid.

[151] "Notes on a Visit to Algeria and Tunisia," Cimade archives/3D 10/11 (DZ02)/Wisser 't Hooft – Dec. 1956.

[152] Letter from Alan R. Booth, secretary of the CCIA, to M. Appel of the FPF, dated June 30, 1960, from the private archives of Charles Harper.

[153] For more on this transition, see Chapter 5.

> The Church in every land is aware that new situations require new strategies and new methods, an adventuring into new forms of human social relationships with appropriately new ways of approach and understanding, a renewed sympathy with all men in their aspirations and sufferings and a fresh determination to speak to men the truth of the Gospel in the actual situation of their lives.[154]

Further observing that the "strategies and techniques of evangelism must change from age to age," the report stressed the importance for Christians to be "of service to the world in which men suffer."[155] In short, it was the role of Christians to help those in need both materially and spiritually to achieve liberation. Evangelism, in these instances, would proceed from the Christian presence among the poor and the tactic of "dialogue," or having "conversations about Christ with them, knowing that Christ addresses them through us and us through them."[156]

Although an emphasis on dialogue had been a central tenet of the ecumenical movement since its inception, its vital place as a form of evangelism was something new. However, the Algerian War also demonstrated that dialogue was only the first step toward a more productive relationship between Christians and Muslims in Algeria; it was not enough to alter the status quo. Christian institutions in both France and Algeria remained hesitant to engage in any "technical" or political solutions to the Algerian conflict, falling back on the long-standing argument that it was not within the competence of the church to engage in politics. Yet Christians on both sides of the Mediterranean began to see this as empty rhetoric, especially when they sought moral guidance on issues such as their Christian duty to obey military authorities who order them to perform acts that go against their consciences. The Algerian War intensified the growing divisions within both Catholicism and French Protestantism that had emerged during World War II and that were directly linked to political as well as theological beliefs. Despite vocal protests to the contrary, religion and politics in France and Algeria were constantly intertwined.

[154] The Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches, *The New Delhi Report* (London: SCM Press, 1961), 78.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid., 82–84.

CHAPTER 4

The Religious Politics of Independence

Charles de Gaulle was sworn in as prime minister of France on June 1, 1958, after the French military's bombing of the Tunisian town of Sakiet Sidi Youssef in February 1958 and a series of international scandals brought down the French Fourth Republic. After Sakiet, the historian Matthew Connelly has shown, the American and British governments placed enormous pressure on the French to discuss a settlement for the deaths of sixty-eight civilians, a strategy that the French military believed would weaken its position in Algeria.[1] As a result, French military leaders in Algiers, led by Generals Massu and Salan, staged a coup to overthrow what they saw as the ineffectual French government. They did so with the assistance of radicalized *pied-noir ultras* like Pierre Lagaillarde, a former French paratrooper, law student at the University of Algiers, and the head of the Association générale des étudiants d'Algérie (General Student Association of Algeria).[2] The ultimate goal of both French military leaders and the *pied-noir ultras* was to bring Charles de Gaulle back to power, as they believed he was more sympathetic to the cause of French Algeria than was the current French government. They also tapped into the widespread belief in both France and Algeria that de Gaulle was a powerful global leader who would restore the honor and grandeur of France, which had been severely damaged by the outcry over the French military's use of torture and inability to control the violence of the Algerian conflict.[3]

[1] On the bombing of Sakiet Sidi Youssef and the resulting international uproar, see Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 160–65.

[2] *Ultras* is the term used to describe far-right *pied-noir* extremists who supported French Algeria. Many of them would become active members of the OAS after its creation in 1961.

[3] On the Algiers coup of May 13, 1958, see M. Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 233–36.

By the summer of 1958, the Algerian War had become synonymous with extreme violence. Christian leaders in Algeria struggled to maintain moral control over the European population as "Christianity" became an even more highly charged rhetorical tool to defend violent actions in the name of *Algérie française*. Christians who had spent a decade or more working to sever the ties between Christianity and colonial authority in Algeria encountered new roadblocks in the expansion of *pied-noir* nationalism, and the growing acceptance and justification of extreme violence within the Christian community (against both Algerians and other Christians). Additionally, the public discovery in 1959 of the Algerian regroupment camps, in which hundreds of thousands of Algerians lived in conditions of near starvation, created an enormous set of challenges for Protestants who had undertaken the project to provide humanitarian aid to as many as possible.

As the previous chapters have shown, there was no unified Christian discourse on the Algerian War. What motivated the engagements of Protestants and Catholics on both sides of the Mediterranean during the Algerian War depended on their social and political background, their theological milieu, and their particular experiences before and during the war. Consequently, the map of religious discourse on Algeria was highly complex, even more so toward the end of the conflict. In Algeria, between 1830 and the late 1940s, direct collaboration between the French state and Christian institutions – Catholic ones in particular – had helped ensure the stability of the settler colonial regime. By the mid-1950s, however, leftist Christians began to question both the relationship of the church to the colonial system and the system itself. In reaction, representatives of conservative state power in France and Algeria, such as military leaders like General Massu, adopted the language of Christian civilization to justify their actions in Algeria on moral grounds. They also sought to destabilize the moral authority of the Catholic Church in Algeria, which they viewed as troublingly contrary to their aims of "pacification" and maintaining French Algeria.

When French President Charles de Gaulle began making gestures toward Algerian self-determination, the French settlers and military officers who felt betrayed by de Gaulle and the French state formed their own paramilitary organization called the OAS (Organisation armée secrète – Secret Armed Organization) to defend French Algeria. Although the OAS had its intellectual roots in far-right integrist Catholic movements that long predated the Algerian War, it also readily adopted the French colonial discourse that claimed French Algeria was the best means to defend Christian civilization in North Africa. Thus by the end of the Algerian War, it was neither the French state nor the Catholic Church that most visibly claimed

to be defending Christian civilization in North Africa. Instead, the settlers and insubordinate military officers of the OAS co-opted this discourse (which they had absorbed through decades of procolonial propaganda) while violently rendering abject both church and state.

Cimade and the Regroupment Camps

In autumn of 1958, when he and his cabinet were still intent on restoring peace in Algeria, Charles de Gaulle decided to shift strategies by instituting a massive economic and social development project in Algeria called the Constantine Plan. Realizing that this plan could not function under the leadership of a military commander, de Gaulle appointed a civilian representative in Algeria to take the place of General Salan, who had assumed both civilian and military powers after the departure of Governor- General Robert Lacoste in May 1958. On December 19, 1958, a government finance director named Paul Delouvrier took on the role of general representative, and for the first time, the military was subordinated to the civil authorities in Algeria.[4] One of his deputies, Eric Westphal, was the son of Charles Westphal, vice-president of the French Protestant Federation. He was also a former classmate of Michel Rocard, a young finance inspector who had recently arrived in Algeria and discovered the existence of temporary settlements across the Algerian countryside that resembled concentration camps.[5] Often surrounded by barbed wire and housing hundreds or thousands of Algerians in little more than tents or hastily constructed shelters far from agricultural or grazing land, the camps that Rocard first encountered also held children starving to death in the arms of the French officers who were charged with protecting them.[6]

These camps, which the French authorities called "regroupment centers" (the word "camp" having too many connotations of a Nazi concentration camp), were neither a new phenomenon in Algeria nor a major secret.

[4] Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, 170–71.

[5] Michel Rocard's mother was Protestant, and he was a leader in the Protestant Scout movement during his childhood. In 1954, he married Geneviève Poujol, whose family included major figures within French Protestantism. Her brother Robert Poujol was a subprefect in the region of Blida, Algeria, and her brother Jacques had been an important figure in Cimade during World War II and, later, a historian of French Protestantism. Despite the scandal over the regroupment camps, Rocard rose quickly through the ranks of French politics, eventually becoming prime minister of France between 1988 and 1991.

[6] M. Rocard, "Premiers engagements," in *Rapport sur les camps de regroupement et autres textes sur la guerre d'Algérie*, ed. V. Duclert and P. Encrevé (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2003), 197.

However, their existence was not known of by the majority of the civilian populations in both France and Algeria, and even by many in the French government, including Paul Delouvrier. Soon after Delouvrier's arrival, Rocard arranged through Eric Westphal to meet with Delouvrier and tell him about his informal survey of the regroupment camps. Delouvrier, who had heard nothing of the camps, charged Rocard with conducting a more thorough investigation and writing a report on the situation. Although he was never given an official mission, Rocard, as a finance inspector, was able to access the camps under the cover of making topographical surveys and tax inspections.[7] On February 17, 1959, after carrying out his investigation with the help of six other finance inspectors in the regions of Orléansville, Tiaret, and Blida, Rocard handed in his report to Delouvrier.

Rocard's report contained three main conclusions: "the regroupments are hardly known to the Administration; the situation of the regrouped is often tragic; means of existence must be, with all urgency, furnished to the regrouped persons, who have been deprived of them."[8] Rocard was quite explicit about the dire conditions in the regroupment camps and the structural problems that led to these conditions. The first problem that he addressed was the administrative responsibility for the camps. There was no centralized authority in charge of the camps or the regrouped population; instead, each small area was under the local military authority for that region. He wrote, "All of the Centers we visited were created solely by the military. The reasons for the decision are always exclusively from the military; the setting up of a regroupment can vary to one or two kilometers away for economic reasons, even though such considerations are rarely brought up."[9] In polite language, Rocard suggested that despite any claims about the humanitarian nature of the regroupments, the entire procedure of population regroupment was subject to the whim of the local military commander. Concerns about the welfare of the population and their access to land for subsistence crops or grazing livestock hardly entered the minds of the military commanders. As his later comments about the lack of medical care for rampant tuberculosis and the condition of the civilians who were starving to death in the camps made clear, Rocard expressed scant support for continued military control of the camps.

[7] Ibid., 192–97.

[8] M. Rocard, "Note sur les Centres de regroupement," in *Rapport sur les camps de regroupement et autres textes sur la guerre d'Algérie*, ed. V. Duclert and P. Encrevé (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2003), 108.

[9] Ibid., 108–109.

The practice of regroupment actually had a long history in Algeria, dating from the 1840s when the French colonial authorities began rounding up nomadic populations from the countryside and placing them in secure villages with military-like organization and houses that "themselves reflected military hierarchy."[10] But in 1956–1957 the French military instituted what Sylvie Thénault has called a "rationalized" and "systematized" practice of regroupment.[11] As part of the military's "pacification" strategy, officials mapped out the various zones in the Algerian countryside that were sites of rebel activity. In the most dangerous areas – the *zones interdites* – no settlements would be permitted, and the civilian populations would be resettled in the French-controlled regroupment centers.[12] The military claimed that many of the regrouped civilians came to the centers voluntarily and that the movement was temporary. But, as Rocard's and other reports make clear, there were very few, if any, civilians who went into the camps or enclosed villages voluntarily, especially as doing so meant that they would be separated from their livelihoods and their land, and placed into conditions of starvation and brutality.[13]

Thénault notes that from the military's point of view one of the major reasons for the lack of housing and subsistence for regrouped civilians was the need to use the tool of surprise to catch insurgents and cutoff their supply lines. This policy made it impossible for the military to prepare properly for the civilian displacements that would follow and left thousands of families without housing, resources, and material aid.[14] According to the reports on the camps, and the analyses of sociologists like Pierre Bourdieu, who had spent many years studying social structures in Kabylia and rural life in Algeria, the greatest harm done to the regrouped populations was their removal from their land.[15] Taking farmers from their grazing land and

[10] M. Cornaton, *Les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie*, 2nd ed. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), 47.

[11] Cornaton, 45; S. Thénault, "Rappels historiques sur les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie," in *Rapport sur les camps de regroupement et autres textes sur la guerre d'Algérie*, ed. V. Duclert and P. Encrevé (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2003), 231. Thénault notes that the sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad estimated that, by 1960, the total number of regrouped Algerians was 2,157,000, one-quarter of the population, but by including the number of rural civilians who left for the city, the number was not less than three million.

[12] K. Sutton, "Army Administration Tensions over Algeria's Centres de Regroupement, 1954–1962," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26 (1999): 250–51.

[13] Cornaton, *Les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie*, 65.

[14] Ibid., 230.

[15] P. Bourdieu and A. Sayad, *Le déracinement: La crise de l'agriculture traditionelle in Algérie* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1964), 20–21.

placing them in closed villages or camps eliminated their main source of income and food, which was never fully replaced by either the military or civilian aid organizations. For the most part, those Algerians who were living in camps or closed villages did not have enough space to grow crops, and there was no grazing land for the animals that normally provided them with milk, eggs, and meat. Their animals died off quickly, leaving starving children everywhere.[16] Rocard's statistics showed that when a regroupment reached one thousand people, one child died every two days.[17]

Rocard's report indirectly alerted the French public to the existence of the regroupment camps. It also pushed Christian organizations like Cimade and Secours catholique to engage much more fully in the Algerian War in the capacity of humanitarian and development organizations. According to Rocard, when Paul Delouvrier received his report, the general representative realized that he had a potential bomb on his hands and that the report needed to reach Charles de Gaulle. However, that was not a simple proposition, as Delouvrier claimed that he did not have direct access to de Gaulle.[18] Delouvrier's personal secretary typed nine copies of the report and gave two to Rocard, charging him with personally giving those copies to the people he knew who were closest to de Gaulle. Rocard gave one copy to a friend who worked in de Gaulle's office and the other to someone who worked in the office of Edmond Michelet, the minister of justice. Although no one knows if the report ever reached de Gaulle, Gaston Gosselin, who worked for the Ministry of Justice, leaked it to two major French newspapers, *Le Monde* and *France Observateur*. On April 18, 1959, large extracts from the report appeared in *Le Monde*.[19]

The publication of Rocard's report was not the first time that the French public had been alerted to the existence of the camps, however. Just a few days earlier, Mgr Rodhain, the head of Secours catholique in Paris, had given an interview to the Catholic paper *La Croix* in which he had launched an appeal to the French to help the "million refugees" that he had found in a state of massive hunger when he visited the regroupment camps in Algeria in March and early April.[20] Mgr Rodhain had himself written a report on the state of the camps, which he also had given to Delouvrier. In Rodhain's public appeal, he pointed out that although private charities like

[16] Rocard, "Notes sur les Centres de regroupement," 131.
[17] Ibid., 126.
[18] Rocard, "Premiers engagements," 200–201.
[19] Ibid., 202.
[20] Thénault, "Rappels historiques sur les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie," 227.

Secours catholique could step up their work on behalf of the "refugees," these organizations were no substitute for the responsible authorities, and that "the first form of charity is to tell the truth."[21] In the wake of Rodhain's interview in *La Croix*, Delouvrier made public his circular from March 31, 1959, in which he had announced that no regroupment could operate without his agreement.[22]

Until 1959, when reports on the regroupment camps began to appear in newspapers in France, camp conditions depended largely on the whims of the military official in charge of the sector in which the regroupment was located. One government official, Commandant Florentin, described the Algerians as "refugees" because their houses had been burned to the ground and they had nowhere else to go. Michel Cornaton, a sociologist who in 1967 wrote one of the first pieces of scholarship on the camps, observed that, for the most part, civilians were kept in camps, which were surrounded by barbed wire, that were located fairly close to their homes, but others were forcibly marched to camps up to eighty kilometers from their agricultural land.[23] When the first press reports appeared, journalists were already using the language of "genocide" and comparing conditions in the camps in Algeria to those in Nazi concentration camps. As a response to this negative publicity, Delouvrier created the office of the "General Inspection of Population Regroupments" (IGRP), and transferred control of the regroupments from the military to the civilian sector. However, he recruited General Parlange, who had organized some of the early regroupments in the Aurès in 1955, to head the IGRP.[24]

After 1957, many of the regroupments came under the control of the Sections administratives specialisées (SAS), a civil-military project that the former governor-general Jacques Soustelle had instituted in 1955 as a means of establishing more contact with the rural Algerian population.[25] The role of the SAS was envisioned to be a civil authority that provided official

[21] "Le rapport de Mgr Rodhain," republished in *Rapport sur les camps de regroupement et autres textes sur la guerre d'Algérie*, ed. V. Duclert and P. Encrevé (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2003), 303.

[22] Thénault, "Rappels historiques sur les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie," 228.

[23] Cornaton, *Les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie*, 67–69; Sutton, "Army Administration Tensions over Algeria's Centres de Regroupement," 252.

[24] Cornaton, *Les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie*, 67.

[25] G. Mathias, *Les sections administratives spécialisées en Algérie: Entre idéal et réalité, 1955–1962* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), 20–23. See also T. Peterson, "Counterinsurgent Bodies: Social Welfare and Psychological Warfare in French Algeria, 1956–1962" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 2015). The SAS and the SAU (Sections administratives urbaines) were created at the same time as the Centres sociaux; however, their objectives ended up being very different. The SAS and SAU were meant to win Algerians to the French cause,

support to the French military by making more direct contact with the local populations to enact French counterterrorism practices but also a means through which the French government could disperse its new development policies. SAS officers thus provided Algerians with access to medical care, basic education, and material aid, while simultaneously serving as a source of civilian population control and counterintelligence for the French military.[26] The historian Todd Shepard describes the SAS as having had a dual genealogy, on the one hand, inheriting the legacy and responsibilities of the nineteenth-century *bureaux arabes* and, on the other, attempting to apply contemporary global practices of multicultural integration, such as those implemented by UNESCO in Mexico.[27] Relations between the SAS and the French military were complex, as military commanders like General Salan viewed the SAS as civil administrators under their authority while fulfilling the task of the "conquest of souls" that Soustelle and General Parlange, the project's first director, had envisioned.[28] As the French government's vision of the regroupment centers shifted in early 1959, so too did the role of the SAS, which became the front line in the government's development project called the "Thousand Villages."

The "Thousand Villages" project combined an attempt to reform the major problems with the regroupment centers – namely, their temporary and isolated state – and to fit the centers into the official development policies that the French administration had begun with the Constantine Plan in 1958. Beginning in May 1960, Paul Delouvrier issued new directives that stated that regroupments needed to be organized in such a way that they were a step toward the creation of new, economically viable villages.[29] For Delouvrier and the French officials charged with the task of developing Algeria, the regroupment centers were a potential liability that could be turned to the government's benefit. But this could occur only if the camps were controlled by civilians and were used as a "humanitarian" tool. The objective of French officials who propagated the "Thousand Villages" project was to convince the Algerians that the French were attempting to renew and develop rural Algeria, as opposed to the former military practice of removing Algerians from their lands and livelihoods and burning their homes to the ground.[30]

whereas the Centres sociaux initially had no overt propaganda or psychological warfare component. This shifted somewhat with the launch of the Constantine Plan.

[26] Mathias, *Les sections administratives spécialisées*, 43–117.

[27] Shepard, "Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO," 294.

[28] Sutton, "Army Administration Tensions over Algeria's Centres de Regroupement," 246.

[29] Cornaton, *Les camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie*, 69.

[30] Ibid., 71–72.

The "humanitarian" aspect of the camps was more complex, however, because the centers remained under the control of the SAS. In addition, much of the humanitarian aid was coming not from the French government, but from Christian groups like Secours catholique and Cimade. The revelations from the Rocard report had motivated Cimade in particular to expand its Algerian presence beyond its social center in Algiers. With their experience in refugee and humanitarian aid and their close ties to the World Council of Churches, Cimade teams could provide both the material aid to the camps and the positive Christian presence that Visser 't Hooft had called for in his 1956 letter to Protestants in Algeria. In early May 1959, Isabelle Peloux, who was directing Cimade's projects on the ground in Algiers, met with Eric Westphal and representatives of the Red Cross in Algeria to discuss how to get into the regroupment camps. Peloux wrote to Jacques Beaumont in Paris that Westphal was waiting for Beaumont's official letter of request, and he would then "pave the way here, particularly with Delouvrier," to get them access to the camps.[31] But although Isabelle Peloux thought that their best chance of access was through the Red Cross, Beaumont's reply indicated that the Red Cross had lost a great deal of credibility, partly through its support of the military's "humanitarian" projects like the sewing circles sponsored by Madame Massu, the general's wife.[32] In addition, the president of the Red Cross, A. François-Poncet, had informed Beaumont and Mgr Rodhain of Secours catholique that the Red Cross needed "their" material goods and was "counting on them," implying that Cimade and Secours catholique would supply the goods and the Red Cross would deliver them to the refugees in Algeria.[33]

Jacques Beaumont was, in fact, working closely with Germaine Tillion and Mgr Rodhain of Secours catholique in Paris to establish a plan for the camps in which the organizations themselves would deliver the food and clothing they had collected. Tillion, in particular, insisted that the Algerian refugees needed to see that the aid was coming from an entity that was separate from the French government. Only a joint action of

[31] Letter from Isabelle Peloux to Jacques Beaumont, May 7, 1959, Cimade archives/3D 10/12. On the history of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent in Algeria, see J. Johnson, *The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, Health Care, and Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

[32] Suzanne Massu, General Jacques Massu's wife, created a number of projects in Algeria directed at "uplifting" Algerian youth and women, including teaching them sewing and knitting. She and the general even adopted two North African Muslim children. On Madame Massu's place in Algerian history, see D. Reid, "The Worlds of Frantz Fanon's 'L'Algérie se dévoile,'" *French Studies* 61 (2007): 460–75.

[33] Letter from Jacques Beaumont to Isabelle Peloux, May 9, 1959, Cimade archives/3D 10/12.

"*oeuvres gratuites*" (disinterested charities) that included Cimade, Secours catholique, and Cojasor (a Jewish charity), she believed, would send that message.[34] Beaumont noted, "She [Tillion] believes that in the eyes of the Muslims, *only* Christians working together have a chance to be believed and accepted as people who are not in it for their own interests."[35] While Beaumont worked through the World Council of Churches to get material aid through the Church World Service in the form of Canadian milk and American surplus goods shipped to Algeria, Marc Boegner and Cardinal Feltin, the presidents of Cimade and Secours catholique, organized a press conference in Paris on May 26 in which they launched an appeal to all French Christians for material and personnel support for the "*regroupés*."[36]

Cimade's role in the camps and the Algerian perception of its work was a concern that expanded beyond the core leaders. In June 1959, Maurice Causse, the Protestant math teacher who had been arrested and put on trial in 1957 with the "progressivist" Christians, wrote to Jacques Beaumont about the camps. Based on the testimony that he had heard, Causse wrote that the Rocard report was actually quite moderate in its description of the camps. What had been presented as a simple humanitarian effort for the "refugees" was not that at all.[37] He warned Beaumont that the military situation was as dire as ever, explaining that "no one takes the Constantine Plan seriously, and the technical competence of its strategists is especially in doubt." He questioned whether Beaumont had seriously considered the point of view of the Algerian Muslims, and if not, charged him to do so. In their participation in a humanitarian action for the "refugees," Causse argued, it might appear as though Christians were simply "throwing holy water" on the whole project, because no one was calling for any sanctions against the parties responsible for the camps.[38]

Whether or not he took Causse's advice, Beaumont was walking a tightrope with the regroupments and with the politics of the Algerian War more generally. In October 1959, he toured several camps and wrote a report that he distributed widely to powerful and sympathetic figures within French politics, including the French politician Simone Veil and Geneviève de Gaulle-Anthonioz, Charles de Gaulle's niece.[39] In his report,

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. Emphasis in original text.
36 Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 147–48.
37 Letter from M. Causse to J. Beaumont, June 9, 1959, Cimade archives/3D 10/12.
38 Ibid.
39 See the transcript of Geoffrey Adams's interviews with Jacques Beaumont, 25, Cimade archives.

Beaumont noted that even though there were not supposed to be any new regroupments constructed under Delouvrier's recent mandate, not a day went by when new populations were not being "regrouped" or "constricted."[40] Given the military situation, he added, the regroupment strategy would only continue because, from the point of view of the military, evacuating an entire region would avoid civilian deaths in rural operations and facilitate surveillance. Beaumont also pointed out that in some instances the regroupments were a preferable situation, for "in this state of famine and psychological misery (the lack of sleep is noted everywhere, although they can sleep in a regroupment center), it is infinitely simpler for certain populations to stay by the side of the road, where a doctor can take care of them, where relief can be distributed, or where schooling can be offered to the children." The only way the regroupments would end, he wrote, was with the end of the war.[41]

After describing in detail the urgency of the problem, and the precarious nature of most of the regroupments, Beaumont argued that Cimade should have two specific roles in the regroupments. The first was to facilitate the survival of the inhabitants through the collection and distribution of milk and sugar donated by both French – Christian and secular – and international sources. The second was to put in place a team of women in the region of Médéa, who could travel to the various camps in the region to help with the distributions and provide medical and social services.[42] The advantage of working in the Médéa region was that strategically useful people who could assist in organizing Cimade's work were already in place, including Pastor Elisabeth Schmidt, who had the parish at Blida, and the Protestant prefect Robert Poujol.[43] In November 1959, the executive council of Cimade decided to send a team to Médéa and another to Orléansville, with a nurse making up a member of each team; their primary tasks were to work directly with the regrouped populations in the camps and to facilitate the distribution of aid.[44]

[40] J. Beaumont, "Les Regroupements en Algerie," Cimade archives/3D 10/12. Beaumont wrote that in April 1959, there were more than one thousand regroupments but that five months later, despite Delouvrier's order that there be no new regroupments, there were thirteen hundred to fourteen hundred, housing 1.2 million people.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 155–56. Geoffrey Adams provides a fuller analysis of Beaumont's report, including his supplemental materials that depicted the military's psychological conditioning of the regrouped populations.

[43] Transcript of Geoffrey Adams's interviews with Jacques Beaumont, 2. Cimade archives.

[44] "Procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil du novembre 16, 1959," Cimade archives. Beaumont stressed that Cimade's distributions needed to be different from those of the SAS in that Cimade was in no way representing the French government or colonial interests.

The aid came mostly from the "SOS" program, which provided American surplus wheat through the Church World Service, although Pastor Boegner and Mgr Rodhain were also working to secure donations of wheat and dairy products from the French government as well as private donations from their joint appeals.[45] The material goods were distributed through Cimade teams, Secours catholique volunteers, Protestant missionaries, and Reformed Church parishes who were willing to participate. Beaumont hoped that the distribution of aid in the camps would finally force the Protestant *pied-noir* community to become more aware of the striking material inequalities that existed in French Algeria.[46] By April 1960, Cimade was distributing aid at eighty-five sites with the help of a full-time staff member named Philippe Jordan who oversaw the distributions. By June 1960, there were more than four hundred people involved in the distributions.[47] Jordan coordinated the division of hundreds of tons of clothing, food, vitamins, and various other goods to the camps, working with Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, French officials, and even SAS officers who agreed to work under Cimade's leadership.

At the same moment, three more Cimade team members – all young women – arrived in Algeria and were setting up more permanent quarters in the camp called Sidi Naâmane near Médéa. In an interview with the historian Geoffrey Adams, Jacques Beaumont referred to the center in Sidi Naâmane as an attempt to be in the regroupment camps in that the team members lived among the population, just as Cimade had done in the internment camps of southern France during World War II. The young women worked particularly with the Algerian women and children. Having team members live full time in the camps, Cimade's leaders hoped, would allow their organization to speak with more authority about camp conditions and serve the people in a more useful way than simply by "throwing holy water" on the situation.[48]

By mid-1960, however, Cimade's position in Algeria had shifted with the arrival of Jean Carbonare, a pacifist engineer who was in charge of organizing new Cimade projects in the Constantinois. In the early 1950s, Carbonare had been an activist for working-class North African immigrants in the Besançon region of France. His experiences there had made him a supporter of Algerian self-determination.[49] In 1956, his reputation for

45 Ibid.
46 J. Beaumont, "Les Regroupements en Algerie," Cimade archives/3D 10/12.
47 "Procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil de la Cimade du 27 avril 1960; Procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil de la Cimade du 27 Juin 1960," Cimade archives.
48 Geoffrey Adams's interview with Jacques Beaumont, 24, Cimade archives.
49 Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 58.

closeness with the Algerian population in France caught the attention of Prime Minister Guy Mollet, who sent him on a confidential mission to the Aurès region of Algeria to make contact with FLN leaders and find out their conditions for a cease-fire.[50] The conditions were evidently unacceptable to the French government, but Carbonare maintained close ties with the FLN. In 1958, an anticolonial minister named Robert Buron, who often worked closely with Cimade, sent Carbonare to resume his discussions with Algerian leaders, although this time in Tunis, and the newly formed Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA).[51] In 1960, Carbonare arrived in Algeria to oversee the Cimade programs. When he got there, he found a distressing situation with the distribution of aid: destitute Algerians were fighting over goods, creating a culture of what he viewed as charity and dependency. His solution was to start a reforestation program that helped address some of the environmental degradation caused by more than a century of deforestation and the French army's use of chemical weapons during the war.[52] It also gave Algerians work to do in exchange for which they received Cimade's aid.[53]

Carbonare's connections with the FLN and the GPRA were advantageous for Cimade, especially toward the end of the war. Jacques Beaumont was in constant negotiation with French officials, including pro-*Algérie française* SAS and military officers, to gain access to regroupment camps and sites in Algeria. Simultaneously, he and other team members in France were secretly working with the French Federation of the FLN. In the mid-1950s, Cimade had begun investing key resources in its prison ministry, which had two women chaplains running it: Tania Metzel and Jacqueline Peyron. In prisons in France, Cimade made contact with the FLN leaders who were there. These included "the Five" who were captured in 1956 (Ben Bella, Khider, Aït Ahmed, Boudiaf, and Lachraf) as well as Salah Louanchi and Mohamed Sahnoun, who had been one of the Algerian defendants tried with the "progressivist" Christians in Algiers in 1957. After 1960, Marc Boegner was also able to get Jacques Beaumont access to several of the major prisons and prison camps in France as a prison chaplain, using Cimade's World War II experiences in these same camps as the reason he should

[50] Ibid., 58–59.
[51] Ibid., 135.
[52] On the environmental degradation of the French colonial regime, see Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome*. On the French use of chemical weapons, including napalm, during the Algerian War, see Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence*, 149–52.
[53] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 209.

be allowed in.[54] Through the prison ministry and people like Carbonare, the FLN learned that Cimade was sympathetic to the Algerian cause, and they began asking Beaumont to help improve conditions in the prisons. In one striking example, Beaumont arranged through the French Interior Ministry that, on their release at the end of the war, Algerian political prisoners would receive clothing and a sum of 15,000 francs, which would be paid through Cimade but financed secretly by the French Federation of the FLN.[55]

With the exception of Jean Carbonare and likely a few close confidants, no one within Cimade or the French Protestant Federation knew about Beaumont's connections to the FLN or the GPRA. He could hide his actions because the majority of his time was spent working with politicians to secure Cimade access to sites by depicting it as an apolitical, humanitarian organization. There were some within Cimade who were frustrated by the refusal of French Protestants to take a political stand on the conflict, including François de Seynes, who wrote a document in 1960 for the directors in which he argued that

> Cimade team members are engaged not only in aid work but in preparing to live together, in a situation where everyone finds themselves associated with one another, in one way or another. The Church, we think, cannot content itself with standing up against abuses. All Algerians should be given the right to freely choose their destiny. For Christians, this destiny can be nothing other than reconciliation. Christians have to talk louder and stronger to ask the head of state and the government to disregard those interests, ambitions, blindnesses that are as dangerous as they are sincere, but also to take into account the inequalities of culture, fortune, power and the complexes that they incite, and consequently to: a) do more than they currently are to obtain the end of combat by negotiation . . . b) do more than they currently are to guarantee the honesty of these consultations – perhaps through an appeal for international aid; c) assure the good faith and disinterest of common studies that will be done between the cease-fire and the consultations for how Algerians can live together.[56]

For Cimade team members in both France and Algeria, their work on the ground toward reconciliation necessitated French and *pied-noir* recognition of the injustices that they had committed against the Algerian people.

[54] Geoffrey Adams's interview with Jacques Beaumont, 8–9, 14, Cimade archives.

[55] Ibid., 13. Beaumont also met secretly in Geneva with high-ranking members of the Croissant-rouge as well as visiting members of the GPRA from Tunis.

[56] F. de Seynes, "Notes sur l'Algérie pour l'Equipe de Direction de la Cimade," Cimade archives, 3D10/11.

It also required concrete efforts toward remedying the problem, beginning with the basic humanitarian efforts in the regroupment camps and shantytowns. Cimade team movements in Algeria were facilitated by Jacques Beaumont's good relations both with French colonial authorities and with the GPRA. But for the increasingly radicalized pro–*Algérie française* population, Cimade's sympathies toward the Algerian civilians were seen as working against the interest of French Algeria. By 1961, Cimade team members were increasingly targets of the *ultras*.

The Fall of the Fourth Republic and the Rise of the OAS

De Gaulle accepted full emergency powers from the French National Assembly on June 1, 1958, and flew to Algiers three days later. There he gave his famously ambiguous speech in which he stated to the enthusiastic crowd: "Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you).[57] He immediately took up the Algerian problem, and for a little while at least the French and *pied-noir* populations seemed satisfied that order would be restored. However, de Gaulle did not prove to be the great savior of French Algeria that its partisans hoped he would be. His main goal was indeed the restoration of French honor and global prestige. By the summer of 1959, de Gaulle had come to the conclusion that maintaining French Algeria had become too much of a liability for France, and that the political solution in Algeria should be decided through self-determination.[58]

In his September 16, 1959, speech to the nation, de Gaulle offered the Algerians the opportunity to choose their own "political destiny" and acknowledged three possible choices: secession, integration, or association.[59] Whereas the majority of the French population grew to support de Gaulle's position, this was not the case in Algeria. Martin Evans writes that the European community there was devastated by de Gaulle's speech. The French military and the *ultras* were even more unsettled and angered by de Gaulle's about-face, which they saw as a deep betrayal.[60] In early 1960, a group of *ultras* that included a bar owner, Joseph Ortiz, and a young medical student named Jean-Jacques Susini staged a dramatic insurrection against the French government, with the complicity of several military officers, including two of General Massu's most trusted subordinates.

[57] Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 173–74.
[58] Ibid., 179–80.
[59] Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 344–45.
[60] Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 269.

This event, which is known as the Semaine des barricades (Barricades Week), was set off by the recall of General Massu, who had made extremely critical remarks about President de Gaulle to a West German journalist. On January 24, the *ultras* seized buildings and built barricades in central Algiers hoping to force General Challe and the French military to fire on them and essentially start a revolution.[61] For a week the *ultras* fought the gendarmes and the paras in a bloody guerrilla street fight in Algiers, resulting in the deaths of fourteen gendarmes and eight insurgents.[62] Ultimately, their revolution was unsuccessful. As the gendarmes closed in, Ortiz fled and Lagaillarde and Susini were arrested and put on trial along with several other *ultras*; those military officers who were complicit in the insurrection were relieved of their duties.[63]

By 1960, Mgr Duval was struggling to calm passions, particularly as events like Barricades Week further divided the Christian community and broadened the separation between the Christian and Muslim communities. Duval took a controversial stand, however, when he refused to allow a Mass to be said specifically for those who had died in the Barricades insurrection, citing unmet canonical requirements for an open-air Mass.[64] As he explained in a letter to General Representative (délégué-général) Paul Delouvrier, he did "not favor the proliferation of ceremonies that are both patriotic and religious."[65] Because of this stance, he received an anonymous letter of protest from someone who signed it "A Catholic, among others." The writer stated that Duval's actions were "sad and scandalous" and that Duval "no longer had any respect and consideration among many faithful who, fortunately, still make a distinction between you [Duval] and their faith."[66] Duval also had to deal with the fact that several members of the Catholic clergy had more or less openly declared their support for the Barricades insurgents. He responded with a letter to the clergy that stated:

[61] Ibid., 270–76.

[62] Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, 206. There were also 123 wounded gendarmes and 20 wounded insurgents.

[63] Ibid., 207. Ortiz was sentenced to death *in absentia*; Susini received a two-year suspended sentence; and Lagaillarde, who had jumped bail and fled to Spain before the trial began, was sentenced to ten years in prison, *in absentia*. All three benefited from the amnesty that President de Gaulle proclaimed for all former imprisoned or exiled OAS militants in 1968.

[64] Duval, *Au nom de la vérité*, 122.

[65] Letter from Mgr Duval to Paul Delouvrier, February 2, 1960, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.

[66] Anonymous letter to Mgr Duval, February 7, 1960, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.

> More than ever it is necessary that the priest be exclusively a "man of God"; instead of participating in the passions that agitate in the human masses in diverse directions, he should brighten spirits, comfort hearts, and pacify souls . . . We should not follow our faithful but guide them . . . In the torment that rocks Algeria, the role of the Church is to proclaim, time and time again, the good news . . . to "kill the hate," to "make the peace," to "reconcile" spirits, and to make "of two peoples one people," "one body" (Ephesians II, 14).[67]

He added that there were to be no special religious services like the Mass for the Barricades deceased, as they had had obvious political intentions and that anyone inquiring about such services was to be informed that they were forbidden.[68]

In January 1961 – apparently to mark the anniversary of the Barricades – two young *pieds-noirs* stabbed the Catholic lawyer Pierre Popie to death outside his office in Algiers. Popie was himself a *pied-noir* who had been one of the founding members of the AJAAS as well as one of the main attorneys defending the "progressivist" Christians during their trial in 1957. He was therefore marked as an ally of the FLN and an enemy of French Algeria. Popie's assassins would go on to join the newly founded OAS. The acronym "OAS" first appeared on the walls of Algiers on February 27, 1961, and in a tract dated March 1 that called on "French of any origin" to "work together, arms in hand, against the abandonment of French Algeria."[69] Jean-Jacques Susini and Pierre Lagaillarde, members of the extreme far-right movement that had been developing in Algeria in the late 1950s, formally organized one section of the OAS in Madrid in February 1961. Simultaneously, a clandestine movement slowly organized in Algeria, primarily in Oran, linking civilian activists with their radical military counterparts, including General Salan.[70]

[67] Circular to the clergy, no. 41, March 5, 1960, in Duval, *Au nom de la vérité*, 125–26.

[68] Ibid.

[69] G. Pervillé, "OAS, le terrorisme du désespoir," in "Algérie, 1954–1962, la dernière guerre des Français," special issue, *Science et Vie* (2004): 95.

[70] A.-M. Duranton-Crabol, *Le temps de l'OAS* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1995), 18–21, 27. Drawing on the timeline initially established by the historian Raoul Girardet, who was also a key player in the events, Duranton-Crabol writes that there were four phases to the development of the OAS, not including the movement of the extreme Right that had been developing in Algeria since the mid-1950s, in particular around the "*poujadistes*" who organized the May 1958 coup attempt that brought de Gaulle back to power. Duranton-Crabol's source is an anonymous edited collection of OAS documents titled "OAS parle," whose author was later revealed to be Girardet.

Yves Courrière describes the OAS mentality as one that believed that "those who 'collaborated' with the Arabs were more detestable than the FLN or the communists . . . From now on it was war. The FLN, that is the Arabs, killed. So, we must kill. The strongest wins . . . and stays."[71] From 1961 until the end of the Algerian War, Christians like Pierre Popie who were seen to be in any way sympathetic to Algerian independence had more to fear from the partisans of French Algeria than from the French military or security forces. In particular, members of the OAS began to target these Christians in their desperate attempts to remove potential threats to French Algeria.[72]

With the formation of the OAS in early 1961, Mgr Duval appeared to be losing his moral authority over the Catholics of Algeria. One anonymous OAS pamphlet addressed to other *pied-noir* Christians from the "Christians of Algeria" attempted to convince them that taking up the fight for French Algeria was, in fact, the "Christian" thing to do, and that "non-violence is more of a Buddhist concept than a Christian one."[73] The author argued:

> In any case, all moralists recognize that a legitimate form of violence, a recourse to the impetuous force that is the right of all victims of unjust aggression, is the right to legitimate defense . . . if the Algerian people [*pieds-noirs*], feeling on the verge of being delivered up to congolization and communism, don't use right now their sacred right to legitimate collective defense . . . it will one day have to use its right to legitimate individual defense and it will be far more bloody.[74]

Historians have noted that the OAS had massive public support among the *pied-noir* population in Algeria. Indeed, it is clear that by late 1961, the arguments of people like Mgr Duval and Jean Scotto who were calling for peace and a more fraternal and just attitude toward the growing conflict were being drowned out and, at times, even violently rejected.[75]

In addition to their use of nationalist tropes and claims about justice for the settler cause, the OAS's consistent declarations that it was acting in defense of "Christian values" must have played well with the European settler population. Several of the most prominent leaders of the OAS

[71] Y. Courrière, *La Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 2:901.

[72] Duranton-Crabol, *Le temps de l'OAS*, 151. Pierre Popie was assassinated on January 25, 1961, in Algiers.

[73] "Lettre de Chrétiens d'Algérie," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 261.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, 216–18.

Mai 58

Catholiques et Français !

● Vous, qui croyez encore qu'il faut « *servir l'Eglise et non pas s'en servir* », avez-vous pensé au danger redoutable que représenterait pour notre pays et la chrétienté tout entière le succès des thèses et des hommes soutenus par *Témoignage Chrétien* ?

● Vous, qui croyez que chacun d'entre nous est un soldat du Christ et de la France, vous, qui savez que depuis les *gesta Dei per Francos* le Christ et la France connaissent ensemble le triomphe ou la défaite

allez-vous supporter plus longtemps LES PROVOCATIONS

de ceux qui viennent, souvent jusque dans nos églises, propager les mots d'ordre de la trahison sous prétexte de *Témoignage Chrétien* ?

● Vous, qui avez lu Karl Marx et Mao-Tse-Toung, n'avez-vous pas encore perçu cette évidence que *Témoignage Chrétien* procède à l'application méthodique et hebdomadaire de leurs **principes stratégiques** et que **c'est par l'action de ce poison** que s'aboliront nos réflexes nationaux ? Vous, qui ne voulez pas que grandisse la rumeur qui naît déjà :

" LES CURÉS TRAHISSENT LA FRANCE "

n'estimez-vous pas urgent d'affirmer hautement votre réprobation à l'encontre de ce *Témoignage Chrétien* qui, prenant systématiquement parti pour les ennemis de la Patrie, entretient une équivoque dont souffrira tôt ou tard l'Eglise de France ?

Qu'est-ce qu'un Chrétien progressiste ?

« Je tiens à préciser dès l'abord, que je suis catholique, que je ne suis pas communiste... je collabore étroitement avec les communistes dans le combat politique, autrement dit, je suis ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui un chrétien progressiste. Que les communistes soient à la pointe du progressisme, cela est indéniable... Travailler au sein du progressisme, c'est admettre qu'à propos de chaque acte précis, on insistera sur ce qui se rapproche des autres progressistes, donc éminemment des communistes

Dans le présent et vu la place qu'occupent les communistes dans la politique française, il n'y a pas trois positions possibles ; il n'y en a que deux : on est avec ou contre eux. JE SUIS AVEC EUX. »

Professeur MANDOUZE

● Quant à nous, nous souvenant des profanateurs que Jésus chassa du Temple *(St Jean, II-14)*, nous poursuivrons sans faiblesse notre action patriotique et chrétienne, persuadés que l'immense majorité des fidèles partage notre conviction : c'est pour la France et pour la Foi que nous avons entrepris la lutte contre *Témoignage Chrétien*.

UN GROUPE DE CATHOLIQUES PATRIOTES

Écrivez dès aujourd hui votre protestation au Curé de votre paroisse, à l'Evêque de votre Diocèse, à toute autorité religieuse susceptible de s'opposer efficacement au scandale que constitue la trahison de la France sous le masque de la Religion.

FIGURE 4.1. "Lettre de chrétiens d'Algérie," OAS tract (no date); archives of the Archdiocese of Algiers, AAA/261. Reprinted with permission of the Archdiocese of Algiers.

emerged from far-right Catholic movements such as the Action française. Others were affiliated with groups like the Centre d'études supérieures de psychologie sociale (Center for the Study of Social Psychology, CESPS).[76] This organization was founded in 1956 and "proposed to train Christians in the struggle against Communism through the study (the motto of the Center is 'Know to Save') of Marxist-leninism."[77] Events such as the 1957 trial of the "progressivist" Christians and the trials of the *porteurs de valises* in France only solidified the long-standing charge from the Far Right and French military officials that leftist Christians were collaborating with communists and the FLN in the destruction of French Algeria. In an anonymous OAS tract titled "Who Is Salan?" (Qui est Salan?), the insurgent French general and OAS leader is described as having emerged victorious from the machinations of progressivists who collaborated with the FLN to bring back de Gaulle and destroy Algeria. Indeed, "his deep knowledge of Islam allows him to measure the attachment of Muslims to France . . . and he vows to fight to the death in defense of French Algeria."[78] Interestingly, in making the argument that Salan had "deep knowledge of Islam," the tract co-opted similar discourses that the so-called progressivists – the enemies of the OAS – used throughout the 1950s to push for a more socially engaged Christian-Muslim dialogue. In the case of the OAS, however, the supposed knowledge of the "Muslim mind" led to the conclusion that the Algerian population was fervently attached to France and gave further support to the OAS's raison d'être.

Christians and the Violent end of French Algeria

By early 1962, the French government was actively negotiating the peace settlement and the conditions for Algerian independence with the GPRA. Meanwhile, the OAS was stepping up its violent campaign to maintain French Algeria. Although the war was nearly over, some of the worst violence was still to come. Alastair Horne writes, "In less than a year the OAS had killed 2,350 people in Algeria, and wounded another 5,418; according

[76] On the OAS's ties to Catholic far-right movements, see A. Harrison, *Challenging De Gaulle: The O.A.S. and the Counterrevolution in Algeria, 1954–1962* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 32–33, 41; and Fouilloux, *Les Chrétiens francais entre guerre d'algerie et mai 1968*, 35–62.

[77] Report on the CESPS, no date, Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 261. On the connections between the CESPS and the OAS, see Duranton-Crabol, *Le temps de l'OAS*, 20.

[78] "Qui est Salan?," no date, Archives of the Archevêché d'Alger, casier 261.

to the calculations of Vitalis Cros, in the Algiers zone alone their activities over the last six months of the war had claimed three times as many civilian victims as had the FLN from the beginning of 1956 onwards; i.e. including the Battle of Algiers."[79]

On April 30, 1961, Mgr Duval addressed a statement that was to be read ex cathedra in Catholic churches throughout Algeria after the Generals' Putsch, the failed military coup in Algiers (April 21–26, 1961) in response to the positive referendum on Algerian self-determination earlier that year. In it, Duval engaged in a bit of spiritual scolding, writing: "The concern for truth obliges me however to proclaim – and I am happy and proud in my paternal love for you – that, despite the tragic circumstances and dangerous solicitations, the strays [*égarés*] who were prepared to use any means were only a feeble minority; in general, you persevered in the path of your Christian duty."[80] He also warned Catholics against following "false prophets," a blatant reference to the leaders of the putsch and the OAS. Some clergy, including one priest, refused to read the statement. Why should the OAS be seen as "strays," he asked, when they were the only ones attempting to defend Algeria from the "Muslim mass," which he claimed was a "band of fanatics" who would install a communist regime in Algeria.[81] In addition to this letter, Duval received a bizarre series of anonymous letters with the phrase "Once upon a time there was a bishop named 'pig,'" as well as death threats, including a letter from someone who wrote, "We are hesitating no longer. You will have a Beautiful Plastic Bomb."[82]

Protestant leaders in Algeria also seemed to watch with their hands tied as more and more of their parishioners joined the side of the OAS. In August 1961, the regional council of the Reformed Church in Algeria held a retreat to discuss the future of the church in Algeria, which included a series of reflections on how the church had responded to the Algerian crisis. Although the report that emerged acknowledged that the ERF in Algeria had major weaknesses, including "a perpetual tendency for self-justification, one of the causes for the bitterness in the dialogue between Christians in the metropole and Christians in Algeria," to a certain extent it continued this self-justification by arguing that the church was simply

[79] Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 531.
[80] Duval, *Au nom de la vérité*, 146.
[81] Letter from a "curé" [name withheld] to Mgr Duval, May 8, 1961, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.
[82] Anonymous letter to Mgr Duval, April 28, 1961, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.

"not prepared for this ordeal."[83] The fact that more and more parishioners were rejecting a peaceful reconciliation and the possibility of Algerian independence as the "Christian" solution to the Algerian problem was taken up only insofar as the report spoke to the human future of the church as one in which there might be many fewer Christians in Algeria. In October 1961, the FPF met in France to discuss the situation in Algeria. The federation issued a message to Protestants in Algeria announcing its support for those who wished to leave, although encouraging as many as possible to stay. At its November meeting, the regional synod of the ERF in Algeria restated that those who had "profound motives of Christian vocation" should remain in Algeria, if possible.[84]

Some pastors, like Elisabeth Schmidt in Blida, did attempt to get their parishioners to see reason with regards to the OAS and to the growing violence in Algeria. During the Generals' Putsch in Algiers in 1961, she told her parishioners that she did not think that the solution the *pieds-noirs* most desired – that Algeria should remain French – was the best one.[85] By early 1962, the leaders of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie (ERA), the Algerian synod of the ERF, seem to have been paralyzed. They even refused to participate in a communal call for peace from the "spiritual leaders" of Algeria that would have included Mgr Duval, the Grand Rabbi, and the Grand Hanafite and Malekite Muphtis. They refused in order to avoid what they called theological and political "ambiguities."[86] In a letter of explanation to Mgr Duval, Max-Alain Chevallier, the president of the regional council of the ERA, explained that until the day that the crimes were occurring mostly on one side only, a communal declaration would not be "rigorously justified on religious grounds." There was also clearly some hesitation about further alienating the Christian population. As Chevallier noted, "I would dread, in any case, for me to be the cause of the hardening of the faithful, rather than their guide to salutary repentance."[87] For the ERA then, the OAS was a problem that they would not face head on. However, it would not go away.

[83] "La Mission de l'Église en Algérie. Journées d'information – 13–14 août 1961," Cimade archives/3D 10/11.

[84] "Rapport présenté au Synode Régional d'Algérie par le président du conseil régional, le 18 novembre 1961," BSHP/Fonds privés du Pasteur Nicolas/028y.

[85] Schmidt, *J'étais pasteur en Algérie*, 127.

[86] "Relations extérieurs," Report for the Conseil Régional de l'Église Réformée en Algérie, April 1962, BSHP/Fonds privés du Pasteur Nicolas/028y.

[87] Letter from Max-Alain Chevallier to Mgr Duval, April 19, 1962, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 309.

The function of OAS bombs was, according to Anne-Marie Duranton-Crabol, one of "threat and intimidation," but in the end they did not dissuade those against whom they were aimed.[88] When some OAS members entered Cimade's offices in Algiers in May 1962 and announced that they were going to bomb the building if Cimade did not depart Algeria immediately, the Cimade team refused to leave. Nevertheless, they did take the threat seriously enough to clear out of the offices and lay low for several days.[89] Neither threats against people like Jean Scotto nor bombs set in churches were enough to intimidate the "liberal" or "progressivist" Christians into doing the bidding of the OAS. As the violence grew more frenetic through 1961 and into 1962, however, the OAS did succeed in drawing more and more *pieds-noirs* into its orbit, including many Christians who might at one point have stood behind people like Mgr Duval or Scotto.

In anticipation of the announcement of the cease-fire in March 1962, Algeria exploded into violence.[90] The OAS programmed specific days of killing in which they targeted specific segments of the population, such as pharmacy technicians and Algerian cleaning ladies, among others.[91] One of the groups that the OAS had in its sights was the Centres sociaux, which OAS members believed were completely infiltrated by the FLN.[92] On March 15, 1962, in one of the most dramatic and tragic events of the war, an OAS commando squad walked into a meeting of six inspectors of the Centres sociaux éducatifs; they then ushered the inspectors into the courtyard, where they forced them against the wall and opened fire. Among the six dead was the Algerian novelist Mouloud Feraoun, who had been one of the most vocal advocates for a peaceful rapprochement between the French and Algerian communities in Algeria.[93] The point of this "blind terrorism," Rémi Kauffer argues, was to provoke the FLN into retaliating, because the Algerians had been holding firmly to the cease-fire agreement. The OAS leader Jean-Claude Pérez said, "We knew that the Arabs were saying to the FLN: do something, we can't even leave our homes without the risk of being killed! We wanted to leave the Muslims

[88] Duranton-Crabol, *Le temps de l'OAS*, 142.

[89] Letter from Philippe Jordan to Jacques Beaumont, May 31, 1962, Cimade archives/3D 18/3 (DZ06 (v)).

[90] Duranton-Crabol, *Le temps de l'OAS*, 146.

[91] Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, 250.

[92] On the OAS vendetta against the Centres sociaux, see Le Sueur, *Uncivil War*, 90–92.

[93] See M. Feraoun, *Journal, 1955–1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War*, trans M. E. Wolf and C. Fouillade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).

to each other, without supplies, without doctors. To give them a taste of independence."[94] In early June, in anticipation of the referendum on independence scheduled for July 1, the OAS announced "Operation Scorched Earth." They launched the operation with a brutally symbolic act: the OAS set fire to the library of the University of Algiers, burning more than six hundred thousand books.[95]

Although Mgr Duval had the support of the Vatican and the ACA, both of which supported the cease-fire and attempts to calm the violence, his pleas to the Christian community in Algeria did little to shift their support from the OAS or convince them that Algerian independence was not a betrayal of the Christian identity of Algeria.[96] This was particularly the situation in Oran, where Mgr Lacaste, who had always been a strong supporter of *Algérie française*, refused to print Duval's statements in favor of peace in the *Semaine religieuse d'Oran*. He also maintained an obvious silence regarding the violence of the OAS and its arguments that it was defending Christian civilization in Algeria.[97] The OAS was just as brutal in Oran as elsewhere; its "scorched earth" policy resulted in the destruction of schools, infrastructure, hospitals, and the port reservoirs of British Petroleum, in addition to numerous human casualties.[98] Oran was the site of the worst violence in Algeria in the days after independence, particularly the infamous July 5 FLN exactions on the European population there.[99] Even when Mgr Lacaste did make a statement on the events, his comments did little to calm the tensions. In André Nozière's estimation, "By his blunt pronouncements and the enormous weight of his silences, the Bishop of Oran leaves the image of a Christianity closed off from the rest of the world."[100]

94 R. Kauffer, *L'O.A.S., Histoire d'une organization secrète* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 286.

95 Ibid., 296.

96 Fouilloux, *Les chrétiens français entre guerre d'Algérie*, 23. The ACA statement from the end of March 1962 seemed to condemn the OAS, or those who "croyant même servir la civilisation chrétienne et liant indûment leur foi à leurs vues propres, cèdent à la tentation de la force matérialiste qui détruit [believing that they are serving Christian civilization and unduly linking their faith to their own views, yield to the temptation of the materialistic force, which destroys]."

97 Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 119.

98 Duranton-Crabol, *Le temps de l'OAS*, 217.

99 Ibid., 214. Duranton-Crabol cites approximately five hundred to two thousand victims, a figure that comes from J. Hureau, "La mémoire rapatriée," in *La France en guerre d'Algérie*, ed. L. Gervereau, J.-P. Rioux, and B. Stora (Nanterre: Éditions BDIC, 1992), 284.

100 Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 120.

As the OAS and the FLN signed a tentative accord, the massive exodus of the *pieds-noirs* in June of 1962 marked the end of French Algeria. The agreement provided some relief to many of the *pieds-noirs*, partly because it ended OAS intimidation of those who were seeking to leave Algeria for France.[101] The *pieds-noirs* who left did so in a spirit of anger and great frustration. Most of them were able to take only a few suitcases of belongings to a country where they had never lived before, and where many had no roots at all. Their reasons for leaving included "bitterness," "fear of bloody reprisals," "fear for the future," and "finding shelter for women and children." According to Anne-Marie Duranton-Crabol, it was less the content of the Evian Accords (the Franco-Algerian treaty that ended the war) than a growing belief that the struggle to keep Algeria French had become futile that convinced many that they should just give up and go.[102] Some left because they feared Algerian reprisals. These did occur, but as Sylvie Thénault points out, the violence against Europeans at the end of the war was nowhere near the level of the violence inflicted by the OAS.[103] By and large, only those Europeans who were convinced that a productive relationship between the French and Algerian communities was possible in the future, or those who had no possible means to leave, stayed in Algeria.

The Algerian War tragically ended much more violently than it began. The achievement of Algerian independence also meant the abrupt departure of the majority of Algeria's European settler population. The ironic tragedy for those Christians who had spent the war working toward rapprochement between the Christian and Muslim populations was that this departure both demonstrated the limits of that dream and provided Christians in Algeria the opportunity to rethink their position in postcolonial Algeria. This was the occasion for Christians to prove to the Algerians that they were no longer tied to the colonial regime and the colonial church, but were instead there to serve the Algerian people through service and dialogue. The departure of the *pieds-noirs* was for many Christians a devastating disappointment, which Jean Scotto and others blamed directly on the violent tactics of the OAS, who, Scotto said, "killed the soul of my people."[104] Many of the *pieds-noirs* fled precisely to escape the OAS violence, but the situation was more complex for others. Despite a carefully negotiated settlement between the French government and the Algerian

[101] Duranton-Crabol, *Le temps de l'OAS*, 225.
[102] Ibid., 224–25.
[103] Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, 252.
[104] Scotto, *Curé pied noir*, 177.

provisional government that guaranteed the settlers protection for their property and nondiscrimination in language, political, cultural, and religious affairs, many of these agreements would evolve or become quite complicated in the postcolonial setting.[105]

[105] Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 520–21.

CHAPTER 5

Inventing Postcolonial Christianity

The standard narrative of Algerian independence has emphasized the rupture between the exiled *pied-noir* population, and the victorious Algerian revolutionaries, who threw off the yoke of French colonialism in what came to be seen around the world as the model of a successful Third World revolution.[1] Yet despite a widespread belief, even among historians, that all of the European population of Algeria fled the country at independence, whether because of fear of violent reprisals or a concerted plot by the FLN to push them out, in July 1962, at the moment of Algerian independence, somewhere between two and three hundred thousand of the nearly one million Europeans who lived in Algeria before 1962 remained there.[2] Among them were many thousands of European Christians – both Catholics and Protestants – who saw Algerian independence as an opportunity for a fresh start for Christianity in Algeria. For those Christians who remained and the influx of volunteers from abroad – the *coopérants* – who came to rebuild the country, Algerian independence offered an opportunity both to

[1] On narratives of Algerian independence, see G. Pervillé, *Pour une historie de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Picard, 2002). On *pied-noir* victimhood, see Eldridge, "Blurring the Boundaries between Perpetrators and Victims," 123–36. On the question of Algeria and Third World revolution, see T. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 1; R. Malley, *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and J. J. Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: From the Algerian Front of the Third World's Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[2] The American Embassy in Algiers from March 1963 cites the figure 210,000, a number given to them by a French embassy official: Airgram no. A-438 from the US Embassy in Algiers to the Department of State, March 12, 1963; Box 3810; Subject-numeric files; General Records of the Department of State, RG 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereafter USNA). See also Daum, *Ni valise ni circueil*, 41. Daum puts the number at 312,900, a figure taken from the French consul general in Algiers from August 1962.

decolonize the church and to separate themselves from the legacy of French colonialism.[3]

But the legacy of colonialism did not disappear overnight. Certainly, the postindependence ideal for someone like Frantz Fanon, whose experience in Algeria had led him to write canonic postcolonial texts such as *The Wretched of the Earth*, was a violent removal of the settler population. The Algerians, however, could not simply "do away" with the colonizers, particularly because Algeria needed to retain white-collar workers with the technical expertise that its undereducated population lacked. Under the terms of the Evian Accords, the Franco-Algerian treaty that ended the Algerian War of Independence, this problem was addressed with a new policy of "*coopération*," what Jeffrey Byrne has described as "a postcolonial partnership between the former colonizer and the formerly colonized."[4] Seen as a victory for France in its attempt to retain influence in its former colonies and gain a foothold in the Third World, "cooperation" entailed an influx of primarily French "experts" in various fields, including education, agriculture, medicine, and industry, who went to Algeria on short-term contracts to fill gaps and train Algerians to rebuild their country. These experts – or *coopérants* – were in most instances young, idealistic volunteers who saw an opportunity to make up for their country's bad behavior under colonialism. Because of their leftist profile and enthusiasm for Algeria's

[3] In September 1965 the French embassy in Algeria reported that in 1964 there were approximately 89,000 practicing Catholics in Algeria, divided among four dioceses, and down from a population of approximately 800,000 before Algerian independence. See "L'Eglise catholique en Algérie," Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Ambassade de France à Alger, 21PO/3/1/ALG.3/55, Nantes, France. Père Denis Gonzalez estimates that in 1967 there were only around 2,500–3,000 practicing Christians out of a population of 50,000–60,000 foreign residents in Algeria. Before 1962, the Algerian synod of the French Reformed Church (ERF), the largest Protestant denomination in France, comprised 6,000 members; however, there appear to be no post-1962 statistics on the Protestant population of Algeria. On the number of indigenous Algerian Christians, there is even less information. A 1988 article by Jacques Lanfry, a Père Blanc who lived for decades in Berber areas of North Africa, noted that a 1955 pastoral report for the Catholic Church in Algeria listed 230 Christian families (940 persons) in the Algiers region, and approximately 300 others in their villages of origin in Kabylia. Lanfry added that there was an estimated diaspora of 4,000–6,000 Berber Christians living in France but that no one knows the exact figure. For the 1967 figure, see D. Gonzalez, "L'Église dans l'Algérie indépendante," in *Histoire des chrétiens d'Afrique du Nord*, ed. H. Teissier (Paris: Desclée, 1991), 237; for the Lanfry article, see J. Lanfry, "Centenaire de la communauté des chrétiens originaires de Kabylie, mai 1888–mai 1988," in *Trente ans de diaspora des chrétiens d'Afrique du Nord (1966–1996)* (Paris: Editions Ibis Press, 1997), 83–91.

[4] J. J. Byrne, "Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009): 428.

new socialist experiment, many of them gained the moniker *pieds-rouges* (red feet).[5] Among the *pieds-rouges* were leftist Catholics, many of whom were members of Catholic Scout movements or of groups such as the Little Brothers and Little Sisters of Jesus in France, and Protestants, including new Cimade team members.[6]

Algeria at independence became a site of experimentation: the creation of a new nation, born from the ruins (sometimes literally) of the colonial regime. Just as Algerians struggled to forge an Algerian identity in the midst of competing narratives of revolutionary and nonaligned socialism, Third Worldism, and their Islamic heritage, the European Christian population found its own identity politics to be no less complicated.[7] For instance, European settlers who chose to remain in Algeria after independence became known as *pieds-verts* (green feet), in reference to their support for the new country and its green, white, and red flag, although some claim that it was an allusion to their sympathy for Islam.[8] Enthusiastic *pieds-rouges* tended to view all European settlers through the same negative lens, one that was tainted by OAS violence in both France and Algeria. They clashed with Christian *pieds-verts*, who resented the *coopérants*' lack of experience and historical awareness of the situation in Algeria. Meanwhile, both groups found themselves engaged in a global dialogue on the future of Christianity after decolonization that was taking place within the Second Vatican Council and the Protestant World Council of Churches.

[5] Although there is an overlap between *coopérants* and *pieds-rouges*, all *coopérants* were not necessarily *pieds-rouges*. See J.-R. Henry and J.-C. Vatin, eds., *Le temps de la coopération: Sciences sociales et décolonisation au Maghreb* (Paris: Karthala, 2012). On the history of *coopérants*, see P. C. Naylor, *France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 63. Naylor cites a French government document putting the number of *coopérants* at 25,000 in 1962. On the *pieds-rouges*, see C. Simon, *Algérie, les années pieds-rouges: Des rêves de l'indépendance au désenchantement, 1962–1969* (Paris: Découverte, 2009).

[6] On the Little Brothers and Little Sisters of Jesus and their influence in Algeria, see Chapter 1.

[7] See, for example, J. McDougall, "Martyrdom and Destiny: The Inscription and Imagination of Algerian History," in *Memory and Violence in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. U. Makdisi and P. A. Silverstein (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 50–72; N. Vince, *Our Fighting Sisters: Nation, Memory, and Gender in Algeria, 1954–2012* (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester Press, 2015); E. McAllister, "Nation-Building Remembered: Social Memory in Contemporary Algeria" (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2015).

[8] On the label *pieds-verts*, see É. Savarese, "After the Algerian War: Reconstructing Identity among the *Pieds-noirs*," *International Social Science Journal* 58 (September 2006): 457–66; Benjamin Nickels claims that the label indicates sympathy for Islam in B. Nickels, "Unsettling French Algeria," (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2007), 77.

Algerian independence thus led neither, as many exiled *pieds-noirs* had predicted, to the destruction of the European population that remained nor, as many had feared, to violence directed at Christians and Jews. Nonetheless, the European population in Algeria after independence could not escape the bitter history of settler colonialism.

Yet the legacy of the war was not entirely negative, as it was the actions of those Christians who supported the Algerians in their fight for independence that, in many ways, secured the future of Christianity in postcolonial Algeria. For the Christians who remained in Algeria, and for those who arrived as *coopérants*, the period after independence offered a chance to reconsider the role of the church in Algeria. For an institution so deeply tied to colonialism, it was necessary, these Christians argued, to decolonize the church. In the context of postindependence Algeria, "decolonizing the church" meant attempting to reimagine how both the institutions and the practices of Christianity could function in Algeria without the settler population at the core of the church and without the colonial state's power guiding the church's engagement with the Muslim population. Also, it was necessary to rethink the role of Christians in Algeria in light of the War of Independence, as Christians on both sides of the conflict had invoked Christianity to defend their particular moral and political positions.

One key aspect of this process of decolonization involved Christian engagement in development projects. Although the French had already begun trying to "modernize" and "develop" Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly with the 1958 Constantine Plan as a last-ditch effort to regain Algerian support, the concept and practices of "development" were just coming into usage on the global stage, particularly by institutions like the World Council of Churches and the Vatican.[9] Cimade, which, beginning in 1959, dramatically increased its activities in Algeria through its involvement with the regroupment camps, became the model for Christian humanitarian and development projects in Algeria and beyond. The organization's work in the regroupment camps helped radicalize Cimade's political stance on Algeria. In addition, it was the origin of what became Cimade's long-term engagement in the social and economic development of Algeria after independence.

This chapter builds on the work of historians and theorists who have demonstrated the political and economic continuities between the colonial

[9] On French practices of "modernization" after World War II, see Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 27–32, and M. H. Davis, "Producing Eurafrica: Development, Agriculture and Race in Algeria, 1958–1965" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2015).

and postcolonial eras in the former European empires, as well as on the work of those who have questioned the absolutes of postcolonial ideologies, to explore how the transition from a colonial to a postcolonial society functioned on the ground.[10] By examining how European Christians negotiated the process of identity formation in postindependence Algeria, we can see that Christian attempts to "become Algerian" and decolonize the church were intertwined with global religious politics, economic necessities, cultural and religious anxiety, political power struggles, and, of course, Algeria's colonial past. Yet the continued presence of Christians in Algeria demonstrates that the standard narratives of postcolonial rupture between the European and Algerian populations do not hold up. For, in the early years of postindependence Algeria, European Christians played an active role in the construction of the postcolonial nation.

The end of the Algerian War also highlighted the extent to which decolonization and shifts in Christian thought affected Christianity on a global scale, as not only in France and Algeria were administrative changes occurring on the political front. After Pope John XXIII was elected in 1959, one of his first papal acts was to call a new council, which came to be known as the Second Vatican Council, or Vatican II.[11] Vatican II brought renewed energy to global Catholicism and a sense that the Catholic hierarchy was finally ready to address many of the church's major problems. These included the need for dialogue between Christians and non-Christians, the relationship of the Catholic Church to the modern world, and questions of social justice and human rights – all issues that Christians in France and Algeria had been trying to address for decades. A similar set of discussions and engagements occurred within the World Council of Churches in the early 1960s, as global Protestantism sought to reconcile its missionary past and Eurocentric structures with the reality of racial and social inequality in the postcolonial world. As this chapter demonstrates, those Christians in France and Algeria who had been working for years to rethink the role of

[10] For example, W. R. Louis and R. E. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22, no. 4 (September 1994): 462–511; works that have attempted to historicize or question the narrative of postcolonial theory and history include F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); D. Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); and R. Serrano, *Against the Postcolonial: "Francophone" Writers at the Ends of Empire* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005).

[11] Pope John XXIII announced his intention to call the Council on January 25, 1959, at an address to a small group of cardinals in Rome. See G. Alberigo and J. A. Komonchak, eds., *History of Vatican II* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995), 1:1–10.

the church in the modern world would suddenly become central figures in both local and global efforts to decolonize Christianity.

Decolonizing Christian Institutions: L'Église d'Algérie

By late 1961, Algerian independence appeared inevitable to everyone but the staunchest defenders of *Algérie française*. Clergy, members of religious orders, and staff of Catholic and Protestant aid organizations began preparing for the transition to independence and negotiating the possibilities of their role in an independent Algeria. The utopian vision of an independent Algeria in which Christians, Muslims, and Jews could live peacefully and in harmony was rapidly evaporating, however, as the country became engulfed in violence, much of it coming from the OAS. Although religious freedom was one of the protections that the French government negotiated for the *pieds-noirs* in the Evian Accords, Mgr Duval and other Christians were concerned enough about how Christians would fit into the new Algerian state to hold their own discussions with the GPRA on the future of Christianity in Algeria.

Despite the violent and tragic end of the war, Christians like Mgr Duval, Jean Scotto, and the Cimade *équipiers* had great faith that the relationship between the Christians who remained and the Algerian people would be a positive one. Just after the Evian Accords, Mgr Duval received a letter from "Capitaine Mohamed" of the FLN's Wilaya IV (Algiers). The captain announced that despite the colonial legacy of racism and humiliation, the Algerians regarded the Europeans as "creatures of God," and they condemned only "the minority of criminals of the OAS who sabotage the peace, strike the innocent, and prolong injustice and oppression." He noted that Mgr Duval had "deployed ardent efforts among Christians of this country" and expressed the hope that Duval would continue his appeals to reason. He also wanted Duval to believe that the FLN condemned racial and religious discrimination. In addition, he stated his wish that the Christian churches make an effort to engage with the FLN in Algeria to promote further rapprochement between "all the habitants of this country." In closing, he wrote, "We pray to God to put an end to this effusion of blood and to help those who struggle to make tolerance, liberty, justice, and peace flourish in this country."[12]

[12] Letter from "Capitaine Mohamed" to Mgr Duval, March 26, 1961 [seems to be wrong handwritten date based on letter's context; it is more likely from March 1962], Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 261.

In July 1961, while accompanying a group of pilgrims from Algiers to Lourdes, Jean Scotto had made a short detour to Genoa, Italy, to meet secretly with Pierre Chaulet, his former parishioner. After leaving Algeria in 1957, Chaulet had joined the FLN in Tunis. Chaulet, as the representative of the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA), and Scotto, representing Mgr Duval, met to discuss the future of the Catholic Church in Algeria after independence.[13] The discussions centered on a report that Chaulet had written in collaboration with two priests who had also joined the FLN in Tunisia – Abbé Alfred Bérenguer and Pierre Mamet, a Mission de France priest from the Souk-Ahras team.[14]

The report proposed three primary points of transformation for the Catholic Church in postindependence Algeria. First, it requested that the church return to the Algerian state all of the Islamic religious buildings that French Christians had taken over since the conquest, most notably the Ketchaoua Mosque in Algiers. Second, it encouraged the church not to fight for the confessional school as an essential institution of its existence or to oppose, for moral reasons, measures under national sovereignty (family planning, etc.). Finally, it suggested an eventual attachment of the church to the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, which would permit Arabic to become the liturgical language.[15] Although the Catholic hierarchy found the third point a step too far, the other two were already in line with the thinking of Mgr Duval and his more progressive clergy in their plans to transform the Église de France into the Église d'Algérie upon independence.[16]

In 1961, Louis Augros of the Mission de France drafted a document titled "Suggestions Relative to the Relations between Church and State in the Algeria of Tomorrow."[17] In it, Augros, who had been the first superior of the Mission de France seminary and a member of the MDF team that was expelled from Souk-Ahras in 1956, sought to respond to the challenges faced by the church in Algeria after independence. He was particularly concerned with the church's position as it transitioned to a situation in

[13] Malek, *L'Algérie à Évian*, 163.

[14] Ibid., 164.

[15] Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 241.

[16] Interview with Pierre Chaulet, February 23, 2009, Algiers, Algeria. Chaulet stated that whereas Père Scotto agreed to the first two conditions, his response to the third was "Now let's not go overboard," because a transition to the Eastern Orthodox Churches would entail both separation from the Roman tradition and the potential marriage of priests.

[17] L. Augros, "Suggestions relatives aux rapports entre l'Eglise et l'Etat dans l'Algérie de demain," CAMT/MDF/1997015 0172. Mgr Duval's annotated copy of the document also exists in his archives, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 280.

which its very existence in Algeria was a symbol of both its past ties to French colonialism and its potential for a radical new form of presence in a non-Christian country. Augros noted that "At first glance, the Church can give the impression that it is a body with a Western character that, under the direction of the Hierarchy, pursues a Western agenda."[18] Yet the reality was rather different, he argued. The hierarchy did not impose political views on its members but allowed them to freely choose their own engagements. "For wrong or for right," he stated, the church was interested in safeguarding the interests of the human person.[19] This is an oddly positive view of the Catholic hierarchy in light of Augros's own experience as head of the Mission de France during the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, his point was rather to insist that the postcolonial church in Algeria would not be controlled by a colonial agenda, particularly one coming from Rome or from a French-controlled episcopate.

In terms of the concrete aspects of the relationship between church and state, Augros noted that the particularities of French law in some ways made the transition to Algerian independence fairly uncomplicated. He believed that it made the most sense to create equivalent accords with the Algerian government, excepting the cases of the mosques-turned-churches, which should be ceded outright to the Algerians.[20] The matter of the confessional schools was one that was directly related to the Catholic Church's missionary past, and one that Augros analyzed with some interest. Because many of the confessional schools were run by missionary orders uniquely for Muslims (the Sœurs blanches, for example), their future in Algeria was in question. Augros suggested that if these establishments were to continue, the training of priests and nuns would have to include language training in Arabic. The schools would also have to guarantee equal access to any student, regardless of their religion or status, and consider the possibility of being integrated into the governmental education ministry. Additionally, the church should openly recognize that previous religious authorities in these schools were not always doing the job they should have been doing.[21]

The major issue at stake for Christians, however, was the integration of the church into the life of Algeria after independence. Would it continue to be a symbol of colonialism or could it break free of those ties? Augros stressed that the previous colonial nature of the church in Algeria was

[18] Ibid., 2
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 3–4.
[21] Ibid., 6–8.

contrary to "the profound vocation of this Church of Christ, which was created for universality and which, for that end, wants to be integrated into the civilizations in the midst of which it wants to be planted." He concluded: "All in all, the Church wants to be Algerian in Algeria."[22] The way for the church to demonstrate this desire was by adopting the positions that its more conscientious members had taken since the outbreak of the Algerian conflict in 1954. The danger at independence, however, was that the church would start to become ghettoized. This, he maintained, would be a catastrophe for both the church and Algeria. Instead, the church needed to participate fully in the construction of the country, and be of service to the Algerian people.[23]

While Augros's document provides some evidence of the conversations taking place within the leadership of the Catholic Church over its future in postcolonial Algeria, in early 1961, Christian leaders still had very little sense of what level of support they could expect from a future Algerian government. However, later that year, when the GPRA sent its official letter to the bishops of Algeria, it declared:

> Never will we forget the understanding, the sympathy, and the support that we found, during the years of struggle, from the most conscious and authentic Christians, outside of Algeria, but also in Algeria. Nothing on earth would make us desire that these Christians do not feel at home with us. Finally, we are convinced that Christian values that are seriously lived in real-life can only increase the spiritual patrimony of our country.[24]

In this letter, the GPRA assured the bishops that even though the churches were losing their privileged position in society, Christians would have a place in Algeria where they "would feel free and respected." Various other important questions, like the future of confessional schools and of hospitals and dispensaries, as well as the issue of the right of association, were to be negotiated at a later date. The letter stated that the GPRA awaited the response of the Catholic Church to its proposals.[25] The significance of this document cannot be overstated, particularly because at the same time as this exchange of views and letters between Catholic leaders and the GPRA was taking place, the OAS had stepped up its murderous rampage against

[22] Ibid., 10.
[23] Ibid.
[24] "Memorandum du G.P.R.A. à N.N.S.S. les Évêques d'Algérie," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 280.
[25] Ibid.

FLN supporters, including Christians who were seen to be sympathetic to Algerian independence.

Just after independence, Mgr Duval gave an interview to Jean-François Kahn, a *Le Monde* correspondent in Algiers, in which he stated, "The Church in Algeria has chosen not to be foreign, but to be Algerian." These words earned him a number of critical comments from both theologians and Christians who argued that the church should have no nationality.[26] In a later interview with the journalist Marie-Christine Ray, Cardinal Duval explained what he had meant by his statement: he wanted everyone to know that the Catholic Church in Algeria was not going to be just a church for the embassies, in the sense that it was only for Catholics in transit, but that it would also be one that was "open to the population and to the realities of the country."[27] To achieve this goal, the dioceses were restructured and the hierarchy reconfigured so that the Église d'Algérie no longer depended on the French episcopate. For the most part, the religious orders maintained the status quo, as they had often had little to do with the *pied-noir* population in the first place. With the exception of laws governing education and the regulation of the social services and hospitals that the Catholic orders had run under the French colonial state, the status of the religious orders hardly changed at independence. The larger questions, as Louis Augros had noted, revolved around how the Catholic Church would be integrated into the Algerian nation. These concerns were very much tied to the legacy of the missionaries and colonialism and to the question of how to overcome that history.

The day after Algerian independence, Mgr Duval proposed to the Algerian authorities that the Catholic Church return to the new state all of the Catholic churches that had been mosques before French colonization. In doing so, the church would "demonstrate the warm feelings of the Church toward the Algerian nation and its desire to alleviate what could become a source of conflict."[28] The question of property transfers between the Catholic Church and the Algerian state had come up well before independence. It had been discussed during the various levels of inquiry and negotiation that emerged around 1961 with the announcement of the Evian Accords. Catholic leaders had also come to their own realization that a handover of particularly symbolic edifices would do much to

[26] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 162.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Letter from Mgr Giroud to M. Hervé Bourges, Directeur du Cabinet du Président du Conseil, October 23, 1962, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 472.

demonstrate the good faith of the Catholic Church toward the new Algerian state.[29] Yet because the 1905 law regarding the separation of church and state was applied unevenly in the French empire, and because most of the clergy and religious orders remained French rather than Algerian citizens, not just property transfers were at issue. Matters such as clerical salaries and the status of religious education and religious congregations also had to be ironed out with the Algerian (and to a certain extent with the French) authorities at independence.

Before independence, clerical salaries were for the most part paid through tithing, although the government contributed a living stipend for a significant number of parish curés. With the loss of the Catholic base, however, clerical salaries were potentially going to be greatly diminished, although for a few years at least the former *pied-noir* congregants were replaced with incoming *coopérants* from Catholic countries. Mgr Duval negotiated with the Algerian president Ahmed Ben Bella for the prolongation of the living stipend for clergy after independence, although this was later reserved only for those who took Algerian nationality.[30] As for the religious orders, until the nationalization and Arabization of the educational system in 1975, the salaries of members of the religious orders were in many instances guaranteed through their teaching positions.[31] Algerian independence left the Catholic Church in a position of financial dependence on the Algerian state, which meant that the church could not afford the upkeep on the significant number of properties that it had maintained in Algeria during the French colonial period. The exodus of the vast majority of the Catholic population meant that a great many parishes could be consolidated and much of the property of the church divested. The close relationship between the French state and the Catholic Church in Algeria during the colonial period made the question of property transfers fairly simple. Churches constructed before the 1905 law belonged to the communes and could therefore be

[29] "Note sur la cathédrale d'Alger," n.d., Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 472.

[30] Nozière, *Algérie: les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 155.

[31] The nationalization and Arabization process resulted in a significant diminution of the Catholic population in Algeria, as it forced the closing of Catholic schools there, many of which were staffed by religious orders. A few priests and nuns who had sufficient Arabic language training or technical skills needed in Algeria were integrated into the public education system, but the vast majority of religious of French nationality returned to France after 1975. See Telegramme de l'Ambassade de France à Alger à Diplomatie, A/S: Nationalisation des écoles privées, 22 June 1976, CADN, Ambassade de France à Alger, 21PO/3/1/ALG.4/57.

transferred directly from the French state to the Algerian state. It also meant that the Catholic Church itself owned comparatively little property.[32]

The most symbolic property transfer was that of the Cathédrale Saint-Philippe. This cathedral had been converted from a mosque to a church in 1832, and it was the seat of the archbishop of Algiers (meaning that a transfer to the Algerian authorities required the additional step of approval from Rome). It was located at the base of the casbah of Algiers, and by the summer of 1962, most of the Catholic population had left that area of the city, notably, the neighboring quarter of Bab el-Oued. On July 5, 1962, Algerian Independence Day, a crowd of young Algerians had attempted to enter the cathedral to hang an Algerian flag from its towers; they were prevented from doing so by the difficulties of climbing the tower and the arrival of Catholic officials from the archdiocese. The following morning – the same day on which Mgr Duval announced the transfer of churches to the Algerian state – a group of approximately eight hundred men and women entered the cathedral. Once inside, an "imam" took to the pulpit. Proclaiming that the church had originally been a mosque that had been forcibly stolen by the French, he declared that it was now being recuperated by the Algerians. Mgr Giroud, the bishop in charge, notified the local Algerian authorities, who were also the members of the FLN section in charge. They arrived at the cathedral to break up the mob, explaining to the crowd three things: that France had always respected mosques, even those constructed in the metropole; that Christians and Muslims pray to the same god; and that this church belonging to Mgr Duval fed the hungry through the works of the Secours catholique. When the "imam" was taken away by force, Catholic officials heard multiple threats from the crowd and "remembrances of the 100 deaths when the [French] Army captured the Cathedral."[33]

On October 2, 1962, Mgr Duval met with Ahmed Ben Bella, the new president of Algeria, to discuss the transfer of the Cathédrale Saint-Philippe, as well as that of the diocesan offices located across the street in a historic Ottoman-era building belonging to the Algerian state.[34] Representatives from the minister of habous, who organized religious affairs in the new

[32] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 154. Mgr Duval noted in his interviews with Marie-Christine Ray that those churches constructed after 1905 belonged to the Diocesan Association.

[33] "Rapport sur l'incident du 6 juillet 1962," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 472.

[34] "Le transfert de l'Archevêché," *La Semaine religieuse d'Alger*, 25, October 11, 1962, 258.

state, requested that the cathedral be turned over to the Algerian authorities before November 1, the anniversary of the outbreak of the Algerian War and thus a highly symbolic day. In order to avoid further conflicts such as those of July 1962, and to demonstrate the "warmth" between the two parties, a "mixed commission" of Catholics and Algerians was appointed to oversee the transfer. It also worked to facilitate the sharing of expenses, especially as the church needed extensive repairs after damage that it had sustained during the war.[35] Despite some minor difficulties in desacralization and the transfer of the remains of previous Catholic archbishops, Mgr Duval signed the transfer of the seat of the archbishop of Algiers to the newly built Église du Sacré-Coeur on October 25, 1962.[36]

The potential precarity of the Catholic Church as an institution in postcolonial Algeria was resolved through gestures such as the church's openness to the transfer of property and the willingness of Mgr Duval and other Catholic clergy to participate in the construction of the Algerian nation. In a May 1965 issue of the *Semaine religieuse d'Alger*, Mgr Duval informed his parishioners that the church in Algeria had the opportunity to engage with "an extraordinary range of spiritual values" as well as the incredible richness of the Third World that was emerging in Algeria. Algeria also afforded Christians the "providentially stimulating opportunity" to encounter a "form of socialism that is still developing" and that "allows for the possibility of a Christian presence."[37] Whereas Duval and the Catholic leadership sought to protect and engage the church as an institution in the life of the nation, with seemingly some minor success, the institution itself could do only so much. It was as individuals that most Catholics sought to carve out a role in postcolonial Algeria.

Like the Catholics in Algeria, the Protestants began planning for Algerian independence several months before the actual end of the war. As a tiny minority within the Christian community in Algeria, they had little need to negotiate directly with the GPRA. Nevertheless, French government officials kept them informed about the negotiations leading to the Evian Accords, according to delegates from private meetings with the ERA, just as they did for Mgr Duval and for representatives of the Jewish community

[35] "Compte-rendu de la commission mixte du 12 octobre 1962," Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 472.

[36] Document of transfer of the Cathédrale d'Alger, signed in Rome by Mgr Duval, October 25, 1962, Archives of Cardinal Duval, Archevêché d'Alger, casier 472.

[37] "Allocution du Cardinal Duval," *La Semaine religieuse d'Alger*, May 27, 1965, 112–13, Archives de l'Archevêché d'Alger.

in Algeria.[38] In the summer of 1961, Max-Alain Chevallier, the president of the ERA, met multiple times with Mgr Duval and the leaders of the Jewish community in Algiers in an attempt to formulate a report on "the situation of the Churches in the new Algeria." Although it is unclear why this report was being prepared, it had been requested by the French government and was to be directed to a commission of "*élus musulmans*" (Muslim elected officials) led by Belkheir Saïd, the conseiller général of Tiaret. For both Protestants and Catholics, the preparation of this mysterious report posed several potential problems, especially as the commission of *élus* appeared to be neither full representatives of the French government in negotiations with the GPRA nor direct representatives of the GPRA (yet, as Duval noted, one could never be sure). Chevallier at one point also indicated that Christian leaders felt somewhat affronted that the *élus* appeared to be more interested in retrieving religious property from Christian and Jewish institutions than in constructing new religious policy for the postindependence period, even if the questions of property and salaries were key logistical issues to be resolved with the transfer of power.[39] Both Duval and Chevallier (in accord with Charles Westphal, the head of the French Protestant Federation) deemed it prudent to avoid implicating the churches in problematic suggestions that might become embarrassing in a postindependence context with different actors.

Mgr Duval's report on the commission meetings and the future of Christianity in postindependence Algeria stressed the importance of guaranteeing religious pluralism and religious liberty, as had been put forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also covered questions of property rights and salary indemnities, as well as the parental right to choose a religious education for their children, the survival and freedom of religious congregations, and the maintenance of religious cemeteries.[40] Although Chevallier put his signature on Duval's report, he also added some "precisions" regarding the situation of Protestant churches in Algeria, emphasizing in particular the importance of a separation between church and state. He stressed that Protestants wanted above all to maintain their religious liberty, which included the freedom to worship, to preach, to teach, and

[38] "Entretien avec M. Morin, Délégué Général, le vendredi 23 février 1962," BSHP, Fonds privés du Pasteur Nicolas, 028y.

[39] Max-Alain Chevallier, "Le regime des cultes minoritaires dans l'Algérie de demain," July 1, 1961, Archives of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie, ANOM/FP/208APOM/17.

[40] Mgr Léon-Etienne Duval, "Rapport de l'Archevêque d'Alger concernant la situation des cultes dans l'Algérie nouvelle," July 13, 1961, Archives of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie, ANOM/FP/208APOM/17.

to witness without social, political, or national discrimination. And even though the document highlighted a few examples of what the Protestant church could give the state, such as "praying for the State authorities" and providing educational and social services, Chevallier focused almost entirely on the expectations Protestants had of receiving protection (of liberty, property, etc.) from the Algerian state.[41] As Chevallier pointed out in his comments to fellow Protestants, the real struggle was to define for non-Christians the meaning of a "missionary Church" while still guaranteeing its freedom. This is a particularly tone-deaf statement considering that the Protestant church had long since essentially abandoned its broader efforts to convert Muslims in Algeria to Christianity. Yet there was clearly a desire to protect the global Protestant missionary enterprise (and its lone Mission Rolland in Kabylia) from what Chevallier and perhaps others saw as the encroaching state. He attempted to achieve such protection, he wrote, by "using clichés like [missions] 'without discrimination.'"[42] In the end, however, there were actually two different Protestant communities that were negotiating their position in an independent Algeria: the churches (including missionaries) and Cimade. Although these two communities were connected, at times their interests and means of engaging with the Algerian population diverged. In addition, there was the added factor of the World Council of Churches, which was attempting to establish its own presence in postcolonial Algeria as a development agency, in a manner that was intentionally distinct from that of a missionary church.

Within the greater Protestant community in Algeria, it was the church institutions and the handful of missionaries that appear to have faced the most difficulties in the transition to independence. In its October 1961 report, the regional council of the ERF put forward two hypotheses for the future. One possibility suggested that French Algeria would continue for a while, a scenario that would give Protestants time to address some of the weaknesses of the church that the ERA had first uncovered in a retreat that its leadership had held in August 1961.[43] The other possibility was that the

[41] Letter from Max-Alain Chevallier to M. Belkheir Saïd, July 13, 1961, and "Notes sur la conception protestante des relations de l'Eglise et de l'Etat," Archives of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie, ANOM/FP/208APOM/17.

[42] Ibid.

[43] "La Mission de l'Église en Algérie. Journées d'information–13-14 août 1961," Cimade archives, 3D 10/11. During this "conscience examination," the ERA had recognized that the Protestant church in Algeria had several major weaknesses, including "a perpetual tendency for self-justification, one of the causes for the bitterness in the dialogue between Christians in the metropole and Christians in Algeria."

policy of self-determination that de Gaulle had outlined would, in fact, take place, in which case Algeria might look something like Tunisia or Morocco.[44] Both scenarios betray a somewhat alarming naïveté about the political situation so late in the Algerian War. Indeed, the fact that in late 1961 the council could still consider that French Algeria might continue longer indicates stronger sympathies with the dying cause of French Algeria than they were willing to admit publicly. If independence were to come, the report noted, there would likely be a massive departure of Christians, as happened in Tunisia and Morocco, and new Christians would arrive. On a juridical level, the situation of the churches would likely change completely because the Christian churches would be religious minorities in a Muslim country. What then, they asked, would be the situation of Christian missionaries as "one should remember that for a Muslim, conversion to Christ is 'unthinkable'?"[45]

It appears that by July 1962, the real concern for many of those Christians who had held out and stayed in Algeria through the violent end of the war was not discrimination from the Muslim community, but the fact that the Algerian state looked like it was going to be "fueled by a 'national and revolutionary' ideology." In this instance, "Christians are without a doubt less likely to be harassed than to be invited in an insistent manner to collaborate in the 'revolution' and show themselves to be good 'Algerians.'" For missionaries, the situation seemed even more dire, as one missionary reported this challenge being thrown at him: "The missionaries must associate themselves with the cause of the Algerian revolution; if not, they will be eliminated."[46] How then could one be a "good Algerian" if one did not particularly want to join the revolution?

It is difficult to tell whether Protestant leaders in Algeria realized the extent to which the Christian churches – and the missionary enterprise in particular – were tied to colonialism, particularly in the eyes of the colonized. It is likewise unclear whether the leaders recognized how tenuous the position of Christian institutions could be in postindependence Algeria. A document titled "The guarantees for minority religious groups to claim [in postindependence Algeria]," which appears in the ERA's archives alongside the 1961 report for the *élus musulmans* and Protestant responses to the Evian negotiations, argued that Christians needed to assert their rights in

[44] "Le Présent et l'avenir de l'Église réformée en Algérie," October 1961, BSHP, Fonds privés du Pasteur Nicolas, 028y.

[45] Ibid.

[46] "Circulaire no. 7," July 1962," BSHP, Fonds privés du Pasteur Nicolas, 028y.

Algeria as a minority faith along with other "peoples of the book." Despite strong evidence to the contrary, the author of the document claimed that "the establishment of Europeans in Algeria was not accompanied by 'Christian aggression' toward the Islamised natives. Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant churches have shown excessive proselytism nor sought to use the Administration for missionary ends. Here, again, tolerance was the rule and peaceful cohabitation was not compromised."[47] Although this position was typical of that of much of the European Christian population in Algeria, it is somewhat alarming to see it expressed in a document from a Protestant leadership attempting to negotiate the church's position in postindependence Algeria. Certainly, the Protestant and Catholic conversion of Muslims was neither excessive nor supported by the French colonial administration. However, this was in large part due to early missionary failure at conversion and the administration's desire for stability, rather than to a Christian sense of tolerance and compassion.

Although there were Protestants who participated in more progressive movements in Algeria, including certain Cimade activities and the ecumenical Association d'études (Study Association), Protestants generally seem to have been less concerned than Catholics were about how to engage with the Algerian Muslim community in independent Algeria. They also seem to have been less troubled by the decolonization of the church as an institution. The ERA laid out its vision of its position in the new Algerian state in a document identical to the 1961 report on the future of Algerian churches. It was relayed to the Algerian government, specifically Ferhat Abbas, the president of the constituent assembly, on the first anniversary of Algerian independence.[48] Considering the somewhat imperious tone of the text and its demands for religious toleration, Abbas's reply six days later was surprising in its generosity. Abbas assured the ERA leader Max-Alain Chevallier that "[the new Algerian] constitution, extremely open to the modern world, will guarantee the free exercise of worship and individual liberties. It will conform, as well, to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."[49]

Yet even a year after independence, the logistical issues of the transfer of church property and responsibility for salaries, pensions, and so forth were

[47] "Les garanties à demander pour les cultes minoritaires," Archives of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie, ANOM/FP/208APOM/17.

[48] "Note à l'intention des autorités sur la place des Églises protestantes dans l'Etat algérien," Archives of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie, ANOM/FP/208APOM/17.

[49] Letter from Ferhat Abbas to Max-Alain Chevallier, dated July 10, 1963, Archives of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie, ANOM/FP/208APOM/17.

only beginning to be resolved. In his July 1963 letter to the secretary-general of the ERF, Chevallier wrote that, to his knowledge, no pastor had received any retirement funds from the Algerian state. Furthermore, as of December 1962, when the Ministry of Habous and Churches (Ministère des Habous et des Cultes) took control of the affairs of the Christian churches, none of the fourteen remaining pastors of the Reformed Church of Algeria had received a salary from the Algerian state. They had, however, gotten notice that a new salary scale would be fixed in the coming weeks, diminishing their salaries to 605 francs per month (from the 1,000 francs previously provided), with family indemnities added accordingly. The letter also noted that although the relationship between Protestant leaders and the ministry was so far "excellent," it was unclear how Protestant relationships with other government authorities would crystallize, especially as the question of religious liberty had not yet been actively pursued.[50]

Developing Postcolonial Algeria

In March 1962, in response to a request from the GPRA for international aid in reconstruction, the World Council of Churches decided to institute a major new development program to help rebuild Algeria after independence. The program would be called the Comité Chrétien de Service en Algérie (Christian Committee for Service in Algeria, or CCSA).[51] Using the expertise of Cimade volunteers and donations from the surplus food program of the American Church World Service, the CCSA became one of the first major nongovernmental cooperative agencies in postindependence Algeria. Eventually, with the departure of the vast majority of the Protestant *pieds-noirs* and the arrival of the *coopérants*, many of whom were not French, the makeup of the Protestant community changed dramatically. Despite their divergent interests, the Protestants who staffed the CCSA ended up working very closely together, as well as building strong relationships with the remaining Catholics.

However, in the spring of 1962, when the WCC announced its intention to create the CCSA, many Protestants in Algeria took great offense to the fact that they were not consulted. They were particularly upset that the WCC had not considered the work that the Protestant churches and missionaries

[50] Letter from Max-Alain Chevallier to Pasteur Albert Gaillard, dated July 2, 1963, Archives of the Eglise réformée d'Algérie, ANOM/FP/208APOM/17.

[51] Letter from Madeleine Barot to Cimade team members concerning the creation of the CCSA, dated July 5, 1962, Cimade archives, 3D 10/12.

in Algeria could do to assist the organization in its projects.[52] The reality was that WCC leaders had come to fear that French Protestants were too compromised by their colonial past and their support for French Algeria to be useful partners in their new development project in independent Algeria.[53] In his memoirs, Visser 't Hooft wrote that following his 1956 tour of Algeria, he realized that "the only way of bridging the gulf between the nationalities was for Christians to enter into direct relations with believers in Islam. In the present situation this should not take the form of missionary work in the traditional sense. What was required, first of all, was an approach based on the desire to get to know one's neighbor."[54] This certainly was not the approach that he found among the Protestant community in Algeria.

In June 1962, ERA president Max-Alain Chevallier went to Geneva to discuss the formation of the CCSA and to be "the guy from Algeria," always pleading to be kept in the loop and talking up the good that the church and the Protestants who were already in Algeria could accomplish.[55] Chevallier was surprised to find that the WCC had added an appendix to the meeting notes stating that the director of the CCSA should not be of French nationality. The project, the WCC added, should be presented to the Algerian government as an international endeavor. It would be a prolongation of Cimade's activities in the country, but with a new character in the sense of being a larger program of development and "cooperation" between international Christian churches and the Algerian government.[56] Chevallier did manage to get himself placed on the WCC's local CCSA committee in Algeria, along with three other Cimade veterans. However, the tensions over the WCC's reluctance to allow the CCSA to become a "French" project and Chevallier's insistence that the "French" Protestants and missionaries still had something of value to offer, despite their colonial history, lingered long after Algerian independence.

During the Algerian War, Cimade had managed to slowly integrate itself into the Protestant community and gain the assistance of a few Protestant missionaries and parishes in the distribution of goods to the regroupment

[52] See the "Procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil regional de l'Église réformée en Algérie, 10 avril 1962," BSHP, Fonds privés du Pasteur Nicolas, 028y.

[53] On the formation of the CCSA, see the letter from W. S. Kilpatrick to Hugh Farley, June 9, 1962, Cimade archives/3D 10/11.

[54] W. A. Visser 't Hooft, *Memoirs [of] W. A. Visser 't Hooft* (London and Philadelphia: S.C.M. Press/Westminster Press, 1973), 302–303.

[55] M.-A. Chevallier, "Notes sur mon voyage à Genève pour le Comité Chrétien de Service en Algérie (C.C.S.A.) (jeudi 21 juin 1962)," Cimade archives/3D 10/11.

[56] Ibid.

camps. From the point of view of both the WCC and the Algerian government, though, Cimade was clearly a separate entity from both the Protestant churches and the missionaries. For one thing, Cimade had arrived in Algeria in the middle of the Algerian War at Visser 't Hooft's request, rather than having been embedded in settler colonial culture.[57] In addition, Cimade's services to Algerian nationalists during the war made the organization a much more welcome partner than colonial institutions (including the churches themselves) had been in the humanitarian and development projects that the new Algerian leaders were attempting to initiate at independence. It is not entirely clear how much the WCC leaders knew about Jacques Beaumont's activities with the FLN during the war. However, they clearly appreciated the extent to which Cimade had developed a place in Algerian society that went much deeper than the troubled relations between Protestants and their Muslim neighbors that Visser 't Hooft had observed in 1956. This position both made Cimade a model for the WCC's new Algerian development program and allowed the organization to be integrated into it.

Cimade's transition into the CCSA was not without its difficulties, however. Many team members were concerned that Cimade would be swallowed into the larger organization and lose its identity and, in particular, its ability to work and live among the populations it served.[58] Cimade's founder, Madeleine Barot, wrote to the Cimade teams in Algeria in July 1962 to reassure them that Cimade was, in fact, always on the minds of the CCSA as they made their plans. The teams, she assured them, would be able to keep their own identity as well as highlight the particularly "French" aspect of Cimade's service in Algeria.[59] By July 1963, all parties seemed to have found equilibrium. A detailed Cimade report on its activities in Algeria noted that the group was one branch of the CCSA that conserved its own personality and vocation within this new community.

[57] At times, Protestant leaders in Algeria had come into conflict with Cimade teams, disagreeing with the orientation of their projects or judging their behavior to be unacceptable. This situation was not surprising when one realizes that most of the Cimade workers in Algeria were idealistic young women from France faced with a fairly conservative set of male clergy in Algeria. Max-Alain Chevallier alluded to one such conflict over the orientation of the Clos Salembier team in a letter he wrote to Madeleine Barot, dated February 3, 1959, Cimade archives/3D10/2.

[58] Many of these concerns were addressed during the meetings of the Cimade Conseil in the spring and summer of 1962. See the Procès-verbaux des réunions du Conseil de la Cimade, February 9, 1962–October 26, 1962, Cimade archives.

[59] Letter from Madeleine Barot to Cimade team members concerning the creation of the CCSA, July 5, 1962, Cimade archives/3D 10/12.

Furthermore, according to the report, Cimade now had three privileged objectives in Algeria: to be present in the country, among friends in "significant milieux," including shantytowns, poor rural douars, and teaching groups; to know the people who surrounded them through an open and active attitude and search for dialogue; and to participate in the life of the country.[60] These objectives, particularly the idea that in order to "know" the people they lived with, they must be in true sympathy with them, and love them, bear a striking resemblance to the goals of the worker-priests in France in the 1940s and 1950s. Cimade team members also recognized the ambiguity of their position in Algeria and similarity to the worker-priests of the 1940s. They realized that they would have to essentially "convert" their own way of life to the reality of Algeria rather than maintain the status quo of the colonial era. It was critical, the report noted, that Christians hold fast to the principle and practice of giving up certain material benefits and living at a level of poverty that would allow them to be better integrated into the Algerian community. They also needed to learn Arabic.[61]

By 1964, the CCSA had created six different development projects in Algeria, all of which were funded with money from member churches and staffed with an international group of young Christians, mostly from Europe and the United States. CCSA projects included a medical service in eastern Algeria that ran dispensaries and mobile clinics as well as material aid provisioning that was a continuation of Cimade's early work in the regroupment camps with supplies donated by the American Church World Service. Cimade also continued its work with medico-social and education teams, who lived and worked directly with Algerian populations in various locations across the country. Jean Carbonare dramatically expanded his reforestation program in the Constantinois and helped set up an agricultural school in the southern Constantinois that was run by the Mennonite Central Committee to train Algerians in farming techniques. Finally, the CCSA organized a community child development project.[62] With their status as *coopérants* in Algeria, the staffs of Cimade and the CCSA fully participated in the young Algerian nation, along with the many thousands of others who came to Algeria after independence to help develop the country in the wake of the *pied-noir* exodus and the destruction of the war. But they did so as a means of being present in Algeria as Christians; they wished to demonstrate to the Algerians that not all Christians were colonialist and

[60] "Les Lignes Directrices de Notre Service en Algerie," Cimade archives/3D 10/11.
[61] Ibid.
[62] "Note d'information sur le C.C.S.A.," Cimade archives/3D 10/11.

that Christianity itself had something at stake in the liberation of colonized peoples from the oppression of the colonial system.

Identity and Integration in Postindependence Algeria

Although institutions like the Catholic Church and the CCSA played important roles as representatives of Christianity in Algeria, it was individuals and Christian communities that were more directly engaged in the process of identity formation in the postcolonial period. On the eve of independence, a small group of Christians who had decided to stay in Algeria, including several Cimade team members and Catholic laypeople, formed a study group called the Association d'études (Study Association). Their goal was to consider how best, as Christians, they could integrate themselves into postcolonial Algeria. The association was in part the result of the efforts of a group of priests that included several Jesuits and was under the leadership of Jean Delanglade and Père Henri Teissier, who worked closely with Jean Scotto and the Mission de France in the early 1950s and later became the archbishop of Algiers. This group was determined not to leave Mgr Duval and clergy like Scotto completely isolated in their attempt to decolonize the church.[63] The first meetings of the Association d'études were held in Algiers in early June of 1962. This was in the midst of the OAS's "scorched earth campaign," when only the most determined Europeans were willing to stay in Algeria. The themes of the meeting were quite practical: a study of the sociopolitical environment in the future independent Algeria, the sociological composition of the Christian population of Algeria, and a discussion of the role of the church in Algeria.[64]

Starting in June 1962, the group in Algiers met nearly every month to discuss various aspects of the role of Christians in Algeria. As word of its existence spread, the group gained more members. At the same time, Christians throughout Algeria formed their own small groups and sent letters supporting or commenting on the publications that the Algiers group produced and distributed to its members.[65] The organizers of the Study Association included prominent *pieds-noirs* such as Dr. Pierre Colonna, a Catholic

[63] M. de Sauto, *Henri Teissier, un évêque en Algérie: De l'Algérie française à la crise islamiste* (Paris: Bayard, 2006), 79–80. This information was also confirmed in my conversation with Paul and Josette Fournier at their home outside Angers, France, on December 11, 2008.

[64] L'Association d'études, "L'Avenir de l'Église dans une Algérie nouvelle," June 24, 1962. From the private archives of Paul and Josette Fournier.

[65] *The Bulletin*, dated September 24, 1962, reports that the meeting of September 8, 1962, in Algiers had nearly one hundred people in attendance.

liberal from Algiers, and Bernard Picinbono, a Protestant physicist.[66] With a membership composed of both Catholics and Protestants, *pieds-noirs* and *coopérants*, the association proved to be a site where they could all discuss the most pressing problems facing them – both as Christians and as "Europeans" – in independent Algeria.

Because there has been almost no historical examination of the situation of Europeans in Algeria after independence, we know little about their experiences during the transition from French colonialism to the independent Algerian nation-state. However, an examination of the range of issues that the Study Association addressed during 1962 and 1963 indicates the complexities of the European community's position and the ways in which the Christian community attempted to deal with them. At first, the Christians who remained in Algeria were concerned about how to distinguish themselves, in the eyes of the Algerians, from the "mass of Europeans" who had just fled to France and who remained emotionally tied to the legacy of French colonialism.[67] Statements from their early meetings reveal that much of the groundwork had been laid during the war by those Christians who had supported the Algerian people, especially by AJAAS members and by Mgr Duval, "who is the object of veneration among Algerians."[68] They also recognized that it would be important for Christians to separate themselves from institutions and behaviors associated with the colonizers, including acting like wealthy philanthropists. The first steps the Christians in the Study Association needed to take were to recognize their own complicity in the colonial system and to gain an awareness of how they were perceived by the Muslim population among whom they lived. Because Christians were perceived by Muslims to be wealthy, their charity often was not well received, and "in certain quarters, one could hear 'we would prefer to die of starvation than use flour from SOS.'"[69]

[66] Pierre Colonna was married at the time to the sociologist Fanny Colonna, who was born in Algeria in 1934. She was active in Catholic Scout movements and later in the FLN. She stayed in Algeria after independence and acquired Algerian nationality; after earning her doctorate in Paris, she taught at the University of Algiers. Other names listed on the minutes of the association meetings include Hélène d'Arras and Bernard de Quillacq, whose origins and religious affiliation are unknown.

[67] L'Association d'études, "L'Avenir de l'Église dans une Algérie nouvelle," June 24, 1962. From the private archives of Paul and Josette Fournier.

[68] Ibid., 2.

[69] Ibid. "SOS" aid refers to food aid provided by the American Protestant Church World Service through the World Council of Churches and Cimade to the regroupment camps during the Algerian War; see Chapter 4 for more details.

Even before independence, as Christians were making decisions about whether to stay in Algeria, a major consideration was their integration into the nation. Although the Evian Accords did not allow the possibility of double nationality for Europeans born in Algeria, the conditions for obtaining Algerian citizenship were ambiguous. Moreover, becoming integrated into the nation had cultural as well as juridical aspects. The chaos in the Algerian government after independence caused many Europeans concern. For example, it was still unclear whether Arabic would be the state language, or what influence Islam would have in the Algerian nation-state.[70] By early 1963, it was increasingly obvious that becoming "Algerian" was not going to be as simple as just living in Algeria. The Code de la nationalité (Nationality Code) that was being debated in the Algerian National Assembly was also an object of concern. However, in the report that Père Delanglade shared with the Study Association in March 1963, he wrote that being Algerian was going to mean wanting to be recognized as such, which entailed wanting to participate actively in the creation of Algeria as both a new and an ancient country, in reference, apparently, to a hypothetical reconciliation of Algeria's Roman and Arab traditions within a new national framework.[71] Père Delanglade recognized the difficulty of the choice Europeans faced in "becoming Algerian," particularly because it involved a certain feeling of "uprooting" themselves. In a sense, they would be abandoning one part of themselves (the French part) and choosing to share the destiny of Algeria – for better or worse – with the Algerians.[72] Whoever made that choice would no longer be French, or even European. For many, it would take a strong Christian vocation and feeling of solidarity with the Algerians to make the leap.

Another major issue that the Study Association addressed, and that Cimade also acknowledged in its reports, was the necessity for European Christians to accept a state of relative poverty. Those who argued that Christian evangelization occurred through Christian actions and attitudes and pointed out that Christians were going to be constantly watched and judged, especially for the first several years after independence. They claimed that it was necessary for Christians not to shut themselves off in a European "ghetto," as they had done during the colonial period. Instead, they must live among the Algerians. To fully participate in the construction of the

[70] Ibid., 5.
[71] "Conscience algérienne, conscience nationale," *Bulletin intérieur de l'Association d'études*, March 20, 1963, 3.
[72] Ibid., 5–6.

state, they were going to have to share the same difficulties and chaos faced by the Algerians. This required their letting go of the privileges that they had been entitled to as the elite class under French colonialism. For some, this was a complex decision, particularly if they had children. Several issues of the *Bulletin* take note of the tension between the desire to stay and build the country and the desire to do what was best for one's family, which might entail sending children to school in France, or even leaving Algeria altogether.[73]

Quite a few study group discussions revolved around the idea of the "Christian vocation in Algeria." This was the theme of a presentation given by Bernard Picinbono in September 1962. Picinbono argued that there were three major implications of the Christian vocation in Algeria: first, there was the announcement of the Gospel, which could be undertaken only after achieving a profound understanding of both Islam and Christianity. It would have to be communicated in a "new language" through lifestyle, ways of thinking, intellectual frameworks, and dialogue. Second, there was service to others, which must necessarily be selfless and neither promote one's own interests nor discriminate against anyone else's, regardless of their political or social position. Finally, there was the need to participate in building the state.[74] In the discussion that followed Picinbono's presentation, several Christians argued that Christianity in Algeria was in a state of redemption for what had occurred during colonialism even more than it was in a state of reconciliation and that any "evangelization" (seemingly synonymous with "the announcement of the Gospel") should first be acknowledged as a witness of love through concrete action. A further issue to be faced was the European "superiority complex," in the sense that the Europeans, consciously or unconsciously, had trouble allowing the Algerians to work out their own solutions to problems. Instead of giving the Algerians the tools to run their new country, the Europeans were impatient and had a tendency to want to step in and run things themselves.

This was the moment when both Protestants and Catholics were figuring out exactly what "development" – as an idea and as a practice – meant, and Algeria was one of the first terrains for exploration. The shift from humanitarian assistance, as in Cimade's early intervention in the regroupment camps, to development projects like the CCSA's massive reforestation program in the Constantinois or the work of the *coopérants* in filling the gap left by the European exodus after independence, seems to have occurred

[73] Ibid., 9.
[74] *Bulletin intérieur de l'Association d'études*, September 24, 1962, 5.

without much forethought or planning. The CCSA's reforestation plan, for example, turned an aid distribution site into a place where Algerian workers could receive material aid in exchange for being trained in forestry techniques. This change was due to Jean Carbonare's observation of the competition among the Algerians over the aid and his realization that the situation was doing nobody any good.[75] A World Council of Churches article later reported on the expansion of this model under the CCSA and its use at other WCC sites as their main development model. Work training allowed populations to earn their own livelihoods and simultaneously build their countries' infrastructure and agricultural capacity.[76]

Catholic leaders also took up development at Vatican II. Later, in March 1967, Pope Paul VI issued the encyclical *Populorum progressio*, stating that the Holy See had added a new pontifical commission whose purpose was to "awaken in the People of God full awareness of their mission today. In this way they can further the progress of poorer nations and international social justice, as well as help less developed nations to contribute to their own development."[77] The encyclical specified that these projects were aimed at nations that had recently gained independence and were struggling to overcome the effects of colonialism. Although the text was qualified with some praise for the technological innovations of the colonizers, it contains what is perhaps the most explicit denunciation of colonialism in Catholic official discourse:

> It is true that colonizing nations were sometimes concerned with nothing save their own interests, their own power and their own prestige; their departure left the economy of these countries in precarious imbalance – the one-crop economy, for example, which is at the mercy of sudden, wide-ranging fluctuations in market prices. Certain types of colonialism surely caused harm and paved the way for further troubles.[78]

The encyclical invoked the example of Charles de Foucauld as a historical case of the Catholic Church's interest in development, but it argued that future projects should move beyond traditional missionary undertakings like schools and hospitals into a redistribution of the resources of the global economy.

[75] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 209.
[76] G. Murray, "Joint Service as an Instrument of Renewal," in *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, ed. H. E. Fey (Philadelphia: Westminster Press: 1970), 2:223.
[77] Pope Paul VI, Populorum progressio, March 26, 1967.
[78] Ibid.

Likewise, the Association d'études came to the conclusion in December 1962 that the simple distribution of material aid was in many ways an offensive gesture, especially if it stopped there. What Christians needed to do "was give the disinherited the means to pull themselves out of their misery (through professional training, basic education . . .)."[79] Although "development" had become the term du jour in Algeria, Christians had to adapt their language and practices to fit within the new socialist state that the Algerian authorities were establishing by early 1963. In some instances, the transition went fairly smoothly, particularly for groups like Cimade that were already functioning independently of the Algerian state. For the institutional churches, however, it also meant opening the diocesan and parish schools to Algerian students. Moreover, shifting the language of instruction to Arabic necessitated the training of qualified Algerian teachers and inspectors, a task that often fell to Europeans and *coopérants*. Interestingly, a large number of both priests and members of religious orders went to work for the Algerian state in various capacities, often training Algerian workers in industry and educational posts. Others, like soeur Marie-Thérèse Brau, picked up the relay of women like Marie-Renée Chéné and opened a basic education center in Hussein-Dey. It later became a center for mentally disabled children and adults that continues to function well into the twenty-first century.[80]

The real transformation, as both Protestants and Catholics discovered, needed to be in the mentalities of European Christians, even more than in their activities. Instead of treating their interactions with Algerians as "mission work" or "charity," they were now engaged in "building capacity" and training Algerians to run the country. Any whiff of paternalism would be a sign that the church had not abandoned its ties to the colonial regime. Christians – especially *pieds-noirs* and those who were holdovers from colonial Algeria – therefore had to be extra careful to engage in development activities in a spirit of cooperation and humility. The emphasis on poverty was clearly an important aspect of this engagement, as was the pursuit of Algerian nationality. For those who foresaw a permanent Algerian presence for themselves, taking Algerian nationality became a symbolic gesture to prove to Algerians that the remaining European population was serious about rejecting its colonial ties.

On the first anniversary of Algerian independence, a handful of Europeans were awarded Algerian nationality for their efforts on behalf of

[79] *Bulletin intérieur de l'Association d'études*, 3 December 3, 1962, 7–8.
[80] De Sauto, *Henri Teissier*, 97–98.

Algerian independence. This group included several notable "progressivist" Christians, such as Pierre and Claudine Chaulet and Annie Steiner Florio.[81] Subsequently, however, the Algerian Nationality Code, which passed the National Assembly in March 1963, required Europeans born in Algeria under the colonial regime to apply for Algerian nationality; they were not entitled to it by birth.[82] Many Europeans did apply, including Mgr Duval and Jean Scotto. There was, however, a limited time frame set for these requests, and it became much more difficult to request Algerian nationality after 1965.[83] In addition, beginning in 1963, the Algerian government began implementing its "agrarian reform," nationalizing "vacant" European farms, industries, and property. This prompted further departures from Algeria of those who were unwilling to participate in the socialist experiment or who felt they had been robbed of their property.[84] The Boumediène coup of 1965 in some ways eased tensions within the Christian community. Many Christians had felt on edge with Algerian president Ahmed Ben Bella's posturing and paranoia and saw in Boumediène a better ally.[85] But his "Arabization" policies, including the nationalization of education, left many Christians – including religious orders – out of work. At this point, even more Europeans left the country because they could not adapt to the new conditions of life in Algeria, which ironically were the same conditions in which Algerians had been living for generations.

The transition to independence and the decolonization of the church in Algeria was neither smooth nor easy. In the end, many of those *pieds-noirs* who had made the decision to stay in Algeria after the war ended up leaving for a complex set of reasons. Some departed because of their familial situation, others because of lack of access to employment and

[81] "A l'occasion de la fête de l'indépendance des français acquièrent la nationalité algérienne," *Le Peuple*, July 6, 1963.

[82] On the passage of the Algerian Nationality Code, the weekly airgram from the US Embassy in Algiers to the Department of State noted that the law had passed "by a vote of 85 to 33 with 11 abstentions, after an extended and intense debate which lasted eleven days. Of 16 European deputies, 13 voted against, one voted in favor, and two were absent." See airgram no. A-451 from the US Embassy in Algiers to the Department of State, March 19, 1963; Folder POL 2–1; Box 3810; Subject-numeric files; RG 59; USNA.

[83] On Europeans in Algeria and the question of Algerian nationality, see P. Daum, "Sans valise ni circueil, les pieds-noirs restés en Algérie," *Le Monde diplomatique*, May 5, 2008.

[84] See "Data on the European population of Algeria," airgram no. A-582 from the US Embassy in Algiers to the Department of State, April 10, 1964; Folder POL 13; Box 1879; Subject-numeric files; RG 59; USNA.

[85] "Call on Cardinal Archbishop of Algiers," airgram no. A-284 from the US Embassy in Algiers to the Department of State, January 10, 1966; Folder POL 15–2; Box 1880; Subject-numeric files; RG 59; USNA.

education, and still others because of questions of nationality. Yet the stalwarts who remained continued to be committed to pursuing dialogue between Christians and Muslims and maintaining a place for Christianity in Algerian society. The Protestant community dwindled down to a very few, but the CCSA, under the name Rencontres et développement (Encounters and Development), has continued to function in Algeria to this day. Mgr Duval was an active participant in Vatican II, which had opened just as the Algerian War was coming to a close. He noted in his interviews with Marie-Christine Ray that the event that most helped him "become African" occurred on the second day of the council. On that day, the bishops were divided by region in their study commissions, and the Algerian bishops realized that they should join the bishops of the African region, as opposed to the bishops of France.[86] In 1965, Pope Paul VI named Mgr Duval a cardinal, an honor that was particularly well received by the Algerian people. He continued to work to defend the rights of the powerless, both in Algeria and abroad. Trusted collaborators like Jean Scotto and Henri Teissier, who had long worked for dialogue and reconciliation between the Christian and Muslim populations in Algeria, also rose in the Catholic hierarchy. Scotto became the bishop of Constantine in 1970, and Teissier the bishop of Oran in 1973 and later, upon Cardinal Duval's retirement, the archbishop of Algiers.

Several prominent European Christians became key actors in the postindependence Algerian nation, some even participating actively in the political process. In the summer of 1962 when elections for the first Assemblée nationale constituante (National Constituent Assembly, or ANC) were announced, 16 of the 196 seats were reserved for Europeans, or as they were legally defined, "Algerians of minority civil status, called Europeans."[87] Among the European Christians who joined the new assembly in 1962 were the Catholic curé Alfred Bérenguer (former militant with the FLN); Pierre Chaulet and his wife, Claudine; and Evelyne Lavelette.[88] In 1964, Algerian citizenship was made a criterion for candidature for the new National Assembly. Thus despite the protests of a number of prominent European deputies, the number of "European" representatives was reduced to just

[86] Duval and Ray, *Le Cardinal Duval*, 170.

[87] Daum, *Ni valise ni circueil*, 72.

[88] Ibid., 72–23. See also airgram no. A-141 from the US Embassy in Algiers to the Department of State, October 3, 1963; Folder POL 15–2; Box 3812; Subject-numeric files; RG 59; USNA; Chaulet and Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie*, 239–79; and Safir Lavalette, *Juste Algérienne*.



FIGURE 5.1. Photo of Mgr. Jean Scotto as bishop of Constantine; archives of the Archdiocese of Algiers, AAA/182. Reprinted with permission from the Archdiocese of Algiers.

one – Evelyne Lavalette, who had taken Algerian nationality.[89] Even the Abbé Jean Scotto was convinced to participate in politics, and he was elected to the city council of Algiers in 1967, along with Dr. Pierre Chaulet.[90] Individuals contributed their unique skills as professionals to the betterment of the Algerian population as well. Dr. Pierre Chaulet, for example, helped organize the country's medical profession and was a leader in the eradication of tuberculosis, and his wife, Claudine, became a professor of sociology at the University of Algiers. Professor André Mandouze returned to Algeria

[89] See airgram no. A-129 from the US Embassy in Algiers to the Department of State, October 8, 1964; Folder POL 15–2; Box 1880; Subject-numeric files; RG 59; USNA.

[90] See the televised interviews with the Abbé Scotto and Pierre Chaulet after their success in the local council elections, "Témoignage de Français restés en Algérie," *Cinq colonnes à la une* (Paris: Office national de radiodiffusion télévision française, January 1, 1967).

in 1963 to take up the post of director of higher education. He eventually became the rector of the University of Algiers, a position he held until 1968.[91]

Overall, a few key features of the Christian community in postindependence Algeria are clear. Even before the outbreak of the Algerian War, a sense of solidarity had developed between those like-minded Protestants and Catholics who were working toward dialogue and rapprochement with the Algerian people. The situation after independence further demonstrated both the benefits and the necessity of working together to form a solid Christian community in Algeria. The team members of Cimade and the CCSA were certainly pioneers in ecumenical action. They helped the Protestant community in Algeria, which was somewhat wary of the influence that the WCC held over French Protestantism, engage more directly with Catholics, especially in groups like the Association d'études. The new push for ecumenical dialogue from the Catholic Church with the opening of Vatican II also fostered a new spirit of openness within the Catholic hierarchy that supported what was taking place on the ground. By the mid-1960s, although differences in theology and outlook certainly remained, there was much more cooperation than conflict between Protestants and Catholics than there had been before. Something like a small, but unified Christian community remained a vibrant element of postindependence Algeria.

The Postcolonial Church in the Modern World

The moral conflicts associated with the Algerian War were central to what the Catholic historian Denis Pelletier has labeled the "Catholic crisis" and the decline of Christian churches in France during the 1960s, but the war also served as a key moral referent for both Vatican II and the ecumenical movement. In the decades after the war, there was little discussion in France about the "events in Algeria," even as the *pieds-noirs* continued to be both bitter about their lost homeland and nostalgic for a romanticized vision of *Algérie française*. The liturgical reforms that Vatican II set in motion, including an emphasis on vernacular languages and a move away from pageantry and processions, were often directed at churches in southern France that had continued to maintain these older traditions,

[91] A. Mandouze, "L'Algérie, mon pays adoptif," in *Un chrétien dans son siècle: De Résistances en résistances*, ed. O. Aurenche and M. Sevegrand (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 339, originally published as an interview in *El Watan*, July 16, 2000.

in much the same manner as had the churches in French Algeria. Not coincidentally, these French churches often had high numbers of *pied-noir* parishioners. This caused further ruptures within the Catholic community in France.

In many ways, the greatest impact of the Algerian War and the decolonization of the church fell on the global Christian community. Algeria was one of many colonies undergoing decolonization, and it was, in fact, one of the last countries in the French empire to gain independence. States within the French Community (created in 1958 to replace the French Union) were given the option in June 1960, through referendum, to become either fully independent or an overseas territory, and most opted for independence. During their wars of decolonization, French colonies like the Malagasy Republic and Indochina had experienced tension and even violence between their Christian and non-Christian populations, but the existence of strong indigenous Christian communities within them, and in West Africa as well, meant that Protestant and Catholic leaders initially had little fear that Christianity would "be erased" from those territories at independence.[92]

The Vatican had supported the promotion of indigenous clergy throughout the European empires in Benedict XV's 1919 apostolic letter *Maximum illud*. However, it often did so to the consternation of French missionaries, who, in general, had quite racist ideas about the "backwards" indigenous populations among whom they lived. Rather than promote indigenous clergy, which was in theory their goal, French missionaries frequently kept non-European priests in subordinate positions.[93] Unsurprisingly, this bred resentment within the indigenous populations, including the clergy. As indigenous Christians gained power in their newly independent countries, their former European "tutors" became potential targets of violence or even for expulsion. Even though it was the most extreme case of violence in the French empire, and a different context for colonial Christianity, Algeria demonstrated to Christians around the world both the dangers in decolonizing Christianity and some of the solutions to the problems that might emerge for Christians in the postcolonial Third World.

In most of the French empire, for example, the decolonization of the Catholic or Protestant churches was not often the result of an organic

[92] On the conflicts between Catholics and communists in Vietnam, see Keith, *Catholic Vietnam*, ch. 7; on Christianity in Madagascar, see D. Ralibera and G. de Taffin, *Madagascar et le christianisme* (Paris: Éditions de Karthala, 1993).

[93] See Foster, "A Mission in Transition: Race, Politics, and the Decolonization of the Catholic Church in Senegal," 260–71; Keith, *Catholic Vietnam*, ch. 3.

movement from the European community. For example, in Senegal, what Elizabeth Foster has called the "decolonization" or "Africanization" of the Catholic Church through the creation of an indigenous clergy was a top-down process, instigated by the Vatican, with strong resistance from French missionaries.[94] Although Protestants also theoretically used overseas missions as a means to establish indigenous churches, the historiography of the Christian missionary enterprise illustrates that complex power struggles were at work. In many cases, missionaries were agents of Western, bourgeois "civilizing missions" that demolished indigenous cultures and practices, whereas in others, indigenous populations gained agency in multiple ways through religious belief and practice.[95]

The emergence in France of radical new missionary ideologies in the 1930s and 1940s to confront the "dechristianization" of the working classes also had a long-term and dramatic impact on global Catholic engagement with non-Christian populations. The Mission de France and lay movements like the Little Brothers and Little Sisters of Jesus were inspired by the theology of incarnation, in which missionaries "incarnated" the values of Christ, living in full immersion among non-Christians.[96] In their 1943 sociological treatise *La France, pays de mission?* (France, a mission land?), two former JOC chaplains, Abbés Godin and Daniel, elaborated on the need for the Catholic Church to fundamentally rethink its missionary strategy and practice. They argued that the church's unsuccessful efforts to convert the working classes were comparable to the foreign missionaries' failed attempts to "Europeanize" non-Western converts, a situation that the authors strongly condemned ("Have we the right to refuse Christ to those who cannot or do not want to receive our culture?" they asked).[97] The working classes also felt a divide between themselves and the bourgeois church that expected them to change their culture and way of life. There was, however, a simple solution to this problem: find in Christianity a pure evangelical message of Christ's love, stripped of its bourgeois, "Western,"

[94] Foster, "A Mission in Transition," 257–59.

[95] See, for example, J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 1, *Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); D. Hodgson, *The Church of Women: Gendered Encounters Between Maasai and Missionaries* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2005); N. R. Hunt, *A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

[96] On the theology and practice of incarnation, see Arnal, *Priests in Working-Class Blue*.

[97] H. Godin and Y. Daniel, *La France, pays de mission?* (Lyon: Les Éditions de l'Abeille, 1943), 46–59.

cultural trappings. They argued that it was the role of the church to convert to the specific cultures to which it was ministering.[98]

This new missionary vision found a captive audience among the "progressivist" Christians in both France and Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s, and it reemerged on a global scale at the Second Vatican Council. For Catholics, decolonization and missionaries were just two of many themes that were up for discussion as Pope John XXIII called a new Vatican Council in 1959. His decision to call the council came as a shock to the Catholic community, particularly to the French Catholics who were increasingly wary of the Vatican after receiving many severe rebukes in the 1940s and 1950s. Etienne Fouilloux maintained that French Catholics had not been especially impressed with John XXIII (then Cardinal Roncalli) during his stint as the papal nuncio to France. His election to the papacy had not brought about any major improvements in French-Vatican relations. Instead, it had resulted in a new condemnation of worker-priests, as well as of the Jesuit Père Teilhard de Chardin for his attempts to reconcile faith with modern science.[99] Yet French theologians like Yves Congar and Henri de Lubac, who had previously been condemned for their radical views, played an influential role at Vatican II and helped write several important texts; in addition, Cardinal Liénart of Lille, the prelate of the Mission de France, was among the most important leaders among the bishops within the council. In the end, the "ecumenical council" was an opening to the modern world that many French Catholics had been working toward for decades. In particular, they sought acknowledgment of the need for a Catholic dialogue with other religions (including Islam), a move toward a missionary spirit more in line with that of the worker-priests or Père Charles de Foucauld, and an opening to Catholics from outside Europe and North America.[100]

Even before the Vatican Council opened in October 1962, Pope John XXIII issued the encyclical *Mater et Magistra* (1961), in which he essentially reexamined the "social question" in a global context. Gerard Cholvy and Yves-Marie Hilaire write that the 1960s marked a shift within leftist French Catholicism toward an attitude of "Third Worldism" and that this encyclical was one of the first Vatican documents to address questions of

[98] Ibid., 125.

[99] Fouilloux, *Les chrétiens français entre guerre d'Algérie et mai 68*, 280. The condemnation of the worker-priests was in 1959 and against Teilhard de Chardin was in 1962.

[100] On the makeup of Vatican II participants, see the typed notes from the Rocco Caporale research on the sociology of Vatican II, folder 1, Rocco Caporale-Vatican II Collection, the American Catholic Research Center and University Archives, Catholic University, Washington, DC.

economic development and global labor practices in the second half of the twentieth century.[101] There is little that is revolutionary in *Mater et Magistra*, and it continues the usual condemnation of "materialist conceptions of man" that suggest the reorganization of society along communist or socialist principles. It upholds Pope Leo XIII's claim from the late nineteenth century that "no practical solution of this question will be found apart from the counsel of religion and of the Church."[102] Yet the pope also spoke out against destroying farm surpluses when poorer countries needed food, and he claimed that it was the responsibility of wealthier nations to help developing countries improve their economies.[103] His successor Paul VI's encyclical *Populorum progressio* in 1967 went much further in its discussions of economic redistribution and responsibility and stuck less to the line drawn since the *Rerum Novarum* that rejected any dialogue with Marxist ideologies.

Within the Second Vatican Council, there was some discussion of themes like development and decolonization, but most of the debates revolved around specifically Catholic questions, such as the future of missionaries, or questions of ecumenism. Although the schema on missions was pushed off until the final session of the council and discussion was limited owing to time constraints, bishops from recently decolonized countries actively participated in the debate. Michel Ntuyahaga, the bishop of Bujumbura, Burundi, who spoke on behalf of the Episcopal conferences of Rwanda and Burundi, and bishops from East Africa and Nigeria, stated before the council, "We live in a transition from missions properly speaking to a time of young churches, which are autonomous and exist in their own right."[104] Continuing with its previous practices, the Vatican responded to the shift in political authority in former mission lands by transferring emphasis from missionaries onto "young churches," in the hope that these churches would eventually be run by indigenous Christians.[105] However, there was a new emphasis on adaptation to local cultures, which was a move away from the conflation of Catholicism with Western values that had occurred under the European colonial regimes. Although there was a strong movement to reform the influence of the Congregation of the

[101] G. Cholvy and Y.-M. Hilaire, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine*, vol. 3, 1930–1988 (Toulouse: Éditions Privat, 1988), 282–85.

[102] John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra*, May 15, 1961, para. 16.

[103] Ibid., paras. 161–65.

[104] J. W. O'Malley, *What Happened at Vatican II?* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 269.

[105] Cholvy and Hilaire, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine, 1930–1988*, 281.

Propagation of the Faith and its influence on Catholic missions, this did not make it into the final text of the approved schema, partly because of the aforementioned time constraints.[106]

French Catholics, particularly the rehabilitated Dominicans and Jesuits like Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, and Jean Daniélou, made important contributions to a number of schemas up for debate at the council. They were also at the center of several of the major power struggles of the council, which tended to pit the conservative Roman defenders of tradition and hierarchy against those bishops hoping for decentralization and reform of the entire system, especially the French and German episcopates. The reform of the liturgy was one of the major debates of the council, and reform-minded bishops in Europe and from Africa, Asia, and Latin America were intent on achieving it. In particular, bishops wanted to shift from Mass that was solely in Latin to Mass in vernacular languages and with priests facing the congregation, which was exactly what the priests of the Mission de France had instituted in Algeria in the early 1950s to the shock of their parishioners. The tradition-minded conservatives at the council, who had drafted the original schema for the liturgical reform that supported the Latin Mass, believed that shifting to vernacular languages was tantamount to Protestantism and set the stage for revolutionary changes in the Catholic Church, which to the reform-minded was not necessarily a negative outcome.[107]

The French also had a particular interest in the schema that produced the pastoral constitution *Gaudium et Spes* (Joy and Hope, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World), which dealt with many of the questions that French leftist Catholics had been struggling with for decades, namely, how the church could respond to the problems of the modern world. The text brought up the issue of human rights, claiming that human inequality was against God's intentions: "With respect to the fundamental rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language or religion, is to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God's intent. For in truth it must still be regretted that fundamental personal rights are still not being universally honored."[108] The constitution put a strong emphasis on the good of society and the responsibility of Christians to ensure the education of all youth, the economic development of the poorer nations,

[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid., 136–41.
[108] Gaudium et Spes, para 29.

and the well-being of the human community. In one passage, which was likely the source of the criticism that the text did not do enough to condemn Marxism, it states, "The Church recognizes that worthy elements are found in today's social movements, especially an evolution toward unity, a process of wholesome socialization and of association in civic and economic realms."[109] The text affirmed that the Catholic Church was willing to promote these movements and institutions that worked in tandem with its mission to secure the basic rights of the person and pursue the common good.

Gaudium et Spes also presented the role of the Catholic Church in the modern world as that of a peacemaker, particularly in an era of nuclear proliferation and of recent wars that "have wrought physical and moral havoc on our world."[110] The text further noted, however, that because the causes of many recent wars were "excessive economic inequalities," and "the desire to dominate," the church needed to root out the sources of injustice that fomented these wars and attempt to ameliorate the base conditions that led to their eruption.[111] To this end, the text was explicit that the church must become involved in international efforts in global outreach and development:

> To reach this goal, organizations of the international community, for their part, must make provision for men's different needs, both in the fields of social life – such as food supplies, health, education, labor and also in certain special circumstances which can crop up here and there, e.g., the need to promote the general improvement of developing countries, or to alleviate the distressing conditions in which refugees dispersed throughout the world find themselves, or also to assist migrants and their families.[112]

It was the role of the international community to promote development and ensure a more equal distribution of wealth and prosperity in the human community, and it was in the interest of Christians to take part in organizations that would promote these values and activities throughout the world.

Although *Gaudium et Spes* made only glancing references to dialogue with peoples of other faiths, two other constitutions emerged that dealt directly with ecumenism (i.e., dialogue with other Christians) and with

[109] Ibid., para 42.
[110] Ibid., para 79.
[111] Ibid., para 83.
[112] Ibid., para. 84.

Catholic relations with other faiths. These both were at the center of controversy in the council and were powerful symbols that major shifts had taken place within the Vatican. Although the term "ecumenical," when uttered by Pope John XXIII in 1959, was utterly ambiguous to both Protestants and Catholics, it gained clarity under the leadership of the Jesuit cardinal Augustin Bea. He was the head of the Secretariat for Christian Unity and was later appointed as a commissioner at Vatican II. He undertook the formulation of a constitution on ecumenical dialogue that was the result of the efforts of people like Yves Congar and the Dutch Catholic Johannes Willebrands, who had both worked closely with Visser 't Hooft during the 1950s and 1960s.[113] The text on ecumenism, *Unitatis Redintegratio*, still included language that suggested that the Catholic Church believed certain "separated Churches and Communities" to be "deficient in some respects," but no longer called for non-Catholics to "return" to the Roman Catholic Church. The text also recognized the "ecumenical movement" and its pursuit of dialogue as a useful and positive initiative.[114]

The more controversial document was *Nostra Aetate* (Declaration on the relation of the Church to non-Christian religions), which stumbled in the council particularly because of debates about the Catholic Church's relationship to Jews, and the political implications of the statement in the Arab world.[115] In the end, however, Pope Paul VI's visit to the United Nations in 1964, and some behind-the-scenes diplomacy, diffused much of the tension in the Arab countries. What emerged was a text that advocated dialogue and collaboration with other religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. This text became a useful tool for Christians in places like Algeria who were working to promote those very principles. Mgr Henri Teissier, the former archbishop of Algiers, commented that passages such as this one, which states, "Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom," helped guide the work of the Catholic Church in Algeria.[116]

Perhaps the best-known result within the Catholic Church of the theological revolutions of the 1940s through Vatican II is the emergence of Latin

[113] Visser 't Hooft, *Memoirs*, 338.
[114] Unitatis Redintegratio, November 21, 1964.
[115] On the debates over the text, and the issue of the Jews and Jesus specifically, see O'Malley, *What Happened at Vatican II?*, 218–24.
[116] De Sauto, *Henri Teissier*, 107.

American Liberation theology. Gustavo Gutierrez first described Liberation theology in his 1971 essay, "A Theology of Liberation," as the "irruption of the poor," who were of little importance to society and the church. They became agents of their own destiny by engaging with the new social doctrine of the Catholic Church that emerged from Pope John XXIII and Vatican II, while reflecting critically on it "in the light of God's word."[117] Its birth in Latin America is often traced back to the Medellín conference of 1968 in which the Latin American bishops expanded the social doctrine of the Catholic Church into even more progressive and openly political stances, particularly toward the church's responsibility regarding poverty.

There is no doubt that Liberation theology emerged in a specific historical context within Latin America and the Latin American church. Several academic studies locate its theological origins within European traditions of Social Catholicism of the early- to mid-twentieth century, drawing on the intellectual connections between Liberation theology and the work of European Social Catholic theologians like Marie-Dominique Chenu and Yves Congar (Gutierrez himself cites both of them as important intellectual inspirations).[118] The danger, however, in tracing a genealogy of Third World Liberation theology movements directly from European theologies, as Gutierrez points out, is that it treats Liberation theology as "the radical, political wing of European progressive theology," thereby replicating an intellectual model of dependency and lack of local context and agency that Gutierrez and other noted theologians rightly reject.

Yet by placing the history of leftist Christian engagement in Algeria back into this narrative, we see already the sparks of a theology of liberation. The context is quite different, of course, because the Christians in Algeria who were working to decolonize Christianity were a minority, who represented the colonizers, among a Muslim majority (the colonized). The theology and praxis of Christianity could be liberatory in the sense that it was a performance of service, always in dialogue with non-Christians. Although the engagement of Vatican II and the WCC with the Third World would most likely have occurred without the dramatic events of the Algerian War, they proved to be the catalyst for a wake-up call to the Christian community. If Christians wanted to have any place in the areas of the world that were throwing off the shackles of colonialism, then they needed

[117] G. Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation*, rev. ed., trans. C. Inda and J. Eagleson (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988), xx–xxi.

[118] See, for example, G.-R. Horn, *Western European Liberation Theology: The First Wave (1924–1959)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

to take stock of their moral position relative to colonialism, capitalism, economic development, human rights, and various other issues that were global human concerns, and in which Christians were deeply implicated. Thus, the realization of the so-called progressivist Christians in Algeria that their Christian engagements in the colonial context were inherently political and necessarily social meant that their role in Algeria was much different than that of French missionaries in Senegal, Vietnam, or the rest of the French empire. As those Christians who remained in Algeria after independence demonstrated, it was not enough simply to be a Christian in a former European colony; one had to engage in active reflection on the "true face" of Christianity and the role of the Christian in the modern, postcolonial world.

The World Council of Churches had started to consider these questions as well at its international assembly in Evanston, Illinois, in 1954. But, as Visser 't Hooft noted in his memoirs, the central question of the 1961 assembly in New Delhi was whether the WCC could really be a "world council" in the sense that churches from outside Europe and the United States would fully participate in its life.[119] The meeting was held in India specifically as a sign that the WCC was open to the "young churches" of the world and ready to move beyond the "old syncretism between the Christian faith and Western culture."[120] This move out of Europe was extremely important, for, as Paul Albrecht observed in an article on ecumenical social thought, "It is a sobering thought that the ecumenical movement discovered the urgent problems of the nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East only after the process of radical decolonization was well under way."[121] He explained that there were institutional reasons for this blindness, particularly the fact that the Christian interest in those lands was in missionary societies that could not be expected to see the need for revolutionary change as clearly as did the indigenous Christians in those nations. Yet Albrecht acknowledged that it was the influence of the non-European Christians on the WCC that pushed Europeans to understand the need for decolonization and the problems with revolutionary social change.[122]

[119] W. A. Visser 't Hooft, *Memoirs*, 309.
[120] Ibid., 317–18.
[121] P. Albrecht, "The Development of Ecumenical Social Thought and Action" in *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, ed. H. E. Fey (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press: 1970), 2:247.
[122] Ibid., 247–49.

The 1961 WCC assembly also saw the full integration of the WCC with the International Missionary Council. With a more global influence on the missionary council, there was a shift away from seeing missionaries as occidental Christians who went to impoverished "mission lands" in the global south; instead, the 1963 Conference on World Missions and Evangelism (CWME) in Mexico City covered the theme of the "mission on six continents." Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the mission department was influenced by trends like Liberation theology and development as a mission strategy, in a shift from traditional mission theology. After the 1961 New Delhi Assembly, the WCC started putting enormous resources into its development programs, and the CCSA in Algeria, which was the WCC's first large-scale development project in Africa, became the model for those that followed. It was the 1966 World Conference on Church and Society in Geneva, however, that fully addressed the role of Christians in global economic development. The report on the conference was much in line with the Vatican encyclical *Populorum progressio*, which was issued the following year. It acknowledged the responsibilities of the wealthier nations and suggested changes to global economic structures to better serve the economic development of poorer nations.[123]

Although they brought a much more democratic and global worldview to the Catholic Church, Vatican II and the changes that emerged from it were not without their own problems and limitations, just as the shift in the World Council of Churches away from Europe and North America did not necessarily mean a complete change in mentalities. Algeria, once again, became a testing ground for many of those questions, as Catholics and Protestants worked to understand what "development" really meant, and Christians pursued dialogue with one another and with the Muslims they lived among. Although doing so was never easy or smooth, those Christians who worked in Algeria after independence sought to put into practice the principles for which many of them had put their lives on the line during the war, only now they had support from higher up.

The Algerian War ended in an explosion of violence, and the dreams that Christians like Mgr Duval and Jean Scotto had nurtured throughout the war – that *pied-noir* Christians would come to understand and accept their moral and social responsibilities toward the Algerian community – did not exactly work out in the way that they had hoped. However, Algerian independence did allow the Christians who remained to rebuild the church from the ground up and try to heal the damage that Christianity's alliance

[123] Ibid., 252.

with colonialism had done in Algeria. The decolonization of Christianity in Algeria was a difficult process, especially because it was undertaken under the complex circumstances of a country recovering from one of the most brutal wars of the twentieth century. Throughout the decades after independence, the Christians who remained in Algeria attempted to transform the church into an institution that served the Algerian people, despite facing such challenges as the hostility of government officials, and the growth of conservative Islamist movements. Just as the Christians who sought dialogue and cooperation with Algerians during the Algerian War were a model for Christian movements globally, including the World Council of Churches and Vatican II reformers, the Christians who remained in Algeria after independence became a fascinating model for Christian-Muslim dialogue and for the possibilities of a Christian presence in politically challenging, non-Christian lands.

Conclusion

On the night of March 26, 1996, seven Trappist monks from the monastery Notre-Dame de l'Atlas in Tibhirine, a village high above the Mitidja valley of central Algeria, were kidnapped from the monastery by a faction of the GIA (Groupe islamique armé), a *takfiri* insurgent group responsible for a campaign of civilian massacres across Algeria.[1] In mid-April, the GIA issued a communiqué stating its "theological" reasons for kidnapping the monks and the conditions for their liberation, which included the release of several GIA prisoners. Although the French and Algerian governments had attempted by various means to recover the monks, the GIA announced in its May 21 communiqué that as the French government had refused to negotiate, the GIA had beheaded the monks.[2] Nine days later, Mgr Teissier, who had become the archbishop of Algiers after the retirement of Cardinal Duval in 1988, mounted the hill to Notre-Dame d'Afrique, overlooking the bay of Algiers, where he learned that the cardinal had just passed away. Later that morning, he received a call informing him that the bodies of the monks had been found.[3] However, it turned out that

[1] The GIA, which emerged in late 1992 with the union of two armed jihadi groups after the electoral victory of the Front islamique du salut, had a diffuse organization that shifted over time as its leadership changed. It had multiple factions, including a *djazarist* group, which sought mainly to overthrow the Algerian government, and Salafists, who primarily attacked civilians who did not follow their moral strictures. Responsible for the assassinations of high-profile Algerian journalists and artists such as Tahar Djaout and Cheb Hesni, as well as for the bombing of the Paris metro in 1995 and the violent massacres of thousands of Algerians, the GIA was the most successful terrorist organization in Algeria during the "dark decade." The GIA leader Djamel Zitouni (1994–1996) was known for his particular version of *takfir*, which justified the killing of apostates or anyone who opposed his authority. By 1996, however, the GIA had begun to splinter as its militants deserted en masse, alienated by the violence and civilian massacres.

[2] J. Kiser, *Passion pour l'Algérie*, trans. H. Quinson (Montrouge: Nouvelle Cité, 2006), 331.

[3] Ibid., 336.

only the heads of the monks had been discovered; their bodies have never been recovered, a situation that has added to the mystery surrounding their deaths.[4]

The death of the Tibhirine monks occurred in the midst of a civil war in Algeria. This war began in 1992 when the Algerian government cancelled the second round of legislative elections that had been held in late 1991 after the Front islamic du salut (FIS), a fundamentalist party with a strong Islamo-nationalist component, won a majority of the vote in the first round due to a high abstention rate.[5] The party's popularity came partly from its contestation of the FLN's corrupt and unpopular single-party political system and partly from its ability to engage the disenfranchised and impoverished young Algerian Arabaphone population who had lost faith in their once-socialist government and the nation's political class.[6] Fearing the power of the growing Islamist movement, the Algerian army took control of the government, setting off a war for control of the country that would turn hundreds of thousands of Algerian civilians and a handful of foreigners residing in the country into collateral damage. Just as in the Algerian War of Independence forty year earlier, maquis took to the hills or the winding streets of the casbahs and fought a dirty guerrilla war against the military and uncooperative civilian populations. The Christian community, like the civilians of the so-called triangle of death on the fertile plains just west of Algiers where Notre-Dame de l'Atlas stood, was caught in the middle of the conflict.

In a statement issued in October 1993, the GIA, one of the main armed Islamist movements, declared war on foreigners in Algeria, giving them an ultimatum to leave the country within a month.[7] During the course of the war, both the French and Algerian governments attempted to convince

[4] The real story of how the monks died remains a mystery. Although the GIA was blamed for their assassination, the fact that their bodies were never recovered, that their heads had been buried before they were recovered, and that a former intelligence officer came forward several years after the event to say that he had overheard a radio transmission from an Algerian army helicopter in which someone claimed to have accidentally shot the monks during an attack on the GIA, has put the original claim up for question. At this point, neither the French nor the Algerian government will release documents relating to their deaths.

[5] On the history of the Algerian civil war, see H. Roberts, *The Battlefield: Algeria* (London: Verso Books, 2003), and M. Evans and J. Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). Evans and Phillips stress the importance of examining the conflict in the *longue durée* and on the role that economic and political crises of the 1960s–1980s had on the growth of Islamist movements in Algeria.

[6] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*, ch. 5.

[7] Kiser, *Passion pour l'Algérie*, 207.

French citizens, and especially Christians, to leave Algerian territory, as they were direct targets of Islamist violence, including both assassinations and kidnappings. At Notre-Dame de l'Atlas, despite a number of frightening interactions with the GIA, including the brutal murders of several Croatian construction workers near the monastery, and a Christmas Eve intrusion by the local GIA emir in 1993, the monks collectively decided not to leave Algeria. Their decision had the support of numerous other Christians who remained, including Cardinal Duval and Mgr Teissier.

The Trappists had a long history in Algeria, as the first Trappist monks had arrived in 1843, soon after the French conquest. Notre-Dame de l'Atlas was founded in 1938 with six monks from the Aiguebelle monastery in France and six others from Slovenia. In 1947, the monastery received the status of abbey after the community had grown to twenty monks. After Algerian independence, the monastery faced a few decades of instability, and in 1984, the monks voted to once again become a simple priory; it became the only Trappist monastery in a non-Christian land. By the mid-1990s, there were nine permanent monks who lived off of the profits from their small garden, the honey they sold at the local market, and the hostel and retreat center they ran at the monastery.[8] Since 1984, they had been under the leadership of their elected prior, a young French Islamophile named Christian de Chergé.

All of the monks at Notre-Dame de l'Atlas had deep ties to Algeria. Christian de Chergé, for example, had spent two years of the Algerian War as an SAS officer working in a regrouped Kabyle village.[9] As a seminary student in Algeria, he had found himself assisting a parish priest who refused to read Mgr Duval's pastoral letters and believed that the end of *Algérie française* would spell both the end of Christian civilization and the victory of communism in North Africa.[10] The two oldest brothers – Frères Luc and Amédée – arrived at the monastery in 1946, and both stayed throughout the Algerian War. The monastery was located in a fairly hot zone during the war, close to the town of Médéa and to the mountains where rebels hid; regroupments were numerous, and the French army used napalm to subdue the countryside. Throughout the war, Frère Luc, a doctor, continued

[8] B. Chenu, ed., *Sept vies pour Dieu et l'Algérie* (Paris: Bayard Éditions/Centurion, 1996), 10.

[9] Kiser, *Passion pour l'Algérie*, 58. Christian de Chergé was in Algeria between January 1959 and January 1961. Kiser writes that because of his high ranking among the reserve officers of his cohort at the École de cavalerie de Saumur, he was able to choose to do his military service in the SAS.

[10] Ibid., 37–38.

to care for anyone who arrived at the monastery needing help, never asking questions – a practice that he continued until the day that he was taken from the monastery in 1996.[11] According to John Kiser, during the war for independence, the monastery and its crops were never attacked (a situation that many *pieds-noirs* apparently found suspicious – were they "progressivists"?), and many Algerian families found refuge from the military's bombs at the monastery, which was how the village of Tibhirine came to be formed.[12] The youngest brother, Frère Christophe, had spent his military service working with mentally disabled children in Marie-Thérèse Brau's programs in Hussein-Dey.

Yet the monastery had almost closed its doors after Algerian independence. In 1963, the head of the Trappist order decided, with the accord of nine of the ten monks of Notre-Dame de l'Atlas, to close the monastery. Mgr Duval, however, was profoundly opposed to the idea. The monastery was the only Catholic order in Algeria devoted to contemplation and prayer, which, he argued, the Muslim community greatly respected and the demoralized Christian community in Algeria greatly needed. After the sudden death of the abbé général and a personal visit from the new abbé, who came to the conclusion that it would be "better to close a monastery in France than to close Tibhirine," the monastery remained open. It became a symbol of the new mission of the Catholic Church in Algeria as a church of presence and of service to the people.[13] Mgr Duval called Tibhirine the "lungs" of the church in Algeria, giving much needed spiritual oxygen to those who were struggling to keep it alive in difficult circumstances after Algerian independence.

Tibhirine in many ways represents the ideal of the Christian presence in Algeria after independence. The monks there lived very humbly, and they served the community directly. Brother Luc continued to see up to fifty patients a day in the monastery clinic until the day he was kidnapped.[14] Although Christian de Chergé was viewed as a radical in his early days at Tibhirine, his theological and personal approach to Islam was that of a communal search for God. He, along with several other Christians in

[11] Ibid., 47–48, 233–35. Frère Luc had been at Tibhirine since 1946, along with Frère Amédée, a priest born in Algiers. Luc had also been kidnapped from Tibhirine by FLN rebels in 1959 but was later freed after one of rebels recognized him as the only doctor in the region and as someone who had helped all the Algerian villagers, including the rebel himself.

[12] Ibid., 48.

[13] Ibid., 50–52.

[14] Ibid., 235.

Algeria, including Claude Rault, the bishop of the Sahara region, formed a study group with interested Muslims called Ribât al-Salâm (the Ties of Peace) to engage in Christian-Muslim dialogue.[15] At a 1989 meeting organized in Rome for Christians who lived in Muslim lands, Chergé noted, however, that this dialogue "is rarely of a strictly theological order. Rather, we flee from this type of battle. I believe them to be very limited. A glass of water offered or received, a shared piece of bread, a helping hand, these say more than a theological manual of what is possible in living together."[16] It was this sense of community with the Algerian Muslims in Tibhirine that the monks did not want to desert; if they left, as the symbol of the Christian Church in Algeria, it would look as though Christianity had deserted Algeria in its time of need. The monks of Tibhirine were extremely sensitive to the responsibility on their shoulders. In addition, if they left, they knew that the military would take over the monastery and the villagers would then be swept into the violence of the war.

The monks of Tibhirine were not the first or the only Christian casualties of the civil war. In 1994, a Catholic priest and nun were killed in the library for Algerian students that they ran in the casbah of Algiers, and several White Fathers were assassinated in Tizi-Ouzou in Kabylia, all killings for which the GIA claimed credit.[17] In August 1996, Pierre Claverie, the bishop of Oran, was assassinated along with his young Muslim assistant by a bomb that had been planted at the door of the bishopric.[18] Yet it was these same Christians who had spent their days in Algeria struggling to bring the Christian and Muslim communities together; long after their demises – through their writings and their *témoignage* (testimony) – they argued that it was neither the Algerians nor Islam as a whole that should be blamed for their fate. They also seemed to understand better than many others the necessity for forgiveness and reconciliation. In December 1993, Christian de Chergé composed a letter to his brother that was to be opened only after the monk's death. In this letter, which has come to be known as Christian's Testament, he wrote:

[15] Ibid., 92. Christian de Chergé had studied Arabic and Islam at the PISAI (Pontifical Institute for the Study of Arabic and Islam) in Rome for two years before he settled permanently in Tibhirine in 1974.

[16] Ibid., 113.

[17] Ibid., 244–45, 262–63.

[18] R. Masson, *Jusqu'au bout de la nuit: L'Eglise d'Algérie* (Paris: Cerf/Saint-Augustin, 1998), 19–29. In total, nineteen members of the clergy and *religieuses* were victims of the violence of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s.

> If it should happen one day – and it could be today – that I become a victim of the terrorism which now seems ready to encompass all the foreigners in Algeria, I would like my community, my Church, my family, to remember that my life was *given* to God and to this country . . .
>
> I would like them to be able to associate this death with so many other equally violent ones allowed to fall into the indifference of anonymity. My life has no more value than any other. Nor any less value . . .
>
> I could not desire such a death. It seems to me important to state this. I don't see, in fact, how I could rejoice if the people I love were indiscriminately accused of my murder. It would be too high a price to pay for what will be called, perhaps, the "grace of martyrdom" to owe this to an Algerian, whoever he may be, especially if he says he is acting in fidelity to what he believes to be Islam.
>
> I know the contempt in which Algerians taken as a whole can be engulfed. I know, too, the caricatures of Islam which encourage a certain idealism. It is too easy to give oneself a good conscience in identifying this religious way with the fundamentalist ideology of its extremists. For me, Algeria and Islam is something different. It is a body and a soul. I have proclaimed it often enough, I think, in view of and in the knowledge of what I have received from it, finding there so often that true strand of the Gospel learned at my mother's knee, my very first Church, precisely in Algeria, and already respecting believing Muslims.[19]

Christian's Testament speaks eloquently of the type of Christianity that many Christians who remained in Algeria throughout the postindependence period were trying to create: one that was rooted in a sense of service to the community, and dialogue with and understanding of the people and their politics. It also entailed a shared commitment to the successes and dangers that politics might engender. For Chergé, it was not Islam that was at the root of the terrorism, nor was it indiscriminately all Algerians.

On June 2, 1996, under massive security, a funeral Mass was held at Notre-Dame d'Afrique in Algiers for Cardinal Duval and the seven monks. Two days later, seven caskets were transported back to Tibhirine for burial, accompanied by a small group of family and intimate friends – long negotiations with the Algerian government had allowed the monks to be buried at the monastery despite the security risks. When the cortège arrived at the monastery, the villagers of Tibhirine had dug the graves for their neighbors, even though the Algerian security forces would not allow them to

[19] C. de Chergé, "Testament of Dom Christian de Chergé, OCSO."

participate in the ceremony. For Christians who stayed in Algeria throughout the civil war – and for those who remain there to this day – Tibhirine stands as a reminder of the stakes of being a tiny visible minority in an overtly Muslim country. More importantly, though, it symbolizes the reasons why it is necessary to stay.

Religion, Secularism, and the Nation in France and Algeria

The story of the decolonization of Christianity in Algeria and its influence on the transformation of Christianity in the postcolonial world has profound implications for the status of religion in France and Algeria in the present moment. The historian James McDougall has shown that debates over the place of Islam in postcolonial Algeria – both in terms of individual practice and national identity – have primarily taken place in the realm of culture. But this does not mean that culture is divorced from politics. Rather, he argues, "In the Algerian case, as in other colonial and post-colonial contexts, we might say that culture has often been a central means of waging 'war,' in this broad sense of underlying socio-political struggle that sometimes eventuates in armed conflict, between competing groups and interests within society, and between society and the state."[20] In the 1970s, one major item on the agenda of the "cultural revolution" in Algeria was to "re-Islamise" the state in an attempt to solidify the social and economic goals of the Boumediène regime and to define a more unified and "authentic" national identity.[21] In consolidating both the regime and Algerian national identity under an Arabized, Islamized FLN, groups that did not fit these categories – and thus were seen as threats to national unity – were marginalized from public life. These groups included dissident political movements and Christians.

Threats to cultural authenticity were particularly linked to "foreign" elements, especially those with ties to the French colonial period. This put Christians of European origin in the spotlight. And although there is not a teleological line from the discourses of the 1970s to the violence of the 1990s, McDougall argues that the identity-laden language of national authenticity that the cultural revolution of the 1970s produced set the exclusionary terms

[20] J. McDougall, "Culture as War by Other Means: Community, Conflict, and Cultural Revolution, 1967–1981," in *Algeria Revisited: Contested Identities in the Colonial and Postcolonial Periods*, ed. R. Aissaoui and C. Eldridge (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming).

[21] Ibid.

with which various groups in the 1990s justified their claims to power and use of violence.[22] Decades later, these debates still linger, as tensions ebb and flow around the reemergence of radical Salafist clerics or the arrest and imprisonment of Muslims who convert to Christianity and those who incite them to convert.[23] Even though many Christians in Algeria are concerned about the unsettled atmosphere, those who have remained through the violence of two wars simply carry on as usual, while the younger generations find new venues for dialogue and service. Indeed, in an environment that mimics that of the immediate postindependence period, the Christians who remain in Algeria argue that the greatest threats against Christianity in Algeria tend to emerge less from Algerian Muslims than from Christians themselves. They particularly single out foreign evangelicals, who arrive in Algeria with no knowledge of the history of the country or of its Christian community and its efforts to maintain the presence of the church amid complex political and social tensions. When these foreign evangelicals openly proselytize or hang crosses on buildings in Kabylia, they wittingly or unwittingly echo the troubled history of colonial Christianity in Algeria, and place an entire community at risk of expulsion or worse.[24]

Meanwhile in France, a growing conflict has emerged in the past few decades between France's particular brand of secularism – or *laïcité* – and France's Muslim population. French officials and the French public more generally perceive what they see as the increasingly intrusive and disruptive presence of Islam in public spaces as a fundamental challenge to *laïcité*, one of the core values of the French Republic.[25] That this perceived challenge to French national identity and republican values has been

[22] Ibid.

[23] In 2006, the Algerian government passed a law proposing a prison sentence for anyone attempting to convert Muslims to another religion and calling for sanctions against those fabricating, holding, or distributing documents that would cause Muslims to question their religion. See A. Akef, "Condamnation de deux Algériens convertis au christianisme," *Le Monde*, July 3, 2008.

[24] When I worked in Algeria in 2009, an American Methodist pastor, who had been leading the Protestant church in Algeria for well over twenty years, had recently been expelled from the country. Several people I spoke to noted that his expulsion was due to the presence and activities of foreign evangelicals in Kabylia who incited the 2008 law against proselytism and endangered the rest of the Christian community. Additionally, multiple English-language missionary websites deplore the 2008 law against proselytism and often include messages that exhort Christians to pray for Algerians to "open their hearts to Jesus," without any indication of the history or context of religious affairs in Algeria.

[25] In the wake of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and the attack on the Jewish supermarket in January 2015, the French government has declared December 9 a new Day of Laïcité.

accompanied by waves of North African, particularly Algerian, immigrants, is self-evident. Rather, scholars such as Joan Scott and Mayanthi Fernando have traced the genealogy of *laïcité* as a contemporary ideology in France that has, since the decolonization of Algeria in 1962, become a means through which the French state exerts control over Muslim – and particularly North African – bodies.[26] In the 1970s, with changes in the immigration policies of both France and Algeria, North Africans began to settle permanently in France, and the state had to seriously contemplate the incorporation of Islam into the religious life of the metropole for the first time.[27] Both Mayanthi Fernando and Naomi Davidson have demonstrated that with the increasing presence of North Africans in France since the 1960s, the categories of religion and culture have collapsed there, much as they have in Algeria.

Indeed, within France there now seems to be little public acknowledgment of the Christian roots of *laïcité* or of the contradictory and hypocritical application of its policies. For example, despite the supposedly secular nature of government and education, the public school calendar is structured around Christian holidays, and although school canteens serve meals that cater to Christian diets, they are prohibited from serving halal food. Moreover, a 2004 law that bans the display of religious symbols in public spaces (often called the "headscarf law") primarily targets those young Muslim women who wear headscarves in high school, rather than their Christian or Jewish peers who also wear symbols of their faith.

French Muslims, as Fernando points out, are embedded in a complex system of discourses and practices – both colonial and postcolonial – that have constructed Muslims as the Other. Their alterity is signified, for instance, by their outward performance of religiosity, which stands in contrast to French republican secular ideology that relegates religion to the private sphere. Thus, young women who wear headscarves or young men who pray in the street outside the mosque are interpreted as directly challenging the norms of the French nation, placing their "Muslimness" front and center in the public sphere. In response, the French state attempts to discipline Islam, especially aspects that emphasize difference, and to mold it into a religion that fits within the boundaries of the secular republic.[28] Under the guise of *laïcité*, then, "French" (i.e., Christian) values are once again placed

[26] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*.
[27] Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 169–78.
[28] Fernando, *The Republic Unsettled*, ch. 2.

in opposition to those of Muslims, even if these Muslims are legally French and imagine themselves culturally as citizens of the French Republic.[29]

As Talal Asad has argued, "There cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes."[30] The analysis I present in this book proves exactly this point. It illustrates the ways in which ideologies and practices of religion change over time, and how they are dependent on their historical context. In addition, I demonstrate that the line between religion and secularism is always fluid. In both France and Algeria, the state and individuals mobilized religious belief and practices in multiple ways to justify a variety of moral and political positions. Whereas Mgr Duval and General Massu debated the finer points of Pope Pius XII's theological views on torture to justify their respective moral and political positions, Catholics and Protestants in both France and Algeria found justification for their own political engagements in both theology and the historical practices of their churches. In fact, theology itself constantly adapts to the changing circumstances of the world around it, which is something that the "progressivist" Christians argued all along (and arguably what they were condemned for thinking). It shapes the beliefs and practices of individuals as well as their political beliefs and engagements; conversely, individuals and movements at the grassroots level can transform religious practice and theology on both a local and global scale.

These observations have important repercussions for the present. Although some might claim that Christianity and Islam, or *laïcité* and Islam, are intrinsically engaged in a "clash of civilizations," this book demonstrates that this is not the case. There is no monolithic version of Christianity, just as there is no monolithic Islam or secularism in this story. These religious categories and political ideologies are constructed and evolve in response to their historical circumstances. Government officials in France might claim that *laïcité* is an inherent value of the French Republic, and that outward displays of religious belief and practice challenge these values and the structures of the republic. They then might use this argument as justification to reshape Islamic practices in France into "acceptable" republican forms. Yet, as this book demonstrates in the case of Algeria, the French state has never been all that secular. Christianity – as an ideology – was a

[29] Ibid., 49–62.
[30] Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, 29.

cornerstone of the colonial regime, and mere decades ago was used by French government and military leaders, and by European settlers on both sides of the conflict, to justify their actions in Algeria, some of which included horrific violence against their co-religionists. Additionally, the ways in which religion has been deployed in multiple forms in colonial and postcolonial Algeria to unify and solidify national identity illustrate the necessity to analyze the links between religion, politics, and culture, rather than see them as separate categories. Religion is not absolute. While Christianity in Algeria was long used as a means to justify the colonial regime, various forms of settler privilege, and even the use of torture and extreme violence, it also became one important tool through which those practices could be challenged. As this book has illustrated, it was the individual believers who made the difference; in some cases, their choices had a global impact.

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